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 2 
I. Introduction 
 
 When the author of this study travelled for the first time to Iran, in 1999, he was 
surprised to be confronted with so many drug dealers and drug addicts, more or less openly 
selling and consuming drugs in the street. It was not long after he learnt that the Islamic 
Republic has one of the world’s highest addiction rates to drugs, particularly opiates. Not long 
ago, Switzerland had introduced a major drug policy change by introducing the controlled 
distribution of heroin to long-time intravenous drug users. This provoked a heated discussion 
in the Swiss media and society at large, eventually leading to a broad-based acceptance of 
such harm reduction measures in the country. As a result, the author of this study started to 
develop a keen interest in similar discussions about local drug addiction and the best ways to 
confront it in Iran. This promised to be an interesting entry point to this research as drugs are 
not only prohibited by law, but also proscribed by religion, which is deeply ingrained in the 
Islamic Republic. 
 
 When the author visited Iran in 1999, the country had experienced acute internal 
tensions since the revolution of 1979. While the author was travelling through the country, 
huge student demonstrations took place in Tehrān against the conservative ruling elite. This 
was a manifestation of a broader conflict between a new generation of reformist politicians 
and the conservative elite that is in control of almost all centers of powers in Iran. This 
factional line of division runs through the whole political landscape, and arguably society as a 
whole. Spearheading the reformists at the time was Moḥammad Ḫātamī, who had just been 
elected president of the country in May 1997. The reformists were, thus, in control of the 
executive, whose power is in many ways limited in Iran. The real power in Iran lies with the 
Supreme Leader ‘Alī Ḫāmenehʼī and the conservatives allied with him. This conflict between 
a conservative and a reformist faction actually dates back to the beginning of the Islamic 
Republic; but it increasingly escalated from the mid 1990s. 
 
Political & cultural background 
 The struggle between the two factions was, arguably, first and foremost about power 
and influence. But it became manifest in a fundamental ideological difference, namely 
concerning the conception of political and religious authority and the approach towards 
governance. Such a basic tension is already contained in the constitution of the Islamic 
Republic and even in its name, as it contains both, elements of a “theocratic” or clerical 
political order, and of a republican or democratic order. This contradiction was the result of a 
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political compromise in the beginning of the Islamic Republic but it continued to characterize 
Iran ever since. Tensions between the representatives of the two ideological strands appeared 
in the forefront in the matters of everyday politics.  
 
Since the end of the long war against Iraq, political, social and economic challenges of 
the country were plenty. The early decision-makers of the Islamic Republic had come forward 
with the ideological claim to thoroughly reform the Iranian society, eliminating all previous 
problems. This resulted in much success, especially in the fields of education and health care. 
Due to the war, many previous problems, however, persisted. At the beginning of the 1990s, 
the political elite increasingly admitted that it had failed to solve poverty, unemployment, 
rural development, urbanization, and last but not least drug addiction. They, consequently, 
started to address these problems seriously, but it remained divided along the old ideological 
fracture line. As a result, in the field of drug policy, however, the government gradually made 
a volte-face from the previously repressive drug policy to an increasingly liberal drug policy, 
including some of the most progressive harm reduction measures in the region. 
 
 Such economic and social reforms had already started during the administration of the 
moderate and pragmatic president Akbar Rafsanǧānī. But it only took a truly progressive turn 
under the reformist administration of Ḫātamī, in many political, social and cultural fields. The 
reformists adopted an entirely new political program, propagating concepts like rule of law, 
democracy, civil society, and particularly press freedom. Thus, they decidedly departed from 
the almost two decades of political, economic, social and cultural authoritarianism and 
rigidity. With their explicit encouragement, new political groups formed; cultural production 
grew exponentially; non-governmental organizations developed; student organizations 
demonstrated; and women, long being considered second-class citizens, became increasingly 
active and vocal in the public sphere. Arguably the most crucial change in this regard, took 
place in the media landscape, particularly in the press. From 1998, a large number of 
outspoken and critical reformist newspapers appeared that were crucial for the promotion of 
the reformist agenda.  
 
 However, it must be noted that the conservatives vehemently opposed this new 
political development. They saw their hold on power threatened by such new, participatory 
concepts, and strongly disagreed with the new cultural freedoms, ostensibly fearing a dilution 
of the Islamic character of the Republic. As a result, they started to attack the reformists, and 
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with them large sections of the civil society, which was taking profit from the new 
opportunities by actively participating in the political, social and cultural live. This power 
struggle, arguably, was primarily taking place within and over the press. In the absence of 
legal political parties in Iran at the time, the newspapers became surrogates or at least 
mouthpieces for the political factions, in particular for the reformists. The conservatives, who 
were in control of all influential centers of power in Iran, had other means to fight back 
against the reformists and their newspapers; especially through the security forces and the 
courts. By 2000, they largely succeeded in banning almost all critical reformist newspapers. 
The reformists would continue to control the administration until 2005, and the factional 
conflict persists to this day.  
 
Aim and scope of the study 
 While concomitantly serving as organs for the political factions, Iranian newspapers 
have a more general function when reporting on general political, economic, social and 
cultural issues. They were naturally expected to report about drug-related issues. Since such 
“social problems” are often still a taboo in Iran, the author initially was not certain if the press 
covers this topic at all. A first research stay in Iran in the year 2006, however, soon proved 
that the Iranian press reports in detail about the local situation of drug consumption, drug 
addiction, drug trafficking and drug policy, including ever more progressive addiction therapy 
and harm reduction measures, as well as drug prevention. 
 
 The present study, therefore, aims at analyzing Iranian press discourse on drugs. The 
press was chosen as a research subject because it is arguably the freest public forum in Iran, 
much more than the strictly controlled television and radio. It also reflects the broadest range 
of publicly expressed opinions in Iran. Given its crucial role as a venue for factional disputes, 
the press could be expected to mirror sharp factional differences on t important sociopolitical 
topic of drugs. The present study is interested in how the Iranian press writes about drugs, 
drug addiction and drug policy in Iran: which drugs they report to be prevalent; how they 
judge drug addiction; which drug policy measures they discuss; and how they conceive their 
own role in informing about such topics. The study will analyze the range of the main topics 
and arguments, diverging opinions, changes and developments, and further peculiarities 
concerning the format, style, sources and language of this discourse. Since content analyses of 
Iranian newspapers are generally scant, such an analysis proves to be of critical importance. 
The study further aims at analyzing the interplay of different factors that influence the Iranian 
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press discourse on drugs. Naturally such factors are the official drug policy and the press 
policy; but also international drug policy discourse, religious discourse and scientific 
discourse. 
 
In order to fully grasp the importance of the shifts taking place in Iranian drug policy, 
and consequently in the press discourse on drugs, the analysis examines the drug related press 
coverage during a sample period comprising the years before and after the election of Ḫātamī. 
This period encompasses six years (1995-2000), but the analysis will only consider every 
alternate year, specifically the years 1374 (1995-96), 1376 (1997-98) and 1378 (1999-2000). 
 
Methodological basis 
Methodologically and theoretically, the analysis is based primarily on Foucault’s 
discourse analysis, but complemented with Fairclough’s and Jäger’s critical discourse 
analysis and the grounded theory. While maintaining that discourses are characterized by a 
large homogeneity, discourse analyses is nevertheless also interested in the power play 
between differing individual positions that try to influence and thus change the overall 
discourse. Discourse analysis is both interested in such homogeneous and heterogeneous 
factors, since both exert power on and thus influence the discourse. The analysis will thus 
concentrate both on regular, homogeneous and irregular, heterogeneous patterns within 
Iranian press discourse on drugs. Since the analysis encompasses the diachronic development 
of Iranian press discourse over the course of three consecutive years, it pays special attention 
to the establishment of homogenous discourse orders, as portrayed in Foucault’s 
“Archaeology of Knowledge”. Against this background, discourse analysis is, thus, 
considered a particularly apt methodology for the present analysis. In a final interpretative 
observation, the study aims at reflecting more generally on the role of the press in Iran.  
 
The structure of the study 
 The present study is organized into five main chapters. The first two introductory 
chapters cover the history of drugs and drug policy in Iran (chapter II), as well as the history 
of the press and press policy during the Islamic Republic (chapter III). This is followed by a 
methodological chapter comprising of a description of the aim and scope, the sources 
(newspapers), and the methodology of the analysis (chapter IV). A descriptive analysis of the 
Iranian press discourse on drugs is next undertaken, which includes the structuring of 
discourse events; the chronological order and development of the main topics and arguments; 
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and the typical linguistic imagery (chapter V). The last chapter, finally, consists of a synthesis 
and interpretation of the previous chapter, which particularly examines the various factors that 
influence and alter the Iranian press discourse on drugs.  
 
 The first chapter [chapter II] provides a summary of the long history of drug 
consumption in Iran, concentrating on shifting social and political patterns in regards to drug 
addiction and related problems. It concomitantly gives a survey on the most important 
literature in European languages and in Farsi. The chapter follows the sequence of 
consecutive political time periods, by paying particular attention to changes in drug 
consumption and drug policy patterns. This history presents itself as a prime example of a 
trial-and-error approach towards drug policy, in which liberal and repressive drug policies 
alternate. Of particular interest is the observation that emerges as to how the Islamic Republic 
has repeated many mistakes of previous governments. 
 The second chapter [chapter III] gives a survey on the development of the press 
during the Islamic Republic. The history of the press in Iran is, arguably, even more strongly 
characterized by successive periods of press freedom and periods of strict press control. While 
the first period of press freedom during the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1911 had a 
lasting impact on the development of the Iranian press, two further such periods have taken 
place since 1979 alone. This chapter concentrates on the last “press spring” in Iran between 
1997 and 2001, and its interrelation with the concomitant political reform process and the 
factional power struggle; as well as on the legal framework. 
 The third chapter [chapter IV] lays out the aim and scope of the analysis. It continues 
to describe the newspapers represented in the discourse, including their political affiliation, 
and gives a first overview on the quantitative distribution of drug related articles over the 
course of the sample period. It finally lays out the contours of the combined methodologies of 
(critical) discourse analysis and grounded theory, which form the basis of the present analysis. 
 The fourth chapter [chapter V] first provides an analysis of so-called discourse events. 
These events are triggered by the publication of newspaper articles, which, as a result, often 
appear in clusters around specific dates and events. They consequently provide Iranian press 
discourse with a first structure. The chapter proceeds to give a chronological account of the 
development of the most important topics and arguments of the Iranian press discourse on 
drugs. It thus reproduces the impression, an average reader of Iranian newspapers might have 
experienced in Iran. Eventually, it analyzes typical features of the language and linguistic 
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imagery of the discourse. This often contradicts the explicit arguments that are made, 
therefore revealing the persistence of the more unconscious perceptions of the Iranian society. 
 The fifth chapter [chapter VI] synthetizes and interprets the analytical description of 
the previous chapter. It pays particular attention to the various extrinsic and intrinsic 
influences that shape and influence Iranian press discourse. It will show that these forces have 
various homogenizing and heterogenizing effects on the discourse, which as a result is 
constantly being renegotiated. Such power is especially exerted by the official Iranian drug 
policy and to a lesser degree by Iranian press policy but also by further factors such as the 
international or the medical drug discourse levels. The chapter argues that Iranian press 
develops its own, intrinsic dynamic, which produces its own homogeneities and, as will be 
argued, especially heterogeneities. The chapter concludes with some general considerations 
on the changing role and function of the press during the sample period. It argues, that despite 
being organs for the competing political factions, Iranian newspapers increasingly adopted 
professional journalistic ethics and have slowly developed into an entity independent from the 
state, a fourth estate so to speak. 
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II. A Short History of Opium in Iran 
 
Archaeological findings at different sites in Central Europe demonstrate that humanity 
had become conscious of the nutritious and healing power of the opium poppy (papaver 
somniferum) already in the 4th millennium BC.1 Sumerian and Assyrian clay tablets from the 
3rd millennium BC provide the first written evidence for the cultivation of this important plant. 
Opium is referred to as “the red brown drug” or more figuratively the “joy plant” (hul gil).2 
The familiarity with the amenities of the poppy plant spread to the ancient world around the 
Mediterranean. Egyptian papyri from the 2nd millennium BC list a variety of ailments against 
which opium-containing drugs were prescribed, even if the raw material might have been 
imported from Crete3, where a statue of the so-called “poppy goddess” suggests a cultic use of 
opium around the 13th century BC.4 Not long after, the Greek world becomes the most 
important centre for opium production in antiquity.5 
 
Opium in the Hellenic World 
 Already Homer (9th – 8th cent. BC) in his Iliad mentions poppy (mekon) and the “pain reliever” 
(nepenthes) from Egypt.6 Opium appears increasingly in a medical context. Hippocrates (5th cent. BC) for 
instance describes it as a cathartic, astringent and narcotic drug; 7 Theophrastus (371/70-287/86) lists 
different poppy categories in his historia plantarum; 8  and Pedanios Dioscorides (1st century BC) 
differentiates between opion, the proper opium “juice”9 and mekones, the sap of the entire crushed plant.10 
The poppy was also an attribute of several Greek gods, among them namely Demeter, the goddess of 
agriculture; as such opium seems to have been as well part of the Eleusinian Mysteries. Demeter is said to 
have consumed poppy juice to forget about the loss of her daughter Persephone in the city of Sicyon, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  E.g. in today’s France (Provence), Italy (Milano) and Switzerland (Robenhausen): Seefelder (1996), 9f.; 
Booth (1996), 15. 
2  Neligan (1927), 1f.; Kritikos & Papadaki I (1976). Brownstein (1993), 5391; Scarborough (1995), 17; 
the exact meaning of hul gil is contested among assyriologists: Seefelder (1996), 12, 25f.; opium was 2  N ligan (1927), 1f.; Kritikos & Papadaki I (1976). Br wnstein (1993), 5391; Scarborough (1995), 17; 
the exact meaning of hul gil is contested among assyriologists: Seefelder (1996), 12, 25f.; opium was 
already collected by the incision of poppy pods: Booth (1996), 15f. 
3  Neligan, Kritikos & Papadaki and Seefelder question the cultivation of poppy in Egpyt before Hellenistic 
time: Neligan (1927), 2; Kritikos & Papadaki I (1976); Scarborough (1995), 4.; Seefelder (1996), 12f., 
16, 19, 26ff.; MATTHEE assumes that “real opium” was found in a Pharaonic tomb (1500 BC): Matthee 
(2005), 97. 
4  Researchers disagree whether the depictions are to be interpreted as opium pods or pomegranates: Kritikos 
& Papadaki II (1976); Askitopoulou & al. (2002). 
5  The earliest coins depicting poppy pods were found in the 7th cent. BC in Lydia: Seefelder (1996), 15, 31. 
6  Nephentes most probably refers to opium: Brownstein (1993), 5391; Scarborough (1995), 4; Seefelder 
(1996), 17, 19, 28f.; Booth (1996), 18f.; Matthee (2005), 97. 
7  According to Neligan Hippocrates called it “poppy juice” (opos mekonos): Neligan (1927), 3; Seefelder 
(1996), 29; Booth (1996), 18. 
8  Kritikos & Papadaki I (1976); Scarborouogh (1995), 5; Seefelder (1996), 30; Booth (1996), 16; 
9  Opion is a diminutive of opos „(vegetable) juice“: Neligan (1927), 3; Dubler (Afyūn – EI); Seefelder 
(1996), 9; Booth (1996), xi; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr). 
10  Neligan (1927), 4; Kritikos & Papadaki I (1976). 
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which was also known as Mekone, the “city of poppies”.11 Consequently, the depiction of poppy pods on 
statues or vessels came to symbolize fertility and wealth, healing and therapy, sleep and death or ecstacy 
and euphoria.12 
 
 Closely related to death – or the fear of death respectively – are the popular theriaka. Recipes for 
these antidotes are handed down from Nicander of Colophon (3rd – 2nd cent. BC).13 In Roman times, the 
theriaka of Galen (129-216 AD) were famous as it contained opium as a main active agent and were 
prescribed as miracle cure.14  Galen, however, only had developed earlier recipes of alexipharmic, which 
were variedly known as mithridatum15, philonium16 or galene17. The Romans seem to have consumed 
these cure-alls in great quantity and not exclusively for medical purposes. The Roman physicians Galen 
and Pedanios Dioscorides (1st cent. AD) 18, notably still of Greek origin, were accordingly already aware 
of opium’s addictive capacity and the notion of tolerance.19  
 
The influence of Greek and Roman medical use of opium on locally and timely neighbouring 
cultures is particularly visible in the terminology of poppy and opium. Greek mekon turned into mak in 
different Slavic languages or Mohn in German,20 while opion21 became opium in various European 
languages, but also afyūn (or rarely apyūn) in Arabic and Persian,22 ahiphena or aphuka in Sanskrit and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Demeter – as well as Hypnos and his twin brother Thanatos – are often depicted with bundles of poppy – as 
are their Roman equivalents: Seefelder (1996), 14f., 18, 35, 40; Booth (1996), 17, 20; Askitopulou & al. 
(2002), 28f.; for the use of opium in initiation rites of the Eleusinian Mysteries: Kritikos & Papadaki I 
(1976) & Kritikos & Papadaki II (1976). 
12  Kritikos & Papadaki I (1976). 
13  The early theriacs did, however, not contain opium yet: Scarborough (1995), 5, 11; SEEFELDER refutes the 
etymology of theriak as a derivation of “viper” (therion): Seefelder (1996), 31; ĀḎARAḪŠ assumes a 
derivation from the the city of Tyros: Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 345. 
14  Galen advised opium containing drugs as a panacea against vertigo, epilepsy, poor sight, asthma, bronchitis, 
leprosy, coughs, colics, fever or melancholy: Neligan (1927), 4; Scarborough (1995), 17f.; Seefelder 
(1996), 41f.; Booth (1996), 19. 
15  Named after Mithridates VI of Pontos (120/63 BC), who reportedly took so much of this antidote that he 
eventually became immune to poison: Neligan (1927), 3; Scarborough (1995), 17; Seefelder (1996), 32f., 
37; Booth (1996), 19. 
16  Named after the pharmacologist Philo of Tarsus (1st cent. AD): Seefelder (1987), 31f. 
17  A term, which was adapted to the antidote by Andromachos the Elder (1st cent. AD), Nero’s personal 
physician, from an expression meaning “calmness of the sea” or “stillness”: Neligan (1927), 3; 
Scarborough (1995), 17; Seefelder (1996), 40ff.; Ambühl (Galene – New Pauly); Eder (Tranquilitas – 
New Pauly). 
18  Dioscorides wrote extensively on the different applications of opium, e.g. as lozenges, powder, decoctions 
or syrups, which were prescribed against almost all ailments: Neligan (1927), 4; Scarborough (1995), 5ff., 
15ff.; Seefelder (1996), 37f.; Booth (1996), 17. 
19  Scarborough and Seefelder both accentuate, that the modern differentiation between a medical and a 
recreational drug use, doesn’t make sense for these early times: Scarborough, (1995), 10f., 18; Seefelder 
(1996), 40; Booth (1996), 19. 
20  A southern German variant was magen (still visible in Magenbrot, a type of cookie): Seefelder (1996), 18; 
assuming a reverse etymology from Germanic mago: Kritikos & Papadaki I (1976) & Kritikos & 
Papadaki II (1976). 
21  Neligan (1927), 3; Dubler (Afyūn – EI); Seefelder (1996), 9; Booth (1996), xi; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr). 
22  Neligan (1927), 5f.; Kritikos & Papadaki I (1976); tracing it back to the city Afyon, which at the time 
was however known as Akroinon and only later obtained the name Afyon: Seefelder (1996), 18f.; Matthee 
(2005), 97; Dubler (Afyūn – EI); Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr). 
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(y)apian or afurong in Chinese.23 In Ottoman Turkey and in Persia, opium containing theriak had become 
tiryāq or taryāk, a term that soon was used for opium itself.24 In modern times, many of the fifty alkaloids 
of opium obtained their name in allusion to the Greek-Roman culture, namely morphine, codeine or 
papaverine.25 
 
The exact date of an Iranian acquaintance with opium is unknown. The only pre-
Islamic evidence for the use of opium in Persia dates from the Sassanid period, when the 
Zoroastrian book of Ardā Vīrāz (ardā-vīrāz-nāmag) refers to opium as afyūn or apyūn. This 
term clearly indicates a Greek influence.26 Yet, in view of the scarcity of ancient Iranian 
literature and given the use of opium in ancient Mesopotamia, an Elamite acquaintance with 
the drug cannot be excluded altogether.27 In Achaemenid time, Darius the Great could have 
come across opium during his campaigns to Egypt or Asia Minor.28 Early Iranians were aware 
of the remedial properties of herbal drugs as revealed by the cultic use of haoma and other 
drugs in the Avesta.29 During Alexander the Great’s conquest, or the subsequent Seleucid rule 
at the latest, medical applications of opium can be expected to have been introduced to Iranian 
territory as well.30 
 
More crucial for the proliferation of medical knowledge on opium was perhaps the 
Sassanid era. Greek physicians might have performed for a long time in the Persian Empire. 
After the Christianization of the Roman Empire, many pagan physicians and scholars were 
forced to flee the new austerity, certainly carrying with them Galen’s and Dioscorides’ opium 
recipes. Many found a safe haven in Nisibis or Gondēšāpūr, contributing to the reputation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23  For the Sanskrit terms found in Ayurvedic medical texts: Neligan (1927), 5; Dwarakanath (1965); for the 
Chinese terms: Neligan (1927), 6; Dikötter (2004), 78. 
24  To this day opium continues to be called teryāk in Iran: Neligan (1927), 3f.; Matthee (2005), 97f.; Dubler 
(Afyūn – EI); Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr). 
25  Morphine from Morpheus, god of sleep; codeine from kodeia, the “poppy pod”; thebaine from the Egyptian 
Thebes (thebai), a region famous for its opium; and papaverin from Latin papaver, to which the English 
poppy or the French pavot can be traced: Seefelder (1996), 19f., 32; Booth (1996), 16. 
26  Erroneously ascribed to the Parthian epoch: Neligan (1927), 7; the Ardā Vīrāz (6th cent. AD) specifically 
mentions “opium oil” (mishgâ-i apîyûn), which is mentioned together with poison: Haug & West (1872), 
117; Parvin & Sommer (1987), 247; Kūhī-Kermānī (1945/46), 136; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 42; 
Matthee (2005), 97; Gignoux (Ardā-Wīrāz – EIr). 
27  Neligan (1927), 2; Malek-Moḥammadī considers the Elamites mainly because they were non-Aryan: 
Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 39. 
28  Malek-Mohammadī (2005/06), 41. 
29  The identification of haoma (Sanskrit soma) is disputed; often it is assumed to be the stimulant plant 
ephedra: Falk (1989); Taillieu (Haoma I – EIr); Boyce (Haoma II – EIr); Seefelder (1996), 51; many 
denotations of drugs from the middle ages can be traced back to a Persian origin: Sajjādī (Drugs – EIr). 
30  Neligan (1927), 7; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr); related to the introduction of opium into India during 
Alexander the Great’s reign: Kritikos & Papadaki II (1976); Scarsborough (1995), 4, Matthee (2005), 
97; Seefelder disagrees: Seefelder (1996), 19, 51. 
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famous medical colleges there. 31  Others continued to teach at the medical school of 
Alexandria, which the Sassanids controlled for a short time before the Arab conquest.32 Not 
long after, Islamic sources depict the Persian shahs as always keeping the popular theriacs 
with them.33 In all likelihood, opium thus was introduced to Iran before the Arab conquest in 
the 7th century AD.  
 
II. 1. Opium in Islamic Persia 
 
 The Arab conquests, and especially their scientific developments, were crucial for the 
proliferation of the knowledge about opium and its use in the Islamic world. Whether the 
Arabs were already trading opium in the Indian Ocean before Islamic times remains 
speculative.34 Later, they certainly traded opium with countries as far as India and China 
including Iran.35 
 The medical prescription of opium had already been present in the regions, which after 
632 AD (10 HQ) successively came under Arab dominance. This is especially true for Egypt, 
but in all likelihood as well for Iran.36 The physicians of the Umayyad caliphs, most of them 
of Syriac or Greek origin, certainly knew the works of the old Greek masters and might have 
prescribed opium-containing medicine in their own communities and at the court.37  
Not long after the Abbasid takeover, an intense period of translations from the Greek 
medical canon took place, often through the intermediary of Syriac works. Information on 
various illnesses and their cures, among them especially the theriaka, thus became accessible 
in Arabic as well. The two outstanding early physicians and translators Yuḥannā Ibn 
Māsawaih (d. 857 AD) and Ḥunain ibn Isḥāq (808-873) both mention the poppy plant and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31  Seefelder (1996), 49f.; Sajjādī (Drugs – EIr); Russell (Greece: Greek Medicine in Persia – EIr); the 
Greek name apyūn/afyūn in the Ardā-Vīrāz might date from Sassanid or even from Seleucid time: Neligan 
(1927), 7; other authors consider Gondēšāpūr in the 6th century AD generally an “outpost of Hellenism”: 
Savage-Smith & al. (Ṭibb – EI); 
32  Russell (Greece: Greek Medicine in Persia – EIr) 
33 Ccorroborated by the Arab physician ‘Alī al-Ṭabarī: Seefelder (1996), 50f. 
34  A pre-Islamic Arab opium trade to India is assumed by: Neligan (1927), 5; Kūhī-Kermānī (1945/46), 103, 
136f.; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 42. 
35  Kūhī-Kermānī (1945/46), 136f.; Brownstein (1993), 5391; Seefelder (1996), 23; Booth (1996), 21f.; 
Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 42f. 
36  The medical knowledge about opium certainly was still prevalent in Alexandria and arguably in 
Gondēšāpūr; poppies might still have been grown in Upper Egypt, later again an important region for 
opium production: Seefelder (1996), 50, 52f.; Dubler (Afyūn – EI); Sajjādī (Drugs – EIr). 
37  Few information are available on the situation of medicine under the Umayyads: Savage-Smith & al. (Ṭibb 
– EI); Sajjādī (Drugs – EIr). 
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medical uses of opium and theriacs,38 as does the equally renowned ‘Alī al-Ṭabarī (d. 864), 
who was of Persian origin.39  
Of the later Muslim physicians and polymaths, who all built their works on these early 
translations, two scholars of Persian descent are worth mentioning: al-Rāzī (Rhazes) and Ibn 
Sīnā (Avicenna). In his pharmacological encyclopaedia the influential physician Abū Bakr 
Muḥammad al-Rāzī (854-924 or 935) mentions wild and cultivated forms of opium poppy 
and describes various prescriptions of theriacs against a plethora of ailments.40 Arguably, the 
only person to overshadow his reputation is Ibn Sīnā (980-1037), considered to be the most 
famous Muslim polymath. He wrote in detail about the beneficial effects of the “great theriac” 
(al-tiryāq al-fārūqī) as he calls the opium-containing antidotes and reported a widespread 
opium use in Ḫorāsān and Transoxania. Taken along with al-Rāzī’s comment on poppy 
cultivation, a local opium production in Iran can therefore not be excluded. Both physicians 
also warn of an excessive use of opium because of its addictive and lethal potential. This did 
not prevent Ibn Sīnā of dying from an opium overdose himself according to Arab sources.41 
At the same time, the equally versed polymath al-Bīrūnī (973-1048) mentions kūknār, a 
proper Persian name for “poppy”, and reports that opium was widely consumed in the hot 
climate of Mecca.42 These outstanding scholars were all working at the courts of the new 
semi-independent Iranian principalities of the Sāmānids, Būyīds or Ġaznavīds.43  
 
Opium in Persian poetry 
“The poison of separation has killed you, ‘Aṭṭār 
it is time to talk about [taking] taryāk“44 
 
From the outset, Persian epic and lyric literature, which was crucial for the development of a 
distinctive Persian collective identity, refers to opium and theriaka in their manifold applications. The 
general increase in opium consumption in the 10th and 11th century is increasingly reflected by 
corresponding references in the Persian literature. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38  Seefelder (1996), 50f.; Sajjādī (Drugs – EIr); both of them apparently were close to Iranian circles at the 
court; Ibn Isḥāq even wrote a treatise on antidotes (al-tiryāq): Vadet (Ibn Māsawaih, Abū Zakariyyāʼ 
Yuḥannā – EI): Strohmaier (Ḥunain b. Isḥāḳ al-‘Ībādī – EI). 
39  Seefelder (1996), 51; Sajjādī (Drugs – EIr). 
40  Neligan (1927), 7f.; Kūhī-Kermānī (1945/46), 104; Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 343; Seefelder (1996), 52; Booth 
(1996), 21; Sajjādī (Drugs – EIr); Goodman (al-Rāzī, Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Zakariyyāʼ - EI). 
41  Neligan (1927), 7f.: Kūhī-Kermānī (1945/46), 104; Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 343; Sajjādī (Drugs – EIr); 
Seefelder (1996), 52ff.; Booth (1996), 21; Mathee (2005), 98. 
42  al-Bīrūnī calls the white poppy mīqūna (mekon) and the black poppy “cough pomegranate” (rummān al-
su‘āl): Seefelder (1996), 54; Boilot (al-Bīrūnī {Bērūnī}, Abu ‘l-Raiḥān Muḥammad b. Aḥmad – EI). 
43  Further authors, who wrote about opium, were e.g. ‘Alī b. al-‘Abbās al-Maǧūsī (10th cent. AD) and 
Muwaffaq Harawī (10th-11th cent. AD): Seefelder (1996), 52; Elgood (‘Alī b. al-‘Abbās al- Maḏjūsī – EI); 
Karamarti & Rezaee (Abū Manṣūr Muwaffaq Harawī - EI). 
44  (košt zahr-e haǧr tō ‘aṭṭār-rā – vaqt agar āmad dam az taryāq zan): Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 124. 
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All famous Persian poets essentially refer to taryāq / taryāk, especially in its capacity as a cure-all 
against the pains and sorrows of love, both earthly and mystically. Relevant verses have been written by 
Ferdousī (10th cent.), Nāṣer-e Ḫosrou (11th cent.), Sanāʼī (11th cent.), ‘Omar-e Ḫayyām (11th-12th cent.), 
‘Aṭṭār (12th-13th cent.), Rūmī (13th cent.), Sa‘dī (13th cent.) and Ḥāfeẓ (14th cent.).45 
 
The recurring allusions to the addictive and fatal nature of opium in these medical and 
pharmaceutical works suggest that opium was not exclusively taken as a medicine. The same 
source that reports the overdose of Ibn Sīnā speaks of another victim of opium: Mas‘ūd I 
Ġaznavī (r. 1030-40 AD), son of the famous Maḥmūd Ġaznavī (r. 998-1030) who was 
reported to have consumed “a little opium” (andak-e taryākī) and as a result overslept and 
lost a crucial battle against the Salǧūqs.46 The distinction between a medical and a recreational 
drug use is, nevertheless a modern one. However, at that time, differentiation might have been 
between a moderate and an excessive use. Against the background of the classical medical 
theory of the four temperaments, al-Bīrūnī’s description of opium consumption in Mecca as a 
means to endure the torrid heat might thus rather be judged as medical use. As shown by the 
increasing varieties of opium preparations, opium nevertheless started to become a 
fashionable drug again no later than the 10th century AD, like during the Roman times. 
Opium was prescribed in a variety of recipes, either pure (ḫāleṣ) or mixed (maḫlūṭ), as 
“powder” (masūd), “potion” (ma‘ğūn), dissolved in wine or probably in the form of a 
„tablet“ (qorṣ) or „pill“ (ḥabb).47  
 
From the 10th century, presumably, opium started to be produced in Iran. To what 
extent such a local production might have covered the domestic needs, remains a matter of 
scholarly debates.48 Even during Mongol times in the 14th century, poppy cultivation still 
seems to have been limited. Still, the Īlḫānīd ruler Abū Sa‘īd (r. 1316-1335 AD) apparently 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45  Anwari-Alhosseyni (1981), 484f.; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 119-138. 
46  Reported by the historian Abo-l-Fażl Beyhaqī (995-1077): Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 344f.; Malek-Moḥammadī 
(2005/06), 48ff.;  
47  Neligan (1927), 9; Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 433; Malek-Moḥammadī ascribes the praxis of mixing opium with 
wine to the Mongols, but quotes a corresponding distich of the earlier ‘Aṭṭār: Malek-Moḥammadī 
(2005/06), 47, 51f., 135f.; the mixing of opium (ma‘ǧūn) with wine later was to become the preferred way 
of consumption in Moghul India: Honchell (2010), 19. 
48  Neligan and Shahnavaz assume a local cultivation from the 10th cent. AD at latest: Neligan (1927), 9; 
Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr); Petrushevsky assumes that poppy cultivation only started to gain track from the 
11th or 12th cent. AD: Petrushevsky (1968), 502; Rāzī’s allusion to opium cultivation, however, suggests an 
even earlier date: Parvin & Sommer (1987), 247. 
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paid a large amount of opium as a tribute to China.49 The Mongols are said to have been 
“instrumental in spreading the use of opium to China”.50 The Īlḫānīd rulers and soldiers in 
any case are reported to have been often addicted to opium, especially opiate wine, either out 
of fear of being poisoned or for simple recreational purposes.51 But, it remains disputed 
whether – especially the recreational – use of opium has increased in general in Iran during 
Mongol times.52 
 
Iranian Discourse I 
Arabs and Mongols as scapegoats 
Iranian authors, who in the 20th century wrote about the history of opium in Iran, often put forward 
rather conspiratorial views on the introduction and dissemination of opium use in Iran. Usually, they 
blame foreigners for having introduced the habit of opium smoking in Iran, or domestic fringe groups. In 
doing so, their positions follow the prevailing ideological discourses of their times. 
 
Authors who wrote before the revolution of 1979 thus attribute the introduction of opium to the 
Arabs; while authors sympatethic to the Islamic Republic deny them such as crucial role.53 Both agree, 
however, that the Iranians themselves, at least initially hardly had any role in this54 and that the Mongols 
are to be blamed for the increasing turn of Iranian society towards the recreational use of opium.55 
 
II. 2. Opium in Ṣafavīd Iran  
 
 The establishment of the Ṣafavīd realm in the early 16th century heralded a distinctive 
new era for Iran. Although the Ṣafavīds were of non-Iranian descent and for a long time did 
not differ much from their predecessors regarding the sphere of control or the use of Persian 
in administration and culture, they are commonly acknowledged for the reunification and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49  Matthee agrees with Petrushevsky that opium production still was small, given the rare references to it in 
the tax records; the Mongols were, nevertheless „instrumental in spreading the use of opium to China“: 
Petrushevsky (1968), 502; Matthee (2005), 98. 
50  Matthee (2005), 98. 
51  For the fear of poisoning: Matthee (2005), 98; for recreational purposes: Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 345f.; 
Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 50ff. 
52  Not assuming an increase in opium consumption are: Parvin & Sommer (1987), 247. 
53  According to KŪHĪ-KERMĀNĪ, Arabs allegedly took opium to chase away “tiredness” (ḫastegī) and  
“different pains” (dard-hā-ye moḫtalef); he explicitly refers to a certain “French Dr. Martin” – lilely Ernest 
Martin’s work L’opium, ses abus, mangeurs et fumeurs d’opium, morphinomanes (Paris, 1893): Kūhī-
Kermānī (1945/46), 103, 136f.; ĀḎARAḪŠ attributes this to the fact that the Europeans became acquainted 
with opium through the works of al-Rāzī and Ibn Sīnā: Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 343f.; MALEK-MOḤAMMADĪ 
denies that the early inhabitants of Central Arabia were acquainted opium, else it would have been 
mentioned in the Qurʼān: Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 42f. 
54  According to then finance minister MAḤMŪD BADR: Kūhī-Kermānī (1945/46), 103; Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 
343; (ma‘dūdī az pezeškān-e īrānī […] yā pezškān-e melal-e dīgar): Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 42. 
55  Āḏaraḫš maintains that no opium consumption for the purpose of „enjoyment and recreation“ (barāye kaif 
va tafrīḥ) took place before the Mongols: Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 345ff.; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 50ff. 
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reawakening of an Iranian entity and identity. This interpretation might have emerged only in 
later times.56 However, it is in so far appropriate as the Ṣafavīds chose the Twelver Shī‘i faith 
as their official denomination, resulting in Iran becoming a Shi’a majority country.57 They 
also started to develop increasing diplomatic and commercial links with European countries, 
in the wake of which many European diplomats and traders travelled to Iran.58 
 
 During the Ṣafavīd reign, the situation of opium consumption, too, changed 
dramatically. Opium became a fashionable everyday recreational drug, simultaneously with 
the consumption of tobacco, coffee and other luxury goods.59 European travellers left behind 
vivid descriptions of this new fashion, their curious accounts becoming important sources for 
the history of opium during this time. Eṣfahān, Šīrāz and Yazd emerged as famous poppy 
growing centres to satisfy the ever-increasing local demand for opium. The Ṣafavīd shahs 
repeatedly tried to prohibit – or at least to restrict – opium consumption, especially among 
soldiers. This was to no avail as Iranians remained avid consumers of an increasing variety of 
opium preparations. 
 
Opium consumption 
 Like wine, opium – or a mixture of the two – initially seems to have been consumed 
for recreational purposes at the royal court, and was considered a luxury good.60 The 
chamberlains of the shahs and other courtiers were said to always have carried golden caskets 
containing opium with them.61 It is difficult to assess, when exactly this fashion of non-
medical opium consumption found its way to ordinary people. Crucial for the proliferation of 
opium as a drug of “joy” (našāṭ)62 might have been soldiers, who were avid consumers of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56  Newman doesn’t take the Ṣafavīd rule as an absolute rupture with earlier times: Newman (2006), esp. 11-
12. 
57  For the declaration of the Twelfer Shī‘īsm as the official faith under Esmā‘īl I (r. 1499-1542 AD): Matthee 
(2005), 19f.; Calmard (2009), 139-190. 
58  On the diplomatic and commercial relations between Europe and Iran: Floor (2000), esp. 125-245. 
59  In the 17th cent., tobacco spread even quicker than opium: Tavernier (1679), 714; Matthee (2005), 117ff.; 
for a history of coffee during Ṣafavīd time: Matthee (2005), 144-174; tea was only introduced later: 
Matthee (2005), 237-266. 
60  This was also the opinion in Iran at the time: Teixeira (1902), 200f.; Chardin (1801) IV, 73; Malek-
Moḥammadī (2006), 53; for wine consumption before and during Ṣafavīd time: Matthee (2005), 37-68. 
61  Kaempfer (1940), 82; for further examples of the widespread opium consumption at the Ṣafavīd court: 
Matthee (2005), 101-105; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 53.  
62  Matthee (2005), 101; TAVERNIER and CHARDIN both accentuate the recreational use: “pour se render 
allegres & se divertir”: Tavernier (1679), 715; “qu’elle produit […] des visions agréables et une manière 
d’enchantement”: Chardin (1811) IV, 74. 
 16 
wine and opium;63 and arguably Ṣūfīs, whom Iranian authors, admittedly, often blame for all 
sorts of vices.64  
Opium consumption certainly was already common in the 16th century, as was 
observed by the prominent Ṣafavīd physician ‘Emād al-Dīn Šīrāzī (16th century) and the 
Portuguese traveller Pedro (de) Teixeira (d. 1614).65 Later European travellers to Iran at times 
contradict each other in details. Yet, most agree that opium consumption was widespread 
among Iranians from all classes.66 Probably the most famous Europeans, who visited Persia in 
the 17th century, were the merchant Jean-Baptiste Tavernier (1605-1689) and the jeweller Jean 
Chardin (1743-1713), who both travelled as well on diplomatic missions. Both report in detail 
about the extent of opium consumption. According to Tavernier “il est mal-aisé de trouver en 
Perse un home qui ne soit adonné à quelqu’un de ces bruvages, sans quoy il semble qu’ils ne 
pourroient pas vivre avec plaisir” and according to Chardin, this was “une inclination si 
general, que de dix personnes, à peine on trouvera-t-on une exempte de cette méchante 
habitude”.67 Even if this estimation seems to be exaggerated, the multitude of preparations 
alone shows how popular opium had become. 
 
Opium Preparations 
 Opium powder (masūd), opium concoction (ma‘ǧūn, generally all theriacs), opiate-wine and 
probably opium pills (sg. ḥabb) or tablets (sg. qorṣ) were already familiar to Iran long before Ṣafavīd 
time. These preparations certainly continued to be prescribed for medicinal application; but together with 
new preparations, they were now also used for purely recreational purposes68. At the beginning of the 
Ṣafavīd epoch opium (afyūn / taryāk)69 seems to have been an expensive commodity, which only the rich 
could afford.70 The poorer Iranians were drinking a decoction made of the poppy “husks” (pūst) instead 
and accordingly were called pūstī71. Like its equivalent afyūnī or taryākī for regular opium-eaters this 
was a pejorative, insulting term indicating addictive behaviour.72 The “opium pill” (ḥabbeh-ye taryāk) or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63  The British traveller and historian THOMAS HERBERT describes the soldiers as “the Foot-posts by 
continuall chawing it, runne fleeping day and night”: Herbert (1638), 241.: Matthee (2005), 106. 
64  According to the Carmelite missionary Ange de Saint-Joseph (1636-1697), opium consumption was 
widespread among Ṣūfīs; poets, too, were said to have been sympathetic to opium: Matthee (2005), 105. 
65  Šīrāzī (16th cent.) locates problematic opium use in particular among ordinary people: Matthee (2005), 
100; Teixeira (ca 1593-97 in Iran) also describes opium consumption among common people: Teixeira 
(1902), 200f.; for an increased general consumption since ‘Abbās I: Parvin & Sommer (1987), 248. 
66  Chardin often copied from Tavernier: Tavernier (1679), 715f.; Chardin (1811) IV, 73ff. 
67  Tavernier (1679), 715; Chardin (1811), IV: 77; similarly also the Capuchin monk Raphaël du Mans 
(1613-1696): Matthee (2005), 106. 
68  The popularity of opium probably was due to its medicinal status: Matthee (2005), 99. 
69  Taryāk was already synonymous to afyūn in the 16th cent. AD: Teixeira (1902), 200. 
70  Matthee maintains that opium soon became cheap: Matthee (2005), 106; Parvin & Sommer are of the 
opinion that opium pills were only consumed by the privileged: Parvin & Sommer (1987), 248. 
71  Teixeira (1902), 200; Chardin describes the pūst as being especially strong: Chardin (1811), IV: 79; 
according to Šīrāzī the husks were consumed in ground form (kūfteh) or boiled in water: Matthee (2005), 
106. 
72  Teixeira (1902), 200; Tavernier (1679), 715. 
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“enjoyment pill” (ḥabbeh-ye nešāṭ), the most famous of which was called hāšem begī, increased in 
popularity.73 The same is true for the ma‘ǧūn, which was prepared as a sweet confection, and for the all-
cure felūnīyā74. From the 17th century, another decoction, which was prepared by boiling the entire 
crushed poppy pods, was called kūknār. Kūknār seems to have been the preferred recreational drug 
among the common people as suggests the many references to the “kūknār houses”  (sg. kūknār-ḫāneh). 
Like the “coffeehouses” (sg. qahveh-ḫāne), where not only coffee but also opium was served, they were 
public, though rather shabby places where people would gather to consume this particular drug.75 
 
Even when taken for pleasurable purposes – not at least as an aphrodisiac76 - and 
despite the sensational European accounts, most Iranians still seem to have consumed opium 
moderately.77  Excesses were particularly reported for the consumption of kūknār, while 
Šīrāzī generally identified the problematic consumption among the ordinary people78. The 
words taryākī and afyūnī, however, also point to problematic consumption of proper opium. 
European travellers and the Persian annalists repeatedly mention cases of addiction.79 de 
Teixeira maintained “I have seen men die in various places for want of opium, and others 
from taking more than they were used to”.80 Tavernier for his part describes addicts to kūknār 
as follows: “Dans leurs jeunesse on voit ces Theriakis ou preneurs d’Opium […] avec des 
visages pâles mornes & abatus, & qui on comme perdu la parole” and observes “quand ils 
approchent de quarante ans ils se trouvent fort incommodez de douleurs”.81 Fatal overdoses 
continued to be reported by both European and Iranian authors.82 Arguably, the most 
prominent victim was Šāh Esmā‘ī II (1576-77), who is said to have died of an overdose of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
73  According to Ange de Saint-Joseph, whom Chardin met in Persia, Hāšem Begī was the name of its 
inventor: Chardin (1811), IV: 74ff.; attributed to the German author and diplomat Adam Olearius (1599-
1671): Mattee (2005), 99ff.; Tavernier and Chardin both refer to the recreational use of opium pills: 
Tavernier (1679), 715; Chardin (1811) IV, 73f.; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 55. 
74  Matthee (2005), 111; according to Malek-Moḥammadī felūnīyā was a mixture of opium (taryāk), cannabis 
(bang), and hashish (ḥašīš) with spices: Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 54. 
75  For kūknār, which Tavernier calls kokemaar and Chardin cocquenar: Tavernier (1679), 716; Chardin 
(1811) IV, 78; Kaempfer (1940), 28; generally on the use of kūknār in the kūknār-ḫāneh: Matthee (2005), 
107ff.; Parvin & Sommer (1987), 248.  
76  For a specific example: Kaempfer (1940), 28; opium of course only worked as an aphrodisiac when taken 
in moderate amounts: Matthee (2005), 103; a rather questionable “Oriental” nexus between inebriation, 
sexuality and mystic experience is put forward by: Gelpke (1995), 33ff.; 199ff. 
77  Mathee (2005), 99f. 
78  Mathee (2005), 100. 
79  Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 352; Matthee (2005), 101f., 105f. 
80  Teixeira (1902), 201; the German physician and traveller Engelbert Kaempfer gives another vivid 
description of drug addicts and their desperation: Neligan (1927), 9f. 
81  Tavernier (1679), 715f.; Chardin provides a similar description of addiction to opium pills: Chardin 
(1811), IV: 76f. 
82  Matthee (2005), 104. 
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felūnīyā.83 Opium did, however, not only accidentally lead to death; men and women alike 
specifically consumed it in order to commit suicide.84 
 
Poppy cultivation 
It is unclear, how much opium was produced locally before Ṣafavīd time. For the 17th 
century, the Europeans report extensive poppy cultivation around Lanǧān near Eṣfahān, and 
around Kāzerūn near Šīrāz, both of which soon counted among the best poppy growing 
regions in Iran.85 Yazd soon seems to have been an important poppy-growing centre as well.86 
Chardin emphasized that the poppies “ne rendent nulle part autant de suc comme en Perse, ni 
si fort” and that the Iranians “y font toujours douze incision, en mémoire des douze imams”.87 
More importantly, opium was already subject to taxes, as shows a prebend, which ‘Abbās I 
gave to one of his weapon-bearers. 88  Opium was, however, not yet a regular export 
commodity.89 The local poppy cultivation might not even have covered the local needs, as 
opium was additionally imported from other countries.90 
 
Addiction treatment & royal bans 
 Physicians and pharmacologists had always been aware of the Janus-faced properties 
of opium. When in Ṣafavīd times, addictive patterns became more prevalent, physicians not 
only prescriped opium as a medicine but saw themselves increasingly confronted with a need 
to cure opium addiction. The common ‘cure’ against opium dependency consisted of simply 
substituting opium with wine, and opium in turn was often advised as a cure against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83  According to the Iranian historian Eskandar Baig Torkamān Monšī (1560-1633?): Āḏaraḫš (1956), 350f.; 
Matthee (2005), 104; before, he had already consumed “pure opium” (taryāk-e ḫāleṣ) and an “opium-
containing composition” (tarkīb-e afyūn-dār): Malek-Moḥammadī (2006), 62;  
84  According to Tavernier: „si quelqu-un par desespoir se veut faire mourir, il en avale un gros monceau 
[sic], puis prend du vinaigre par dessus, de peur qu-on ne le secoure par du contrepoison“: Tavernier 
(1679), 716; Chardin (1811) IV, 78; for specific examples: Matthee (2005), 104f.  
85  Parvin & Sommer assume that a “regular opium industry” existed since the 17th cent.: Parvin & Sommer 
(1987), 248. 
86  The quoted references are, however, all from later times: Matthee (2005), 213; also from a later time: 
„from time immemorial opium has been grown in Persian in the neighbourhood of Yezd“: Wills (1886), 
234.  
87  Chardin (1811), III: 300f; the same observation is made by the French traveller Mélchisedec de Thévenot 
(1620-1692); “opium from Kāzerūn” (taryāk-e kāzerūnī) is also mentioned in a royal edict (farmān): 
Matthee (2005), 99. 
88  According to the Ṣafavīd viceregent Ḫūzānī Eṣfahānī: Matthee (2005), 114; according to Kaempfer, 
farmers cultivating royal lands had to pay 45% of their crop to the shah: Kaempfer (1940), 90; also: 
Neligan (1927), 9f. 
89  Some Iranian opium was exported via Hormoz to India: Matthee (2005), 99. 
90  Teixeira reports that there were two sorts of opium in Iran, one called malwy (malvī) from Malwa 
(Northern India) and another one called mecery (makarī) apparently from Cairo; the local cultivation 
therefore still must have been limited at the end of the 16th cent.: Teixeira (1902), 201; also for imports 
from Egypt: Matthee (2005), 99; for imports from the Ottoman Empire: Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 
54. 
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alcoholism.91 This treatment naturally was rather ineffective, in addition to the fact that wine 
was looked upon disapprovingly.92 A prime example for the failure of this method was Šāh 
Ṣafī I  (r. 1629-1642), whose long lasting opium addiction was treated with wine. It is 
reported that he finally died as a result of his alcoholism.93 Hence, a more promising method 
consisted of mixing an ever-decreasing amount of opium to a drug compound called barš 
until the opium-addicted patient eventually became abstinent.94 
 
 The Shī‘īte clerics, by contrast, never opposed opium consumption during Ṣafavīd 
times. This might be explained by the absence of opium in the Qurʼān, even though the 
religious anathema hit the equally absent but popular “cannabis” (bang).95 A religious 
denunciation might thus rather be lacking because of the historical position of opium in 
Iranian society96, and especially of its status as a traditional and all-curing medicine. 
 
‘Emād al-Dīn Šīrāzī and opium 
  The consumption of opium was nevertheless prohibited during daytime in Ramadan. In this regard 
‘Emād al-Dīn Maḥmūd Šīrāzī had a particularly savoury medical advise. Šīrāzī hailed from a family of 
court physicians and worked himself in this function with Šāh ‘Ṭahmāsp I. He is the author of the famous 
“treatise on opium” (resāleh-ye afyūn), in which he covers various medicinal and recreational uses of 
opium; and like so many contemporaries, he is reported to have been an opium-eater (afyūnī) himself.97 
 In order to comply with the rules for Ramadan, Šīrāzī recommends the regular opium consumer to 
reduce his daily doses to two pills, which he could take before sunrise and after sunset. However, for 
someone who could not endure these long hours without opium, he proposes to insert an opiumcontaining 
cartridge into the rectum, yet writes of the dangers of leaving it too long, lest the muscle lose its 
contracting force.98 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
91  Chardin (1811) IV, 77; Matthee (2005), 102f. 
92  „Mais comme d’ordinaire cela ne satisfait pas ces gens, parce que le vin n’est pas d’une aussi forte 
opération“: Chardin (1811) IV, 77. 
93  Šāh ‘Abbās I (1587-1629) reportedly made his grandson Ṣafī dependent on opium to prevent him from 
becoming a pretender to the throne: Āḏaraḫš (1956), 356; according to Tavernier: Matthee (2005), 102. 
94  Barš consisted of bezoar stone (bād-zahr), zedary (ǧadvar), pepper (felfel), saffron (za‘ferān), gum 
euphorbium (farfīyūn) and dracunculus (‘aqāqīr-hā): Matthee (2005), 102. 
95  Tavernier (1679), 716; bang is e.g. mentioned in manuals of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh): Matthee (2005), 
113. 
96  Matthee (2005), 113.  
97  For general information on Šīrāzī: Savage-Smith (‘Emād al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Serāj al-Dīn Mas’ūd Šīrāzī – 
EIr). 
98  Matthee (2005), 112f. 
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 The royal authorities, in contrast, repeatedly tried to prohibit or at least to restrict the 
consumption of opium and other drugs – at least officially as a proof of their religious zeal.99 
Šāh Ṭahmāsp I (1524-1576) in 1532/33 AD (939 HQ) issued the first royal decree against 
opium as part of his public repentance, while simultaneously banning wine taverns (sg. mey-
ḫāneh), beer-house (sg. būzeh-ḫāneh), cannabis-taverns (sg. bang-ḫāne) and opium-houses 
(sg. ma‘ǧūn-ḫāneh). At the same time, he ordered five hundred tūmāns worth of 
“distinguished opium” (taryāk-e fārūq) of the court to be destroyed. 100  Similar to his 
predecessor, Šāh ‘Abbās I (1587-1629 AD) issued several bans against opium consumption. 
The first two bans from 1596/97 AD (1005 HQ) and 1608/09 AD (1017 HQ) specifically 
prohibited the consumption of opium at the court and in the army on pain of expulsion or 
fines.101 In 1620/21 (1030 HQ), a further ban targeted the public meeting-places, in particular 
the kūknār-ḫāneh, threatening the violators with the death penalty.102  
 
The court jester and opium 
According to CHARDIN, the court jester of Šāh ‘Abbās I, Kel Anayet (Koll-e ‘Enāyat), opened a booth for 
the sale of shrouds, after hearing the angry complaints from the many desperate kūknār consumers who 
could not visit the kūknār-ḫāneh any more. When ‘Abbās passed by and asked him about the reason for 
his absence at the court, the jester answered: “je ne suis plus homme de cour, je suis marchant de toile 
[…] depuis que vous avez défendue le cocquenar [...] ces pauvres coquenaires meurent à centaines, la 
toile à ensevelir est renchérie de moitié”. Following this, the shah allegedly re-allowed the consumption 
of kūknār.103 
 
This anecdote, as well as the fact that such edicts were issued repeatedly, suggests that 
the royal prohibitions ultimately remained ineffective. The edicts additionally do not prove a 
total ban on opium consumption. They seem to have mainly targeted the opium consumption 
at the court and in the army, which directly affected the operability of the Ṣafavīd Empire; 
and the opium consumption in public places, which were associated with all kinds of 
debaucheries and immoralities104. The Europeans in any case continued to deliver most 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
99  The opium bans were propagated as religious deeds by the Ṣafavīd historians: Āḏaraḫš (1956), 348f.; 
353ff.; especially: Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 54ff.; Matthee (2005), 112-115. 
100  According to the historians Eskandar Baig Torkamān Monšī and Ḫoršāh Ebn Qobād al-Ḥosainī; the exact 
date of this ban is not known: Āḏaraḫš (1956), 348; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/2006), 58f.; Matthee 
(2005), 113f. 
101  Āḏaraḫš (1956), 354; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 60f.; Matthee (2005), 114f. 
102  Āḏaraḫš (1956), 354; Malek-Moḥammadī (2006), 62f.; Matthee (2005), 114f. 
103  Chardin (1811), VIII: 126f. 
104  For a vivid description of the atmosphere of a kūknār-ḫāneh: Tavernier (1679), 716; Chardin describes the 
coffee-houses as „vraies boutiques de sodomie“: Chardin (1811), IV: 69; Matthee (2015), 108.  
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pictographic descriptions of opium consumption in kūknār-ḫāneh and ma‘ǧūn-ḫāneh after 
these bans.105 
 
 The Ṣafavīd epoch indubitably marks the definite transition from a predominantly 
medical to a recreational pattern of opium consumption in Iran. Opium, like coffee or tobacco, 
became a fashionable consumer good, which was offered in different forms and often in 
public taverns, specifically in the kūknār- and ma‘ǧūn-houses.106 Even repeated royal bans did 
not succeed in halting this development. In parallel, a local opium industry began to develop, 
which, however, still seems to have been limited, probably not even covering the local 
demand. 
 
II. 3. Opium in Qāǧār Iran 
 
From the power contest that took place after the Afghan conquest of Eṣfahān in 1722, 
the Qāǧārs eventually emerged as the new rulers of Iran. Based in Tehrān, they established a 
comparatively stable order; yet, at the same time Russia and Great Britain grew increasingly 
influential in Iran. Territories were lost to the Tsarist Empire, notably today Azerbaijan, and 
both foreign nations obtained preferential and often exclusive trade agreements with Iran. The 
intensified contact with these countries brought a growing number of European consuls, 
traders and governmental advisers to Iran, who provide important information on the situation 
of opium in Iran. The political and intellectual exchange eventually led to the Constitutional 
Revolution (1905-11), which was as much influenced by liberal ideas from Europe as it was 
by anti-imperialist and nationalist feelings. This revolution would have a deep impact on 
Iranian society but also on the development of a proper drug policy.107 
 
During this eventful period, the position of opium within the Iranian society also 
changed dramatically. Opium consumption remained unabated, but it took on truly disastrous 
forms with the introduction of opium smoking in the second half of the 19th century AD. 
Simultaneously, the opium poppy became the most important cash crop in Iran. Iran was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
105  In 1729, Šāh Ṭahmāsp II issued another ban on poppy cultivation and opium consumption, most probably 
in order to try to legitimize his – short and powerless – rule: Parvin & Sommer (1987), 249; the Austrian 
physician Jakob Eduard Polak (1818-1891) – referring to the Italian traveller Pietro Della Valle (1586-
1652) - mentions only a ban on cācnār (kūknār): Polak (1865) II, 248f. 
106  Kūknār allegedly was the most popular opium preparation: Parvin & Sommer (1987), 248; kūknār and 
ma‘ǧūn were considered to be more addictive than the opium pills: Matthee (2005), 115. 
107  The Qāǧārs were one of the seven Qezelbāš tribes that had been closely associated with the Ṣafavīds – 
Yarshater (Iran II(2) – the Qajar Dynasty – EIr); Katouzian (2006). 
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inspired in this by the British opium industry in India, as both invested in the lucrative 
production and export of opium for the sake of a trade balance. At the end of the Qajar reign, 
the new parliament passed a first law against opium, which in reality, however, rather served 
to institutionalize a state monopoly on the cultivation of poppy and the production of opium. 
 
Opium consumption 
 At the beginning of the Qāǧār Empire, opium consumption patterns did not differ from 
the Ṣafavīd time. Opium continued to be widely enjoyed by lower and upper classes: kūknār 
rather by the poor, and the “joy pills” (sg. ḥabbeh-ye nešāṭ), a mix of opium with different 
spices, rather by the rich.108 Together with the barš and bang, they retained their popularity 
throughout the Qāǧār rule and were consumed in great quantity.109 Most European accounts 
from the 19th century describe the consumer habits in less dramatic terms than their earlier 
colleagues. Thus, the French naturalist Guillaume-Antoine Olivier (1756-1814) observed that 
“l’opium est d’un usage plus génerale en Perse, qu’en Turquie; mais on y voit bien moins des 
ces hommes qui le prennent avec excès”, and compared it to the common wine consumption 
in the countries of Southern Europe.110 The Austrian physician Jakob Eduard Polak (1818-
1891) and the British medical officer Charles James Wills (1842-1912) later shared this 
opinion.111 Iranians would in average not take more than two pills of about two grains per 
day112, but even the ones who consumed up to thirty grains were still described as using it in 
controlled form.113 Men and women114, especially older people115, indulged in opium pills, 
kūknār and various sorts of ma‘ǧūn.116 They continued to consume such preparations in order 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
108  Typical ingredients were nutmeg, amber, cardamom or cinnamon: Olivier (1807) V, 277f.; rich Persians 
always carried a small silver-box containing silver or gold-plated pills on them: Polak (1865), 248, 250f.; 
Wills (1886), 197, 237f.; for kūknār: Olivier (1807), 278f; Bélanger (1838), 342. 
109  For barš and bang: Olivier (1807) V, 278f.; Bélanger (1838), 342f.; Polak (1865), 249f.; Wills (1886), 96 
110  Olivier (1807) V, 278f. 
111  Polak worked in Iran during the 1850s and, like Wills, visited it (again) in the 1880s: Polak (1865), 251f.; 
Polak (1883), 124; “it does not appear that the moderate use of Persian opium in the country itself is 
deleterious”: Wills (1886), 237. 
112  According to Olivier, especially the wise and learned consumed opium or kūknār in moderate amounts: 
Olivier (1807) V, 278f.; Polak (1865), 251; at the end of the 19th cent., the daily ration was already 
between 1-5 grains: Wills (1886), 234, 237f.; similarly also the French physician Jean-Baptiste Feuvrier 
(1842-1926): Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 367. 
113  An 111 years old patient of Polak allegedly had been using 4 grains per day for the most part of his life: 
Polak (1865), 253f.; the Scottish trader John Malcolm (1769-1833) tells a similar story: Malcolm (1845), 
50f. 
114  Wills (1886), 197. 
115  In order to produce “eine gewisse Aufgewecktheit und Frische des Geistes und Körpers”: Polak (1865), 
249ff. 
116  Polak mentions different varieties of opium and many more opium preparations, among them „Electuarium 
Mithridatis“, „Electuarium Andromachi (teriak-e fāregh)“, „Electuarium Fuluniā (Philonia)“ or „Syrupus 
diacodii (scherbet-e-chāschchāsch)“: Polak (1865), 248f. 
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to find “une trève à leurs ennuis ou à leur misère”117 as the French botanist Charles Bélanger 
(1805-1888) states; or simply as a “Schlemmerei” according to Polak118. Opium continued, 
however, also to be prescribed extensively as a medicine, and it was still used as an antidote 
or as a means for suicide.119 Even horses and other animals apparently were given opium in 
order to increase their endurance.120 
 
 It was not long after that European observers noticed a new fashion of taking opium, 
which according to Polak was “unbedingt von schlimmen Folgen”: 121  opium smoking 
(taryāk-kešī). The Dutch are accredited with having first smoked a tobacco-opium mix in Java 
in the 17th century, from where this new habit quickly spread to China.122 It is a matter of 
speculation, when or where exactly opium smoking was introduced to Iran. According to 
Polak, who is the first European to mention opium smoking in Iran, it initially took place in 
secrecy.123 Twenty years later Wills still maintained that “opium-smoking is almost unknown” 
and “when smoked is, as a rule, smoked by a native doctor’s prescription”.124 Hence, it was 
only from the end of the 19th century that opium smoking started to gain ground, and soon 
with an incredible success. A British consul noticed that up to a quarter of the inhabitants in 
Mašhad were smoking opium.125 Each witness had the impression that this new habit was 
most prevalent at the place of his visit, be it in Yazd126, Kermān127, Balūčestān128 or at the 
Caspian Sea129. Most prone to start smoking opium were people who already took opium pills 
in excess,130 and most probably the consumers of kūknār, as these latter gradually disappeared. 
Opium smoking was equally addictive as drinking kūknār, and the “pipe-smokers” (sg. 
vāfūrī) were accordingly described in similar terms with “eingefallenes Gesicht, stierer Blick, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117  Bélanger (1838) II, 342. 
118  Polak (1865), 251. 
119  “Opium syrpus” or “Scherbat Chasch=chasch”(sg. šerbat-e ḫaš-ḫāš) was e.g. used against colds and to 
calm toddlers; especially prone to commit suicide were people of African descent (“Neger und 
Negerinnen”): Polak (1865), 249f., 254; Wills (1886), 234 
120  POLAK even mentions horses being addicted to opium: Polak (1865), 250f. 
121  Polak (1865), 254; Polak (1883), 24. 
122  On the development of opium smoking: Neligan (1927), 5, 10; McLaughlin (1976), 733; Saleh (1956); 
Booth (1996), 103ff.; McMahon (2002), 33-44; Dikötter (2004), 32-38; Matthee (2005). 
123  Polak (1865), 254; according to MATTHEE, James Baillie Fraser (1783-1856) is the first European to 
mention opium smoking in Iran: Matthee (2005), 210; the relevant paragraph, however, refers rather to 
tobacco smoking: Fraser (1826), 161. 
124  Wills (1886), 237. 
125  According to British consul Ronald Ferguson Thompson (1830-1888): Matthee (2005), 220. 
126  According to British consul John Richard Preece (1843-1917): Matthee (2005), 220. 
127  According to British consul PERCY SYKES (1867-1945): Sykes (1902), 434. 
128  According to Sykes: Matthee (2005), 221. 
129  According to British consul Hyacinth Louis Rabino (1877-1950) especially in Lāhīǧān: Malek-
Moḥammadī (2005/06), 70; already POLAK had maintained that around the Caspian Sea, twice as much 
opium is consumed as in the rest of the country: Polak (1865), 251 
130  According to Thomson: Matthee (2005), 211. 
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strohgelbe Gesichtsfarbe, geistige Erschlaffung, confuses Denken, zuletzt wirklicher 
Irrsinn”.131 Until the end of the 19th century, they continued to be “spoken of with contempt” 
even by the opium-eaters,132 and both continued to be labelled teriakhi (taryākī).133 Examples 
for excessive opium eating are, however, also (still) documented. Opium consumers still had 
difficulties to abstain from their habit during Ramadan134 while the Ṣūfī or Qalandar were 
considered prime examples as licentious consumers of opium.135 
 
 Concerning Neligan’s question “as to which country had the doubtful privilege of 
handing the habit [of opium smoking] on”,136 Iranian literature particularly points to India and 
the colonial power Great Britain.137 An Indian origin is, however, implausible because most 
Indians were not smoking opium yet at the time.138 It is more probable that pilgrims who 
travelled to the shrine of Emām Reżā in Mašhad, or merchants from Central Asia, introduced 
this new habit to Eastern Iran.139 This suggestion is corroborated by contemporary European 
travellers, who observed that opium smoking was most widespread in the Eastern provinces 
of Iran.140  
 
Opium smoking141 
 While the Iranians already had developed elaborate and refined consumer habits for opium eating, 
opium smoking would become even more ritualized. Abo ’l-Qāsem Yazdī, a largely unknown Iranian 
author, has written a famous treatise on opium smoking in the 19th cent., in which he describes opium 
smoking as an art form comparable to tea ceremonies in Japan or China. 
 
 Opium, as a rule, originally was usually smoked in company. Before embarking on an opium 
session, a room was prepared with the necessary equipment: comfortable mattresses and cushions ensured 
a relaxed sitting; for the smoking of opium charcoal was burned in a brazier (manqal) and further 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131  Polak (1865), 254; even children of opium-smoking parents were already born „with a craving for the 
drug“: Sykes (1902), 402; on kūknār-addicts: Bélanger (1838), 343. 
132  According to Thompson: Matthee (2005), 211; Saleh (1956). 
133  Olivier (1807) V, 277; Polak (1865), 252; Polak (1883), 124. 
134  “For opium-eaters” there was even “some degree of indulgence to be purchased”: Fraser (1826), 161. 
135  Polak (1865), 252; Polak (1883), 124; Wills (1886), 96; according to the Austrian civil engineer and 
special envoy to the Qajar court, Albert Joseph Gasteiger (1823-1890), the first European to be bestowed 
with the nolbe title “khan” (ḫān): Matthee (2005), 209. 
136  Neligan (1927), 10f.  
137  Aḏaraḫš (1955/56), 365f., 371; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 64, 66, 69. 
138  Neligan (1927), 11; according to a letter sent to the Swiss botanist Augustin de Candolle (1778-1841): 
Parvin & Sommer (1987), 249. 
139  Neligan (1927), 10; McLaughlin (1976), 733; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr); Matthee (2005), 212f. 
140  Sykes (1902), 402; Neligan (1927), 11. 
141  Anwari-Alhosseyni (1981), 484f.; Neligan (1927), 17, 20; Parvin & Sommer (1987), 249; Yazdī’s 
treatise is titled „Book on the opium-pipe and on opium-pipe smokers“ (ketāb-e vāfūr va vāfūrīyān) or 
simply „Treatise on his excellency, the opium pipe“ (resāleh-e hażrat-e vāfūr): Yazdī (1908); Gelpke 
(1995), 48f., 55f. 
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paraphernalia such as fire tongs (anbor), a neelde (sīḫ), a knife (čāqū), an opium cutter (taryāk-šekan) 
and of course the opium pipe (vāfūr) were arranged; and further indispensable were a teapot (samāvar) 
and tea cups as well as sweets (šīrīnī). 
 The opium pipe (vāfūr) consisted of a woode handle (dasteh) and a hob (ḥoqqeh) usually made of 
clay. In the hob, there was a small hole, where for each round a small piece of opium was stuck, which 
was heated with a piece of charcoal. The ensuing vapor was then smoked through the wodden handle. 
During smoking, talking was frowned upon; one was instead advised to listen to the hissing sound of 
smoking, which was compared in his regularity and echo of the name „protector“ (moǧīr) – one of the 
names of God – to the Ṣūfī practice of recitation (ḏikr). 
 
 After having smoked opium through the pipe, the burnt dross (sūḫteh) of the opium remained inside 
the the hollow clay hob. This sūḫteh was scraped out and gathered, in order to be processed into a 
preparation that could be smoked again: the so-called opium juice (šīreh). With around 16%, both these 
by-products had a higher morphine content than (raw) opium (12%). 
 
 Opium often used to be smoked at private gathering at home and continues to be so up to this day. 
Until the respective bans in the 20th century, opium was, however, often also smoked in specific opium 
dens, still called coffee houses (qahveh-ḫāneh) or more commonly šīreh dens (šīreh-ḫāneh). 
 
Poppy cultivation & opium production 
 At the beginning of the Qāǧār period, the Scottish traveller James Baillie Fraser 
(1783-186) stated that opium was not “much or successfully cultivated, although the poppy 
[…] grows sufficiently well”.142 The most important poppy growing regions were Eṣfahān, 
Šīrāz, and Yazd.143 Due to bad transportation routes, only very little Iranian opium was 
exported in these early years, namely to India or Boḫārā and finally to China.144 However, 
Colonel Ephraim Stannus (1784-1850) from the East India Company already warned of a 
possible competitor,145 as opium exports initially remained small.146  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142  Fraser at the time, however, visited the Caspian Sea, where poppy only grew badly; he also states „opium is, 
I believe, made only for consumption in the country“: Fraser (1826), 86. 
143  The European travellers always described Yazd as a traditional poppy-growing region: Wills (1886), 234; 
Matthee (2005), 213; according to the Russian economist and official of German-Baltic descent, Julius von 
Hagemeister (1806-1878),“c’est dans la province de Yezd qu’on sème le plus de pavot”: Hagemeister 
(1839), 34; Groseclose (1947), 107. 
144  Hagemeister (1839), 34; Fraser states „opium is, I believe, made only for consumption in the country“: 
Fraser (1826), 359; also according to Stannus: Seyf (1984), 240; Matthee (2005), 213. 
145  Iran apparently could produce opium for a third of the price of Indian opium: Seyf (1984), 240; Matthee 
(2005), 213f. 
146  A British proposal in 1848, to enhance Iranian opium production failed due to unsafe transportation routes: 
Matthee (2005), 214. 
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It was not until the 1850s that Polak described Šuštar and Dezfūl in Ḫūzestān, Māhān 
near Kermān, as well as Kāšān and Qom, as new regions where poppy was grown.147 At the 
same time, the famous grand-vizier Amīr Kabīr experimented with poppy growing in 
Tehrān.148 Mainly because of private initiatives, Iranian opium production grew threefold 
between 1859-1861149 and opium exports started to increase correspondingly. According to 
George Curzon (1859-1925), the later viceroy of India, opium exports were first recorded in 
Eṣfahān in 1853,150 but only really gained ground after the collapse of the silk trade in 
1864/65.151 The decline of Iran’s silk industry was a caused by the silkworm disease but it 
coincided with a sharp recession in the cultivation of cotton, when after the civil war the USA 
(re-)emerged as a powerful competitor for these crops on the market.152 Suffering from a 
chronic trade deficit with European countries, Iran was thus forced to increasingly invest in 
poppy as a vital cash crop.153 Opium was a manifest choice since the Chinese demand for 
opium grew exponentially after the second British opium war.154 To be able to compete more 
successfully in the profitable market, the Persian opium producer Moḥammad Mahdī Eṣfahānī 
brought back improved cultivation methods from India.155 
 
In the following decades, new areas for the cultivation of poppy were developed, 
namely in the Eastern provinces of Ḫorāsān, Kermān and Balūčestān,156 which alongside 
Yazd, Eṣfahān, Kāzerūn and Šūštar would count among the best poppy growing regions in 
Iran.157 The total production of opium accordingly increased from 870 cases of 160 lbs. each 
in the year 1871/72 to 7,700 cases in the year 1880/81 – a nine-fold increase.158 Opium 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147  The opium from these regions had different names: Polak (1865), 246. 
148  Accordingt to Thompson: Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr); according to the Dutch physician Johann Louis 
Schlimmer (1819-1881): Āḏaraḫš (1956), 362f.; Matthee (2005), 217; Malek-Moḥammadī (2006), 64f. 
149  Matthee (2005), 215. 
150  CURZON was travelling in Iran in the late 1880s: Curzon (1966), 499; Seyf (1984), 240. 
151  Curzon (1966), 499; Groseclose (1947), 107; Seyf (1984), 240. 
152  McLaughlin (1976), 730f.; Seyf (1984), 237f.; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr); Matthee (2005), 213. 
153  For a detailed analysis of Iran’s economy during Qāǧār rule, especially concerning the growing trade 
deficit: Seyf (1984), 233-237; McLaughlin (1976), 730; Parvin & Sommer (1987), 252f. 
154  After the second opium war (1856-60), Iran allegedly sought a peace treaty with China in order to export its 
opium directly to China: Āḏaraḫš (1956), 361ff., 369: McLaughlin (1976), 730; Parvin & Sommer 
(1987), 253f.; according to British consul Lucas: Matthee (2005), 213; generally on the opium wars: 
Booth (1996), 103-173; Dikötter & al. (2004), 42-45. 
155  According to Iranian geographers Arbāb Eṣfahānī (d. 1896) and ‘Abd ol-Ġaffār Naǧm al-Molk (d. 1908): 
Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr); Matthee (2005), 216f. 
156  According to Belgian orientalist Auguste Bricteux (1873-1937): Matthee (2005), 217; according to 
Thompson: Seyf (1984), 244f. 
157  Wills (1886), 234f.; according to the British diplomat EDWARD STACK, in the 1880s “all the fields around 
the city {of Yazd} […] were white with poppy”: Stack (1882), 262; WILLS made a similar observations for 
Eṣfahān: Wills (1891), 173. 
158  According to British consul Baring: Matthee (2005), 218; based on different consular reports, SEYF shows 
a climax for 1884-1886, when 403,000 lbs. were produced solely in Eṣfahān: Seyf (1984), 242. 
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exports from the ports of Būšehr and Bandar-e ‘Abbās mainly to China accordingly 
skyrocketed from 103,000 lbs. in 1865 to 874,710 lbs. in 1880-82.159 “Opium merchants” 
(toǧǧār-e taryāk), who performed different tasks as exporters, middlemen (dallāl-ān), brokers 
or commission merchants were responsible for transporting opium from the cultivation areas 
towards the export harbours.160 
 
 Iranian opium production, however, did not increase unabatedly.161 A first recession is 
assumed for the years following the disastrous famine of 1871/72, which was caused exactly 
by this concentration on cash crops like cotton, silk and poppy at the expense of cereals.162 In 
the mid 1880s, British consuls documented another decrease in Iranian opium exports.163 This 
time, the drop might have been caused by a temporarily lower demand in China164 and 
systemic problems of Iran’s opium industry seem, however, to have played a more crucial 
role. From the 1860s, Iranian opium had developed a bad reputation for being extremely 
altered with ever increasing amounts of sugar, oil, starch, flour, grape juice or simply other 
parts of the poppy plant.165 Incessant poppy cultivation additionally had exhausted the soils, 
which as a result started to yield reduced harvests.166 The transportation infrastructure 
continued to remain poor as well.167 
 
Despite such temporary setbacks, the quality of the Iranian opium steadily improved, 
as did the industry as a whole. While opium of bad quality continued to be shipped to China168, 
opium of better quality – with a morphine content of 10-12% – found ready markets in India 
and Great Britain.169 Opium production continued to experience many crises at the beginning 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159  Based on data from different authors: Seyf (1984), 246; Matthee (2005), 219; after different routes had 
been tested, the shipment to Ceylon proofed to be the cheapest: Seyf (1984), 245; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – 
EIr); Matthee (2005), 214. 
160  According to the Iranian geographer Ḥasan Fasāʼī (1821-1898): Matthee (2005), 217; according to the 
Iranian geographer Mīrzā Ḥossein Ḫān Taḥwīldār-e Eṣfahānī (19th cent.) and Baring: Shahnavaz (Afyūn – 
EIr).  
161  Neligan (1927), 13; Matthee (2005), 218. 
162  Neligan and others primarily hold the poppy cultivation responsible for the famine: Neligan (1927), 13; 
McLaughlin & Quinn (1974), 482; for some time after the famine, more grain was planted: Seyf (1984), 
237, 240. 
163  For tables of opium exports: Seyf (1984), 246; Matthee (2005), 219. 
164  According to Preece, this was due to the bad quality of Iranian opium: Seyf (1984), 241. 
165  Sykes (1902), 423; Curzon (1966), 499f.; Matthee (2005), 215; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr); Āḏaraḫš 
(1956), 370. 
166  Seyf (1984), 239, 241. 
167  In the 1880s, Baring still deplored „the absence of good roads and the utter apathy and helplessness of the 
Government“: Seyf (1984), 238; Parvin & Sommer (1987), 255f. 
168  Polak (1883), 125; according to the Scottish traveller Napier Malcolm and others: Matthee (2005), 215. 
169  Neligan (1927), 13; McLaughlin (1976), 730; Seyf (1984), 241; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr); Matthee 
(2005), 215; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 67; from London some opium was sent to the USA: Curzon 
(1966), 500f. 
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of the 20th century, but the industry recovered after the most dramatic crisis in World War I.170 
By the early 1920s, opium was grown in at least 18 out of 26 provinces, amounting to 
approximately 70,000 acres.171 Despite a Chinese ban on importations of Persian opium, it 
continued to be predominantly sent to China.172  
 
Addiction treatment & clerical bans & state regulation 
The increasing opium production and consumption continued to preoccupy certain 
circles. Cultivators and producers naturally were more concerned with augmenting their 
profits, as was now, during Qajar time, also the government. But, physicians and clerics 
remained comparatively inactive. 
 
The available literature contains little information on medicinal measures against 
opium addiction. Nāṣer al-Dīn Šāh’s personal physician Polak advised a gradual withdrawal 
from opium as being the best method173, as Šīrāzī had done before him. This method, now, 
might indeed have been applied more generally in Iran. 
 
Breaking their silence from Ṣafavīd time, Shī‘īte clerics started to issue legal opinions 
(sg. fatvā) against the consumption of opium. The Ṣūfī ‘Alī Nūr-‘Alī-Šāh Gonābādī (1867-
1918), who wrote the first religious treatise on opium prohibition, cites some religious edicts 
by grand āyatollāhs.174 Yet, the dispersed clerical hierarchy prevented a concerted approach. 
In their function as landowners, the clergy additionally had invested financial interests in the 
opium industry as well. 
 
The Qāǧār shahs for their part were less concerned with opium consumption than the 
Ṣafavīds. The only royal decree against drugs is handed down from the first Qāǧār ruler Āqā 
Moḥammad, who thus wanted to legitimize his rule by tying up with earlier Ṣafavīd displays 
of piety. His ban seems, however, rather to have concerned cannabis (bang).175 Additionally, a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170  For the development of Iran’s opium industry in the volatile period between 1900 and 1920: Neligan 
(1927), 13; Seyf (1984), 242, 247; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr). 
171  Only in the torrid provinces at the Persian Gulf and the dump provinces at the Caspian Sea no poppy was 
cultivated: MacCormack & al. (1924), 7, 37; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr). 
172  Now mostly over Hong Kong and the Straits Settlements: McLaughlin & Quinn (1974), 484f. 
173  Polak (1865), 252. 
174  Cf. his treatise “The piercing {sword} and the prohibition of opium smoking“ (ḏu ʼl-feqār va ḥormat-e 
kešīdan-e taryāk): Gonābādī (1948/49); further Āyatollāhs who had issued religious bans are cited by: 
Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 523ff.; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr). 
175  Parvin & Sommer (1987), 249; Matthee refers to a quote by Olivier concerning kūknār: Matthee (2005), 
207, 209; Olivier, however, refers to bang and explicitly states that “la loi [qui] permet les autres 
breuvages”: Olivier (1807) V, 279. 
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few provincial governors issued edicts on prohibiting opium consumption or restricting poppy 
cultivation, a lesson learnt from the famine of 1871/72.176  
The Qāǧārs initially, however, did not encourage poppy cultivation either.177 Until 
1889/90 poppy – like other cash crops – was not subject to special taxes.178 Only from then 
onwards did the government actively encourage opium production for export purposes. The 
levy on opium exports initially only amounted to one or two percent of the total value, but in 
1903 it was elevated steeply to twenty percent.179 Newly designated inspectors were tasked 
with supvervising the poppy cultivation and opium production, in order to guarantee a high 
quality of the opium and thus secure a profitable and stable export market.180 
 
Characteristically, it was only shortly after the Constitutional Revolution that Iran’s 
second parliament, after long discussions on the scale of prohibition, passed Iran’s first opium 
law, the OPIUM LIMITATION LAW of 1911 of 13th March 1911 AH (12th Rabī‘ I 1329 HQ).181 
 
The OPIUM LIMITATION LAW (qānūn-e taḥdīd-e taryāk) 
In six articles, the law regulates the production and sale of processed opium, in particulary by 
way of taxing. On each mesqāl (4.25g) of processed opium, a levy of 6 šāhīs was imposed (§1). In order 
to control the consumption of šīreh, governmental officials were tasked with buying the country’s stock 
of sūḫteh for 3 šāhī per mesqāl, register addicts to šīreh, and resell them the processed šīreh at twelve 
šāhī per mesqāl (§2). After three years, the levies on processed opium and šīreh were to be increased; and 
after seven years, the consumption of šīreh was to be totally banned, and the consumption of opium 
restricted to medical uses (§4). Only opium destined for export was to be exempt from taxes (§5). Tasked 
with the handling and supervision of these provisions are the ministries for Finance and Interior.182 
 
While the law theoretically aimed at reducing opium consumption, the government in 
praxis merely installed a monopoly on the opium production for the purpose of tax revenues. 
Apparently, it also assumed ownership of many opium (smoking) dens (sg. šīreh-keš-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176  Ẓell al-Solṭān, governor of Eṣfahān, prescribed a minimal acreage for the cultivatin of wheat: Stack (1882) 
II, 36; Āṣef al-Dowal, governor of Ḫorāsān, issued an edict (1881/82) prohibiting the sale of opium and 
ordering the closure of dens for opium smoking (marākez-e taryāk-kešī): Kūhī-Kermānī (1945/46), 154; 
Matthee (2005), 221. 
177  Curzon (1966), 499; Amīr Kabīr’s stimulation of poppy cultivation was rather an experiment – according 
to Ādamiyyat and Okazaki: Matthee (2005), 217; a more active role of the Qājār government is suggested 
by: Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 362f.; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 64f. 
178  Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr). 
179  Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr); Hansen (2001), 98. 
180  Curzon (1966), 499. 
181  Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr); Matthee (2005), 221. 
182  The taxes on stick opium and šīreh increased from 6 and 12 šāhī in 1910 to 20 and 16 šāhī in 1916 
respectively: MacCormack & al. (1924), 4f., 35f.; Neligan (1927), 47; MacCallum (1928), 7; Chahkar 
(1936), 39ff., 141f.; Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 488f.; McLaughlin & Quinn (1974), 483f.; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – 
EIr); Hansen (2001), 98f.; Matthee (2005), 221. 
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ḫāneh).183 William Morgan Shuster (1877-1960), the American Administrator General of 
Finance to the Qājār government, suggested to increase governmental revenues by further 
raising the opium tax. This plan was, however, dismissed by both Russia and Great Britain,184 
not because the existing taxes had already led to local revolts and opium smuggling.185 While 
admittedly establishing a certain governmental control on opium production and consumption, 
the law never really was fully implemented. As a result of British, Russian and Ottoman 
incursions into Iran during WWI, the country soon descended into chaos.186 
 
The OPIUM LIMITATION LAW of 1911 came into existence as a result from the global 
movement against opium. Persia had already taken part in the First International Opium 
Commission at Shanghai in 1909 187  and participated at the First International Opium 
Conference of The Hague (1911-12). The latter resulted in the FIRST INTERNATIONAL OPIUM 
CONVENTION, which regulated the production, distribution and export of opiates and cocaine. 
The Qājār government signed the HAGUE CONVENTION in 1914, but the parliament rejected its 
ratification as it was concerned about the economic impact on Iran, fearing reduced 
governmental revenues and the loss of livelihood for many poppy farmers. 188 
 
Iranian Discourse II 
The British Empire as a scapegoat 
 While the Iranian authors of the 20th century acknowledge the responsibility of Iranian society for 
greatly expanding the recreational use of opium consumption during Ṣafavīd times, they proceed to 
portray rather conspiratorial views for the introduction of the habit of opium smoking during Qājār times. 
 Both, Ottomans and Europeans, are accused of having deliberatly used opium as a colonial strategy 
to subdue Iranian people.189 By encouraging poppy cultivation and circulating opium, they would have 
“suck[ed] the Iranian blood” and done all “to keep Iranians ignorant, backward and stricken by 
misfortune”.190  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183  MacCallum (1928), 7; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 70. 
184  MacCallum (1928), 7; Agahi (1998), 12ff. 
185  The government only paid 1 and later 2 šāhī for the sūḫteh, while selling the šīreh at 12 šāhī: 
MacCormack & al. (1924), 4f., 36; Chahkar (1936), 39; Hansen (2001), 99; Matthee (2005), 221. 
186  MacCormack & al. (1924), 5; Neligan (1927), 47; McLaughlin & Quinn (1974), 485; Shahnavaz 
(Afyūn – EIr); Hansen (2001), 99. 
187  McLaughlin & Quinn (1974), 383. 
188  For the text of The Hague Convention: MacCormack (1924), 24-34; Groseclose (1947), 209; 
McLaughlin & Quinn (1974), 485. 
189  Āḏaraḫš assumes a deliberate colonial opium strategy to exploit the Asian nations: Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 347, 
358; Malek-Moḥammadī is equally conspiratorial regarding the Ottomans and the Western colonialists: 
Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 53f., 63f.;  
190  Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 63f. 
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Considerable blame is put on the British Empire, which was in control of India at the time, and 
towards the end of the 19th century increasingly in Iran. During the construction of the telegraph line, 
which ran across Iran, the British owned INDO-EUROPEAN TELEGRAPH COMPANY, freely distributed 
opium to the Indian workers. Later, they sold it for half a penny per gram while buying the sūḫteh for 5 
pennies per gram.191 The offering of opium – still the main medicine in the region – might rather have 
been motivated by health-related considerations, and the purchase offer for sūḫteh by concerns to prevent 
the consumption of this stronger drug. Yet, Iranian authors interpret this as a deliberate British strategy 
towards the Iranians, who apparently were introduced to opium smoking by the Indian workers.192 
However, they also identify further culprits for the introduction of opium smoking: Nāder Šāh’s military 
campaigns to India193 as well as Indian and Iranian dervishes and Ṣūfīs, who are portrayed as „helpers of 
colonialism“ (ayādī este‘mār).194 
 
The British finally are accused of having influenced the OPIUM LIMITATION LAW of 1911, which in 
fact contained similar provisions for the governmental purchase of sūḫteh from drug consumers. Together 
with the Iranian government, they are consequently blamed of having furthered opium smoking in Iran – 
while the law rather aimed at controlling this more addictive substance.195 
 
Thus, during the Qāǧār rule, opium became even more intricately intertwined with the 
Iranian society than ever before. Although European travellers might have exaggerated the 
extent of opium consumption, it had become more widespread than during Ṣafavīd times. The 
new habit of opium smoking had more negative consequences as it created a stronger 
dependency for opium and thus more opium addicts. The emergence of a vast opium industry 
might have further increased opium consumption. Instead it made opium a bigger part of 
everyday life. The OPIUM LIMITATION LAW of 1911 admittedly installed an expanded 
governmental control, albeit more on tax revenues than on opium consumption. 
 
II. 4. Opium during the reign of Reżā Šāh Pahlavī 
 
 After the outbreak of World War I, Qāǧār Iran descended into chaos. Large parts of 
the country came under British domination or became de facto independent from central 
control. Matters only took a turn when the British-supported military coup of 1921 installed a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191  McLaughlin (1976), 733. 
192  Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 371; according to a special edition of the newspaper Bāztāb in autumn 1359 (1980): 
Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 64, 69. 
193  Āḏaraḫš (1956), 365. 
194  Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 366; Malek-Moḥammadī generally accuses them of being the “helpers of colonialism” 
(ayādī-ye este‘mār): Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 66; POLAK and WILLS admittedly also report that the 
dervishes and fakirs consume opium immoderately: Polak (1865), 252; Wills (1886), 96. 
195  Hardly convincing, the consumers received more money for selling the sūḫteh than they had to pay for the 
opium according to the newspaper Bāztāb (autumn 1359 / 1980): Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 69, 93. 
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new government, which included the powerful chief of army and war minister Reżā Ḫān. 
Within a few years, this determined officer assumed power for himself and declared himself 
as the new shah in 1925, and reduced the young parliament to a mere rubber-stamp. Far from 
being a British lackey, as often portrayed by Iranian sources, Reżā Šāh Pahlavī in fact 
managed to loosen the tight British embrace. Inspired by Western and especially the Turkish 
model, he initiated a decisive modernization process by implementing radical legal, 
educational and infrastructural reforms.196 Arguably the most crucial aspect of Reżā Šāh’s rule 
was, however, a new centralization of power. He strengthened the previously precarious 
control over the country, by violently suppressing tribal and peripheral revolts and by 
asserting state monopolies in all crucial economic fields – including the opium industry. 
 
 Since the opium industry remained a vital source of income for the country, the 
government made every possible effort to control the production and sale of opium. This 
culminated in the STATE OPIUM MONOPOLY LAW of 1928, for which the international 
community had intensely lobbied for a long years. Contrary to international expectations, the 
monopoly, however, did not result in a lasting reduction of opium exports. The methods of 
poppy cultivation and opium production, meanwhile, remained the same as in Qāǧār times. 
The same applies to the habit of opium smoking, albeit the consumption rate might have 
increased further. 
 
Opium consumption 
 During Reżā Šāh’s reign the trend towards opium smoking continued, especially in the 
provinces, while the consumption of opium pills, remained common.197 Despite the OPIUM 
LIMITATION LAW of 1911, the harmful habit of smoking sūḫteh or šīreh respectively was still 
popular;198 and the opium dens (sg. šīreh-keš-ḫāneh) remained frequently visited places.199 
George Everard Dodson, an American missionary stationed in Kermān, was of the opinion 
that opium smoking was a particular habit of the upper and middle classes.200 But, opium 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
196  On the political development between WWI and WWII, or more specifically on Reżā Šāh’s ascent to 
power: Ghani (1998); Katouzian (2003), 15-36. 
197  Due to the quick physical effect „smoking is the method par excellence“: Dodson (1927), 263; for the 
continuing habit of eating opium pills: Neligan (1927), 27ff. 
198  According to Neligan fewer people were smoking šīreh than opium: Neligan (1927), 26; according to 
Dodson, šīreh allegedly was destroyed after collection by the government: Dodson (1927), 264. 
199  Kūhī-Kermānī (1945/46), 124ff., According to the Iranian historian Moḥammad Ebrāhīm Bāstānī-Pārīzī 
(d. 2014): Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 93. 
200  “These folk are obviously mainly those who can afford to grow or purchase a commodity which is not only 
a luxury, but an expensive one withal”: Dodson (1927), 262f.; according to Neligan, the richer classes 
smoked at home and the poorer classes in “tea-houses”, that is opium dens: Neligan (1927), 26; on 
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consumption was certainly not confined to these ranks. There were considerable imports of 
lower-grade and thus cheaper opium from Afghanistan and British-India, and a similar semi-
legal smuggling in Iranian opium. Thus, in 1923/24 an estimated 22,000 lbs. of opium were 
imported into Iran.201 Arthur Chester Millspaugh (1883-1955), an American tax advisor to the 
Iranian government, estimated in the mid 1920s, that a large part of the Iranian opium 
production was consumed locally.202 A commission of the League of Nations, which travelled 
to Iran in 1926 to study possible consequences of an opium prohibition, evaluated a 
consumption rate of 20%-50% of the population. The Iranian government only admitted a rate 
of 5-10%. 203  Ḥossein Kūhī-Kermānī, himself an inspector of the OPIUM MONOPOLY 
INSTITUTION, estimated that 40% of the population of Māzandarān were smoking opium, 
among them many judges, gendarmes and policemen. Out of fear for cot death, even 
newborns were welcomed with a puff of opium.204  
 
Smokers of opium and šīreh were very often strongly addicted. Dodson astutely 
observed: “if the habit has been dropped, every ensuing illness, even a passing cold, is 
attributed to having stopped it, and the advice is pressed home, to treat it by just smoking a 
pill of opium”205 and the dependent taryākī, vāfūrī or šīrehʼī continued to be frowned upon by 
the society.206 
 
Poppy cultivation & opium exports 
 The original plan of eliminating non-medical opium consumption, enshrined in the 
law of 1911, remained futile as long as the government made all possible efforts to enhance 
opium production in order to collect tax revenues. Like in Qāǧār time, the agricultural fields 
were “covered with a bright green crop topped with a white flower”.207 In fact, poppy 
cultivation even increased under Reżā Šāh and amounted to nearly 90,000 acres in 1926, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
apparently widespread opium consumption among the courtiers, including allegedly Reżā Šāh himself: 
Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 93, 951, 252-256. 
201  MacCormack & al. (1924), 39-42; Neligan (1927), 38f.; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr). 
202  Millspaugh (1973), 189; Neligan (1927), 28; Hansen (2001), 100. 
203  Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr). 
204  Kūhī-Kermānī (1945/46), 124ff.; according to Dodson, “one in six” smoked opium in Kermān: Dodson 
(1927), 263, 265; according to Neligan, out of 60,000 inhabitants of Kermān, 25,000 were said to be opium 
smokers, among them women and children: Neligan (1927), 23, 27, 33. 
205  Dodson describes the opium addicts as becoming „slacker and more and more of a slave to the habit“: 
Dodson (1927), 263. 
206  Neligan (1927), 32. 
207  Dodson (1927), 261. 
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covering 21 out of 26 provinces.208 This acreage produced over two million lbs. of opium, 
even though the soils were yielding ever-deteriorating results.209 Due to international pressure 
and more importantly due to domestic economic problems, in 1936 poppy cultivation was 
banned in 35 districts, with the notable exception of Eṣfāhān, traditionally an important area 
for opium production.210 Poppy nevertheless continued to be a vital cash crop.211  
 The declared aim was tax revenues and the procurement of currency. The Iranian 
government achieved this by taxing the different steps of production and sale – including the 
growing opium exports. These exports now also took place overland to Russia and China.212 
Much of this opium was exported illegally that is against the will of the countries of 
destination – in particular China.213 In 1925/26, Iran’s opium exports exceeded for the first 
time 1 million lbs.214 A year later, this amounted to 1.6 million lbs.215 and continued on the 
same level until the mid 1930ies. This was due to an ongoing demand in Japanese-occupied 
Manchuria216. Daniel MacCormack, a member of the American Financial Mission, estimated 
the governmental income from the opium taxes to be approximately 20 million qerāns in 
1923/24, which amounted to 10% of the total state revenues. Characterstically, most income 
was generated from a so-called banderole (bānderōl) tax on local consumption. 217 
Concurrently with the increase in poppy cultivation and opium exports, this amount even 
increased to 45 million qerāns in the early 1930s.218  
 
International framework, & governmental regulation 
 The international community continued to pressure Persia for a reduction of opium 
exports. In 1923, Persia announced its readiness to renounce the reservation towards the 1912 
THE HAGUE INTERNATIONAL OPIUM CONVENTION concerning a limitation opium export.219 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
208  According to MacCormack “it is absolutely impossible to furnish accurate statistics of the Persian opium 
trade”: MacCormack (1924), 9; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr); assuming only 30,000 acres: Destrée (1969), 
98; detailed figures are also provided by: Neligan (1927), 36ff. 
209  The production of 13 lbs. dropped to 5 lbs. per ǧarīb (a third of an acre): Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr); for a 
table with slightly different figures: Groseclose (1947), 213. 
210  During the great economic depression, Iran experienced a shortage in raw materials like sugar beet or 
cotton and consequently invested more in these crops for a certain time: Hansen (2001), 107; according to 
Iranian-American academic Hamid Mowlana, still 1.35 tons of opium were produced in 1936, and 
cultivation only decreased later: Mowlana (1974), 161f.; then health minister Ǧahān Saleh dates the ban in 
1938: Saleh (1956). 
211  MacCormack (1924), 9f. 
212  MacCormack & al. (1924), 12f.; Neligan (1927), 41f.; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr). 
213  Neligan (1927), 41ff. 
214  Neligan (1927), 13, 39f.; Matthee (2005), 215. 
215  Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr). 
216  Groseclose (1947), 212; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr). 
217  MacCormack & al. (1924), 50; Groseclose (1947), 210. 
218  Hansen (2001), 103. 
219  Neligan (1927), 48f.; MacCallum (1928), 19f.; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr). 
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For this purpose, the Persian government commissioned an investigation into the economic 
significance of opium in Iran, which it presented to the Second Opium Conference of 1924-
1925 in Geneva.220 The following year, the League of Nations sent a commission headed by 
Frederic A. Delano, uncle of later US president Frankling Delano Roosevelt, to Iran in order 
to analyze the feasibility of alternative crops. The resulting report of the Commission of 
Enquiry into the Production of Opium in Persia suggested extending governmental control 
over the production and distribution of opium; raising export taxes; and reducing the opium 
production by annually 10% after an initial transition period of 3 years.221 Iran, in turn argued 
that it needs more time to develop alternative crops, and that this proposal would remain 
ineffective as long as other countries were not implementing the same measures.222 It 
nevertheless soon reacted to the international pressure, and ratified the CONVENTION FOR 
LIMITING THE MANUFACTURE AND REGULATING THE DISTRIBUTION OF NARCOTIC DRUGS of 
1931.223 
 
 The trend towards increased governmental control and a taxation of the opium 
industry, which had already started with the law of 1911, received a further boost after 
1921.224 Arthur Chester Millspaugh, who served as Iran’s General Administrator of Finances 
from 1922-1927, realized that the Iranian government only controlled 20% of the local opium 
industry. By adapting a successful trial-and-error method, he consequently greatly increased 
the state monopoly on opium and thus the state revenues.225 The government accordingly 
started to build warehouses, to which the farmers had to deliver their opium, and in which the 
traders had to pay additional taxes for the processing and storageing of opium. This initially 
caused furious revolts by poppy farmers and opium producers. Further taxes were imposed on 
transport permits, opiums exports, and on the local sale of opium. This consumption tax was 
levied on the opium rolls, which were marked with a revenue or banderole stamp according to 
their weight, hence the designation banderole tax.226 Two years later, in 1924, Millspaugh 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220  Neligan (1927), 49; Groseclose (1947), 209f.; Destrée (1969), 84; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr).; for excerpts 
of the report: MacCallum (1928), 39-f.; for the detailed report: MacCormack & al. (1924); Iran did, 
however, not sign the second INTERNATIONAL OPIUM CONVENTION of Geneva (1925): MacCallum (1928), 
37. 
221  Discussed alternative crops were silk, cotton, tea, tobacco pr cereals: MacCormack (1924), 16f.; for 
excerpts of the report: Neligan (1927), 49, 69-77; Groseclose (1947), 210; Destrée (1969), 84; Shahnavaz 
(Afyūn – EIr); Hansen (2001), 105; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 94f. 
222  Groseclose (1947), 210f.; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr). 
223  Chahkar (1936), 107; Saleh (1956). 
224  Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr). 
225  In detail: Hansen (2001), 99-101. 
226  The new policy was first tested in 1923 in Eṣfahān, where revolts were forcefully suppressed: 
MacCormack & al. (1924), 6, 48ff.; MacCallum (1928), 11ff.; Millspaugh (1973), 188-193; MacCallum 
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assessed that two thirds of the country’s opium was now under governmental control, and that 
the revenues had increased to 2 million tūmāns227. Yet, in 1926, the governmental income 
from the opium industry started to diminish again. Millspaugh identified the prohibition of the 
sale of šīreh and sūḫteh as being responsible for it, which apparently had led to an increased 
local smuggling of these byproducts.228 In 1928, the governmental monopolization efforts 
culminated in the STATE OPIUM MONOPOLY LAW. 
 
STATE OPIUM MONOPOLY LAW (qānūn-e enḥeṣār-e dawlatī-ye taryāk) 
 The STATE OPIUM MONOPOLY LAW was ratified by the Iranian palirament on 17th July 1928 (26th Tīr 
1307).229 In 16 articles, the law regulates the exclusive governmental control on the purchase, processing, 
storage, transport and sale of opium. The Iranian government accordingly declared itself the sole legal 
purchaser of raw opium (§3); specified the banderole tax (§7); retained the right to auction export licences 
(§6); prohibited all opium imports (§11); and confirmed its intention to gradually eradicate non-medical 
consumption of opium or morphine within ten years, as earlier requested by the League of Nations (§15). 
Tasked with the supervision of the implementation of the law was the State Opium Monopoly Institute 
(moʼassaseh-ye enḥeṣār-e dawlatī-ye taryāk) (§4).230 
 
 In 1928, additionally, the PENAL LAW FOR OPIUM TRAFFICKERS (qānūn-e moǧāzāt-e mortakebīn-e 
qāčāq-e taryāk) was passed. It prohibited the hitherto widespread trafficking of opium from neighbouring 
Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey, albeit with relatively mild punishments. This initially only consisted of 
monetary fines, except for governmental officials who could be expropriated and imprisoned as well.231 
  
In 1929, the government tried to raise more taxes by increasing the banderole tax 
twofold. It immediately realized this was a mistake, when as a result of increasing local 
smuggling the total revenues from domestic consumption actually started to fall. 
Consequently, it reduced the tax again in 1930. To further counter trafficking of foreign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
(1928), 12ff.; some farmers were allowed to continue processing and transporting opium themselves: 
Hansen (2001), 99-101. 
227  According to the Commission of Enquiry into the Production of Opium in Persia; 2 mio. tūmān were equal 
to 20 mio. qerān: Hansen (2001), 101. 
228  MacCormack & al. (1924), 5f., 39; similar: Neligan (1927), 28f.; Hansen (2001), 102f. 
229  In the preceding parliament debate many deputies clearly stated that this law only would serve as a source 
of income for he government: Groseclose (1947), 211. 
230  Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 490f.; Destrée (1969), 84f.; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr); Hansen (2001), 102f.; civil 
servants were already expulsed from office by an earlier law: MacCormack & al. (1924), 6; as were army 
officers: Dodson (1927), 263.  
231  Two amendments to the Penal Law for Opium Smugglers (1934 and 1940) later also introduced prison 
sentences for non-officials: Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 491; Destrée (1969), 85f.; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr). 
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opium, it granted excise tax reliefs in the border provinces in 1931. 232  Despite such 
concessions, the black market for opium remained thriving.233  
 
Hence, the government set work on controlling the last two weak links of the chain: 
the control on poppy cultivation and opium exports. On the one hand, the STATE OPIUM 
MONOPOLY LAW had not limited the acreage for poppy, nor had it sanctioned fraudulent 
harvest declarations. On the other hand, the government had abused its monopoly on the legal 
purchase of raw opium by paying low prices to the poppy cultivators, without, however, 
supervising the harvest of opium. This amounted to an open invitation to fraud and abuse by 
the opium producers. In 1932, the government consequently amended the law by punishing 
wrong harvest declarations. In 1936, the government eventually started to buy the opium 
directly from the farmers, this time at appropriate market prices. This proved to be a big 
success for the treasury.234 Opium exports, which meanwhile had become the most important 
export commodity,235 gradually came under governmental control as well. Initially, private 
companies could sell opium destined for export, albeit with a governmental licence. In 1930, 
the Amīn brothers were the only ones to receive such a licene. However, since they were not 
able to sell the amount of opium predetermined by the government, opium exports were 
deragulated again for a short time. In 1933, eventually, the government enforced its monopoly 
on opium exports by creating its own Monopoly Corporation for the Export of Opium (bon-
gāh-e enḥeṣār-e ṣāder-āt-e taryāk).236 
 
In the mid 1930s, Iran had finally achieved its goal of largely controlling the opium 
industry from the cultivation to the national and international sale. However, even though the 
establishment of such a governmental monopoly corresponded to the postulation of the 
international community, the League of Nations was not satisfied, as the monopoly had not 
entailed a reduction of opium exports. It continued to soar since the Iranian government used 
the monopoly as a source of income than a means to reduce opium production.237 The overall 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232  The tax was raised from 1 qerān and 1 šāhī to 2 qerān and 10 šāhī per mesqāl; in border provinces 
sometimes only 10 šāhīs were imposed: Hansen (2001), 103f.; Groseclose (1947), 213; Shahnavaz (Afyūn 
– EIr);  
233  The numbers of arrested opium smugglers increased from 18,366 in 1929 to a stunning 155,486 in 1933; it 
was also estimated that in 1929 half of the consumed opium was contraband opium: Hansen (2001), 103. 
234  Destrée (1969), 85f.; in 1936, 500 t more opium were delivered to the governmental warehouses, which the 
government proudly reported to the League of Nations: Hansen (2001), 103f. 
235  Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr) 
236  The Amīn brothers, in whosed company Reżā Šāh is reported to have had a share, were obliged to export 
6,500 cases opium, which even exceeded the global demand: Groseclose (1947), 211f; Hansen (2001), 
105f. 
237  Neligan (1927), 30f. 
 38 
opium production and opium exports only abated after 1936 only due to smaller global 
demand and domestic economic restraints.238  
 
A further explicit postulation of a reduction of the local opium consumption was not 
achieved from the international community and from the STATE OPIUM MONOPOLY LAW. The 
relevant passage in the law had not been sincere from the start. The government 
simultaneously had the monopoly on the local sale of opium and thus had little interest in 
curbing opium consumption as it received most revenues from the banderole tax. 239 
Additionally, a black market for opium continued to thrive, not least because Iran’s central 
authority did not reach to all regions, especially those ruled by the still powerful tribes or 
those bordering neighbouring countries.240 Opium consumption, furthermore, continued to be 
deeply ingrained in society. Opium was still an important medicine,241 a traditional and still 
fashionable consumer product and an all-cure against everday stress and ennui.242 As a result, 
the American missionary Dodson stated: “a public opinion against the abuse of the drug has 
yet to be created, despite the fact that the havoc which it causes is generally 
acknowledged”.243  
 
Iranian Discourse III 
The Pahlavīs as scapegoat 
 Iranian authors of the 20th century continue to point out specific culprits for having furthered opium 
consumption during the time of Reżā Šāh. They accuse Western states of have pushed for the passing of 
the STATE OPIUM MONOPOLY LAW of 1928 and thus contributed to opium addiction.244 The LEAGUE OF 
NATIONS admittedly had requested the establishment of a state monopoly on opium and the law did not 
curb the domestic opium consumption. But it was rather the Iranian government that had a financial 
interest in taxing the local opium industry. Reżā Šāh consequently – and more justifiably – is not exempt 
from harsh criticism.245 One author even maintained that: “there are still many veteran opium addicts, to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
238  Iran even offered to ratify the The Hague Convention of 1912 if it was guaranteed the purchase of 4,000 
cases of opium: Hansen (2001), 106f.; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr); Hansen (2001), 107. 
239  MacCormack & al. (1924), 48ff.; detailed in: Groseclose (1947), 212f.; Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 373;  
240  MacCormack & al. (1924), 11f.; MacCallum (1928), 16. 
241  DODSON mentions his hospital as being the only one in the province of Kermān: Dodson (1927), 261. 
McLaughlin (1976), 728f.; Neligan specifically mentions opium smoking for medical purposes, especially 
as an analgesic: Neligan (1927), 22f. 
242  Opium also still served as a means to commit suicide: Neligan (1927), 23. 
243  Dodson (1927), 265; Millspaugh in contrast maintained, “public sentiment condemned” the opium 
industry: Millspaugh (1973), 189; and according to NELIGAN, many people in Iran were alreday concerned 
about the extent of opium consumption in Iran – not at least because of the bad reputation this created for 
Iran: Neligan (1927), 30f 
244  Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 94. 
245  The Iranian government is described as having run its own opium dens (šīreh-keš-ḫāneh-hā) and advertised 
opium in shop windows; the shop assistants are said to have worked on commission: Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 
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whom opium was sold by force of the gendarm”.246 Not long after, Moḥammad-Reżā Šāh’s twin sister 
Ašraf was accused of having been involved in drug trafficking.247 
  
The attitude of local physicians and clerics, accordingly, does not seem to have 
differed much from earlier times. According to Dodson, physicians continued to treat addicted 
patients with “so-called anti-opium remedies”.248 The clerics, for their part, continued to 
largely refrain from condemning opium consumption. As wealthy landowners, they were still 
profiting from poppy cultivation, and were opposed to the monopolization efforts of the 
government, as was the equally wealthy class of the bāzār merchants, which traditionally has 
been closely intertwined with the clerics.249 
 
II. 5. Opium during the reign of Moḥammad-Reżā Šāh Pahlavī 
 
 During World War II, Reżā Šāh, who was seeking increasing independence from 
Great Britain, was portrayed as being on friendly terms with Nazi-Germany. Great Britain and 
the Soviet Union used this a pretext to invade Iran and on the 17th September 1941 imposed 
crown prince Moḥammad-Reżā as his successor. After the end of the war, the allies withdrew 
their troops. But, Iran continued to be under tight political and economic tutelage of Great 
Britain until the 1950s. This foreign influence eventually served as a catalyst for the 
nationalist movement around Moḥammad Moṣaddeq, who became prime minister in 1952. 
Miscalculating that the USA would support him, he initiated the nationalization of the British-
owned Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) and forced Moḥammad-Reżā Šāh into exile. Due 
to immense external and internal pressure, however, his independence movement was short-
lived. He was ousted on 13th August 1953 by a CIA-backed coup d’état, and Moḥammad-
Reżā Šāh returned to his throne. In the following two and a half decades, the shah 
increasingly turned towards authoritarian rule, and showed himself as a reliable ally of the 
USA, even though he preserved his own agenda. More Americans started to come to Iran as 
advisers for military assistance and foreign policy and contributed to the modernization and 
westernization – or Westoxication (ġarb-zadegī) in the words of the Iranian intellectual Āl-e 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
373; for a rather far-fetched link between Reżā Šāh’s campaign against the veiling of women, sexual 
frustrations by men and increased opium consumption: Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 46. 
246  Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 373; similar: Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 44.  
247  Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 110f. 
248  For the medical prescription of opium eating and even smoking by Persian physicians – e.g. against malaria 
or rheumatism: Neligan (1927), 23f, 33f.; according to Dodson, himself a physician, there were only “few 
efficient doctors of their own” in Kermān: Dodson (1927), 261. 
249  MacCormack (1924), 11, 38f. 
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Aḥmad – of Iran. This eventually would serve as the main catalyst for the revolution of 
1979.250 
 
 The development of Iran’s drug policy during these years mirrored the general 
political development. Initially, political measures to control opium production and 
consumption were a reflection of the errant domestic politics following World War II. 
Concurrent with increasing oil revenues, the economic importance of opium steadily 
decreased, especially after 1953. Iran’s opium industry consequently flourished for a last time 
during Moṣaddeq’s government, when oil revenues were running dry due to international 
sanctions. Arguably, as a service in return for the US supported coup against Moṣaddeq, the 
shah pushed through the first serious law against opium production and consumption in 1955. 
Domestic production indeed was suppressed but local demand for opium persisted and 
immediately started to be supplied by opium – and worse, increasingly by heroin – from 
neighbouring Turkey and Afghanistan. Seemingly more concerned by capital outflow than 
local addiction rates, a new law was passed in 1969 that re-allowed limited domestic opium 
production. This represented a deliberate break with the international drug policy and 
accordingly provoked the anger of the international community. However, this time, the 
opium was not destined for export but for an innovative local opium maintenance programme. 
In combination with repressive measures against opium trafficking and new progressive 
therapy measures against opium addiction, this new programme started to yield its first 
successes. Yet, the revolution of 1979 soon put an end to this progressive approach. 
 
Drug addiction 
 There is little reliable information on the situation of drug consumption in Iran for the 
time during and after World War II. Inferring from the substances that were listed in the LAW 
ON PROHIBITION OF POPPY CULTIVATION AND OPIUM USE of 1955, opium must still have been 
the drug of choice and it was predominantly smoked. The law also lists cannabis, morphine, 
heroin, cocaine, and chemical drugs – yet these drugs were rarely consumed in Iran.251 Even 
cannabis was less consumed as in other countries,252 once the popularity of the cannabis 
products bang and barš had waned at the end of the 19th century. The prohibitive measures 
against the byproducts of opium smoking, sūḫteh and šīreh, which had been upheld since 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
250  For a general overview on the political and economic developments under Moḥammad-Reżā Šāh and 
Moṣaddeq: Afkhami (2009); Gasiorowski & Byrne (2004); Sepehri (1982). 
251  Destrée (1969), 86. 
252  Mowlana (1974), 165. 
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OPIUM LIMITATION LAW of 1911, might have reduced the consumption of these strong opiates. 
Nevertheless, since every opium smoker produced his own sūḫteh, an overall control could 
never be achieved.253  
 
The total ban on opium consumption by the law of 1955 corresponded to international 
requirements and consequently was marred with the inherent flaws of the global, repressive 
drug regime. Iranians continued to consume opiates, which was simply trafficked from 
neighbouring Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey. Due to strict border controls, however, 
traffickers increasingly traded heroin, since heroin was less voluminous and thus – at least 
initially – could be detected less easily by border guards. Afghan heroin initially was typically 
brown heroin (no. 3), which had lower morphine content than the famous white heroin (no. 
4).254 It accordingly was predominantly smoked from a tinfoil, which is called “chasing the 
dragon”. Soon enough, purer heroin no. 4 started to be injected intravenously as well.255 
Opium, sūḫteh, šīreh and heroin continued to be the most popular drugs in Iran until the end 
of the Pahlavī reign, as show statistics on registered, treated and arrested drug users. Cannabis, 
hashish oil and chemical drugs such as LSD or barbiturates, might have increased in 
popularity but they remained negligible in comparison.256 
 
Estimations of drug consumption rates in Iran had been traditionally unreliable and 
varied widely. In 1926, the Commission of Enquiry into the Production of Opium in Persia 
had calculated local addiction rates between 20-50% of the population, while the government 
only acknowledged rates between 5-10%. Elgin Groseclose, who first was an assistant to 
Arthur Millspaugh and later became treasurer general in Iran, equally had estimated addiction 
rates of 25-50% before WWII and even up to 75% afterwards. Reliable numbers are, however, 
lacking and the real rates might probably have been rather around 10%.257 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253  MOWLANA claims in the 1970s that „a substantial portion of shireh addicts do exist“: Mowlana (1974), 
163; according to the health minister Ṣāleḥ there were apparently still 4,700 opium dens (sg. šīreh-keš-
ḫāneh) alone in Tehrān in the 1950s: Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 102f. 
254  McLaughlin (1976), 736. 
255  Generally on the spreading of heroin consumption since the 1960s: Mowlana (1974), 163ff.; McLaughlin 
(1976), 736; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 109f. 
256  Destrée (1969), 91f.; Mowlana (1974), 162ff.; McLaughlin (1976), 727, 736f., 761. 
257  According to the medical adviser to the Iranian Health Ministry, Alexander Neuwirth: Groseclose (1947), 
109; Mowlana and Malek-Moḥammadī assume an increase in opium consumption and opium dens (šīreh-
keš-ḫāneh) due to the political chaos during WWII: Mowlana (1947), 162; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 
98ff. 
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Official figures are only available from the year 1955 again. Then health minister 
Ǧahān Ṣāleḥ assessed a number of 1.5 million drug users out of a population of 19 millions. 
This amounts to 7.9%, which corresponds to the average of the official estimations in 1926.258 
The real number might, however, have been higher, as Ṣāheḥ himself earlier had estimated a 
total of 4 million drug users, which would amount to 21%.259 He furthermore assumed there 
were annually 100,000 drug-related deaths, which if compared to his lower estimation of total 
drug users would be untypically high.260  
 
Subsequent figures were announced on the occasion of the drug law of 1969. This 
time, the number was estimated to be half a million out of a population of now 27 millions – 
which amounts to 1.86%.261 A proportional reduction in the addiction rate since 1955 is 
indeed possible but whether this reduction was indeed so remarkable remains questionable.262 
Subsequent statistical data collected from the opium maintenance programme, therapy clinics 
and prisons, admittedly confirm a countrywide addiction rate of approximately 2%. The 
number of registered opium addicts, who according to the law of 1969 were entitled to 
purchase opium, rose from 50,000 in 1972 to 169,512 in 1975. Jointly, they were consuming 
180 tons of opium annually. The number of non-registered opium users was estimated to be 
between 200,000 and 500,000. Thus, in 1975, approximately 600,000 opium users were 
calculated out of a population of 32 millions, amounting to 1,88%.263 Included in this number 
were an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 heroin consumers.264 The real number of non-registered 
heroin and especially opium-users most probably still was higher. However, in total the 
addiction rate indeed seems to have decreased from the at least 8% in 1955.265  
 
The remarkable reduction in the overall number of drug addicts might, however been 
less a direct result of prohibitive governmental measures. The proportional decrease was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258  According to the newspaper Kaihān: Destrée (1969), 89; Saleh (1956); for a similar, more detailed 
estimation: Mowlana (1947), 162f. 
259  According Malek-Moḥammadī, who cites an interview with Ṣāleḥ in the weekly Tehrān Moṣavvar, these 
addicts annually consumed 500 tons of opium: Malek-Moḥammadī (2995/06), 102f. 
260  Saleh (1956); Frédy Bemont in “L’Iran devant le progrès” even maintained that 100,000 were dying due to 
overdose and another 50,000 due to suicide: Destrée (1969), 89. 
261  According to the newspaper Kaihān: Destrée (1969), 89. 
262  Assuming a relative inefficiency of the 1955 law are: Destrée (1969), 89; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 
106f. 
263  For the numbers of 1975: McLaughlin (1976), 728, 739f.; Mowlana assumes 250,000 non-registered 
opium users and a total annual consumption of 350 t opium; yet, he also maintains that ¾ of all addicts 
would buy illegal opium: Mowlana (1974), 163, 169; Moharreri reports the number of 185,000 registered 
addicts in 1975: Moharreri (1978), 69; Malek-Moḥammadī  assumes an overall increase of opium 
consumers after the passing of the 1969 law: Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 108f. 
264  Mowlana assumes 10,000 to 50,000 heroin addicts: Mowlana (1974), 164f.; McLaughlin (1976), 746. 
265  Destrée attributes this to the amendment of 1959 to the law of 1955: Destrée (1969), 97f.  
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mainly due to population growth; while an increased availability of alcohol and a generally 
changing societal attitude towards opium consumption might have contributed to this 
development.266 Undisputed is the fact that the introduction of opium maintenance programme 
led to a stabilization – maybe even a reduction – of the numbers of heroin addicts.267 
 
 Despite changing societal attitudes, opium smokers were not socially stigmatized and 
generally seem to have been able to perform their everyday social and professional duties.268 
Statistical data from the 1970s show that the consumption of opium and šīreh was particularly 
widespread among men between the ages of thirty to fifty.269 Statistics furthermore suggest 
that drug addiction was distributed equally among the social classes; including amongst many 
clerics, and that it was a predominantly male phenomenon.270 Yet, drug addiction amongst 
women has always been a hidden phenomenon in the Iranian society. According to an Iranian 
magazine “previously many of them [women] […] were smoking opium and šīreh in their 
houses; but slowly they had been relinquishing all their being and had been forced to sell 
themselves in order to procure opium”. 271  Heroin, in contrast to opium, tended to be 
fashionable amongst the young, notably among the better-off men – and women – between 
the ages of twenty to thirty.272 The same young people, who were often oriented towards a 
Western lifestyle, were most prone to consume cannabis, LSD, cocaine or barbiturates.273  
 
Cultivation, production, and trafficking 
 Like the addiction rate, the exact poppy cultivation during and after WWII is difficult 
to estimate. The overall opium production certainly was lower than the 2,000 tons in 1926. A 
reduction of poppy cultivation has been postulated for the time during WWI due to an 
increased demand for vegetables by the foreign troops.274 In reality, however, no reliable data 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266  On the widespread and free alcohol consumption: McLaughlin (1976), 727. 
267  Siassi & Fozouni (1980), 128; according to the newspaper Bāztāb: Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 110; 
McLaughlin (1978), 768. 
268  For an example of a lorry-driver from Sīrǧān: Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 1091. 
269  Cf. table 1 in: Mowlana (1974), 164; McLaughlin assumes that over 50% of the drug consumers were sixty 
years or older – this, however, rather reflects the official criteria of the maintenance programme: 
McLaughlin (1976), 739f. 
270  According to official figures of 1973, most addicts were employed and nine percent of all drug users were 
women: Mowlana (1974), 165f.; on detailed statistics of drug addicts considering age, gender, education, 
profession or civil status: Moharreri (1978), 69, 71-80; Siassi & Fozouni (1980), 133. 
271  According to the magazine Tehrān Moṣavvar: (besyārī az ān-hā keh qablān  [...] dar ḫāneh-hā-ye ḫvod 
taryāk vā šīreh mī-kešīdand; valī kam-kam kollīyeh-ye hastī-ye ḫvīš-rā az dast dādeh va barāye beh dast 
āvordan-e taryāk nā-čār beh ḫvod-forūšī šodeh būdand): Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 105. 
272  In Western countries, heroin addiction was rather prevalent among the poorer classes in the 1970s: 
Mowlana (1974), 164; McLaughlin (1976), 736. 
273  McLaughlin (1976), 727, 736f. 
274  Destrée (1969), 86. 
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is available and the annual production figures vary considerably. Governmental statistics 
show for instance a production of 752,250 kg of opium in 1940 and of 192,000 kg in 1944.275 
Yet, this reduction might rather point to a declining governmental control.276 The US 
government accordingly still assumed an annual production of 600 tons in 1944.277 In 1947, 
poppy was apparently grown in 18 of a total of 26 provinces. Conflicting governmental 
decrees against or in favour of a continuous opium production further suggest an unabated 
poppy cultivation and constantly high exports278. Most opium thus now seems to have been 
produced illegally and sold on the black market.279 Opium revenues consequently fell to 2.5% 
of the overall governmental income, however, mainly because of increasing revenues from 
the oil industry.280  
 
 The share of opium taxes in the state revenues increased for a last time to 20% 
between the years 1951 and 1953.281 This was due to Moṣaddeq’s ill-fated project of the 
nationalization of Iran’s petroleum industry because of which Great Britain imposed a naval 
blockade on Iranian oil exports from the Persian Gulf and the subsequent withdrawal of 
petroleum engineers by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). Hence, the income of opium 
rose relatively to the total state revenues. The annual opium production, by contrast, only 
seems to have increased slightly to a minimum of 700 tons.282 Soon after, the overthrow of 
Moṣaddeq, the relative share of opium incomes consequently decreased to 2% again.283 
 
 Domestic poppy cultivation and opium production only reduced after 1955, with the 
implementation of the new drug law. Limited cultivation for personal use seems nevertheless 
to have continued. 284 The bulk of opium production, however, now simply moved to 
neighbouring Afghanistan, Pakistan and Turkey. This can be considered the beginning of the 
region as a main global opiate produceer, which continues to this day. In allusion to the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
275  Groseclose (1947), 214; Hansen (2001), 108. 
276  Groseclose reports in 1947 that opium “is a source of great profit to [local] smugglers”: Groseclose 
(1947), 81, 214; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 98. 
277  Even 600-700 tons: Groseclose (1947), 214; the US State Department assumed that the bulk of these 600t 
were consumed domestically: Hansen (2001), 108. 
278  Iran was supposed to still provide for 30% of the world-wide (illegal) opium trade: Groseclose (1947), 108, 
207. 
279  Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 99f. 
280  Hansen (2001), 108. 
281  According to a report of the UN COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS in 1953: Hansen (2001), 109; FRÉDY 
Bémont assumed an increase of 12% in opium revenues: Destrée (1969), 86. 
282  Ṣāleḥ assumes an annual production of between 700-1,200 tons before 1955: Saleh (1956); according to a 
report in the Illustrated Weekly of Indiana, Iran again produced 700t per year until 1955: Malek-
Moḥammadī (2005/06), 106. 
283  According to a report of the UN COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS in 1954: Hansen (2001), 109. 
284  McLaughlin & Quinn (1974), 495. 
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Golden Triangle in Southeas Asia, it consequently has become known as the Golden Crescent. 
From then onwards, opium of usually rather low quality was now trafficked into the 
continually profitable Iranian market.285 Owing to serious interception efforts by the Iranian 
security forces, Turkish drug traffickers started to increasingly smuggle morphine and heroin 
instead of opium into Iran. These were processed in small laboratories in the vicinity to the 
Iranian border.286 Raw opium, however, also continued to be imported from Afghanistan.  
 
From the mid 1960s, morphine and heroin were increasingly trafficked from 
Afghanistan as well.287 The Iranian government increasingly became disillusioned with this 
development. Not only did addiction rates barely decrease; but also drug addiction started to 
become more harmful with the consumption of morphine and heroin. In particular, however, 
Iran no longer gained any income from local opium production;288 but additionally even lost 
currency to the drug producers abroad.289 The well-known contemporary poet Amīrī Fīrūzkūhī 
summarized the common Iranian feeling about this development when he expressed:“we give 
pure gold and buy pure filth […]; [thus] we paint the loo of the others”.290 The government 
thus gradually became convinced that it needed to adapt its drug policy. In 1969, the 
parliament therefore passed a new drug law, which re-allowed limited poppy cultivation and 
opium production for a local maintenance programme. Originally, poppy was intended to be 
grown on 100,000 hectares.291 The authority to decide the exact acreage was the Ministry of 
Land Reform and Rural Cooperation (vezārat-e eṣlāḥāt-e arżī va ta‘āvon-e rūstā-yī).292 In 
1969, the ministry first designated 1,000 hectares for legal poppy cultivation; but in 1972, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
285  Saleh (1956); Destrée (1969), 88f., 92f.; Mowlana (1974), 168; McLaughlin (1976), 736-742; like the 
Iranian opium in the 2nd half of the 19th cent., Afghan opium was infamous for a high water-content and 
many impurities: Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 107 
286  Iranian traffickers allegedly were often nomadic tribes, especially the Ġirzay (Ghilzai), Balūč, Šīnvārī and 
the Turkmen: Mowlana (1974), 170f.; according to the U.S. World Opium Survey of 1972: McLaughlin 
(1976), 726, 736; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 109f. 
287  Destrée (1969), 88f., 92f.; Mowlana (1974), 170; McLaughlin (1976), 736-742. 
288  Most authors are convinced that the Iranian government was more concerned with the negative economic 
than with the negative social effects: Destrée (1969), 89, 94; McLaughlin (1974), 741f.; Siassi & Fozouni 
(1980), 128; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 107. 
289  The capital outflow for opium was estimated to be 90 mio. US$ per year: Destrée (1969), 89; Malek-
Moḥammadī (2005/06), 106ff. 
290  (ṭalā-ye ḫāleṣ mī-dehīm va [...] keṯāfat-e ḫāleṣ mī-ḫarīm va ḫalā-ye dīgar-ān-rā rangīn mī-konīm): 
Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 108. 
291  According to the business paper Būrs, he government expected to earn 100 Mio US$ from this accreage: 
Destrée (1969), 90. 
292  For a list of the provinces and districts that were allowed to grow poppy: Destrée (1969), 934; the ministry 
was created in 1967: Lambton (1969), 359f.; MCLAUGHLIN calls it MINISTRY OF COOPERATIVES AND 
RURAL AFFAIRS: McLaughlin (1974), 743; entitled to harvest the licit opium were the Agricultural Joint 
Stock Compnies and governmental rural cooperatives: Mowlana (1974), 168. 
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poppy was again grown on 21,000 hectares and in nineteen provinces.293 Opium production 
accordingly increased from 8 tons in 1969 to 217 tons in 1972.294 Given Iran’s endemic 
corruption, illegal poppy cultivation in remote regions and thus an even higher production 
cannot be ruled out altogether.295 Smuggling of Iranian opium indubitabely existed to a certain 
degree296 – as did more importantly the trafficking of the cheaper Afghan, Pakistai and to a 
lesser extent Turkish opium and of heroin.297 From the 1970s, opium and heroin from the 
Golden Crescent additionally started to be smuggled through Iran towards Europe, thus 
initiating the infamous drug trail, which continues to flourish to this day.298 
 
Governmental Provisions 
 During the 1940s, a series of quickly changing governments were issuing a plethora of 
laws and governmental decrees against the production and consumption of opium, which all 
remained largely ineffective. A governmental decree in 1941 restricted the sale of opium to 
pharmacies, where registered consumers should purchase it with special coupons, but to no 
avail.299 In March 1942, the government presented a bill to the parliament, which would have 
prohibited the production and consumption of opium; but the parliament refused to discuss 
it. 300  However, the government came under increasing pressure from international and 
domestic actors. In 1943, the Society for the Fight Against Opium and Alcohol (anǧoman-e 
mobārezeh bā taryāk va alkol) demanded a total ban on drugs301, while the USA also 
increased their pressure on the Iranian government to ban local opium consumption302. Hence, 
in 1946 the government of Ahṃad Qavām al-Salṭaneh prohibited poppy cultivation as well as 
the sale and consumption of opium.303 Shortly thereafter, some provisions were mitigated;304 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
293  According to the newspaper Kaihān: Destrée (1969), 96, 98, 101; the figure of 21,835 ha in 1972 is given 
by: Mowlana (1974), 168f.; McLaughlin mentions 16,000 ha in 1974 but – rather incredible- only 2,500 ha 
in 1975: McLaughlin (1976), 743f. 
294  Mowlana (1974), 168f. 
295  Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 106ff.; Destrée and Mowlana in contrast maintain that Iran was seriously 
and efficiently fighting drug smuggling as it lost currency: Destrée (1969), 364; Mowlana (1974), 172. 
296  McLaughlin (1974), 741. 
297  Destrée (1969), 81, 99ff; Mowlana (1974), 169f., 173; McLaughlin (1976), 741, 752, 761; Malek-
Moḥammadī (2005/06), 109. 
298  Drug trafficking was also eased by new custom conventions, in particular the Transport International 
Routiers (TIR) system, which relied on a reduced inspection procedure: McLaughlin (1976), 761-763. 
299  Addicts above the age of forty were entitled to these coupons: Grosclose (1947), 215; Hansen (2001), 107. 
300  Hansen (2001), 381. 
301  Grosclose (1947), 215f.; McLaughlin & Quinn (1974), 489; Hansen (2001), 108; Malek-Moḥammadī 
(2005/06), 105f.; for more details on the SOCIETY TO FIGHT OPIUM AND ALCOHOL, which had been inspired 
by similar organizations in the US: Kūhī-Kermānī (1945/46), 131, 155. 
302  In 1944 the USA sent a circular letter to Iran, asking it to limit opium production to medical needs; in 
response they offered Iran a guaranteed annual share of the licit opium trade – absurdely only amounting to 
125kg: Grosclose (1947), 216; Hansen (2001), 108; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 105f. 
303  Grosclose (1947), 216; Saleh (1956); Hansen (2001), 108; Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr). 
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and in 1949, the parliament declared the governmental decrees null and void by stressing that 
according to the UN CONVENTION FOR LIMITING THE MANUFACTURE AND REGULATING THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF NARCOTIC DRUGS of 1931, Iran had the right to produce an amount of 
opium “large enough to ensure a sufficient amount of foreign currency”. 305 This right 
consequently continued to be used as an economic tool, especially by the administration of 
Moṣaddeq.306 
 
 Soon after the return of Moḥammad-Reżā Šāh in 1953, then health minister Ǧahān 
Ṣāleḥ presented a bill for a new drug law, which postulated a total ban on opium 
production.307 The parliament and senate started a heated debate about the desirability of such 
a law but due to international and national pressure, they eventually passed the LAW ON 
PROHIBITION OF POPPY CULTIVATION AND OPIUM USE on 7th October 1955 (15th Mehr 1334). 
A cartoon in Ṭehrān-e Moṣavvar illustrates the ensuing popular animosity towards health 
minister Ṣāleḥ by depicting an addict grumbling: “Why did you shatter my pipe, doctor? You 
shut me the door to the delightful life, doctor”308. 
 
LAW ON PROHIBITION OF POPPY CULTIVATION AND OPIUM USE  
(qānūn-e man‘-e kešt-e ḫaš-ḫāš va este‘māl-e taryāk) 
 In five articles, the law of 1955 provided for the first time a clearly defined schedule to suppress 
poppy cultivation, opium production and drug consumption. Prohibited were poppy cultivation; the 
production and importation of opium, šīreh and further derivatives; visiting opium dens; and producing 
opium paraphernalia (§1). Opium consumption was banned as well, and opium addicts were instructed to 
register with the Health Ministry in order to start addiction therapy and withdrawal. The government 
additionally was tasked with providing enough financial support for (former) poppy farmers and drug 
addicts (§2). The penalties for contraventions against these provisions were to be approved within one 
month after the passing of the law (§4). Responsible for the implementation of the law were the ministries 
of Health, Interior, Finance, Agriculture and Justice (§5).309 
 
 The amendment defining punishments and fines was, however, only passed in 1959. The 
amendment expanded the list of banned drugs by including morphine and heroin amongst others (§1). 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304  Against the assertion of the government, opium continued to be produced between 1946-48: Groseclose 
(1947), 81; Hansen (2001), 108; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 100; for the abrogating decrees after 
1946: Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr). 
305  The Iranian government sent a report to the UN pointing to the economic difficulties of crop substitution: 
Saleh (1956); according to the UN COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS of 1953: Hansen (2001), 109. 
306  Groseclose (1947), 108f. 
307  Saleh (1956); McLaughlin & Quinn (1974), 492; Hansen (2001), 109;  
308  (vāfūr-e ma-rā čerā šekastī, doktor? – bar man dar-e ‘aiš-rā be-bastī, doktor): Malek-Moḥammadī 
(2005/06), 1032. 
309  On the law of 1955: Saleh (1956); Destrée (1969), 86f.; McLaughlin & Quinn (1974), 492; Shahnavaz 
(Afyūn – EIr). 
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The Health Ministry (vezārat-e beh-dārī) was tasked with the production of drugs for medical and 
scientific purposes (§2), for which a specific administrative unit, the General Office for Narcotics Control 
(edāreh-ye koll-e neżārat bar mavādd-e moḫaddereh), was created (§3). Articles 4 to 12 are regulating 
fines and punishments for cultivators, producers, traffickers and consumers of drugs. They range from 
penalties to prison terms and compulsory labour and stipulate the death penalty for the repeated 
production or trafficking of drugs. Articles 13 to 15 regulate the procedures of destroying poppy crops, 
while further articles are dedicated to officials violating the law.310 
 
 Responsible for the coordination of the interministerial efforts was the newly created 
Organization for the Prevention of Poppy Cultivation and the Combat of the Use and 
Smuggling of Opiates (sāz-mān-e man‘-e kešt-e ḫaš-ḫāš va mobārezeh bā este‘māl va qāčāq-e 
mavādd-e afyūnī).311 The police and gendarmerie managed to gradually destroy thousands of 
hectares of poppy cultivation and closed down hundreds of opium dens (šīreh-keš-ḫāneh).312 
They also arrested opium addicts and transferred them to establishments where they were 
treated with ‘anti-opium pills’.313 The law of 1955 with its amendment of 1959 thus was Iran’s 
first law that sanctioned the cultivation, production, smuggling and particularly consumption 
of drugs with heavy penalties. Yet, due to increased drug smuggling from Afghanistan and 
Turkey, the law largely remained ineffective in reducing opium consumption.314 
 
 Increasingly worried about the outflow of currency and the growing availability of 
heroin, the Iranian government started to look for a different solution. Drug policy specialists 
discussed a new approach, according to which limited poppy cultivation for a clearly defined 
domestic use should be re-introduced again.315 Critical voices both in Iran and within the 
international community vehemently opposed this plan.316 The Iranian parliament nevertheless 
passed the LAW OF LIMITED OPIUM CULTIVATION AND EXPORTS in 1969. 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
310  The amendment was passed on 22nd June 1959 (1st Tīr 1338): Destrée (1969), 86ff.; McLaughlin & Quinn 
(19745), 493f.; McLaughlin (1976), 737; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 105f. 
311  Saleh (1956); Shahnavaz (Afyūn – EIr). 
312  Saleh (1956); Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 104. 
313  Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 103.  
314  Destrée (1969), 88; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 103f., 106f. 
315  A first draft of the law was presented at a session of the UN COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS in Geneva 
on 31st January 1969; Iran tried to defuse their worries by emhasizing that the plan was only directed 
against the smuggling of foreign drugs: Destrée (1969), 89. 
316  The newspaper Eṭṭelā‘āt on 17th January 1969 (27th Day 1347) pointed to the fact that drug trafficking will 
continue as long as drug consumption continues to be prohibited: Destrée (1969), 90; tellingly, next to the 
Western countries especially the pharmaceutical companies, which were also present at the session of the 
UN COMMISSION ON NARCOTIC DRUGS, opposed Iran’s plan: McLaughlin (1976), 743. 
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THE LAW AUTHORIZING LIMITED OPIUM CULTIVATION AND EXPORTS  
(qānūn-e ejāzeh-ye kešt va ṣāder-āt-e maḥdūd-e taryāk) 
 In nine articles, the law, which was passed on of 4th March 1969 (13th Esfand 1347), reorganized 
Iran’s drug policy by stressing on the regulation of local opium production and expanding therapy 
measures. 
 
Tasked with supervising poppy cultivation was the MINISTRY OF LAND REFORM AND RURAL CO-
OPERATION (vezārat-e eṣlāḥāt-e arażī va ta‘āvon-e rūstā-yī) (§1), and the entire chain of production was 
monopolized by the governmental (§2). Drug consumption continued to be prohibited as a general rule, 
except for those with a medical licence (mojavvez-e ṭebbī) or for scientific purposes, and was punished 
even stricter than previously (§3). Special provisions applied for addicted civil servants, who were to be 
excluded from service after a certain period of grace (§4-7). The government finally was tasked with 
allocating sufficient funds for addiction therapy (§8).317  
 
THE LAW OF AGGRAVATED PUNISHMENTS FOR (DRUG) SMUGGLERS 
(qānūn-e tašdīd-e moǧāz-āt-e mortakeb-īn-e qāčāq {mavādd-e afyūnī}) 
 Parallel to the re-allowance of limited poppy cultivation and opium consumption, this law, which 
was passed on 21st June 1969 (31st Ḫordād 1348), strengthened punishments for drug smuggling, in order 
to emphasize the state monopoly. According to a previous regualtion, drug traffickers, who were not 
organized in gangs and did not smuggle more than a fixed amount of drugs, could be granted amnesty.318 
The new law aggravated the punishments. For organized drug trafficking, capital punishment could 
already be imposed for small amounts of drugs. Military tribunals tried these cases with the explicit aim 
of shortening court procedures. However, even for non-organized trafficking, or the posession of certain 
amounts, stiff prison sentences, hard labor or hefty fines were handed out.319 
 
 Various subsequent decrees defined the implementation of the law; especially 
concerning the acreage under cultivation, the exact mode of operation for poppy cultivation, 
or the treatment of drug addicted civil servants.320 Other important enactments were related to 
law enforcement, therapy and rehabilitation programs, and particularly to the opium 
maintenance programme for severe drug addicts.321  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
317  On the law of 1969, which also promised to cease opium production as soon as the neighbouring countries 
would do the same (§1): Destrée (1969), 93-95; Mowlana (1974), 172; McLaughlin & Quinn (1974), 
498-503. 
318  Destrée (1969), 91f. 
319  Destrée (1969), 91f.; Mowlana (1974), 173; McLaughlin (1976), 751; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 
100. 
320  Addicted farmers initially were to loose their land if they did not quit addiction: Destrée (1969), 90f., 99f.; 
Mowlana (1974), 172; McLaughlin (1976), 290f.; on competences for and procedures of opium 
production: Destrée (1969), 96; Mowlana (1974), 172; Siassi & Fozouni (1980), 128; for students, too, 
harsh provisions were applied: Mowlana (1974), 173. 
321  According to the enactment of 11th September 1969 concerning § 3 and §4 of the 1969 law: McLaughlin 
(1976), 290f.; Destrée (1969), 99f. 
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Since 1969, Iranian drug policy was based on the three pillars of repression, addiction 
therapy and limited maintenance programme. Most contemporary observers have judged the 
controlled opium distribution programme as a regression to previous laissez-faire drug policy 
patterns. Yet, in reality, it might be considered as one of the first explicit global harm 
reduction measure. 
 
Repression by the police and gendarmerie 
Before the passing of the LAW ON PROHIBITION OF POPPY CULTIVATION AND OPIUM 
USE, the Iranian government had led joint campaigns with US assistance against drug 
smugglers.322 From the 1950, two law enforcment agencies were tasked with combating drug 
trafficking. The National Imperial Police (šahr-bānī-ye koll-e kešvar-e šāh-an-šāhī) and its 
Bureau to Combat Drugs (dawreh-ye mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḫadder) were in charge of 
law enforcment in cities with more than five hundred inhabitant. The Division to Combat 
Smuggling (vāḥed-e mobārezeh bā qāčāq) and the Armed Customs Guard (gārd-e moṣallaḥ-e 
gomrok), subordinated to the NATIONAL IMPERIAL GENDARMERIE (žāndārmerī-ye koll-e 
kešvar-e šāh-an-šāhī), enforced the law in smaller cities and villages as well as along the 
borders.323 Both special drug units continued to cooperate with the USA and the UN Division 
of Narcotic Drugs.324 In 1969, almost 20,000 drug traffickers remained incarcerated, thus 
putting a heavy burden upon the judiciary system.325 
 
With the passing of the LAW OF AGGRAVATED PUNISHMENTS FOR (DRUG) SMUGGLERS 
of 1969, the persecution of drug traffickers intensified. Until 1976, military tribunals executed 
more than 200 drug traffickers.326 Yet, borders were long and porous,327 and corruption was 
widespread.328 The police and gendarmerie furthermore competed with each other for budgets 
and responsibilities and generally refrained from cooperation.329 At times, investigations 
simply were stopped because important officials or even members and the royal family were 
involved in drug smuggling.330 Drug trafficking accordingly continued. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
322  Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 99f 
323  McLaughlin (1976), 755. 
324  US liaison officers regularly served as advisers to both agencies: McLaughlin (1976), 756f. 
325  Destrée (1969), 99f. 
326  McLaughlin (1976), 741, 752, 761; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 109 
327  McLaughlin (1976), 766f. 
328  According to the historians Madanī-Kermānī and Rāvandī: Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 106f. 
329  The competition between the security agencies was also the result of a deliberate power strategy of 
Moḥammad-Reżā Šāh: McLaughlin (1976), 757-771. 
330  McLaughlin (1976), 760; e.g. Moḥammad-Reżā Šāh’s twin sister Ašraf was accused of organizing drug 
trafficking: Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 110f. 
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Therapy and rehabilitation 
 Coordinated governmental addiction therapy only started after the passing of the LAW 
ON PROHIBITION OF POPPY CULTIVATION AND OPIUM USE of 1955. At the beginning, common 
therapy measures consisted almost exclusively in mere detoxification without supportive 
consultations. Private physicians continued to dispens anti-opium pills – often still partly 
containing opium – but also started to experiment with methadone. Relapse rates accordingly 
were high.331 
 
 The Health Ministry continued to supervise addiction therapy after the law of 1969. 
However, their incompetence became increasingly evident as it had never established a 
national coordination plan for therapy measures, there were only a few existing therapy 
facilities and most often lacked skilled manpower.332 In 1974 consequently, the newly created 
Ministry of Social Welfare (vezārat-e refāh-e ejtemā‘ī) was tasked with supervising 
governmental addiction therapy, while the direct implementation was incumbent upon the 
National Iranian Society for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled (NISRD). This society was, 
however, again transferred back to the health ministry in 1976. Within short time, it 
reorganized the nationwide therapy administration. The bulk of therapy measures were 
assigned to community based mental health centres, which offered ambulatory psychological 
treatment alongside detoxification.333 For heroin addicts, specific addiction treatment clinics 
were created, in which detoxification with methadone as well as psychological and 
occupational therapies were performed on an inpatient basis. In 1976, two such clinics were 
operating in Yāftābād near Tehrān and in Reżāʼīyeh near Orūmiyyeh, while another clinic 
was under construction in Kermānšāh. Further three clinics existed in Mašhad, Rašt and Sarī, 
where addiction had been traditionally widespread.334 The promising combination of medical 
and therapeutic treatment was new in Iran. Yet, these clinics, too, merely detoxified drug 
addicts to produce successful statistics, without longterm objectives.335 Private physicians 
continued to treat addiction in cities, especially in the smaller towns and villages. As they 
continued to be supervised by the Health Ministry, an impeding competition between the two 
ministries developed, further hampering successful addiction treatment.336 Before the new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
331  Mowlana (1974), 174; Moharreri (1978), 70. 
332  McLaughlin (1976), 747. 
333  Mowlana (1974), 174; McLaughlin (1976), 748311; Moharreri (1978), 70; the community based centres 
had a capacity of 50 to 70 beds: Siassi & Fozouni (1980), 129, 133; Agahi & Spencer (1980), 43; 
Spencer & Agahi (1990), 173; Kamali (2011), 17. 
334  Mowlana (1974), 174; McLauglin (1976), 748. 
335  McLaughlin (1976), 749f. 
336  McLaughlin (1976), 748ff. 
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therapy system and competing comptetences could be calibrated, the revolution of 1979 set in, 
eventually resulting in a temporary halt of most scientifically based addiction treatment. 
 
Addiction research and drug prevention 
 For many years, the only drug related studies undertaken in Iran were analyses of the 
impact of the opium industry on Iran’s economy rather than drug addiction. It was carried out 
under the supervision of Americans and mostly destined for the League of Nations and the 
United Nations respectively.337 Proper domestic research on drug addiction only started in the 
mid 1970s. Studies by Agahi & Spencer, Siassi & Fozouni or Mehryar & Moharreri examined 
the efficiency of addiction treatment by methadone and mutabon, or the effects of the opium 
maintenance program on the behaviour of drug addicts and their families. Most of these 
studies were, however, only published after the revolution.338  
 
 Drug prevention was further neglected. The opinion was widespread that drug 
education would rather lead to an increase in drug consumption. With the development of 
addiction clinics, drug addicts in treatment at least were informed about the harm and the 
dangers of opium and heroin addiction and thus provided with secondary and tertiary 
prevention. Primary drug prevention only received a boost in 1974, when the government 
decided to make drug awareness a top priority. After a few months of intense state activities 
and media coverage, however, the enthusiasm soon faded. Unclear responsibilities once again 
impeded successful national measures.339 
 
The Opium maintenance programme 
 The most striking change in the LAW OF LIMITED OPIUM CULTIVATION AND EXPORTS 
was the introduction of the opium maintenance programme. This idea was not new in Iran, as 
already in the 1940s a law restricting the sale of opium to pharmacies had been proposed. 
Such earlier measures were, however, rather aimed at ensuring the governmental monopoly 
and thus increasing state revenues. This motive, admittedly, was still present in the new 
maintenance programme, as the government explicitly was concerned with the loss of capital 
for the purchase of foreign-produced opium. Yet, at the same time, the government tried to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
337  MacCormack (1924); this is also supported by: Agahi & Spencer (1981), 43. 
338  For further details on these and similar studies: McLaughlin (1976), 763ff.; the second study mentioned is: 
Siassi & Fozouni (1980); other studies were conducted by: Moharreri (1987); Mehryar & Moharreri 
(1978). 
339  Before 1974 “no large-scale predrug education programs” existed: Mowlana (1974), 173; McLaughlin 
(1976), 451. 
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rein in the increasing spread of heroin consumption. Additionally, the programme attests to a 
realistic assessment of the inefficiency of the repressive drug policy that had been introduced 
by the LAW ON PROHIBITION OF POPPY CULTIVATION AND OPIUM USE of 1955. 
 
According to the implementation provisions to the law, initially, only Iranians above 
the age of sixty could apply for participating in the opium distribution programme. Applicants 
had to be recommended by a private physician and approved by three medical doctors of the 
Health Ministry. If the assessment was positive, they received an identity card marked with a 
skull, bearing the name, address and a picture as well as the daily ration the were allowed to 
obtain from one of the countrywide 300 licenced pharmacies. They had the possibility to 
provide themselves with up to thirty daily rations at one time. This was meticulously noted on 
the card. The governmental opium, however, was not free, but had to be purchased for 17.5 
rīyāl per gram.340 
 
The stated rationale of the maintenance programme was to cure all drug addicts below 
the age of sixty; 341  while allowing people above this age – those considered to be 
economically unproductive – to continue controlled opium consumption until their eventual 
decease.342 In practice, however, an ever-increasing number of people were supplied with 
governmental opium. The eligibility age was in practice soon lowered to fifty years and in 
exceptional cases even lower. Daily rations furthermore could vary considerably, while opium 
eaters at times would register as opium smokers, who generally were consuming more. 
Additionally, the law did not obligate opium smokers to return the dross (sūḫteh), even 
though the cards mentioned that its consumption was illegal. Many holders of opium cards 
thus either smoked the sūḫteh and / or sold the surplus in opium; or they sold the 
governmental opium altogether and provided themselves with cheaper, illegal Afghan or 
Turkish opium.343 The government did not seem to be too worried about fraud within the 
maintenance program, as it was probably content that at least Iranian opium was consumed.344 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
340  Mowlana (1974), 174; McLaughlin (1976), 738-742; Siassi & Fozouni (1980), 128. 
341  Drug addicts could, however, not be forced to undergo treatment: McLaughlin (1976), 745f., 750. 
342  For more details on the aim of the opium maintenance programme: McLaughlin (1976), 738-742; 
Moharreri (1978), 69f.; Siassi & Fozouni (1980), 128. 
343  For more details on the problematic implementation of the opium maintenance programme: McLaughlin 
(1978), 739-742; Moharreri (1978), 70; Siassi & Fozouni (1980), 128, 130ff. 
344  McLaughlin (1978), 739, 741f. 
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II. 6) The Islamic Republic 
 
After the revolution of 1979, the Islamist authorities often broke completely with the 
policies of the shah, even if certain administrative structures and practices were continued. 
This paradigmatically also applies to the drug policy. During the first months after the 
revolution, poppy cultivation and opium consumption seem to have greatly increased due to 
the lacking control of the new authorities. But, this situation soon changed. First practical 
measures against drug addiction were implemented from mid 1979 when security forces 
started to gather drug addicts in rehabilitation centres and increasingly in addiction camps and 
prisons. Soon, the recently increased poppy cultivation was forbidden again, and since then, 
no noteworthy opium production has taken place inside Iran. Yet, just like thirty years ago, 
ever-increasing amounts of opium and herion started to be trafficked from Afghanistan and 
Pakistan to Iran again and through Iran towards Europe and the Middle East.  
 
The incident that arguably should prove most decisive in changing the previous drug 
policy was, however, the war Iraq waged against Iran in 1980. It brought proper therapy 
measures against drug addiction to a halt and most probably let to a rise in addiction rates. 
The Iranian government only realized the extent of drug addiction – especially to heroin – 
towards the end of the war.  
 
In the context of a general reconfiguration of the Islamic Republic at the end of 
Āyatollāh Ḫomainī’s reign, the newly created Expediency Discernment Council passed a new, 
harsh drug law in 1988. This law in particular led to the creation of the Drug Control 
Headquarter (DCHQ), a body tasked with coordinating all domestic drug demand and drug 
supply reduction measures. But, since the severe punishments against drug traffickers and 
addicts still did not yield the expected result, the Rafsanǧānī administration gradually 
introduced a more progressive drug policy. The government started to re-emphasize drug 
therapy and rehabilitation, and private clinics again started to prescribe opioid-agonists such 
as methadone and buprenorphine, as had been the case before the revolution. In 1997, this 
new policy was embodied in an amendment to the drug law, which allowed for the treatment 
of drug addicts instead of imprisonment, even though the consumption of drugs continued to 
be criminally liable. The government of Khātamī gradually replaced previous, prison-like 
addiction camps with new inpatient and outpatient therapy centres, in which increasingly 
progressive scientific treatment methods were applied. This development was supported by 
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the UNDCP office, which was opened in Tehran in 1999. Increased contacts with 
international addiction specialist and the return of Iranian addiction experts resulted in the 
introduction of further harm reduction measures, such as the distribution of sterile syringes or 
secondary and tertiary prevention campaigns. Besides, private clinics and governmental 
centers started to closely cooperate with each other, supervised by the DCHQ and new 
academic research institues such as DARIUS or INCAS. 
 
During Aḥmadīnežād’s term, this progressive drug policy continued, with DARIUS 
experimenting with a tentative maintenance programs At the same time, however, repressive 
measures were strengthened again. Drug addicts again started to be rounded up in prison-like 
addiction camps, as had become clear during the protests against the re-election of 
Aḥmadīnežād in 2009. 
 
Cultivation, Production, and Trafficking 
During the transition period of the revolution, governmental control waned, especially 
in the remote provinces. Poppy cultivation is accordingly assumed to have increased for a 
short period to approximately 33,000 hectares – including in provinces where no cultivation 
had taken place.345 In the autumn of 1979, however, Āyatollāh Ḫomainī issued a fatvā, in 
which he prohibited poppy cultivation and opium production. 346  The new government 
consequently started to destroy existing cultivations in all provinces. Since, no noticeable 
opium production has taken place in Iran.347 This is also true for during the war, as the 
situation after the war had corroborated.348 The United Nations acknowledged this fact early 
on, but the USA continued to list Iran on its annual list of Major Drug Producing and 
Trafficking Countries.349 Only in 1998, did president Clinton admit that Iranian poppy 
cultivation is negligible and that the Iranian security forces are waging successful combat 
against drug trafficking. Iran consequently was removed from the list. 350  The afresh 
prohibition of local opium production, however, produced the same dynamics as did the LAW 
ON PROHIBITION OF POPPY CULTIVATION AND OPIUM USE of 1955.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
345  Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44; Agahi & Spencer (1990), 174; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 112. 
346  Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 112; Spencer & Agahi (1981), 45. 
347  Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 2; CACI (2004). 
348  Only in the eastern provinces a limited cultivation still seems to have taken place: Spencer & Agahi (1990), 
175. 
349  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 167; Reid & Costigan (2002), 101; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 2; CACI 
(2004). 
350  Not all members of congress agreed with this political switch: Samii & Recknagel (1999), 166f.; Reid & 
Costigan (2002), 101; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 2; CACI (2004); Navai (2005), 80. 
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POPPY CULTIVATION IN AFGHANISTAN 
 After the prohibition of producing domestic opium in Iran, poppy cultivation immediately increased 
in the vast tribal belt between Afghanistan and Pakistan, from which it continued to be trafficked to Iran 
and further to European and Arab countries.351 This development, admittedly, was reinforced by the 
Soviet-Afghan war, in which opium production served to bolster the war chests especially of the 
Mujahedeen (moǧāhedīn).352 This disastrous combination of armed resistance and drug trafficking, 
together with a lack of viable economic alternatives, is the main reason for which Afghanistan has 
remeained the principal producer of opiates in the world to this day. Opium and heroin production in fact 
further increased during the Afghan civil war in the 1990s, not exclusively in the Taliban-controlled 
areas.353 The Taliban admittedly had declared a ban on poppy cultivation in 2000; yet, this was only a 
strategic – and eventually futile – move to gain the acceptance of the international community. Opium 
and heroin sales continued unabatedly354 
 
 After the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the Americans announced the intention of ending the 
soaring opium production in the Golden Crescent. The USA indeed played a less ambiguous role than 
during the 1990s, when the CIA actually had participated in the trafficking of heroin. Yet, Afghan opium 
production continued to rise to unprecedented heights. The previous peak of 4,565 tons of opium under 
the Taliban was again reached in 2004. In 2007, this almost doubled to of 8,200 tons, which even 
exceeded the global demand for licit and illicit opiates.355 
 
The shortest trafficking route for Afghan and Pakistani drugs towards Europe and the 
Middle East, which had been established before the revolution von 1979, continued to run 
through Iran.356 After the collapse of the Soviet Union, illegal exports towards Central Asian 
countries and Russia have increased; but the Iranian route has remained the most important. 
In the 2000s, an estimated 60% of Afghan and Pakistani opium was trafficked through Iran, 
of which about 40% was consumed in Iran.357 Of the 4,574 tons that the two countries 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
351  The dislocation of the poppy cultivation to Afghanistan and Pakistan was also the subject of many Iranian 
newspaper articles in 1979 and 1980: Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44; Spencer & Agahi (1990), 175f.; 
Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 1f.; CACI (2004); Navai (2005), 79.  
352  The CIA was demonstrably actively involved in the transportation of Afghan opium and heroin: McCoy 
(2003); Calabrese (2007), 1. 
353  The acreage under poppy cultivation continued to be more extended in Southeast Asia until 2003; but in 
1999, Afghanistan and Pakistan for the first time produced more opium than the countries of Southeast 
Asia: UNDCP (2000), 34; UNODC (2007), 40.  
354  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 153ff.; Siyāsat (2000), 9; Reid & Costigan (2002), 100f.; Samii (2003), 
284f.; Navai (2005), 83.  
355  For charts analyzing the Afghan opium production: UNODC (2009), 34; generally on the development of 
the Afghan drug industry: Samii (2003), 285; Catania (2004), 17; Curtis (2004), 17; CACI (2004); 
Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 2; Navai (2005), 79f.; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 118; GTZ (2006); 
Calabrese (2007), 2. 
356  Reid & Costigan (2002), 100f.; CACI (2004); Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 2; Navai (2005), 79f.; GTZ 
(2006); Calabrese (2007), 2. 
357  According to estimations of the UNODC and Chouvy: Samii & Recknagel (1999), 162; Samii (2003), 
287; CACI (2004); Navai (2005), 79f.; Calabrese (2007), 2. 
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produced in 1999, 2,744 tons were trafficked to Iran.358 If one subtracts the estimated 15% 
percent that the Iranian security forces supposedly seize,359 domestic consumption still would 
have amounted to over 2,000 tons. 
 
Many details of the drug trafficking patterns naturally remain unknown. A coarse 
picture of drug trafficking routes and involved drug traffickers nevertheless can be gained 
from drug seizures and the interrogation of arrested traffickers. Addiction rates in Iranian 
cities are a further indication for trafficking routes, since these tend to be higher in cities that 
lie on such routes.360 The available data thus point to two main trafficking routes, on which 
opium, morphine and heroin are smuggled from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Iran.  The more 
important route enters Iran in the southeast of the country through the province of Sīstān va 
Balūčestān – either directly from Afghanistan or indirectly from Pakistan. The other route 
runs through the northeastern province of Ḫorāsān, to where the drugs are either smuggled 
directly from Afghanistan or indirectly from Turkmenistan.361 Iran’s long eastern border 
consists or rugged mountains and vast deserts. It is consequently porous and difficult to 
control.362 
 
Drug trafficking in southeast Iran is almost exclusively organized by traffickers 
belonging to the Balūč minority,363 which lives on both sides of the Iranian-Pakistani border. 
Sīstān va Balūčestān is the least developed province in Iran and smuggling – of all kinds of 
goods – thus often is the only viable income in the region.364 In addition to their economic 
maginalization, the Balūč, as a Sunni ethnic group, are also politically and religiously 
disadvantaged. As a result, they started to form armed opposition groups, the most important 
of which is the ǦONDOLLĀH (Army of God).365 Drug trafficking accordingly became closely 
intertwined with the armed combat against the central state and drug trafficking in Sīstān va 
Balūčestān took on rather violent forms. The traffickers are heavily armed with machine guns 
mounted on pick-up trucks and Kalashnikovs and they use satellite phones and night vision 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
358  UNODC (2000), 34. 
359  Reid & Costigan (2002), 104; 
360  Cf. chapter VI. 
361  These two main routes consist of different subroutes, which constantly change according to specific 
counter-measures of the Iranian security forces: CACI (2004); AEGD 3:2 (2001), 6f.; AEGD 3:3 (2002), 
6f.; Navai (2005), 80. 
362  Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 3; the border between Iran and Afghanistan and Pakistan is 1,925 km long: 
Navai (2005), 79; Samii & Recknagel (1999), 157; Calabrese (2007), 3. 
363  On the Balūč and their role in drug trafficking: Samii (2003), 294f.; CACI (2004); Navai (2005), 82; 
Calabrese (2007), 3. 
364  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 158; Samii (2003), 294; Navai (2005), 81; Calabrese (2007), 17. 
365  Calabrese (2007), 4, 8. 
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devices. This led to a veritable feud with the Iranian security forces, which resulted in many 
traffickers being killed in these fights. Executions and kidnappings of mostly non-Balūč 
persons also regularely take place.366 The traffickers usually transport the drugs to the most 
important drug hub around Kermān – often in full daylight – or with the help of motorized 
boats to the countries of the Persian Gulf.367 
 
Drug traffickers in northeast Iran, by contrast, are less organized. Many seem to be of 
Afghan origin – given the fact that indeed many Afghan refugees are living in the province of 
Ḫorāsān.368 There can, however, be no doubt that Iranians are involved in trafficking as well. 
These traffickers usually operate in small groups of a few people and carry smaller amounts 
of drugs, usually by night. They either carry the drugs in backpacks; cross the borders with 
their sheep heards by sewing drugs under their skin; or sometimes pack a young camel with 
drugs, which follows the mother camel, with which the traffickers have crossed earlier, by 
itself. As the traffickers in Ḫorāsān do not necessarily have kinship relations to the local 
population, there is more information on murders, kidnapping and intimidation of the village 
people living in the vicinity of the border. The most important smuggling hub in the northeast 
is Mašhad from which the drugs are transported further to Iran and abroad.369 
 
Besides the two main routes, whose importance alters according to the intensity of the 
counter-trafficking measures by the Iranian security forces,370 drugs are also smuggled by 
individuals – so-called mules. This often takes place through the official border crossings, 
also at airports. Like everywhere else, they constantly adapt their tactics in concealing the 
drugs, sometimes in very creative ways.371 
  
It is not entirely clear, who organizes the further transportation of drugs inside Iran 
from the important drug hubs around Kermān and Mašhad. It seems clear, however, that 
different, smaller groups take over frome here.372 Just like before the revolution, local and 
international transportation companies play a certain role.373 Neither is it clear, how organized 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
366  Navai (2007), 82. 
367  AEGD 3:2 (2001), 6f.; AEGD 3:3 (2002), 6f.; Reid & Costigan (2002), 101; CACI (2004); 
Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 3; Navai (2005), 80ff.; Calabrese (2007), 3. 
368  CACI (2004); Calabrese (2007), 4. 
369  AEGD 3:3 (2002), 6f.; Reid & Costigan (2002), 101; CACI (2004); Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 3; 
Navai (2005), 80; Calabrese (2007), 3. 
370  Navai (2005), 80. 
371  Samii (2003), 289; CACI (2004); Navai (2005), 80. 
372  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 162; Samii (2003), 287. 
373  Agahi & Spencer (1981), 45; Spencer & Agahi (1990), 175; Siyāsat (2000), 9. 
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retail dealing of drugs is. Mafia groups seem to control the retail distribution of drugs between 
and within the cities.374 Thousands of petty dealers – often drug addicts themselves –sell the 
drugs to the consumers in the cities, in parks, around central squares, in cars or in abandoned 
houses375.  
 
Rumours have even linked former president Rafsanǧānī, who made his fortune in the 
pistachio business, to drug trafficking, although there is no evidence for this. Corruption – and 
probably active involvement in drug trafficking – is, however, undoubtedly present up to the 
highest echelons of power.376 ‘Alī-zādeh Ṭabāṭabāʼī, responsible for budget planning in the 
combat against drug trafficking in 1986, in 2000 explicitly acknowledged this in an interview: 
“we knew from the beginning, when the drug problem wasn’t discussed yet very 
much, that this topic is much more powerful and entrenched than the usual reference 
to the number of traffickers, addicts and the thousands kilograms of smuggled opium 
and hashish”377 
The IRGC are said to be directly involved in drug trafficking, in particular by opposition 
groups. They are in control of the borders, especially of the ports and border crossings, and of 
ever-increasing parts of the domestic security and economy. It is thus indeed difficult to 
imagine that drug trafficking happens without a certain approval from the IRGC. Whether this 
happens in an organized way or just in individual cases remains speculative. Individual cases 
of corruption certainly cannot be ruled out in the police, neither. 
 
 The 60% of drugs that leave Iran are most often trafficked over the Western border, a 
smaller part also over the southern and northern borders. The bulk of drugs are transported by 
Kurdish traffickers to Turkey, from where they are shipped to Istanbul and by way of the 
Balkan route to Central and Western Europe.378 After the fall of Ṣaddām Ḥussain, drugs have 
been increasingly trafficked to Iraq, either again by Kurdish traffickers in the north or by Arab 
traffickers in the south.379 The Sunni Kurds are in many regards comparable to the Balūč. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
374  Reid & Costigan (2002), 102; in 2004, it was estimated that over 1,000 distribution networks exist: CACI 
(2004). 
375  Ṭabāṭabāʼī assumed a number of 200,000 drug dealers for the year 2000: Siyāsat (2000), 9;  
376  On specific assumptions of corruption among security and customs officers:  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 
159. 
377  Siyāsat (2000), 9. 
378  In the south, drugs are e.g. smuggled to Middle Eastern countries through the ports Bandar-e ‘Abbās and 
Būšehr, which also serve as entry points for precursor chemicals – and for designer drugs such as 
methamphetamines or hallucinogenic drugs: CACI (2004); Navai (2005), 80ff.; Calabrese (2007), 5. 
379  Navai (2005), 82; according to then INCB president Hamid Ghodse, some traffickers disguise themselves 
as pilgrims to the holy shrines in Karbalāʼand Naǧaf: Calabrese (2007), 5. 
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Likewise economically marginalized, and equally connected to their ethnic kinsmen across 
the border, they also often live from smuggling – including drugs. This seems to apply in 
particular to the PJAK (Partî Bo Žiyānī Āzādī la Kordestān – Pežāk).380 Further ethnic 
minorities, such as the Āḏarī in the north or the Ahvāzī and Baḫtiyārī in the south, are 
however at times also involved in drug trafficking.381 The predominant involvement of the 
Iranian minorities in drug smuggling is due to the fact that they settle along the borders.  
 
 Iranians are, however, not only involved in drug trafficking within Iran. After the 
revolution of 1979, many Iranians who left Iran were involved in the drug trafficking along 
the Turkey-Balkan route. In Western countries with considerable Iranian expatriate 
communities, such as Austria, Germany or England, heroin distribution networks, too, often 
have been in Iranian hands.382 
 
Iran’s security forces annually arrest ten thousands of drug traffickers and dealers.383 
Directly after the revolution thousands of drug smugglers and dealers were executed, 136 for 
instance alone in August 1980.384 It was suspected this often included mere drug addicts but 
also political opponents.385 This situation seems to have continued during the wartimes. 
Although from the early 1990s, the death penalty was only imposed on armed drug trafficking, 
in total more than 10,000 drug traffickers were executed in this decade.386 Another 1,000 
traffickers still were on the death row 2000.387 In the same year, 121,742 traffickers were 
newly arrested, while a similar number of traffickers and dealers were already serving their 
sentence. In 2001, over the course of one day, almost 1,000 suspected drug dealers were 
arrested in the Ḫāk-e Sefīd quarter of Teheran.388 Thus, it seems that drug trafficking has 
increased since the 1990s.389  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
380  On the role of the Kurds in drug trafficking: Samii & Recknagel (1999), 159; CACI (2004); Calabrese 
(2007), 4. 
381  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 159; CACI (2004); Calabrese (2007), 4. 
382  Agahi & Spencer (1981), 43; Samii & Recknagel (1999), 159; according to THE GUARDIAN: Calabrese 
(2007), 5. 
383  Reid & Costigan (2002), 104; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 4; Razzāġī (1999). 
384  Most executions took place in Ḫorāsān: Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44; even the responsible officials 
allegedly did not know the exact number of executions: Siyāsat (2000), 9. 
385  Specifically by the US STATE DEPARTMENT: Samii (2003), 290; also at: Youtube (2010); in 1979/80 AD 
(1358 ŠH), 18,000 people were incarcerated for drug related crimes (probably including addiction); in 
1980/81 AD (1359 ŠH), there were already 30,000 imprisonments: Siyāsat (2000), 9; Samii (2003), 290.  
386  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 164; Siyāsat (2000), 9; Reid & Costigan (2002), 104; Samii (2003), 290. 
387  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 153, 164. 
388  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 162, 164; Siyāsat (2000), 9; Reid & Costigan (2002), 102; according to the 
DCHQ ‚only’ 80,000 drug convicts were in prison: Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 3. 
389  Mokri (2002), 3; Samii (2003), 288. 
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Drug Addiction 
 Directly after the revolution, opium consumption seems to have increased.390 This was 
a result of a greater availability of drugs due to the implosion of the state administration,391 
but probably also of the new alcohol prohibition, which seem to have driven Iranians more 
towards opiate consumption.392 While the use of ‘Western’ drugs like cocaine and LSD 
always had been negligible, it certainly further decreased after Iran’s rupture with the West in 
the wake of the occupation of the US embassy on 4th November 1979. This might initially 
also have resulted in a shortage of medical drugs, which in turn further contributed to opiate 
consumption.393 Iranians arguably still predominantly consumed opium and its by-products 
sūḫteh and šīreh.394 No precise information is available for the consumption of cannabis.395 
 
 It is of interest to note that no information exists for the situation of drug consumption 
during the years of war. Inferring from the post-war situation, Iranians still predominantly 
consumed opiates. Due to a reinforced combat against drug trafficking in the east since 1980, 
opium had become more expensive, which in turn led to the increase in the consumption of 
heroin. Drug addicts either smoked it or increasingly started to inject it intravenously. It can 
only be assumed that the consumption of legal drugs, too, greatly increased in wartime.396 
 
 The continuing popularity of opiates after the end of the war was confirmed by the 
drug law of 1988, which mainly concentrates on opium and heroin.397 Opium continued to be 
smoked, usually by improvised paraphernalia since the official sale of opium pipes is 
prohibited.398 The consumption of opium, sūḫteh and šīreh, seems, however, to have further 
decreased in relation to heroin since the 1990s. This trend was exacerbated by the short-lived 
ban of the Taliban against opium production in 2000, which greatly increased trafficking in 
heroin. Since then it has been estimated that more heroin than opium is consumed in Iran, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
390  Agahi & Spencer (1981), 43; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 114; Calabrese (2007), 1. 
391  Particularly a result of increased poppy cultivation: Agahi & Spencer (1981), 43; Spencer & Agahi 
(1990), 174. 
392  The prices for alcohol on the black market increased tenfold: Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44; on the 
campaign against alcohol: Spencer & Agahi (1990), 174; Reid & Costigan (2002), 102; Nassirimanesh 
& al. (2005), 2. 
393  Spencer & Agahi (1981), 43f. 
394  SPENCER & AGAHI assume that in big cities, heroin consumption prevailed; yet, they rely on data from 
urban rehabilitation centres, where naturally more heroin addicts were treated: Agahi & Spencer (1981), 
45; Spencer & Agahi (1990), 174; CACI (2004); REID & COSTIGAN assume that still more opium was 
consumed: Reid & Costigan (2002), 100;  
395  Spencer & Agahi (1990), 174; CACI (2004). 
396  AGAHI & SPENCER believe in an initially slight reduction in drug consumption in 1980: Agahi & Spencer 
(1981), 45; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 114. 
397  DCHQ (1997), 4. 
398  Reid & Costigan (2002), 101. 
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especially in the cities.399 An official of the State Welfare Organization (sazeman-e behzisti-ye 
keshvar) stated in this regard:  
 
“the purchase of heroin has become easier than the purchase of a bottle of milk. 
To buy bread, we are forced to wait in a line for a long time, but to purchase 
drugs, no problem exists”400.  
 
Heroin was almost exclusively injected.401 Soon, new heroin products were brough onto the 
market, the most infamous of which is called “crack” (krāk). This is not to be confusd with 
the internationally known crack, which is a mixture of cocaine and baking soda. Originally, 
Iranian crack was a particularly pure heroin – similar to the white heroin – with a morphine 
content of over 90%. Soon, however, it became known for being a particularly altered heroin, 
sometimes apparently even mixed with horse blood.402 According to Iranian drug specialists, 
these impurities are responsible for the existence of worms in the bodies of drug addicts403 – 
although this usually is rather a result of an unhygienic lifestyle. Another product is called 
crystal (krīstāl), which seems to be either synonymous with crack or a very pure heroin.404 
 
Other drugs, however, also have increased in popularity. This is particularly true for 
methamphetamines, such as crystal meth, which is called “glass” (šīšeh) in Iran, or ecstasy 
(ekstāsī / ekstāzī). Originally rather used a party drug, šīšeh has become a widely used and is 
a cheap drug. Metamphetamines are inreasingly produced domestically, as the production is 
inexpensive and easy manageable in small laboratories.405 Cocaine, for its part, only has 
limited market amongst the rich, since it is comparably expensive. The consumption of LSD, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
399  According to SANDRO TUCCI, at the time the official spokesman for the UNDCP, a gram of heroin could be 
purchased for the equivalent of 1 US$: Samii & Recknagel (1999), 176; in cities, now definitively more 
heroin than opium was consumed: Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), XXX; Reid & Costigan (2002), 102; 
Calabrese (2007), 2. 
400  According to treatment and prevention specialist BEHRŪZ MEŠKĪNĪ in the newspaper Kār-o-Kārgar of 2nd 
December 2000: Samii & Recknagel (1999), 163. 
401  Reid & Costigan (2002), 102; Mokri (2002), 4; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 2; 
402  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 163; crack addicts are increasing in numbers and meanwhile comprise 23% of 
all drug users, according to ḤAMĪD-REŻĀ ḤOSAINĀBĀDĪ, head of the Anti-Narcotics Police: Paik-e Īrān, 
15th April 2010 (26th Farvardīn 1389). 
403  This opinion was expressed by many Iranian drug addicts and addiction specialists, e.g. in the UNODC 
office in Tehran, to the author in 2008. 
404  Deutsche Welle, 8th August 2009; Farārū, 5th November 2009(14th Ābān 1388); Deutsche Welle, 9th 
November 2009. 
405  At the end of the 1990s, the consumption of methamphetamine and ecstacy still was neglibible: Mokri 
(2002), 4; in 2002 they were, however, already a matter of concern to the DCHQ: Samii (2003), 287; later, 
they became more widespread: Calabrese (2007), 5.  
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even though often mentioned by Iranian newspapers, also seems to be rather neglectable.406 In 
contrast to most countries, cannabis also continues to be a rather marginal drug, which might 
be explained by its traditionally negative image in Iranian society.407 
 
The real extent of drug addiction continues to be a highly controversial topic in Iran. 
Like in prerevolutionary times, official estimations of the addiction rates are certainly too low. 
Relevant data are primarily collected from prisons, courts, and health centres specialized in 
addiction treatment.408 These produce relatively reliable data on heroin addiction, as heroin 
addicts are more likely to be in contact with such institutions. Questionnaires distributed in 
schools or households, or the mandatory blood tests for newlywed couples, learner drivers or 
government employees arguably provide less reliable information.409 
 
 Immediately after the revolution, the new government assessed a number of 2 million 
drug addicts, amounting to 5% of the population.410 Some researchers have estimated this 
number to be too high;411 and indeed, the Islamist government could have voluntarily 
exaggerated to justify the ensuing moral purge of the society. Yet, the last official estimation 
of less than 2% of the population in 1969 certainly had been too low – and, thus, the 2 
millions might actually have been accurate. The number of drug addicts, or at least heroin 
addicts, seems to have further risen during the war years412, not last because of the war. The 
overall addiction rate might, however, have decreased slightly due to the population growth 
resulting from the new pro-natalist governmental policy.  
The next official estimation of addiction rates dates from 1989. Based on the arrest of 
100,000 drug consumers, the government extrapolated a total of 1 million drug addicts.413 It 
took another ten years, until the first serious epidemiological study was commissioned in the 
Islamic Republic. In 1998/99, the State Welfare Organization, in cooperation with the UN 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
406  For reports on (limited) cocaine and LSD consumption and seizures respectively: Mokri (2002), 4; Samii 
(2003), 287; Calabrese (2007), 5. 
407  ANTONIO MAZITELLI, the first represantative of the UNDCP office in Tehran, assumed a shortlived increase 
in cannabis consumption after the Taliban ban on opium production in 2001: Samii (2003), 286. 
408  Mokri (2002), 1f.; Reid & Costigan (2002), 103. 
409  The social and religious stigmatization of drug addiction certainly leads to an underreporting of addiction 
cases: Mokri (2002), 1f.; Reid & Costigan (2002), 1-3; Calabrese (2007), 5. 
410  AGAHI & SPENCER only refer to „two separate official sources“: Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44; Spencer & 
Agahi (1990), 174; Reid & Costigan (2002), 1000; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 1. 
411  Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 1. 
412  In 1986/87, then director-general of the PLANNING AND BUDGED ORGANIZATION (sāz-mān-e barnāhmeh va 
būdǧeh), Maḥmūd Karīmī, suggested a total of 500,000 drug addicts: Siyāsat (2000), 9; an increase in drug 
consumption assume: Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 2; Calabrese (2007), 2. 
413  In 1992, the number of convicted drug addicts fell to 25,000; this seems, however, rather to have been the 
result of a laxer law enforcement: Mokri (2002), 2f.; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 114. 
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Drug Control Program (UNDCP) conducted the most comprehensive epidemiological study 
so far: the RAPID SITUATION ASSESSMENT (arz-yābī-ye sarī‘-e vaz‘iyat), which evaluated the 
number of 700,000 drug users in Iran, based on data from addicts in prisons, detention and 
treatment centers.414 At the same time, however, the DCQH declared a total of 1.2 million 
drug users, amounting to 2% of a population of sixty millions.415 In 2000, the DCHQ 
calculated a total of 2 million drug users: 1.2 million drug addicts and 800,000 occasional 
drug users,416 amounting to 3,3% of the population. This figure has remained the official, 
almost sacrosanct estimation ever since, repeated both by the DCHQ and the UNODC (former 
UNDCP).417 This estimation has been disputed from the beginning. In 2000, the National 
AIDS Committee (komīteh-ye kešvarī-ye aidz), estimated a number of 3.3 million drug 
users.418 A year later, the Ministry of Health even suggested a number of 3.7 millions.419 
Further addiction researchers and officials similarly started to challenge the official estimation 
of 2 millions420, which soon would be reflected in the press as well. Conservative officials, 
especially those close to the security forces, consequently started to warn officials and the 
press not to exaggerated addiction rate numbers. Thus, the deputy for security and law 
enforcement in the Interior Ministry said in 2001: 
 
“The presentation of strange drug statistics is dangerous for the country. I 
announce in my capacity as someone who is involved in and has a thorough view 
on drugs that the number of occasional and non-occasional drug users is 
approximately 3 percent [of the entire population]”421.  
 
There is, nevertheless, much evidence that the real addiction rate is higher than this official 
estimation and probably even higher than the maximal estimation of 5.7%. This is certainly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
414  Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 17; Mokri (2002), 2. 
415  Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 4, 16 
416  Mokri (2002), 3. 
417  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 162; Reid & Costigan (2002), 103; Samii (2003), 297; CACI (2004); 
Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 2; Navai (2005), 83; GTZ (2006); Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 114; 
most recently, ḤAMĪD-REŻĀ ḤOSAINĀBĀDĪ, then director of the Anti-Narcotics Police repeated this number 
in April 2010: Paik-e Īrān, 15th April 2010 (26th Farvardīn 1389). 
418  Reid & Costigan (2002), 103; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 2; Kort & al. (2006), 40. 
419  Mokri (2002), 4; CACI (2004); Navai (2005), 83; Madani Ghahfarokhi (2006), 139; Calabrese (2007), 
6. 
420  Even MOḤAMMAD FALLĀḤ, then secretary general of the DCHQ, admitted that the real number of drug 
addicts and drug users must be much higher: Samii (2003), 287; Ġolām-Reżā Anṣārī, the former head of 
the STATE WELFARE ORGANIZATION, allegedly even mentioned the number of 6 million drug users in 2001: 
Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 115. 
421  (erāyeh-ye āmār-hā-ye ‘aǧīb va ġarīb dar bāreh-ye mavādd-e moḫadder, barāye kešvar ḫaṭar-nāk ast; beh 
‘onvān-e dast-andar-kār va kasī keh beh mavādd-e moḫadder ešrāf-e kāmel dārad, e‘lām mī-konam keh 
šomār-e mo‘tādān-e tafannonī va ġair-e tafannonī nazdīk beh 3 dar ṣad [az koll-e ǧam‘iyyat] ast): Malek-
Moḥammadī (2005/06), 115. 
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true for some cities located on the main drug trafficking routes, where addiction rates are up 
to 10%.422 This also seems to increase further.423 
 
The RSA of 1998/99 was the first analysis since the studies of the late 1970s to 
examine exact demographic aspects of drug addiction in Iran. These early studies on the 
situation of drug addiction under Moḥammad-Reżā Shah had in fact been the first serious 
epidemiological studies in Iran, but most were only published after the revolution. Their 
results still applied for the situation of drug addiction directly after the revolution. 
Accordingly, most drug addicts were male, although addiction among women and and even 
children was common too. The average starting age for opium seems to have been the in the 
late twenties, and drug users came from all social strata. Based on interviews with patients in 
the drug rehabilitation centre of Šīrāz, these researchers concluded that in the big cities, more 
heroin was consumed than opium.424  
 
On first sight, the RSA of 1998/99 depicts a similar image of addiction patterns. Drug 
users were between twenty to forty years old and generally male, married and employed.425 
Like before the revolution, addiction rates among women might have been unterrated 
though.426 There was, however, one big difference to the early years of the Islamic Republic: 
the starting age for heroin now seemed to be under twenty,427 and twenty-two for drug 
consumption in general.428 Meanwhile, the starting age for drug consumption might have even 
dropped further.429 Drug addiction among Iranian youth accordingly is one of the most 
discussed topics in Iran.430 Youth addiction is of course a global problem, but is even more 
explosive in a country, where seventy percent of the population is younger than thirty years.431 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
422  Reid & Costigan (2002), 103; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 2; Navai (2005), 83; CATANIA even reports an 
addiction rate of 20% for Kermān in 2004: Catania (2004), 17. 
423  Assuming an unabated upwards trend in the addiction rate are: Samii & Recknagel (1999), 153; Reid & 
Costigan (2002), 101; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 114; MOḤAMMAD-REŻĀ ǦAHĀNĪ, then deputy of 
the DCHQ, assumed an annual growth of the addiction rate by 8%: AFP, 23rd May 2006; Calabrese 
(2007), 6. 
424  For more details: Moharreri (1978), 69-81; Mehryar & Moharreri (1978), 93-102; Siassi & Fozouni 
(1981), 1135f.; Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44f.; Spencer & Agahi (1990), 174. 
425  Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 17-23; Mokri (2002), 2ff.; Reid & Costigan (2002), 103; Catania (2004), 17; 
Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 3; XXX 
426  Madani Ghahfarokhi (2006), 138. 
427  MOKRI mentiones the average starting age for heroin consumption as 19.4: Mokri (2002), 4; Reid & 
Costigan (2002), 103. 
428  Spencer & Agahi (1990), 174; Mokri (2002), 4; 
429  Already in 2003, an official of the health ministry assumed the starting age for drugs to be between 10-19 
years: Samii (2003), 287. 
430  This had also ben stated by MOḤAMMAD FALLĀḤ: Samii (2003), 287. 
431  For basic demographic information on Iran: Reid & Costigan (2002), 101; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 2. 
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Heroin unse & HIV/AIDS 
 The trend towards the consumption of heroin has increased unabatedly since the 1960s, irrespective 
of the particular drug policies. The long-standing repressive approach of the Islamic Republic has only 
further aggravated this situation.432 According to the RSA study of 1998/99, approximately 20% of the 
respondents had injected drugs at least once in their lifetime, most of them heroin.433 Intravenous heroin 
consumption consequently is supposed to prevail in all Iranian cities.434 The trend towards heroin in any 
case has further increased since.435 The RSA evaluated in total 200,000 to 300,000 heroin addicts – a 
number that seems to have been too low already back then.436 In contrast to opium addiction, heroin 
addiction implies more social stigmatization and heroin addicts consequently are more likely to live on 
the streets and commit acquisitive crimes.437 According to the study, drug addicts are often married.438 
Yet, these marriages do not last. Drug addiction of the husband is in fact one of the few accepted, and 
often-stated reasons for a woman to divorce439. 
 
 The probably most calamitous effect of heroin consumption is, however, the transmission of 
HIV/AIDS and hepatitis. Most heroin users in Iran are injecting heroin intravenously.440 Even though the 
majority of the respondents of the RSA already knew about the danger of HIV in case of needle, over 
50% reported having shared syringes – often with rudimentary cleaning techniques.441 This number might 
have been reduced since, as sterile syringes were made more available in pharmacies, clinics and DICs. 
The first cases of HIV date back to 1986. A little later, Iran’s blood bank had a scandal with HIV 
contaminated blood samples.442 Until 2001, the National AIDS Committee had registered 2,710 cases of 
HIV infection and estimated a total of approximately 60,000 HIV positive cases.443 The real number 
might, however, have been much higher and certainly has increased since. HIV/AIDS is a highly 
politicized topic in Iran, because it has been perceived for a long time as a symptom for of an amoral, 
sexually permissive – Western or African – lifestyle. In Iran, the transmission of HIV seems, however, to 
happen predominantly by needle sharing.444 A quarter of the approximately 300,000 heroin addicts in Iran 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
432  Spencer & Agahi (1990), 175f.; Mokri (2002), 8f.; Calabrese (2007), 2.  
433  Mokri (2002), 4; in some cities along the trafficking routes, up to 70% of the respondents were injecting 
heroin: Reid & Costigan (2002), 101f.; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 2; according to a WHO/UNAIDS 
report: Calabrese (2007), 6. 
434  Reid & Costigan (2002), 102. 
435  Mokri (2002), 8; this also can be deduced from the increase in the number of drug deaths – from 717 in 
1996 to 2989 in 2002: Reid & Costigan (2002), 103; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 3; CACI (2004). 
436  Reid & Costigan (2002), 103: CATANIA seems to mistake the official number of 2 mio. drug addicts with 
heroin users: Catania (2004), 17l; the annual growth rate was even assumed to be 33% in 2006: Madani 
Ghahfarokhi (2006), 139. 
437  Mokri (2002), 1; Samii (2003), 283; Calabrese (2007), 7. 
438  According to the RSA, approximately 50% of all intravenous heroin users were married: Mokri (2002), 
4f.; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 3. 
439  According to Ḥoǧǧat-ol-Eslām ḤOǦǦATĪ-NIYĀ, a judge from Kermān, 90% of all divorces resulted from 
the drug addiction of the husband in 1998/99: Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 117. 
440  Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 21f.; Reid & Costigan (2002), 102. 
441  Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 28f.; Mokri (2002), 5; the cost of a sterile syringe was about 10 US cents in 
pharmacies: Reid & Costigan (2002), 102; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 5. 
442  Mokri (2002), 6; Reid & Costigan (2002), 103; Catania (2004), 17; CACI (2004). 
443  Mokri (2002), 6; Reid & Costigan (2002), 103f.; Samii (2003), 288.; CACI (2004); Nassirimanesh & al. 
(2005), 3; Navai (2005), 86. 
444  An estimated 60% to 70% of all HIV contaminations are assumed to be caused by needle sharing: Samii & 
Recknagel (1999), 153; Mokri (2002), 6; according to the MAP report of 2001 even 74%: Reid & 
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are estimated to be HIV positive.445 This figure alone shows that the real extent of HIV infections must be 
higher than the alleged 60,000 cases. HIV is, however, of course also transmitted by sexual contact – a 
trend, which has increased in recent years. Contributing to the spread of HIV are female sex workers, who 
often are heroin users in the first place. This continues to be a taboo topic. Consequently, official 
organizations have developed few corresponding secondary prevention measures.446 
 
Intravenous drug use and HIV infection remain a problem insdie Iran’s prisons. It 
actually even seems that it was first realized here.447 Even after the amendment of 1997, drug 
addiction continues to be punishable by imprisonment. An estimated 60% of all prison 
inmates was incarcerated for drug related crimes during Ḫātamī’s presidency. Half of them 
were considered drug addicts who might, however, also have committed acquisitive crimes.448 
This number has rather increased since the implementation of the Plan for the Enhancement 
of Social Security (ṭarḥ-e erteqāʼ-e amniyyat-e eǧtemā‘ī)449 under president Aḥmadīnežād. In 
prisons, more heroin than opium is consumed. Some have suggested that 20% of prison 
inmates consume heroin.450 Until 2000, no clean syringes were distributed in prisons, so 
needle sharing was the rule.451 The first official HIV case in prison was registered in 1996. In 
2000, over 50% of heroin addicted inmates were HIV positive in certain prisons.452 However, 
since then, triangular clinics have started to distribute sterile syringes and in some cases even 
methadone to heroin addicts.453 Even if in reality only a minority might have access to these 
services, this respresents an extraordinary and exceptional harm reduction measure in the 
entire region. 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Costigan (2002), 104; Samii (2003), 288; Catania (2004), 17; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 3; Navai 
(2005), 86; GTZ (2006); according to ANTONIO MAZITELLI, then UNODC representative in Tehran: 
Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06) 117; Calabrese (2007), 6f. 
445  The percentage of HIV positive heroin users differed sharply between addiction treatment centres (12%) 
and prisons (up to 63%): Reid & Costigan (2002), 104; Samii (2003), 288; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 5. 
446  In 2003, the WHO estimated that 3-4% percent of all IDUs - meaning over half of the drug injecting 
women – are female sex workers: Madani Ghahfarokhi (2006), 139. 
447  Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 36f.; Zamani & al. (2006), 342-346; Calabrese (2007), 6. 
448  Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 32f.; Samii & Recknagel (1999), 163; Reid & Costigan (2002), 103; Malek-
Moḥammadī (2005/06), 116; for slightly different figures: Samii (2003), 288.   
449  Gooya, 8th July 2008. 
450  Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 32ff.; Reid & Costigan (2002), 103; Catania (2004), 17; NAVAI even 
maintains that half of the drug related inmates are consuing heroin: Navai (2005), 86. 
451  Another way of HIV transmission was homosexual contacts between the inmates, which already had been 
acknowledged by the RSA of 1998/99: Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 34; Reid & Costigan (2002), 102, 104; 
Samii (2003), 288; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 1; Navai (2005), 86. 
452  Reid & Costigan (2002), 104; Catania (2004), 17. 
453  The authors of the RSA of 1998/99 had warned of the explosive situation of drug addiction and the spread 
of HIV in prisons and postulated swift countermeasures: Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 37. 
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Legal measures 
 After the revolution, previous drug laws were not abolished immediately, but they 
were hardly enforced any more. The revolutionary committees initially rather concentrated on 
a strict alcohol prohibition.454 After realizing that drug trafficking and consumption were 
increasing, Āyatollāh Ḫomainī in autumn 1979 issued a religious decree (fatvā) declaring 
poppy cultivation forbidden (ḥarām). It remains, however, unclear which punishments were 
envisaged.455  
 
From the beginning of the year 1980, the new government iniated a broad campaign 
against drugs, targeting drug trafficking and drug consumption alike.456 Before the revolution, 
the jurisdiction on drug delinquencies had been divided between penal courts and military 
courts. Now, the newly created Islamic Revolutionary Courts (sg. dād-gāh-e enqelāb-e 
eslāmī) were tasked with judging all drug related offences. They continued to hand out death 
penalties for drug traffickers.457 Yet, they seem to have applied public hangings of drug 
related criminals much more extensively than before the revolution. In the beginning, the 
religious purification zeal seems to have included mere drug addicts as well.458 In particular, 
Āyatollāh Moḥammad Ṣādeq Ḫalḫālī was notorious for his merciless strength. Hence his 
sobriquet “the hanging judge” or simply “killer” (ādam-koš).459  
 
On 9th June 1980 (19th Ḫordād 1359), the Council of the Islamic Revolution (šūrā-ye 
enqelāb-e eslāmī) passed a new drug law, the LAW OF AGGRAVATED PUNISHMENTS FOR DRUG 
DELINQUENTS. 
 
LAW OF AGGRAVATED PUNISHMENTS FOR DRUG DELINQUENTS460 
(qānūn-e tašdīd-e moǧāzāt-e mortakebīn-e ǧarāʼem-e mavadd-e moḫadder)  
In 28 articles, this law aimed at standardizing the initially rather improvisational and random 
sentences the revolutionary courts handed out against drug addicts and drug traffickers. The language still 
bears the characteristics of the prerevolutionary drug laws, and in fact, no allusion to the newly created 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
454  Agahi & Spencer (1981), 43; Spencer & Agahi (1990), 173f. 
455  Agahi & Spencer (1981), 45; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 112. 
456  Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44; Spencer & Agahi (1990), 174. 
457  Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44. 
458  Within the first months, thousands of drug traffickers and dealers were executed, also as a deterrant; the 
executions regularly covered in the newspapers: Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44. 
459  Bakhash (1984), 111. 
460 Majles (1980); Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44; DCHQ (1997), 2; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 113 
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revolutionary institutions is found. The resonsibility for the enforcment of the law still lay with the 
gendarmerie and the cirminal courts. 
 
The punishment meted for drug trafficking and drug consumption was increased. Traffickers were to 
be handed out the death penalty in case of repeated drug trafficking or for trafficking more than 1 gram of 
heroin or morphine (§ 6-7). Drug consumption remained prohibited except for those with a medical 
description. Illegal drug consumption accordingly was punished with prison sentences, but the judges 
could decide to replace imprisonment by either monetary fines or bodily punishment (§8). Drug addicts 
further could be sent to „detention and rehabilitation centers“ (marākez-e negah-dārī va modāvā) that 
were to be built by the government. This could be instead of but also in addition to a prison sentence, 
(§18-19). Addicts were given a timeframe of six months after the passing of the law to seek treatment and 
withdrawal with existing medical facilities, before the punishments would become effective (§20). 
 
 The first drug law of the Islamic Republic remained, however, provisional and 
eventually largely ineffective. By tasking the traditional institutions with its implementation, 
it was actually divorced from the realities on the ground, and thus, reflects the competition 
between the elected government and the real clerical power brokers at the time. The Iraq-Iran 
war further contributed to restraining the ability of the law enforcement and health care 
institutions to successfully combat drug trafficking and drug consumption.461 In reality, drug 
crimes continued to be judged by revolutionary courts instead of criminal courts as envisaged 
by the law. However, the religious judges disagreed on how exactly to categorize drug 
traffickers on religious grounds.  
 
„Fighting God“ and „corrupt on earth“ 
 Judges were unanimous in treating armed drug traffickers as “fighting against God” (moḥārebeh bā 
ḫodā), which automatically entailed the death penalty. However, they disagreed on whether to judge 
milder cases of unarmed drug trafficking also as moḥārebeh bā ḫodā or as “corruption on earth” (efsād fe-
l-arż), while the latter verdict did not automatically require a capital punishment. This legal dispute was 
not solved until the passing of a new drug law in 1989. Therefore, convictions of drug traffickers, dealers 
and even addicts remained highly arbitrary und ultimately depended upon the goodwill of the individual 
judge in charge.462 
 
  
The need for an adjusted drug law had become evident before the end of the war. 
However, the stalemate between the parliament and the Guardian Council (šūrā-ye negah-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
461  Agahi & Spencer (1990), 174. 
462  Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44f.; Siyāsat (2000), 9; Samii (2003), 290; Malek-Moḥammadī mentions that 
drug traffickers were considered as „corruptors on earth“ (mofsed fe-ʼl-arż) according to a fatvā of 
Āyatollāh Ḫomainī: Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06),   
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bān), the religious body reponsible for verifying the religous consitutionality of all laws 
passed by the parliament, prevented it. As part of the constitutional reorganization of the 
Islamic Republic towards the end of Āyatollāh Ḫomainī’s life, thus, the EXPEDIENCY 
DISCERNMENT COUNCIL OF THE SYSTEM (maǧma‘-e tašḫīṣ-e maṣlaḥat-e neẓām) was created 
in 1988, in order to solve this stalemate. This new body, in which both then parliamentary 
speaker Rafsanǧānī and president Ḫāmeneʼī were represented, swiftly moved to prepare the 
new ANTI NARCOTICS LAW.463 
 
The ANTI NARCOTICS LAW (qānūn-e mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḫadder) 
 The Expediency Council on 25th October 1988 (3rd Ābān 1367) approved the law, which in thirty-
five articles stipulates clearly defined penalties for drug crimes, thus passing the first effective drug law of 
the Islamic Republic.  
 
The cultivation of poppy and cannabis, as well as the production, smuggling, distribution, dealing, 
carrying and storing of poppy, cannabis, heroin or morphine are prosecuted according to pre-defined 
amounts of drugs. Penalties can include imprisonment, whiplashes and the death penalty (§1-13). The 
death penalty is envisaged for persons who are caught cultivating drugs for the fourth time (§2), who are 
producing, smuggling or distributing more than 5kg bang, Indian hemp juice, opium or opium juice 
(šīreh) (§4) or more than 30g of heroin, morphine and other morphine derivates (§8) or who are 
concealing, storing or possessing more then 5kg of the drugs mentioned in §4 (§5) or more than 30g 
heroin or morphine (§8). A person caught four times importing, exporting, carrying or simply possessing 
a total of more than 30g of heroin or morphine is considered a “corruptor on earth” (mofsed fe-ʼl-arż) and 
is to be executed in public (§9).  
 
Drug addicts below the age of sixty are given a period of six months after the implementation of the 
law to undergo withdrawal treatment. The prosecutor general is tasked with sending those not succeding 
in quitting their addiction to rehabilitation centers (marākez-e bāz-parvarī). After this period of grace, 
drug addiction will be punished by monetary fines, prison sentences and whiplashes (§15). Recreational 
drug use is punished seperately by monetary fines and whiplashes (§19). 
 
Further articles prohibit the production or importation of drug paraphernalia or the instigation of 
drug addiction of a family member, students or members of law enforcement; regulate law enforcement 
competences of the police, municipalities and the Basīğ; penalize false accusations of drug trafficking or 
possession; or determine the utilization of seized assets and further possessions. Convicts, who cannot 
pay imposed monetary fines, are to be imprisoned according to predetermined rates (§31). Death 
sentences are required to be endorsed by the chairman of the Supreme Court (raʼīs-e dīvān-e ‘ālī-ye 
kešvar) or the Prosecutor General (dād-setān-e koll-e kešvar) and can be revised or quashed by them 
(§32). Finally, the law envisaged the creation of a specific headquarter to coordinate all state drug policy 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
463  Siyāsat (2000), 9. 
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efforts, later to be named Drug Control Headquarter (DCHQ) (setād-e mobārezeh bā mavādd-e 
moḫadder) (§33).464 
 
 From the onset, the Expediency Council was criticized for not having consulted 
relevant drug experts before passing the law and for unrealistically assuming that the 
problem of drug addiciton could be solve within six months.465 Immediately after its 
implementation, the law led to a new wave of execution of drug traffickers and often of 
petty dealers. As a result, the six-month period elapsed without the addiction problem 
having been solved.466 It was arguably due to the pragmatism of president Rafsanǧānī, 
chairman of the Expediency Council, that the Iranian authorities soon acknowledged the 
ineffectiveness of the repressive drug law.467 From the beginning of the 1990s, accordingly, 
the death penalty was less often applied: even drug traffickers caught with high amounts of 
opium or morphine were sometimes spared from execution. Eventually it became clear that 
the drug law of 1988 had to be reformed in order to counter drug addiction more 
effectively, namely by putting more stress on drug demand reduction.  
 
The AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW  
(qānūn-e eṣlāḥ-e mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḫadder) 
On 8th November 1997 (17th Ābān 1376), the Expediency Council passed the amended drug law 
consisting of forty-six articles. The law explicitly refers to the law of 1959 in listing the prohibited drugs 
(§1). It increased the penalties for trafficking, dealing or storing of drugs (§2-13). The law additionally 
introduces a differentiation between drug trafficking for local consumption and drug trafficking for 
transit, the latter of which is punished more leniently (§5, Note; §8, Note).468  
 
The most important shift concerned the treatment of drug addicts (§15-19). The law notably still 
maintains, “drug addiction is a crime” (e‘tiyād ǧorm ast). Now it specifies “all addicts are permitted to go 
to legal centers […] and to use such centers for their treatment and rehabilitation” (beh kolliyyeh-ye 
mo‘tādān eǧāzeh dādeh mī-šavad, beh marākez-e moǧāzī […] morāǧe‘eh va nesbat beh darmān va bāz-
parvarī-ye ḫvod eqdām nemāyand) (§15). It further specifies: “the mentioned addicts are protected from 
the prosecution of this crime in the period of treatment and rehabilitation” (mo‘tād-ān-e maḏkūr dar ṭūl- 
moddat-e darmān va bāz-parvarī az ta‘qīb-e kaifarī-ye ǧorm-e e‘tiyād mo‘āf mī-bāšand) (§15).  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
464  On the Anti-Narcotics Law of 1988: DCHQ (1997); DCHQ (2010); Reid & Costigan (2002), 104; Samii 
(2003), 290; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 113. 
465  Siyāsat (2000), 9. 
466  Siyāsat (2000) 9; human rights organizations and the US State Department again expressed the concern 
that drug trafficking was used as a pretext to execute political dissidents: Samii & Recknagel (1999), §63; 
the court hearings again often were hasty and at times even presided over by an intelligence officer: Samii 
(2003), 290.  
467  Siyāsat (2000), 9; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 4.  
468  In practice, drug trafficking from Iran to foreign countries often was not punished by death sentences: 
Siyāsat (2000), 9; Reid & Costigan (2002), 104. 
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Further articles rule that the revolutionary courts had to send a copy of their verdicts to the DCHQ 
(§36) and specify the condictions for converting a death sentence into life imprisonment (§38).469 
 
 Since 1988, the central coordinating and planning role for Iran’s drug policy was 
assigned to Drug Control Headquarter, presided over by the state president. Since the 
amendment of 1997 it comprises the following institutions: the Prosecutor General (dādestān-
e koll-e kešvar), the ministers of Interior (kešvar), Intelligence and Security (eṭṭelā‘āt va 
amniyyat), Health, Treatment and Medical Education (beh-dāšt, darmān va āmūzeš-e pezeškī), 
Education (āmūzeš va parvareš), and of Islamic Culture and Guidance (farhang va eršād-e 
eslāmī), the manager of Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting (IRIB) (sāzemān-e ṣadā va 
sīmā-ye jomhūrī-ye eslāmī-ye īran), the commander-in-chief of the Law Enforcement Force 
(nīrū-ye enteżāmī), the head of Tehran’s Islamic Revolutionary Court (dād-gāh-e enqelāb-e 
eslāmī), the head of the Organization of Prisons and Penitentiaries (sāz-mān-e zandān-hā va 
eqdāmāt-e taʼmīnī va tarbiyyatī) as welle as the commander of the Basīǧ (farmāndeh-ye nīrū-
ye moqāvamat-e basīj).470 Initially, the cooperation between the individual members of the 
DCHQ, and between them and the administration of the DCHQ, had been rather ineffective 
and marred by conflicts of comptence. Iran thus continued to almost exclusively concentrate 
on repressive drug policy measures. During Ḫātamī’s presidency, the administrative structure 
of the headquarters and its twenty-eight provincial offices were strengthened, however. Since, 
the DCHQ has become more effective and concentrates - at least nominally – equally on drug 
supply and drug demand reduction. The first executive director of the DCHQ was Moḥammad 
Fallāḥ, followed by ‘Alī Hāšemī under Ḫātamī, and Fadā Ḥossain Mālekī and Esmā‘īl 
Ahṃadī-Moqaddam under Aḥmadīnežād. The mere fact that the latter concomitantly was the 
commander-in-chief of the Law Enforcement Forces indicates a new strengthening of 
respressive drug policy measures under Aḥmadīnežā, even if drug demand reduction activities 
were continued.471 
 
 One of the persisting problems of Iran’s drug laws has been its implementation by the 
judges. According to the penal code of the Islamic Republic, individual judges are to a certain 
degree free in assessing a case according to their own knowledge of the Islamic sources. Thus, 
certain judges continued to imprison drug addicts instead of sending them to rehabilitation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
469  DCHQ (1997); DCHQ (accessed 2010); Reid & Costigan (2002), 104; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 10f. 
470  As specified in § 33 of the law: DCHQ (1997), 16. 
471  Siyāsat (2000), 9; Samii (2003), 291-293; CACI (2004); Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 113; Calabrese 
(2007), 8; on the aims and organizational structure of the DCHQ: DCHQ (accessed 2010). 
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centers, while others were even persecuting the service providers. The head of the judiciary at 
the time, Āyatollāh Maḥmūd Hāšemī Šāhrūdī, thus had to remind them in a circular letter of 
2005: 
 
“Thus, this is to remind judges at all courts of justice and prosecutors' offices 
throughout the country that since a major element of accompaniment in crime 
needs to be verification of malicious intent, the said interventions are clearly 
intent but rather motivated by the will to fulfil the mission of protecting society 
from the spread of deadly contagious diseases such as AIDS and hepatitis. 
Therefore all judicial authorities must consider other centers and organizations 
which are active in this field and not accuse the service providers with unfair 
characterization of accompaniment in the criminal abuse of narcotics and not 
impede the implementation of such needed and fruitful programs”472 
 
Repressive drug supply reduction – and still in drug demand reduction - measures? 
 During Moḥammad-Reżā Šāh’s reign, the combat against drug trafficking and dealing 
had been primarily the duty of the police (šahr-bānī) and the gendarmerie (žāndārmerī) 
supported by custom guards. These security forces continued to exist after the revolution of 
1979, and they were indeed still involved in drug supply reduction. While the gendarmerie 
and the custom officers initially still seem to have remained the primary force in combatting 
border trafficking, they soon started to be supported by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards 
Corps (sepāh-e pās-dārān-e enqelāb-e eslāmī), founded in April 1979. The gendarmerie 
furthermore continued to be reponsible for the drug combat in the smaller cities and villages 
in the countryside, while the police had the same responsibility in bigger cities. At the 
beginning of the revolution, the police seem to have been the most active security force in this 
regard. Also fighting against drug dealing were, however, the many Islamic Revolutionary 
Committees (sg. komīteh-ye enqelāb-e eslāmī).473 Together, these forces accounted for the 
seizure of thousands of kilograms of drugs and for the arrest of tens of thousands of drug 
traffickers, dealers – and often addicts.474 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
472  The letter dates from 24th January 2005 (5th Bahman 1383): Nassirimanesh & Trace & Roberts (2005), 6; 
GTZ (2006); Calabrese (2007), 13. 
473  AGAHI & SPENCER report that they have been often obstructed by the revolutionary committees in their 
research: Agahi & Spencer (1981), 43, 45; CALABRESE mentions the repressive drug policy against drug 
traffickers and consumers as part of the “jihad against sin”: Calabrese (2007), 8. 
474  In August 1980 alone, the security forces seized 3,535kg opium, 97kg heroin and 238kg hashish; and the 
revolutionary courts executed 136 traffickers: Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44f.; according to ṬABĀṬABĀʼĪ, 
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 According to Maḥmūd ‘Alīzādeh Ṭabāṭabāʼī, director-general of the PLANNING AND 
BUDGET ORGANIZATION (sāz-mān-e barnāhmeh va būdǧeh) in 1986 and later a member of the 
DCHQ, however, the combat against drug trafficking and dealing virtually came to a halt in 
1980/81 (1359ŠH). He called the war years a “period of inactivity”, as no institution or 
organization was seriously active in drug policy.475 This first seems to have been mainly the 
result of the dispute among judges of the revolutionary courts on whether to designate 
traffickers as moḥārebeh bā ḫodā or mofsed fe-l-arż. Later, the Iraq-Iran war contributed to 
shift the attention of the law enforcement forces and the whole security establishment away 
from the eastern border to the west. In 1986/87 AD (1365 ŠH), however, an ANTI-DRUGS 
UNIT (vāḥed-e mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḫadder) was created within the Islamic 
Revolutionary Committees on proposal of Maḥmūd Karīmī, its first director general.476 
 
 After the passing of the new drug law, and after the end of the war, both in October 
1988, the security forces started a reinvigorated combat against drug trafficking. Freed from 
their war duties, the IRGC together with the police and the revolutionary committees greatly 
enhanced their endeavours along the borders and within the country. They started to arrest 
thousands of drug traffickers and dealers, many of whom were executed in the late 1980s.477 
While the executions soon declined, the law enforcement measures did not abate. In 1991, 
then president Rafsanǧānī set about reforming the hitherto fragmented security forces. The 
POLICE (šahr-bānī), the GENDARMERIE (žāndārmerī), and the ISLAMIC REVOLUTIONARY 
COMMITTEES (kōmīteh-hā-ye enqelāb-e eslāmī) were all disbanded as independent units and 
integrated into the newly created LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 
(nīrū-ye enteżāmī-ye ǧomhūrī-ye eslāmī), commonly known by its acronym NAJA.478 This 
new force continued to be the official leading agency in drug supply reduction.  
 
 But soon, the (para-)military forces of the IRGC, the ARMED FORCES OF THE ISLAMIC 
REPUBLIC OF IRAN (nīrū-hā-ye moṣallaḥ-e ǧomhūrī-ye eslāmī-ye īrān) and the Basīǧ started 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18,000 drug related convicts were imprisoned in in 1978/79 AD (1358 ŠH), and 30,000 in 1980/81 (1359 
ŠH): Siyāsat (2000), 9. 
475  Siyāsat (2000), 9. 
476  Karīmī was succeeded by Moḫtār Kalāntarī, whom CALABRESE mentions as the first executive director of 
„anti-narcotics task force“: Siyāsat (2000), 9; Calabrese (2000), 8. 
477  Within the IRGC, the central headquarter Moḥammad Rasūl-Allāh, and the tactical headquarters Salmān, 
Meqdād and Abū Ẕarr were responsible for combatting drug trafficking; from 1991 this also applied to the 
Qods Headquarter: Calabrese (2007), 9. 
478  Buchta (2000), 65; the first unit responsible for combating drug trafficking was the Merṣād Headquarter: 
Calabrese (2007). 
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to be increasingly involved as well.479 Along the borders, the IRGC took the lead in the 
combat against drug trafficking. They formed numerous armed village militias, which they 
soon restructured into Basīǧ units.480 In the mid 1990s, an estimated 30,000 troops were 
stationed at the eastern border with Afghanistan and Pakistan, including policemen and border 
guards.481 The anti-narcotics police and border guards numbered 12,000. In 2000, the Iranian 
police created a special unit, the ANTI-NARCOTICS POLICE (polīs-e mobārezeh bā mavādd-e 
moḫadder), in order to improve the coordination against drug trafficking and smuggling.482 
Together with the IRGC, the Basīǧ, custom guards and the army and various intelligence 
departments they continue to be responsible for Iran’s drug supply reduction policy to this 
day.483  
 Iran legitimately takes pride in accounting for the highest rates of drug seizures, which 
the international community readily acknowledges.484 It was estimated that Iran accounts for 
85% of the global seizures of opiates and for 30% of the global seizures of heroin and 
morphine.485 Iran supposedly confiscates 17% of drugs that are smuggled into and through the 
country, which is much higher than the average worldwide rate of 10%.486 Thus, Iran is 
reported to have seized 27.6 tons of drugs in 1990, 250 tons in 2000 and 350 tons in 2005.487 
Tens of thousands of traffickers have been executed since the 1990s and hundreds of 
thousands of drug smugglers are arrested each year, including admittedly many petty 
dealers.488 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
479  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 157; Samii (2003), 289; CACI (2004). 
480  A typical village militia contained 600 to 700 fighters; the militias were present in over 50 villages along 
the eastern border: Samii & Recknagel (1999), 157; Samii (2003), 289; Calabrese (2007), 9.  
481  Calabrese (2007), 9. 
482  This special unit seems to have inherited the respective duties of the Merṣād Headquarter: Samii & 
Recknagel (1999), 157; Samii (2003), 289. 
483  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 153; (Calabrese (2007), 8. 
484  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 157, 166f.; Samii (2003). 290; e.g. by the INCSR report of 2007: Calabrese 
(2007), 7; in 2009, Tehran Times published a four-page article on its successes in combating drug 
trafficking: Tehran Times, 28th June 2009. 
485  Razzaghi & al. (1999), 1; Samii & Recknagel (1999), 157; CACI (2004); Nassirimanesh mentions 25% 
of the worldwide drug seizures: Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 1f. 
486  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 157. 
487  Mokri (2002), 3; Reid & Costigan (2002), 101; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 2; the UNODC assume 
lower seizures, e.g. 124 tons in 2001: Samii (2003), 284, 287; CACI (2004); for the figures of 2005: 
Calabrese (2007), 9. 
488  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 164; ṬABĀṬABĀʼĪ reported that 100,000 drug traffickers and dealers were 
imprisoned in 2000, while another 200,000 to 300,000 were still active outside: Siyāsat (2000), 9; MOKRI 
reports an annual increase of 20% in drug related arrests between 1995 and 2000: Mokri (2002), 3; REID & 
COSTIGAN reported 121,742 imprisoned drug smugglers for 2000, and a total of 1.7 million for the years 
1979 to 2000: Reid & Costigan (2002), 102; Iran’s National Prison Organization only assumes 68,000 for 
the year 2001: Samii (2003), 290; CACI (2004); Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 4; according to the 
newspaper Siyāsat-e Rūz, 314,268 drug-related arrests took place in 2006: Calabrese (2007), 7. 
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 Iran has built an impressive security infrastructure particularly at the eastern border. 
Mountain passes have been blocked with concrete dams; major roads – also within Iran – are 
being controlled with vehicle berms and checkpoints; and flat plains are secured with a series 
of static defenses including ditches, dams, barbed wire fences, mine fields and observation 
towers. Observation techniques have become ever more sophisticated including unmanned 
drones and satellite technology. Controls along the roads are carried out with inspection 
mirrors, police dogs and regular inspections.489 At the western border, however, much less 
efforts are invested in the fight against drug trafficking. As revealed by the more lenient 
punishments for transit trafficking in the amended drug law of 1997, Iran arguagly is content 
in seeing the majority of drugs exiting Iran again. The security forces nevertheless lead a 
veritable war against the well-armed drug traffickers. Until 2005, more than 3,000 security 
officers have been killed in clashes with drug traffickers according to Iranian authorities.490 
 
 Despite these measures, the flow of opium and heroin has only increased. As Iran’s 
borders are long and porous, even the most sophisticated reconnaissance technology, and the 
deployment of tens of thousands of security forces remains ineffective as long as drug 
trafficking remains such a profitable business, and as long as certain structural deficiencies 
persist. Iranian authorities often complain that the US and UN enforced embargo prevents 
them from acquiring necessary military and intelligence technology, thus impeding a more 
successful drug combat. Additionally, at least some critical voices have started to question the 
ongoing concentration on repressive drug supply reduction measures. Thus, Member of 
Parliament Moḥsen Armīn, for instance, warned that the problem of drug trafficking cannot 
be solved by repression alone, but also needs political, economic and diplomatic efforts.491 
Admittedly, drug traffickers and dealers started to be treated more leniently at intervals,492 
also due to financial concerns, as court proceedings and imprisonments pose a burden to the 
country’s budget.493 Nevertheless, certain security forces and radical ideological circles have a 
vested interest in continuing a repressive drug policy approach.494  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
489  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 157; Samii (2003), 289; Navai (2005), 80; Calabrese (2007), 9. 
490  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 157; Reid & Costigan (2002), 101; Samii (2003), 289; Nassirimanesh & al. 
(2005), 3; CACI (2004). 
491  Samii (2003), 293; Malek-Moḥammadī (2005/06), 116. 
492  Siyāsat (2000), 9; Reid & Costigan (2002), 104. 
493  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 165; Samii (2003), 293; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 2; Navai (2005), 86. 
494  Samii (2001), 292. 
 77 
Therapy and Rehabilitation 
 Therapy and rehabilitation centres initialy continued to exist under the Islamic 
Republic government, both public and private ones. These clinics and hospitals continued to 
be under the supervision of the Ministry of Health. Therapy generally still included medicinal 
treatment including methadone. However, the clinics and hospitals seem to have often lacked 
such drugs. Expert staff and treatment capacities were equally insufficient.495 Since the 
inception of the anti-drug campaign in mid 1979, thus, even approximately 30 additional 
centres had been opened. These were rather improvised centres, often staffed with former 
drug addicts.496 Instead of delivering scientific treatment, they increasingly concentrated on 
religious and moral instructions.497 Outpatient treatment that had been offered by mental 
health clinics before the revolution, however, was discontinued, execpt for children.498 
 
 At the same time, however, the revolutionary committees and courts started to put 
drug-addicted people either in prisons or in prison-like camps, which sometimes seem to have 
been set up in buldings seized from former elites loyal to the shah. 499 Soon, however, the 
already insufficient therapy efforts seem to have halted altogether – arguably following the 
logic of the law of 1980, that all drug addicts had to been cured within six months. The 
National Iranian Society for the Rehabilitation of the Disabled (NISRD) accordingly ceased 
to be responsible for therapy and rehabilitation measures.500 
 Proper therapy treatment definitively came to a halt during the Iraq-Iran.501 This is 
explainable by the fact that the health and rehabilitation services had to take care of the many 
war victims. Drug addicts consequently were put into prison or in desperately overstaffed and 
unhygienic prison-like rehabilitation centres, which often resembled penal camps. Here, 
addiction was predominantly treated from an ideological viewpoint, without medically 
supported withdrawal. Addicts were forced to undergo religious instructions, forced labour, 
but probably including other forms of occupational therapy forms. Even Iranian specialists 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
495  Despite the official budget of 500 mio. tūmān (70 mio. US$), hospital officials still reported a shortage in 
methadone: Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44f.; Spencer & Agahi (1990), 174. 
496  Agahi & Spencer (1981), 45. 
497  Agahi & Spencer (1981), 45. 
498  The newspapers at the time often covered the topic of addicted children: Agahi & Spencer (1981), 45. 
499  Siyāsat (2000), 9. 
500  The Health Ministry was the first institution to realize the rapidly increasing drug addiction: Agahi & 
Spencer (1981), 43; Spencer & Agahi (1990), 173. 
501  Siyāsat (2000), 9.  
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compared these rehabilitation centres to overcrowded prisons, which were desperately 
overstaffed and unhygienic.502 
 
 This situation continued until the mid 1990s. During this period, the rehabilitation 
camps treated– thousands of drug addicts.503 It is also only from the post-war period that we 
are informed about measures applied by these centres. With the strict abstinence-based 
measures, they might indeed have cured some drug addicts; the majority, however, most 
probably have relapsed within a short time, since forcible withdrawal generally has limited 
success and since after-care therapies were lacking.504 These rehabilitation camps continue to 
exist to this day, as even the amended drug law of 1997 still makes provisions for treatments 
in such “special camps” (ordūgāh-hā-ye ḫāṣṣ) under the supervision of the judiciary.505 In 
1999, there were still 12 similar centres operating across Iran under the supervision of the 
prevention department of the National Social Welfare Organization, which at the time formed 
part of the Ministry of Health.506  
 
 From 1994, however, the Rafsanjānī administration initiated an important shift in the 
drug policy approach. Almost fifteen years after their closure, OUTPATIENT TREATMENT 
CENTRES (marākez-e darmān-e sar-pāʼī) usually affiliated to hospitals were reintroduced 
again. In 1999, already 40 of these centres were operative – typically, one per province, but 
several in bigger cities like Tehran.507 Unlike in the traditional rehabilitation centres, drug 
users were seeking treatment here on a voluntary basis. This did, however, not prevent them 
from being prosecuted until the legislative reform of 1997.508 These centres again offered 
medical detoxification by opioid-agonists like clonidine and other sedatives like NSAIDs or 
phenothiazines. They also applied supportive therapies such as hypnosis, acupuncture or 
herbal medicine. At times, withdrawal was simply achieved by a gradual reduction of drug 
consumption. Mere detoxification treatment generally lasted for two weeks. However, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
502  In 1989, an estimated 100,000 drug addicts were imprisoned: Samii & Recknagel (1999), 164; Mokri 
(2002), 185; information on the rehabilitation camps are only available from the time after the war: 
Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 4; Samii (2003), 291; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 4. 
503  It has been estimated that 25,000 to 30,000 drug addicts have been treated in these rehabilitation centres 
until 1989: Reid & Costigan (2002), 100, 104. 
504  90% of of the admissions happened by court order; the average duration of therapy in these centres was 
between 2-6 months: Razzaghi & al. (1999), 4. 
505  According to § 42 of the law: DCHQ (1997), 18.  
506  One centre was reserved for female drug addicts: Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 4; Reid & Costigan (2002), 
104; Madani Ghahfarokhi (2006), 138. 
507  Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 4f. 
508  After 1997, state officials were repeatedly pointing out to the fact that drug addicts would not be prosecuted 
anymore: Samii & Recknagel (1999), 164; Siyāsat (2000), 9. 
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patients now also received after-treatment in the form of psychological consultation in 
individual, group and family therapy.509 Admittedly, these first therapy measures were only 
partly satisfactory. The prescribed medication, namely clonidine, still involved heavy 
withdrawal symptoms, and resulted in very high relapse rates.510 Addiction withdrawal and 
therapy were, however, concomitantly offered by private organizations. Initially, these rather 
operated on a shaky legal ground.511 Soon, however, they started to be supervised by the 
National Welfare Organization, with which they cooperated closely.512 The first und arguably 
still most famous of these organizations are the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS (mo‘tādān-e gom-
nām), who had started their activities in 1994. 
 
 After the passing of the amended drug law of 1997, the government of Ḫātamī 
encouraged new scientific addiction treatment methods. In 1999, the Rūzbeh Hospital, 
affiliated to the Tehran University of Medical Sciences, introduced a pilot programme 
experimenting with the opioid receptor agonist naltrexone. During the first six months, 
addicts were passing by once a week in order to collect their ration of naltrexone and to 
receive additional consultation and check-ups. This meant that the relapse rate decreased in 
comparison with clonidine. The programme consequently was extended to more clinics, 
where the drug addicts continued to participate in individual and family therapies sessions.513 
The Rūzbeh Hospital concurrently started to introduce the ultra-rapid detoxification (URD) 
technique, in which addicts were treated with the sedative midazolam and the opioid 
antagonist naloxone. This method, however, did not prove to be very succesful in decreasing 
relapse rates.514 The number of addiction treatment centers nevertheless continued to increase 
to almost 100 in the year 2000, and 138 in the year 2003.515 
 
 Private associations also expanded their servives. The first private organization 
offering medical detoxification and counselling services to drug addicts was Persepolis (pers-
pōlīs). In 1998, Persepolis opened a general practice clinic in Marvdašt near Šīrāz and soon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
509  Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 4f., 30f.; Mokri (2002), 6f.; Reid & Costigan (2002), 100, 104f.; Samii (2003), 
290; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 5; Calabrese (2007), 10. 
510  Estimates of the relapse rates of drug addicts treated with clonidine differed between 60% and 95%: 
Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 31; Mokri (2002), 188; Reid & Costigan (2002), 105. 
511  Other self-help groups, which were also supported by the government, are not mentioned by name: Mokri 
(2002), 189; Reid & Costigan (2002), 100. 
512  The State Welfare Organization sent cured addicts after their release to NA sessions: Razzaghi & al. 
(1998/99), 5, 30. 
513  Relapse rates on naltrexone first accounted to 50% and later to 35-40%: Mokri (2002), 188. 
514  The ultrarapid detoxification only lasted 6 hours: Mokri (2002), 188. 
515  Admittedly, the numbers of such centres vary considerably: Samii & Recknagel (1999), 164; Reid & 
Costigan (2002), 104f.; Samii (2003), 291; CACI (2004); Calabrese (2007), 12. 
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started to experiment with buprenorphine and methadone. These medications had proved to 
be effective as a substitution to opiates in Western countries, but were prohibited at the time 
in Iran – even though they had been used in addiction therapy before the revolution.516 In 1999, 
Persepolis was the first institution to obtain an official permit to test a long-term substitution 
treatment programme in the Islamic Republic, by distributing buprenorphine tablets to 3,000 
patients. The pilot program proved to be a huge success, as many more patients remained in 
the program than in previous programs that had presribed clonidine and naloxone.  
 
 Iranian authorities consequently started to accept substitution treatment and to offer 
similar programs in their own clinics and hospitals.517 Soon, further private organizations 
followed, while complementing the medicinal treatment with therapeutic, vocational and 
sometimes even financial support.518 Besides, a privately funded hotline for drug addicts was 
founded in 2000.519 In 2001, various therapeutic communities (TC) started to operate in 
Tehran, Eṣfahān and other cities. Just like the NA, TCs pursue a purely abstinence-oriented 
approach and consequently are willingly supported by the government.520 In 2002, there were 
nince TCs in Iran with the capacity to support about 5,000 drug addicts.521 
 
 At the beginning of the 2000s, the Iranian government increasingly started to introduce 
further progressive harm reduction measures. Already the prescription of buprenorphine 
tablets, which was aimed at substitution instead of pure abstinence, can be considered a harm 
reduction meausre. Now, the addiction experts of the Ministry of Health and the National 
Welfare Organizations were explicitly encouraged to seek international expert advice and to 
travel abroad to study best practices of other countries. Additionally, many Iranian addiction 
specialists returned to Iran amidst the general opening of the society under Ḫātamī.522 In 2000, 
the Health Ministry consequently launched a pilot methadone program for 140 drug addicts in 
the psychiatric clinic of Zāhedān, one of the cities with the highest addiction rates in Iran.523 
This development was mainly the result of an increased awareness about the rapid spread of 
HIV infection among intravenous drug users (IDUs). The RSA study of 1998/99 had in fact 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
516  Mokri (2002), 188; Calabrese (2007), 10. 
517  Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 5. 
518  Mokri (2002), 188;  
519  Samii (2003), 291. 
520  Mokri (2002), 188f.; Reid & Costigan (2002), 105; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 4; Calabrese (2007), 11.  
521  Reid & Costigan (2002), 105. 
522  Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 5. 
523  Samii (2003), 291; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 5; Calabrese (2007), 12. 
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shown that 70% of all HIV cases were due to needle sharing.524 In the same year, the 
government decided to introduce further harm reduction programmes in existing addiction 
clinics, specifically in the cities of Tehran, Šīrāz and Kermānšāh. IDUs and HIV positive 
people consequently started to receive free counselling, sterile syringes and methadone, which 
meanwhile had become legal for this purpose. The results of these pilot studies were 
presented to the president and his cabinet in mid 2001 and met with unanimous 
endorsement.525 
 
 Despite ongoing resistance by conservative political circles, the government further 
expanded these programs to another 15 clinics.526 The first regular methadone maintenance 
treatment clinic was established in 2002, in the Rūzbeh Hospital in Teheran.527 In the same 
year, the Health Ministry created a NATIONAL COMMITTEE FOR HARM REDUCTION (komīteh-
ye kāheš-e āsīb-hā-ye kešvar) as a sub-committee to the NATIONAL AIDS COMMITTEE.528 In 
2003, the Health Ministry declared methadone programmes to be a core principle of the 
official drug policy.529 In 2002, the DCHQ and the UNODC created the DRUG ABUSE 
RESEARCH AND INTERVENTION UNIFIED STRATEGY (DARIUS) Institute, which also offers 
harm reduction programs; as does the IRANIAN NATIONAL CENTER FOR ADDICTION STUDIES 
(INCAS) (markaz-e mellī-ye moṭāle‘āt-e e‘tiyād), whis is affiliated to the Tehran University 
of Medical Sciences.530 Today, methadone programmes and other harm reduction measures 
are integral parts of many clinics and hospitals in Iran. In 2005, eventually, the parliament 
ratified a law legalizing methadone treatment by private practitioners.531 
  
 The explosive nexus between intravenous drug use and the spread of HIV by way of 
needle sharing, seems to have been realized in prisons first,532 even though the prison 
authorities continued to deny or downplay this for a long time in public.533 Initially, prison 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
524  Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 7; Navai (2005), 86; Calabrese (2007), 11. 
525  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 164; in the clinic of Kermānšāh, each month approximately 700 drug addicts 
were being treated, 150 of which with methadone while 50 used the needle exchange program: Reid & 
Costigan (2002), 105; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 5; Calabrese (2007), 10. 
526  Reid & Costigan (2002), 105; this plan, however, never was fully realized, as in 2005 there were still only 
„a small number of clinics [...] offering some form of substitution therapy“: Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 5. 
527  Razzaghi & al. (2005), 1f.; Calabrese (2007), 12. 
528  Calabrese (2007), 10. 
529  Calabrese (2007), 12. 
530  30% of the budget of DARIUS are reserved for treatment and rehabilitation measures, and 10% for harm 
reduction measures: Calabrese (2007), 12, 16. 
531  Calabrese (2007), 12. 
532  Reid & Costigan (2002), 102; Catania (2004); 17; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 5f.; Calabrese (2007), 
11. 
533  Razzaghi & al. (1998/99), 33f. 
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staff tried to separate IDU or HIV positive inmates from other prisoners.534 However, due to 
chronic overcrowding of prisons, and due to the fact that released prisoners were spreading 
HIV within the broader society, this plan was never really implemented. In 2000, thus, first 
harm reducation measures were introduced to the Iranian prisons. The brothers’ Alāʼī initiated 
the first so-called triangular clinic in the central prison of Kermānšāh in 2000. These clinics 
offered addicts a variety of services, including sterile syringes, hygienic kits, and even 
condoms, in order to reduce cases of HIV/AIDS and (other) sexually transmitted diseaese 
(STDs). Later, they included methadone maintenance treatment.535 In 2002, the Health 
Ministry organized a roundtable with the participation of the Welfare Organization, the State 
Prison Organization (sāzemān-e zendān-hā-ye kešvar) as well as non-governmental and 
community-based organizations, where it was decided to further expand triangular clinics in 
the prison system.536 The authorities have established triangular clinics in more than 40 
prisons throughout the country since.537 The distribution of syringes in prisons continues, 
however, to be disputed, since some officials fear that this reveals that drug consumption 
takes place in prisons.538 Officially, thus, Iranian authorities only admit that drug addicts 
receive sterile syringes after being released and admitted to outpatient treatment centers and 
clinics.539 Today, Iran belongs to a group of 22 countries worldwide that distribute methadone 
and syringes in prisons.540 
 
 From 2003, triangular clinics were also created outside of the prison system. Since 
then, more than 60 such clinics have been established in different Iranian cities.541 Further 
created were drop-in-centers (DICs) in deprived quarters of larger cities, which often 
overlapped with general outpatient addiction clinics.542 Persepolis, for instance, has built a 
DIC in Teheran, which conducts outreach work. The staff, often former drug addicts 
themselves, go out into the nearby streets and parks in order to approach drug users, inform 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
534  According to MAḤMŪD BAḪTIYĀRĪ, head of the State Prison Organization: Samii & Recknagel (1999), 
163. 
535  The entire study is dedicated to Iran’s first Triangular Clinic in Kermānšāh: WHO (2004), 17f. 
536  Catania (2004), 17. 
537  Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 6;  
538  In 2001, the authorities still seem to have opposed the distribution of syringes: Reid & Costigan (2002), 
105; Catania (2004); some even still opposed it in 2005: Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 6; Calabrese 
(2007), 11. 
539  Catania (2004); Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 6; Calabrese (2007), 11. 
540  Calabrese (2007), 11. 
541   Mokri (2002), 189; Catania (2004); Calabrese (2007), 12. 
542  The first drop-in centres were located in the Qār and Bāġ-e Āẕarī quarters in Tehran: GTZ (2006). 
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them about drug-related harms, and invite them into the centers, where they are offered 
showers, free meals, clothing, medical check-ups, counselling and injection paraphernalia.543 
 
 Until the end of Ḫātamī’s presidency, the number of governmental and private 
addiction clinics, therapy centres, drop-in-centres and triangular clinics has ranged into the 
thousands.544 Despite a generally more repressive approach towards drug addicts under 
Aḥmadīnežād, these clinics continue to operate to this day. Even the trend towards more 
progressive addiction therapies has continued. In 2007, for instance the Iranian National 
Center For Addiction Studies (INCAS) started to experiment with opium tincture – officially 
still with the ultimate goal of abstinence, in reality, however, arguably as a new maintenance 
treatment.545 Also treating addicts with – apparently gradually decreasing amounts of – proper 
opium is the CONGRESS 60 (kongreh 60). This society was founded in 1999/2000 AD (1378 
ŠH) by Ḥossain Dežākām, a long-time former opium addict himself, and combines this form 
of maintenance program with psychological counselling and sports activities.546 A further 
discussed – though not implemented – measure was for instance the distribution of sterile 
syringes in vending machines.547 In practice, thus, the Iranian government actually has started 
to reintroduce parts of the prerevolutionary maintenance program. 
 
Prevention 
 Drug prevention conceived as general awareness raising about drugs and drug 
addiction, has always been a weak spot in Iran. During the first months of 1979, even the 
limited public information campaign disappeared. In the autumn of 1979, the new authorities 
admittedly started a national campaign against drugs, similar to the campaign against alcohol 
that had started directly after the revolution. This consisted, however, in mere demonization. 
Iranian newspapers, which reported extensively on the drug problem in 1979 ad 1980, often 
portrayed male drug addicts as homosexuals, adulterers or pimps; and female drug users as 
prostitutes.548 In combination with further repressive measures against drug users, this moral 
campaign only contributed in further driving drug addiction underground.549 Hospitals and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
543  On the DIC of Persepolis in Bāġ-e Āẕarī: Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 5; GTZ (2006). 
544  Madani Ghahfarokhi (2006), 138; in the province Āẕarbāyǧān-e Ġarbī, 221 drug treatment centres were 
operating in 2007: Calabrese (2007), 12f. 
545  The author visited INCAS in summer 2008 and was presented a sample of the opium tincture; controlled 
distribution of opium had already been proposed by Ṭabāṭabāʼī in 2000: Siyāsat (2000), 9. 
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Dežākām (1998/99). 
547  Burrows & Wodak (2005), 28. 
548  Agahi & Spencer (1981), 44. 
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clinics might initially still have informed drug users about harms related to intravenous drug 
use. Prisons and rehabilitation centres in contrast, arguably, simply condemned drug use 
instead of providing unbiased information on drugs and drug addiction.550 The public religious 
campaign against drugs ceased with the beginning of the Iraq-Iran war.551  
 
 The available information suggests that new preventive measures were only 
implemented from the end of the 1990s. At the time, even experts were of the opinion that 
public information on drugs rather contributes to drug consumption.552 New prevention 
measures were considerably influenced by concepts and best practices of the international 
community, in particular by the WHO, the UNODC and by European countries. The basic 
conception accordingly differentiates between primary prevention targeting the general 
population, with and secondary and tertiary prevention programmes targeting people who are 
aready drug addicts.  
 
 Official drug prevention in Iran continues to suffer from frailties in all three areas, yet 
arguably most in primary prevention. Lacking governmental efforts in this regard can be 
explained by the fact that drug prevention does not yield immediately observable success; but 
also by continuing religious reservations towards the topic. Still, from the mid 1990s, the 
national media started to increasingly provide more or less unbiased information on drugs and 
drug addiction – with the exception of the national television, which continues to ignore the 
topic. The development of the public press discourse will be the task of the subsequent 
analysis. At the same time, the DCHQ and the State Welfare Organization started to print 
brochures and posters informing about drugs and drug addiction.553 Then managing-director 
of the DCHQ Fallāḥ also encouraged the clerics in Qom to issue religious edicts against drug 
consumption. As the main coordinative agency, the DCHQ has a strategic role in drug 
prevention as well, and at least during the Ḫātamī administration it started to closely 
cooperate with the UNDCP, which in 2002 was renamed UNODC. They jointly organized 
demonstrations against drug addiction, sportive events and exhibitions, all particularly 
targeted at Iran’s predominantly young population.554 In this regard, the INTERNATIONAL DAY 
AGAINST DRUG ABUSE AND ILLICIT TRAFFICKING has become of particular importance in Iran, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
550  Agahi & Spencer (1981), 45. 
551  Spencer & Agahi (1990), 174. 
552  This opinion was still expressed by MEHDĪ ABŪʼĪ, commander-in-chief of the Anti-Narcotics Police in 
2002: Samii (2003), 287. 
553  On written prevention material and prevention activities of the media in Yazd: Samii & Recknagel (1999), 
163. 
554  E.g. according to Ṭabāṭabāʼī: Siyāsat (2000), 9. 
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as in few countries so many public events are organized on this occasion. During these years, 
drug prevention had become increasingly factual and unbiased.  
 
 Nevertheless, inter-agency cooperation on drug prevention remains problematic. As 
will be shown in the analysis, the government often sees primary prevention as the duty of the 
media, while the media complain about not being provided with enough or precise 
information, in addition to the general restrictions imposed on them. The Education Ministry, 
which is responsible for drug education among the millions of pupils and students, is 
repeatedly accused by the press of being largely inactive. 
  
 The Aḥmadīnežād government continued drug prevention programs, albeit to a 
reduced extent. The media were in general less free to discuss delicate topics or to criticize 
lacking governmental measures. The DCHQ became more biased towards drug supply 
reduction and a repressive drug policy. A case in point was the international drugs day of 26th 
June 2008, where the DCHQ displayed an educational video consisting exclusively of scare 
tactics.555 
 
 Far better developed than primary prevention are in contrast secondary and tertiary 
prevention. Responsible for designing these measures are Health Ministry and the National 
Welfare Society, the National AIDS Committee and the National Harm Reduction Committee 
as well as the National Prison Organization. The implementation of secondary and tertiary 
prevention takes place in inpatient and outpatient addiction clinics, drop-in-centres, triangular 
clinics and through outreach work in the streets.556 Here, addiction specialists inform drug 
users about therapy programs, safe ways of drug injection and HIV/AIDS prevention. Since 
the introduction of respective prevention programs in the triangular clinics, the general 
awareness about such dangers has greatly increased among drug users outside and inside of 
prisons.557 However, in this area inter-agency competitions contribute to prevent a more 
effective cooperation. The prevention departments of the DCHQ, the National Welfare 
Organization and the National AIDS Committee have been accused of pursuing each its own 
agenda, without consulting each other.558 Strongly increased inter-factional fighting between 
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which the author attended, such a prevention spot was shown. 
556  Reid & Costigan (2002), 105; GTZ (2006); Calabrese (2007), 11. 
557  Navai (2005), 86. 
558  Reid & Costigan (2002), 105; Catania (2004), 17. 
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conservatives and reformists during the Ḫātami administration further exacerbated this 
situation. 
 
Research on drug addiction and trafficking 
 During the first years after the revolution, scientific research on drug addiction in Iran 
continued to be published reflecting the situation before the revolution. Particularly active in 
this field have been America-based Īraǧ Siyāsī and Iran-based Bahman Fozūnī who wrote two 
studies on the efficiency of the governmental opium maintenance programme.559 Not long 
after, Chrisopher Spencer from the University of Sheffield and Cyrus Agahi from the 
University of Eṣfahān published the first general overview on situation of drug addiction 
directly after the revolution. The same authors published further articles on general addiction 
patterns in Eṣfahān560 or on rehabilitation measures in Šīrāz561. At the time, these researchers 
complained about the revolutionary committees increasingly obstructing their research 
activities, and consequently, addiction research soon ceased in Iran. 
 
 Unsurprisingly, the first researchers to publish a coarse overview on the situation of 
drug addiction after the war were again Spencer and Agahi.562 Meanwhile, precise information 
on epidemiological aspects of drug addiction in Iran had been almost entirely lost. Agahi and 
Spencer therefore emphasized the urgent need for new studies. However, it would take the 
Iranian government another decade to respond to this postulation. The first countrywide study 
was the Rapid Situation Assessment (RSA) of 1998/99 AD (1377 ŠH), commissioned by the 
prevention department of the State Welfare Organization and the UNDCP under the Ḫātamī 
administration, and headed by the psychiatris ‘Emrān Moḥammad Razzāġī, later director of 
INCAS.563 This study evaluated the number of 1.2 million drug addicts and another 600,000 to 
800,000 recreational drug users, which would remain the officially accepted estimation for the 
coming decades. 
 
 From 1999 to 2005, Iranian academic institutions published a plethora of research 
papers on drug addiction, the overwhelming part of which in the field of addiction medicine. 
Here, only a short overview on the main research field shall be provided. It is worth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
559  Siassi & Fozouni (1980a), 1127-1140; Siassi & Fozouni (1980b), 127-133. 
560  Spencer & Agahi (1982), 77-84; Agahi & Spencer (1982a), 99-110; Agahi & Spencer (1982b), 235-242. 
561  Šahīn Dalvand, co-author of the study, was executed with other Bahāʼīs in 1983: Dalvand & Agahi & 
Spencer (1984), 87-92. 
562  Spencer & Agahi (1990), 171-179. 
563  Razzaghi & al. (1998/99). 
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mentioning the two research centres INCAS and DARIUS, headed by the luminaries of the 
Iranian addiction research, Āḏaraḫš Mokrī and Hūmān Nārenǧīhā respectively. Iranian 
research centres publish articles both in Persian and English. Besides general epidemiological 
studies,564 articles are written on drug addiction in specific cities;565 on addiction among 
specific sections of the population: in particular among men,566 women,567 the youth,568 
intravenous heroin users (IDUs)569 or prison inmates;570 on addiction causes such as the 
influence of the family environment;571 on effects of harmful ways of drug use;572 on the 
efficiency of methadone or buprenorphine in relapse prevention;573 on the correlation of drug 
addiction and (acquisitive) crime;574 on HIV/AIDS amont IDUs or students; 575and many more 
aspects. 
 
 Further research has been carried out on legal aspects of drugs, such as drug 
trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, or acquisitive crimes since 2000.576 This legal 
literature often amounts to mere legal compendia, without a critical discussion of the 
predominant prohibition system that criminalizes mere drug addiction and puts a heavy 
burden on the Iranian judicial system. More interesting in this regard are the compilations of 
religious opinions (sg. fatvā) as they reflected a broader range of views.577 Often also 
religiously inspired, albeit more from a religious-moral or religious-political, rather 
conspiratorial point of view, are works on the history of drugs and drug addiction in Iran. 
Proper historical or sociological studies in contrast are largely lacking. Of use that is more 
practical are the many guidebooks for parents and for drug addicts, with titles like “What is 
Addiction? Who is an Addict?” or “Who is an Addict? What are Drugs?”578 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
564  Mokri (2002), 184-190; Nassirimanesh & al. (2005), 1-7. 
565  Ahmadi & Ghanizadeh (2000); Sobhani & al. (2000); Ziaaddini & Ziaaddini (2005). 
566  E.g.: Fāżelī & Mawlawī (2003). 
567  E.g.: Raḥmatī (2003); Ṣafarī (2003). 
568  E.g.: Ahmadi & Hasani (2003); Qavvī-Del (2003/04). 
569  E.g.: Nassirimanesh & al. (2006). 
570  E.g.: Būlhārī & al. (2003); Šahīdzādeh (2003/04); Bāqerī (2004/05); Esmā‘īlī & al. (2004/05). 
571  E.g.: Esmā‘īlī (2003/04). 
572  E.g.: Haghpanah & al. (2005). 
573  E.g.: Ahmadi (2002); Ahmadi & al. (2004); Ṣādeqī & Bordbār (2005/05); Razzaghi (2005). 
574  E.g.: Raʼīsdānā (2003/04); Moḫtāriyān (2003/04); Pālāhang (2003/04); Ǧavānfar (2003/04); 
575  E.g.: Mansoori & al. (2003); Tavoosi & al. (2004); Adibi & al. (2004); Gheiratmand & al. (2005); 
Nakhaee (2005); Vazirian & al. (2005); Zamani & al. (2005); Zamani & al. (2006a); Zamani & al. 
(2006b); Naderi & al. (2006); Eshrati & al. (2008). 
576  E.g.: Możafferī (2003/04); Raḥmdel (200505); Bāḫter & Raʼīsī (2004/05); Badriyān (2006/07); Zerā’at 
(2007/08); Yūsefī-Maḥalleh & Maẓlūmī (2007/08). 
577  E.g.: Hendī (1999/2000); Tabrīzī (2000/01), „Devil’s Trade“ (teǧārat-e šaiṭānī); Reżāpūr-Poršokūhī 
(2002/03); Šahīdī (2003/04); Zakariyyāʼī (2006/07); Qāderiyān (2005/06). 
578  E.g.: Dežākām (1998/99); Mīr-Faḫrāʼī (2004/05): (e‘tiyād čīst? mo‘tād kīst?);  Dāneš (2006/07): (mo‘tād 
kīst? mavādd-e moḫadder čīst?); As‘adī (2005/06). 
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International cooperation and agreements 
 The Islamic Republic did not end its multiple memberships in different international 
organizations and treaties. It remained for instance signatory to the UN SINGLE CONVENTION 
ON NARCOTIC DRUGS of 1961, which the previous authorities had signed in 1973. In practice, 
however, Iran’s once close international cooperation, especially with the USA, in the fields of 
drug trafficking and drug addiction, ceased after the revolution. This situation continued 
during the Iraq-Iran war.579 
 
 After the war,  Rafsanǧānī decided against much domestic resistance to improve Iran’s 
relation with the international community, not last because of the dire economic situation. 
This resulted inter alia in first contacts with the recently established UNDCP.580 Iran initially 
only was interested in an exchange of information, but the foundations for further cooperation 
had been laid.581 A first tangible consequence of the improved relations was the signing of the 
UN CONVENTION AGAINST ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN NARCOTIC DRUGS AND PSYCHOTROPIC 
SUBSTANCES of 1988 in December 1992.582 The UNDCP for its part also realized the 
importance of a close cooperation with Iran in the combat against drug trafficking, and started 
to seek a closer cooperation towards the end of the 1990s. Albeit the USA continued to 
oppose financial aid to Iran’s drug supply reduction efforts,583 Iran and the UNDCP agreed to 
the opening of a UNDCP country office in Iran in 1999.584 Not long after, Iran signed the UN 
CONVENTION ON TRANSNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME of 2000 – although it has not ratified it 
yet.585 In 2001, it ratified the 1972 PROTOCOL AMENDING THE SINGLE CONVENTION ON 
NARCOTIC DRUGS OF 1961586.  
 
 The UNDCP/UNODC office in Tehran further initiated and facilitated a series of 
bilateral or multilateral agreements and memoranda of understanding between Iran and 
different countries. The most important ones were naturally concluded with the main opium 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
579  On the negative impact of Iran’s rupture with the international community on Iran’s drug policy: Agahi & 
Spencer (1981), 43f.; Spencer & Agahi (1990), 171f., 175. 
580  In general on contact with the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and the United Nations: 
Milani (1994), 231, 239. 
581  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 153; in November 1990, Qodratollāh Asadī from the Health Ministry met with 
respresentatives of the UNDCP; in May 1991, an Iranian observer-team travelled to Vienna to meet with 
Giorgio Giacomelli, then director of the UNDCP and ask for support for the Iranian drug policy: Calabrese 
(2007), 15. 
582  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 165; Samii (2003), 295; Calabrese (2007), 14. 
583  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 167f. 
584  Samii (2003), 295. 
585  CACI (2004). 
586  CACI (2004); Calabrese (2007), 14. 
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producing countries Afghanistan and Pakistan.587 Despite Iran’s keen interest in a close 
cooperation with Afghanistan, the political and economic situation in Afghanistan rendered 
such efforts largely futile. Different factions in Afghanistan continued to profit from the 
opium trade, as did subsequent governments. Although vehemently opposing the US conquest 
of Afghanistan, Iran at least expected a positive impact on a reduction of the opium industry. 
Subsequently, Iran succeeded in concluding different agreements with the new Afghan 
administration. In 2001, Iran proposed a crop substitution programme, which in February 
2002 led to an agreement, according to which Iran guaranteed to purchase these alternative 
crops.588 In another agreement in 2004, Iran consented to train Afghan anti-drug trafficking 
experts and to finance 25 additional border checkpoints. This intention was reaffirmed in June 
2006.589 In December 2005, the UNODC initiated a first agreement between Iran, Afghanistan 
and Pakistan on joint border control activities and an exchange of information on drug 
trafficking. This agreement was followed by two similar agreements in 2007 and 2008.590 
Also facilitated by the UNODC was the BERLIN DECLARATION ON COUNTER-NARCOTICS of 
2004, in which Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and China 
promised a closer cooperation in countering drug cultivation and trafficking.591 The sheer 
number of such agreements indicates that their implementation has been rather ineffective so 
far.592 
 
 Iran is, additionally, a member of many further multilateral organizations that 
cooperate in the combat against drug trafficking. It is a principal member of the ECONOMIC 
COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (ECO), which was created in 1985 by Iran, Pakistan and 
Turkey, and which since 1992 includes Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. As part of its secretariat, the ECO maintains a 
DRUG CONTROL COORDINATION UNIT (DCCU) in Tehran.593 Iran is also part of the SIX PLUS 
TWO GROUP, comprising Afghanistan’s neighbours Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan and China as well as Russia and the USA, which aims at solving the conflict in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
587  Iran has signed agreements with the EU Commission (2005), and bilaterally with its member states France, 
Great Britain (February 2001), Italy (October 2004), Spain, Greece and Cyprus; but also with Norway and 
Switzerland; it has signed further agreements with naturally Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia (July 2007), Russia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and the UAE (May 2005); as well as with 
Australia, Japan, Lebanon, Oman, Singapore and Thailand: Samii & Recknagel (1999), 165; Samii (2003), 
295; CACI (2004); Navai (2005), 87; Calabrese (2007), 14f. 
588  Samii (2003), 285f. 
589  CACI (2004); Calabrese (2006), 15. 
590  On the details of these agreements: Calabrese (2007), 16. 
591  CACI (2004). 
592  Calabrese (2007), 17; TIME Online, 28th October 2009. 
593  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 165; Samii (2003), 295; CACI (2004). 
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Afghanistan and the related problem of drug trafficking.594 It is also included in the PARIS 
PACT, which had been created in 2003 by countries affected by the Afghan drug trade.595 Iran 
takes part in further international cooperation mechanisms against drug trafficking, for 
instance with the European Union and individual member states,596 as well as the Anti-Drug 
Liaison Officials’ Meetings for International Cooperation, whose second conference took 
place in Mašhad in 2000597. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
594  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 165; Samii (2003), 295; CACI (2004). 
595  Samii (2003), 295; CACI (2004). 
596  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 165; Calabrese (2007), 14. 
597  Samii & Recknagel (1999), 165. 
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III. A Short History of the Press in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 
„One cannot imagine any means better than a free newspaper 
to save the people of Iran and promote their progress”598 
 
III. 1. Iran’s fourth press spring during the revolution of 1979 
 
 During the last weeks of Moḥammad-Reżā Šāh’s reign in 1978, the Iranian press had 
successfully fought for more freedom and the Iranian government increasingly had given in to 
their demands for press freedom. The Iranian newspapers in fact were at the forefront in the 
political struggle against the shah, especially the two traditional and influential newspapers 
Eṭṭelā‘āt and Kaihān, as well as the newspaper Āyandegān. Eṭṭelā‘āt. It has been recorded 
that by this time Kaihān’s circulation attained the unprecedented number of 1,5 million copies, 
while Āyandegān’s readership reached 300'000.599 At the same time, the various political 
parties and factions that took part in the revolution started to publish their own newspapers, 
often continuing earlier publications, which were banned under the shah.600 Even the ethnic 
minorities could publish newspapers in their own languages.601 From the shah’s departure on 
January 16, 1979 to September 1980, approximately 250 new publications appeared.602 Thus, 
after the Constitutional Revolution in the early 20th century, the interregnum between Reżā 
Šāh and his successor Moḥammad-Reżā Šāh in the 1940s, and Moḥammad Mosaddeq’s short-
lived cabinet in the early 1950s, a fourth period of almost unrestrained press freedom set in. 
 
 Newspapers that continued to be published from before the revolution of 1979 were 
Bāmdād (Morning),603 the traditonal Tehrān-e Moṣavvar (Illustrated Tehran)604, or the leftist 
Payġām-e Emrūz (Todaz’s Message).605 The political parties and factions, for their part, used 
the new press freedom to start their own newspapers, some of which admittedly already have 
been published clandestinely before. As a result, the NATIONAL FRONT (ǧabheh-ye mellī-ye 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
598  According to Qānūn, Esfand 1, 1268 (February 20, 1890): Shahidi (2008), 741. 
599  Rawan (2000), 124; Shahidi (2007) 15f. 
600  In the last month of Moḥammad-Reżā Šāh’s rule alone, 105 new publications were launched: Shahidi 
(2007), 16. 
601  Saeed (1981), 13; Saʼedi (1984), 18. 
602  Shahidi (2007), 25; 400 new publications appeared in 1979, of which 122 dailies, weeklies and monthlies: 
Rawan (2000), 127. 
603  Basically a now independent succesor to the organ of the shah’s RASTĀḪĪZ single party: Saeed (1981), 13. 
604  Saʼedi (1984), 18; Shahidi (2007), 43. 
605  Paiġām-e Emrūz originally was the organ of the NEW IRAN PARTY (ḥezb-e īrān-e novīn): Gehrke & 
Mehner (1975), 109; Saʼedi (1984), 18; Shahidi considers Paiġām-e Emrūz to have been a very influential 
newspaper after the revolution – despite its comparably small circulation: Shahidi (2007), 4, 43. 
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īran) published its party organs Ḫabarnāmeh (Newspaper) and Ārmān-e Mellat (Ideal of the 
Nation),606 and the politically influential FREEDOM MOVEMENT (nahżat-e āzādī-ye īrān) and 
its organ Mīzān (Scale).607  
 
More active in this regard were, however, the leftist and communist parties. The 
TŪDEH PARTY (ḥezb-e tūdeh) openly published its organ Navīd (Good News), but also 
reactivated its previous organ Mardom (People) and the more theoretical Donyā (World), 
which for many years had appeared in exile.608 The Moǧāhedīn-e Ḫalq, which had split up 
into two factions in 1974, also published their own newspapers. The majority faction, which 
had renamed itself ORGANIZATION OF THE BATTLE ON THE WAY TO THE LIBERALIZATION OF 
THE WORKING CLASS (sāzemān-e paykār dar rāh-e āzādī-ye ṭabaqeh-ye kārgar), launched its 
new organ Paykār (Combat).609 The faction that synthesized Islam with Marxism published 
for its part the organ Moğāhed (Fighter). The People’s Devotees (fadāʼīyān-e ḫalq) – or 
officially the ORGANIZATION OF THE GUERILLAS DEVOTED TO THE IRANIAN PEOPLE (sāzemān-
e čerīk-hā-ye fadāʼī-ye ḫalq-e īrān) published the weekly Kār (Work) and the theoretical 
journal Nabard-e Ḫalq (Battle of the People).610 Other communist organs were for instance 
Komūnīst (Communist) and Ḥaqīqat (Truth) of the UNION OF IRANIAN COMMUNISTS 
(etteḥādiyyeh-ye kōmūnīst-hā-ye īrān); Zaḥmat (Hardship) of their splinter group 
REVOLUTIONARY SOLIDARITY / UNITY (vaḥdat-e enqelābī); Ranǧbar (Toiler) of the anti-
Soviet PARTY OF THE TOILERS in Iran (ḥezb-e ranǧbarān-e īrān); and Čeh Bāyad Kard (What 
has to be Done) of the Trotskyists (trotskīst-hā). 611 
 
 However, the most important new newspaper to appear was launched by the Islamist 
and religious groups. The religious opposition against the shah had never owned a real 
newspaper before but the ALLIED ISLAMIC GROUPS (hayʼat-hā-ye moʼtalafeh-ye eslāmī) and 
the SOCIETY OF ISLAMIC COALITION (ǧam‘iyyat-e moʼtalafeh-ye eslāmī), which were led by 
the clerics Moṭṭaharī, Bāhonar and Rafsanǧānī, had published the newsletter Enteqām 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
606  Saeed (1981), 13; Abrahamian (1982), 50117, 504, 50623, 51136; Rawan (2000), 133. 
607  Saʼedi talks about „another“ newspaper (additionally to Mīzān) that was only published from November 
1979, without mentioning its name: Saʼedi (1984), 18f. 
608  Abrahamian (1982), 454ff.; Milani (1993), 310, 319 no 20; Rawan (2000), 133; Ḥaqšenās (Communism 
– EIr); Shahidi (2007), 25.  
609  Abrahamian (1982), 493ff.; ḤAQŠENĀS was a cofounder of the SĀZEMĀN-E PAIKĀR: Ḥaqšenās 
(Communism – EIr). 
610  Abrahamian (1982), 483ff.; Ḥaqšenās (Communism – EIr). 
611  On the smaller communist parties and their organs: Ḥaqšenās (Communism – EIr). 
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(Vengeance) from 1966612. After the creation of their own party in February 1979, the 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY (ḥezb-e ǧomhūrī-ye eslāmī) started to publish their eponymous 
newspaper: Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī (Islamic Republic). The first editor was ‘Alī Ḫāmenehʼī. But 
the newspaper was never able attain the same circulation as Eṭṭelā‘āt, Kaihān or 
Āyandegān.613 The MUSLIM PEOPLE REPUBLIC PARTY (ḥezb-e ǧomhūrī-ye ḫalq-e mosalmān), 
which supported Ḫomainī’s main rival Āyatollāh Šarī‘atmadārī, published the newspaper 
Ḫalq-e Mosalmān (Muslim People). Another newspaper that was launched by a person close 
to Ḫomainī was Enqelāb-e Eslāmī (Islamic Revolution), which was published by the later 
president ‘Abd ol-Ḥasan Banī Ṣadr on June 19, 1979.614 
 
 There had been early signs that Ḫomainī would not prove to be a champion of press 
freedom. Even before his return to Tehrān on February 11, 1979, the SYNDICATE OF 
NEWSPAPER WRITERS AND JOURNALISTS (sandīkā-ye nevisande-gān va ḫabar-negar-ān-e 
maṭbū‘āt) had met on the same day first with the shah’s secret service SAVAK and then with 
representatives from Ḫomainī, while the latter complained that the newspapers would provide 
too much coverage to the secular opposition. A journalist present at the meetings later 
reported: “we left a meeting with the SAVAK, only to participate in a meeting with the SAVAḪ” 
– referring to Ḫomainī with the replacement of the last letter.615 The shah’s last prime minister, 
Šāpūr Baḫtiyār, warned the press of an imminent censorship if Ḫomainī was to assume 
power.616 On January 17, 1979, a group of the imam’s followers demonstrated against Kaihān, 
which had published critical articles against them.617 This resulted in an increasing pressure on 
the press almost immediately after the return of Āyatollāh Ḫomainī. Alredy in March 1979, 
Ḫomainī personally started to warn the press “there would be freedom of expression, pen and 
views for all” but “people will not tolerate conspiracies”.618 The followers of the imam then 
first set about bringing the most widely read newspapers Eṭṭelā‘āt, Kaihān and Āyandegān 
under control.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
612  Vakili-Zad (1990), 11ff.; the theological seminaries in Qom also published journals, among them Maktab-
e Eslām (School of Islam): Sreberny-Mohammadi (1990), 356. 
613  Generally on the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY: Corstange (2000), XXX; LoC (2009); Sciolino (1983), 897; 
Hassan (1984), 678-680; Buchta (2000), 12, 212; on the newspaper Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī: Sciolino (1983), 
897; Saʼedi (1984), 18; Shahidi (2007), 45. 
614  Parvin (Enqelāb-e Eslāmī – EIr); Saʼedi (1984), 18; concomitantly, the newspaper Bāmdād also received 
its official license, although it probably had appeared before: Shahidi (2007), 43. 
615  Ḫomainī’s delegation included Āyatollāh Moḥammad Beheštī, Āyatollāh Morteżā Moṭahharī and 
Moḥammad Mofatteḥ, all belonging to his close circle; on the part of of the syndicate were Raḥmān Hātefī 
from Kaihān and Ġolām-Ḥossain Ṣaleḥyār from Eṭṭelā‘āt: Rawan (2000), 131; Shahidi (2007), 17f. 
616  Baḫtiyār was the leader of the NATIONAL FRONT after Moṣaddeq: Shahidi (2007), 20f. 
617  By vaḥdat-e kalām, Ḫomainī originally rather referred to Islamic solidarity in the society: Sreberny-
Mohammadi (1990), 359;  Shahidi (2007), 20. 
618  Saʼedi (1984), 17; Shahidi (2007), 31; on similar later threats: Rawan (2000), 127. 
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 The first target of the concerted actions of the Islamist factions was the newspaper 
Kaihān. Kaihān had become the highest-circulating newspaper in Iran, especially due to its 
critical reporting on Ḫomainī’s political initiatives such as the referendum for an Islamic 
republic, or the abrogation of the family law.619 Even prime minister Bāzargān, who himself 
felt increasingly powerless against the Islamist parallel institutions, accused Kaihān of 
dedicating too much coverage to rival political groups such as the MOǦĀHEDĪN-E ḪALQ.620 
Islamist pressure groups consequently started to threaten critical journalists and the editorial 
board.621 But pressure also mounted from the inside. The administrative and technical staff, 
which had created ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF KAIHĀN (anǧoman-e eslāmī-ye Kaihān), started to 
interrogate and expel many journalists: a practice which Mesbāḥzādeh, the owner of Kaihān, 
apparently supported. 622 On March 18, 1979, Kaihān officially declared itself as an organ of 
the Islamic Republic and a supporter of Islam;623 and in April, the recently created editorial 
council was forced to disband. Raḥmān Hātefī initially remained chief editor.624 In May, 
eventually, after Kaihān had reprinted a critical article on Ḫomainī, the ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF 
KAIHĀN removed twenty critical journalists and members of the editorial board.625 When, as a 
result, the journalists went on strike, the society started to publish the newspaper itself albeit 
on a rather low journalistic level. The same day, a delegation of the society was received by 
Ḫomainī in Qom, who reiterated: “the press and public media have to correct themselves”626. 
Not long afterwards, Mesbāḥzādeh agreed to confer the assets of Kaihān to the wealthy 
Ḥossain Mahdiyān.627 Mahdiyān managed to negotiate an end of the journalists’ strike by 
paying golden parachutes to critical journalists willing to resign. He replaced them with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
619  Ḫomainī’s followers accused Kaihān of having caused the ‚chador crisis’ by printing Ḫomainī’s speech, in 
which he accused Bāzargān’s administration of being full of naked women: Nikazmerad (1980), 351f.; 
Shahidi (2007), 24. 
620  Nikazmerad (1980), 351f.; Shahidi (2007), 24. 
621  The well-known satirist Hādī Ḫorsandī e.g. was threatened with death and eventually had to flee the 
country: Shahidi (2007), 24ff. 
622  The ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF KAIHĀN – which cooperated closely with the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY – 
apparently forwarded the names of critical journalists to the demonstrators in front of the Kaihān offices, 
who then asked for their dismissal or even execution: Shahidi (2007), 29f. 
623  Shahidi (2007), 26f., 29. 
624  The ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF KAIHĀN – which cooperated closely with the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY – 
apparently forwarded the names of the critical journalists to organized demonstrators in front of the Kaihān 
offices, which then asked for their dismissal or even execution: Shahidi (2007), 29f. 
625  Some journalists assumed the TŪDEH PARTY to have provided the ISLAMIC SOCIETY OF KAIHĀN with the 
list of journalists to be banned: Shahidi (2007), 38. 
626  Shahidi (2007), 39. 
627  Meṣbāḥzādeh probably agreed into this deal in order to safeguard his considerable other assets in Iran; 
Ḥossain Mahdiyān was a wealthy ironmonger, who had been active in publishing Islamic literature from 
the 1960s, and was the co-director of the ISLAMIC CULTURAL PUBLISHING HOUSE (daftar-e našr-e fahang-e 
eslāmī): Shahidi (2007), 40. 
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younger, less experienced colleagues, who published Kaihān as “the first newspaper of the 
dispossessed”.628 A “group of twenty”, however, refused Mahdiyān’s offer and launched their 
own newspaper Kāihān-e Āzād (Free World / Kaihān). However this was to last only for 
about a week.629 
 
Eṭṭelā‘āt, which always had been a more moderate newspaper, was the next newspaper 
to be brought into the official line. While the conflict in Kaihān took mainly place between 
the administrative and technical staff on the one side and the journalists on the other, the 
journalists of Eṭṭelā‘āt disagreed on the future alignment of the newspaper. The ongoing 
conflict provoked the interference of Moḥammad Mofatteḥ, one of Ḫomainī’s representatives 
for the press. He decided to call back Mas‘ūdī, still the official owner of the newspaper, who 
had left Iran concomitantly with the shah in January 1979.630 Mas‘ūdī expelled Eṭṭelā‘āt’s 
most respected and critical journalists, and, on 8th May 1979, set up an editorial council, 
which promised to report in accordance with the “line of Emām” (ḫaṭṭ-e emām).631 
 
On September 9, 1979, Ḫomainī eventually assigned both newspapers to the 
FOUNDATION OF THE DISPOSSESSED (bonyād-e mostaż‘afān), which managed the huge assets 
of the confiscated PAHLAVĪ FOUNDATION (bonyād-e pahlavī). He reserved for himself the 
right to personally appoint the editors of Eṭṭelā‘āt and Kaihān respectively.632 Initially, 
Kaihān continued to be managed by Mahdiyān, while Mas‘ūdī was removed from the 
masthead of Eṭṭelā‘āt, which no seems to have been managed directly by Mofatteḥ.633 In May 
1980, Ḫomainī appointed Maḥmūd Do‘āʼī as chief editor of Eṭṭelā‘āt,634 and in 1981, the 
following president Moḥammad Ḫātamī was appointed as chief editor of Kaihān.635 
 
The first move against the newspaper Āyandegān came from the highest echelons of 
power by Āyatollāh Ḫomainī. Āyandegān, on May 2, 1979, had published an article, in which 
the obscure religious group FORQĀN declared responsibility for the murder of Āyatollāh 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
628  Nikazmerad (1980), 356; Saeed (1981), 12; Rawan (2000), 131ff.; the takeover of Kaihān is particularly 
well documented in Ǧavānrūdī’s account “Conquest of Kaihān” (tasḫīr-e kaihān): Shahidi (2007), 37ff.; 
629  On the short-lived Kaihān-e Āzād: Saeed (1981), 12f.; Shahidi (2007), 41. 
630  Shahidi (2007), 28; Parvin (Eṭṭelā‘āt – EIr). 
631  Saʼedi (1984), 18; Rawan (2000), 129f.; Shahidi (2000), 28f. 
632  Nikazmerad (1980), 362; Rawan (200), 132; Parvin (Eṭṭelā‘āt – EIr); according to some reports, Eṭṭelā‘āt 
already had been handed over to the FOUNDATION OF THE DISPOSSESSED on 8th August 1979: Shahidi 
(2007), 42f.. 
633  Shahidi (2007), 42f. 
634  Shahidi (2007), 42. 
635  Shahidi (2007), 44. 
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Moṭṭaharī, one of the ideologues of the Islamic Republic and a close associate of Ḫomainī. 
Trying to hide possible internal tensions between the religious factions, Akbar Rafsanǧānī, 
then a member of the influential COUNCIL OF THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION (šūrā-ye enqelāb-e 
eslāmī), however, accused the leftists to be behind the murder. In an article published on 10th 
May 1979, Āyandegān nevertheless continued to hold Forqān responsible for Moṭṭaharī’s 
assassination and quoted an interview of Ḫomainī with the French newspaper Le Monde, in 
which he denied the involvement of the leftists. On the very same day, the national radio and 
television stations cited Ḫomainī with a statement that he was quoted wrong and that he 
would never again read Āyandegān. The following day, pressure groups attacked the premises 
of the newspaper offices. Ceding to the pressure, Āyandegān’s staff decided to publish one 
last issue, which became known as the White Āyandegān (āyandegān-e sefīd), and in which 
the newspaper listed its merits for the revolution in general and the freedom of opinion and 
the press in particular. 500’000 copies of this special issue were sold.636 The new MINISTRY 
FOR INFORMATION AND PUBLIC RELATIONS (vezārat-e eṭṭelā‘āt va ravābeṭ-e ‘omūmī), 
however, assured that Āyandegān was not banned.637 The newspaper soon re-appeared in the 
newsstands and it emerged as being more popular than before mainly because it was the last 
large independent newspaper. Although generally advancing rather leftist positions, the entire 
secular and moderately religious opposition gathered around it.638 Yet, on August 7, 1979, 
armed unities of the IRGC occupied the editorial offices of the newspaper Āyandegān and 
arrested most of its staff. Āyandegān continued to be published afterwards, albeit – unlike 
Kaihān and Eṭṭelā‘āt – under a new name: Ṣobḥ-e Āzādegān (Morning of the Free). All three 
continued to be widely read newspapers in Iran.639 Despite big demonstrations against the 
increasing press censorship,640 Āyatollāh Ḫomainī continued to criticize the independent press. 
This was usually followed by immediate attacks of pressure groups against newspaper 
premises and journalists as well as newsstands that were selling the papers and even against 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
636  Saʼedi (1984), 18; Rawan (2000), 128; on more details on the religious group Forqān, and on Āyandegān’s 
coverage: Shahidi (2007), 33ff. 
637  Shahidi (2007), 38. 
638  Elwell-Sutton (Āyandegān – EIr); even Kaihān, which was meanwhile brought into the official line, often 
reprinted Āyandegān’s articles: Shahidi (2007), 41. 
639  Saeed (1981), 13; Saʼedi (1984), 18; Beeman (1984), 153f.; Milani ascribes the closure of Āyandegān to 
the imminent referendum on the new constitution of the Islamic Republic: Milani (1994), 155; Rawan 
(2000), 129f.; the staff of Āyandegān was accused of being spies of the CIA and Mossad; but with the 
exception of the members of the editorial board they were never convicted and soon released: Shahidi 
(2007), 41 
640  The protests were particularly triggered by the attacks on Āyandegān: Nikazmerad (1980), 357; Rawan 
(2000), 130. 
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readers.641 Āyandegān in fact had listed many corresponding instances in its famous special 
„white edition“.642 Soon, the newspaper Paiġām-e Emrūz met the same fate, while it editor 
went into hiding.643  
 
The Islamist authorities, had, however also more systematic plans to control the press. 
Officially responsible for licensing and regulating newspapers was the MINISTRY OF 
NATIONAL GUIDANCE (vezārat-e eršād-e mellī), which was created on May 27, 1979. During 
the transitional period of the revolution, this ministry, however, simply lacked power. It only 
restrictively issued new licenses but most newspapers simply appeared without license. More 
assertive were the new regulations that were passed by the COUNCIL OF THE ISLAMIC 
REVOLUTION, which in vague terms penalized the defamation of religious scholars (‘olamāʼ) 
and the religion of Islam in general. 644  The SYNDICATE OF NEWSPAPER WRITERS AND 
JOURNALISTS were also penalized as it appeared that its leaders seemed to be keener to purge 
its ranks than the culture minister Nāṣer Mīnāčī.645 This did not help the syndicate much, since 
it was never allowed to convene during the following years.646 In particular, however, the new 
government planned to regulate the media with a new press law, which eventually was passed 
in August 1979 even before the adoption of the new constitution.647 
 
The Press Law of August 8, 1979 
 
 The Islamic Republic’s first press law was based on a bill, which had been prepared under the 
shah.648 On first sight, it did not differ much from the press law of 1955, and even seemed to be more 
liberal than the amended press law of 1963, which was nominally still in force. But it introduced various 
new offenses, whose fatal character was enshrined in vague wording. 
 The provisions on publication licenses were similar to those of 1955 and 1908 respectively. Barred 
from obtaining a license were now all persons, who had rendered “media services” to the monarchy, 
which in effect would have included all experienced journalists, editors and publishers. To obtain a 
license, furthermore, editors had to prove their “political piety” and “moral competence”. As had been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
641  Saʼedi gives a pictographic description of the concerted procedure against disliked newspapers: Saʼedi 
(1984), 16ff. 
642  Shahidi (2007), 27, 36. 
643  Saʼedi (1984), 16ff.; Rawan (2000), 127f.  
644  Milani (1988), 155ff. 
645  Shahidi (2007), 32. 
646  Shahidi (2007), 43, 110; Shahidi (2008), 746. 
647  The SYNDICATE OF NEWSPAPER WRITERS AND JOURNALISTS wanted to be involved in the preparation of the 
new press law, but was ignored: Shahidi (2007), 31, 42. 
648  Saʼedi ascribes the new press bill to an earlier press draft under the military administration of general 
Azhārī – instead of Šarīf-Emāmī: Saʼedi (1984), 18.  
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the case for the shah, all libel or defamation of Āyatollāh Ḫomainī, clerical and lay leaders, as well the 
religion of “Islam” and the “revolution” was punishable.  
On the other hand, the law also sanctioned all governmental pressure on the press. Court 
proceedings against editors or publishers were envisaged to take place in the presence of a jury.649 The 
law also affirmed the right of the journalists to self-organize professional associations.650 
 
 The authorities wasted no time to put the law into practice. Directly after the 
enactment of the press law, the new prosecutor-general Aḥmad Āḏarī-Qommī announced a 
long list of newspapers whose publication henceforth would be banned. This list included 
almost all remaining independent newspapers: Kaihān-e Āzād and Paiġām-e Emrūz, whose 
publication factually already had ceased before due to attacks of the pressure groups; Bāmdād, 
Omīd-e Īrān and Tehrān-e Moṣavver; MOǦĀHEDĪN-E ḪALQ’s Moǧāhed, FADĀʼĪYĀN-E 
ḪALQ’s Kār and Nabard-e Ḫalq, Paikār of the PAIKĀR PARTY, and the various organs of the 
smaller communist and leftist parties like Komūnīst, Ḥaqīqat, Zaḥmat, Rahāʼī, Ranǧbar, 
Kand-o-Kāv, Čeh Bāyad Kard, Etteḥād-e Čāp and Āzādī; as well as probably the newspapers 
of the NATIONAL FRONT, Ḫabarnāmeh and Ārmān-e Mellat. Also banned were the popular 
satirical journals Ḥāǧǧī Bābā, Āhangar and Ferdowsī and all other weekly publications. Only 
the newspapers of the TŪDEH PARY were still allowed to appear, mainly due to its 
unconditional support of Ḫomainī.651 
 
While already plans for the new press law had led to protests, the passing of the law 
provoked again a big demonstration on August 12, 1979, which was violently attacked by the 
pressure groups.652 These same groups also carried on their physical attacks against the 
editorial offices of the banned newspapers, which despite the ban continued to be 
published.653 It would take almost another two years until all these newspapers effectively 
ceased their publication.654 The factual closure of the already banned newspapers then 
occurred concomitantly with the suppression of the respective political groups or the 
expression of opposing political view. The independent newspaper Bāmdād was also shut 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
649  On the press law of 1979: Nikazmerad (1980), 361; Saʼedi (1984), 18; the law came into force on 11th 
August 1979: Rawan (2000), 132f.; Shahidi (2007), 42f.; Shahidi (2008), 746. 
650  Shahidi (2007), 43, 110; Shahidi (2008), 746. 
651  According to Saeed and Saʼedi, 40 newspapers had ceased their publication by 9th or 12th August 1979: 
Saeed (1981), 13; Saʼedi (1984), 18; According to Nikazmerad and Rawan, 22 newspapers and magazines 
were shut within the next two weeks: Nikazmerad (1980), 361; Rawan (2000), 132; Shahidi mentions 63 
banned publication: Shahidi (2007), 42; 
652  Saeed (1981), 13. 
653  Saʼedi (1984), 181; Rawan (2000), 132f.; Shahidi (2007), 42. 
654  Sepehri (1982), 9. 
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down in the run-up to the ballot on the new constitution in November 1979.655 After the 
adoption of the constitution in December 1979, which in article 24 actually enshrined the 
press freedom “except when it is detrimental to the fundamental principles of Islam or the 
rights of the public”,656 the PARTY OF THE MUSLIM PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC was banned together 
with its newspaper Ḫalq-e Mosalmān.657 In April 1980,658 the authorities proceeded against 
the NATIONAL FRONT, whose newspapers Ḫabarnāmeh and Ārmān-e Mellat had also ceased 
to appear. The same situation applied to the publications Ǧonbeš, Negīn, Ketāb-e Ǧom‘eh.659  
 
With the start of the war against Iran in September 1980, Ḫomainī intensified his 
criticism of the residual party papers by complaining that “unfortunately and most 
surprisingly” some newspapers still serve “the evil intentions of the right and the left in 
Iran”.660 In June 1981, he dismissed president Banī Ṣadr, who increasingly had aligned with 
the MOǦĀHEDĪN-E ḪALQ,661 and consequently his newspaper Enqelāb-e Eslāmī as well as the 
FREEDOM MOVEMENT’s Mīzān were shut down.662  As a result, the MOĞĀHEDĪN-E ḪALQ, who 
were now bereft of any direct political influence, started what was to become known as the 
“summer of terror”: a killing spree of dozens of the highest-ranking officials of the Islamic 
Republic. The Iranian authorities paid back by brutally repressing the group.663 At the same 
time, they also focused on the minority faction of the Fadāʼīyān-e Ḫalq and the smaller leftist 
group. Consequently, all critical leftist newspapers were closed, namely Moǧāhed, Komūnīst, 
Ḥaqīqat, Rahāʼī, Paikār, Rāzmanegān, Ranǧbār, Rāh-e Kārgar, Kand-o-Kāv and Beh Sū-ye 
Āyandeh.664 The only surviving political groups now were the TŪDEH PARTY and the majority 
faction of the FADĀʼĪYĀN-E ḪALQ, which had entirely adopted the official TŪDEH line in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
655  Shahidi gives no date for the closure of Bāmdād: Shahidi (2007), 43. 
656  On the new constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran and on opposing voices: Nikazmerad (1980), 362; 
Menashri (1980), 122-132; Sciolino (1983), 897; Hassan (1984), 681ff.; Milani (1994), 154-161. 
657  On the conflict between the followers of Ḫomainī and the followers of Šarī’atmadārī: Nikazmerad (1980), 
365f.; Menashri (1980), 1356ff.; Saeed (1981), 12; Milani (1994), 174f. 
658  On the incidence of Ṭabas and the subsequent purge in the army: Sciolino (1983), 898; Milani (1994), 
178ff. 
659  On the closure of the newspapers of the NATIONAL FRONT and other publications: Saeed (1981), 14; 
Sciolino (1983), 898; Beeman (1984), 154; Milani (1994), 178ff.; Rawan (2000), 131; according to 
Shahidi, Bāmdād was definitively closed on this occasion: Shahidi (2007), 43. 
660  According to a study on the Iranian press by the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE: Shahidi 
(2007), 44. 
661  On Ḫomainī’s dismissal of Banī Ṣadr, who later would say: ‚I felt like a child watching my father slowly 
turn into an alcoholic. The drug this time was power’: Sciolino (1983), 896f.; Milani (1994), 184f. 
662  Saʼedi (1984), 18; Rawan also mentions a few newspapers of the NATIONAL FRONT (e.g. Ārmān-e Mellat) 
and the TŪDEH PARTY (e.g. Mardom) to have been banned at this date; they might, however, already have 
been closed before: Rawan (2000), 133; Shahidi (2007), 42 
663  On the attacks of the MOǦĀHEDĪN-E ḪALQ on the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY: Sciolino (1983), 896ff.; 
Saʼedi (1984), 19f.; Milani (1994), 186ff. 
664  After the dissolution of the MOǦĀHEDĪN-E ḪALQ and the FADĀʼĪYĀN-E ḪALQ, all oppositional political 
mass demonstrations ended: Sa’edi (1984), 18. 
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1980.665 When in 1983, a hidden network of TŪDEH sympathizers was detected within the 
army,666 the ruling Islamists eventually dissolved the TŪDEH PARTY and closed its newspapers 
Mardom, Navīd and Donyā, as well as the party organs of the FADĀʼĪYĀN-E ḪALQ, Kār and 
Nabard-e Ḫalq.667 By 1983, the followers of Ḫomainī were in total control of the political and 
the public spheres. The press spring had definitely come to an end with the only remaining 
newspapers of importance that still appeared being Kaihān, Eṭṭelā‘āt, Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī and 
Ṣobḥ-e Āzādegān. 
 
III. 2. Total Press Censorship in the Islamic Republic of Iran 
 
 With nearly all the left and right opposition parties having being suppressed, the ruling 
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY achieved total control of the political sphere. It emerged that the 
only other party that was still tolerated was the FREEDOM MOVEMENT, the most centrist of 
Iran’s parties. However, as soon as the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY achieved its political 
dominance, it started to fall apart into two competing factions: a leftist, more progressive 
faction, and a rightist, conservative faction. Ideological differences in the party had existed 
from the start but they were concealed through a common fight against the opposition.668 
Differences of opinion, especially about the right interpretation of the Islamic law, had existed 
for centuries within the clerical establishment.669 But in this instance, they became more 
pronounced as the clerics were in power. 
 
The Islamic Left vs. the Islamic Right 
The Islamic Left 
Directly after the revolution, after the occupation of the American embassy, the Islamic left (čāp-e 
eslāmī) or the radicals (rādikāl-hā) were the most influential political faction among the Islamists. The 
members of the leftist faction were in general younger, and thus lower-ranking clerics. They represented 
the interests of the lower classes: the urban working-class, the small merchants, and also the students. 
Their ideological concepts were strongly influenced by leftist thoughts, in particular by the ‘Alī Šarī‘atī.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
665  On the repression of the FADĀʼĪYĀN-E ḪALQ in 1980: Ḥaqšenās (Communism – EIr). 
666  On the double game of the TŪDEH PARTY: Milani (1994), 190ff. 
667  Hassan (1984), 684; Milani (1994), 190ff. 
668  Hassan calls the Islamic left “radicals” and the traditional right “moderates”: Hassan (1984), 685; Akhavi 
(1987a), 184; Akhavi (1987b), 54; Siavoshi criticizes the classification in two factions as being too simple: 
Siavoshi (1992), 27f., 29f.; Buchta (2000), 11f.; Milani (1994), 197ff.; Keddie (2006), 255.  
669  Hassan (1984), 686; Milani and Buchta correctly point to the fact that this multi-factional system is also a 
characteristics of the clerical system in Shi‘a Islam, where there are always several clerical authorities 
(marāǧe‘-e taqlīd) at a given time: Milani (1994), 198; Buchta (2000), 11. 
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The long serving prime minister Mīr-Ḥossain Mūsavī and president ‘Alī Ḫāmenehʼī belonged to this 
current.670 The Islamic left won a majority of seats in the elections to the 2nd parliament (maǧles). It had a 
strong representation in the IRGC, and initially also in the JUDICIARY (qovveh-ye qażāʼiyyeh). Of further 
importance were the representatives of the Islamic left such as Āyatollāh ‘Abd-ol-Karīm Mūsavī-
Ardebīlī, chairman of the SUPREME COURT (dīvān-e ‘ālī-ye kešvar); the state prosecutor Āyatollāh  
Moḥammad Mūsavī-Ḫoʼainīhā; and ‘Alī-Akbar Moḥtašamī-Pūr, cofounder of the Lebanese Ḥezbollāh; 
Mehdī Karrūbī, parliament speaker for two terms and presidential candidate; Moḥammad Ḫātamī, then 
MINISTER FOR ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE and chief-editor of Kaihān; and Behzād Nabavī, later 
chairman of the ORGANIZATION OF THE FIGHTERS FOR THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION (sāzemān-e moǧāhedīn-
e enqelāb-e eslāmī).671 
The Islamic left, thus, dominated both domestic politics and foreign policy. Their ideological 
positions leaned towards the nationalization of the economy, the exportation of the Islamic revolution to 
other countries and was outspokenly anti-imperialist, especially against the West hence their designation 
as “radicals”. They were seen as advocating progressive ideas in social as well as cultural issues. 
 
The Islamic Right 
 The traditional right (rāst-e eslāmī) consisted of higher-ranking clerics who had dominated the 
religious sphere before the revolution. Often rich landowners – either personally or as administrators of 
religious endowments (ouqāf, sg. vaqf) – they were closely interrelated with the influential and rich 
merchant (bāzārī) class. As the interest of both groups had been affected by Moḥammad-Reżā Šāh’s 
agrarian reform, the so-called „White Revolution“ (enqelāb-e sefīd), they supported the revolution of 
1979. 
 
Until the passing of Ḫomainī, the Islamic right was under-represented in the executive and the 
parliament. Yet, by virtue of their high religious qualification, they were strongly represented in the 
middle and low ranks of the judiciary, and particularly in the powerful GUARDIAN COUNCIL OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (šūrā-ye negah-bān-e qānūn-e asāsī). Members of this council were e.g. the āyatollāhs 
Moḥammad-Reżā Mahdavī-Kanī, Qāsem Ḫaz‘alī, Moḥammad Emāmī-Kāšānī, Moḥammad Moḥammadī-
Gīlānī, Moḥammad Yazdī, Aḥmad Āḏarī-Qommī or Aḥmad Ǧannatī. The Islamic right was furthermore 
in control of influential mosque networks and accounted for the majority of the religious teachers in the 
seminaries in Qom.672 
 
 In contrast to the Islamic left, the Islamic right, however, consequently opposed any further erosion 
of property rights and thus the left’s nationalization project. They was generally for modernization, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
670  Akhavi (1987b), 53f. 
671  On the Islamic left: Akahavi (1987a), 185; Akhavi is of the opinion that the judiciary and the parliament 
were dominated by the conservatives: Akhavi (1987b), 53; Siavoshi (1992), 29ff.; on the foreign policy 
positions of the Islamic left: Sciolino (1983), 909ff.; Milani calls the Islamic leftists also “crusaders”: 
Milani (1994), 198f.; on the influence of the Islamic left in the IRGC and the religious foundations (sg. 
bonyād): Buchta (2000), 17f.; Keddie (2006), 255ff. 
672  On the traditional right: Akhavi (1987a), 184ff.; Akhavi (1987b), 54f.; Siavoshi (1992), 29ff.; Milani 
(1994), 198; the traditional right was of the opinion that economic differences in a society are God-given 
and that they can be eased by religious solidarity: Buchta (2000), 13ff.; Keddie (2006), 256. 
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especially the Western model the shah had tried to impose. But they were at least interested in a working 
peace with the West, also to secure their business interests. Consequently, they were less enthusiastic 
about exporting the revolution and soon advocated for an end of the war against Iraq hence their 
designation as “moderates”. In social and cultural matters, they were usually staunchly conservative and 
backward looking. 
 
Āyatollāh Ḫomainī: the arbiter 
 Āyatollāh Ḫomainī was seen as holding himself above the factions as he cleverly pitted both 
factions against each other to balance their differences so as to secure his own power.673 Although he had 
attained fame by denouncing Moḥammad-Reżā Šāh’s reforms, he appeared to have favored the positions 
of the Islamic left, including the nationalization of the economy, the exportation of the revolution, as well 
as social and cultural openings such as airing music or Western movies on radio and television. He could, 
however, not afford to alienate the powerful traditionalist clerics because other high-ranking clerics did 
not always accept his leadership role without challenge. He therefore often accommodated their moral 
rigor, even though he re-allowed certain cultural freedoms they abhorred, such as for instance airing 
Western movies on television or the playing of music. 
  
In the following years, the conflict between the two factions increasingly paralyzed the 
country. Many urgent problems, such as high inflation, unemployment and receding oil 
production, remained unsolved. Mainly responsible for this was the frequent stalemate 
between the leftist dominated parliament and the traditionalist dominated Guardian Council, 
the latter of which had a veto right on all laws passed by the parliament. A similar stalemate 
soon developed between Prime Minister Mūsavī and president Ḫāmenehʼī, who subsequently 
joined the camp of the traditional right.674 
 
 Logically, the debates between the left and the right faction also started to take place 
in the press. Since the shutdown of the independent and alternative press, Iran’s media had 
become been vastly synchronized. It reported almost exclusively along the official line about 
the “holy defence” (defā‘-e moqaddas) against Iraq by glorifying the thousands of martyrs (sg. 
šahīd), propagated the official Islamic commands and values and condemned an alleged 
“Western cultural invasion” (tahāǧom-e farhang-e ġarbī). 675  Yet, with the increasing 
disagreement on war and economic policies, cracks soon appeared in the press as well. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
673  According to the Islamic Republic’s first prime minister Bāzargān, Ḫomainī would let none of the factions 
know, how much power they exactly have: Milani (1994), 199; Buchta (2000), 12; Keddie (2006), 255. 
674  On the stalemate between the two factions: Sciolino (1983), 899, 906ff.; Milani (1994), 199f.; Corstange 
(2000);  
675  On the predominant war-coverage of the newspapers before 1983: Sciolino (1983), 906.  
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 Initially, the Islamic left was in control of most newspapers that still existed. Kaihān 
had been edited from 1981, by the leftist cleric and minister for ISLAMIC CULTURE AND 
GUIDANCE Moḥammad Ḫātamī, and particularly voiced its support for the export of the 
revolution. It soon developed a reputation as a radical newspaper.676 Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, too, 
rather was a leftist paper, as the Islamic left dominated the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC PARTY. The 
most vocal newspaper of the Islamic left was, however, Ṣobḥ-e Āzādegān.677 Eṭṭelā‘āt for its 
part, traditionally a moderate outlet, seems to have been rather neutral in this conflict.678 
Ḫomainī often deliberately used the respective positioning of Kaihān and Eṭṭelā‘āt according 
to his current political expediency.679 In 1984, the Worker’s House (ḫāneh-ye kārgar), the 
official workers’ syndicate, which was controlled by the Islamic left, started to publish the 
new newspaper Kār va Kārgar (Work and Woker).680 
 
III. 3. A timid opening for more press criticism 
 
 The traditional right, by contrast, initially did not have a public organ to promote its 
political views. The TEHRAN SOCIETY OF THE BAZAR AND THE GUILDS (ǧāme‘eh-ye anǧoman-
hā-ye eslāmī-ye aṣnaf va bāzār-e tehrān) admittedly published the economic journal Eqteṣād-
e Eslāmī (Islamic Economy), which as a specialized magazine never attained a wide 
readership.681 In 1985, the traditional right created the RESĀLAT FOUNDATION, right before the 
second presidential elections of August 1985. The foundation included Member of Parliament 
Āyatollāh Āḏarī-Qommī, labor minister Aḥmad Tavakkolī and Mortażā Nabavī, another 
member of Mūsavī’s cabinet, amongst many others. The foundation also had the support of 
the influential conservative SOCIETY OF THE TEACHERS OF THE (THEOLOGICAL) SEMINARIES OF 
QOM (ǧāme‘eh-ye modarresīn-e ḥouzeh-ye ‘elmiyyeh-ye qom) and the equally important 
COALITION OF ISLAMIC ASSOCIATIONS (haiʼat-hā-ye moʼtalefeh-ye eslāmī), which was close 
to the bāzār merchants. The RESĀLAT FOUNDATION consequently launched the newspaper 
Resālat (Mission), whose first editor was Tavakkolī, who later would be replaced by Kāẓem 
Anbarlūʼī. Within a short time, Resālat became one of the most influential Iranian newspapers. 
Repeatedly voicing the conservatives’ critical stance towards the continuation of the war, 
Ḫomainī banned its distribution on the front, and the leftist dominated government threatened 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
676  Shahidi (2007), 44. 
677  On Ṣobḥ-e Āzādegān and its political position: Šahrvand-e Emrūz (1364). 
678  Akhavi calls it a „militantly fundamentalist“ (leftist) newspaper: Akhavi (1987), 53. 
679  Shahidi (2007), 44, 46. 
680  Shahidi (2007), 45, 64;  
681  Akhavi (1987a), 185. 
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it with closure. It is barely astonishing then, that the leftist government often threatened it 
with its closure.682 Thus, despite being a staunchly conservative newspaper, Resālat actually 
was responsible for a limited re-opening of the public sphere, in which criticism of the official 
politics again became possible to a certain degree. 
 
 This criticism continued to an astonishing degree. The two factions particularly 
attacked each other in their main organs, Resālat and Ṣobḥ-e Āzādegān. Member of 
parliament Ǧalāl al-Dīn Fārsī for instance harshly criticized the nationalization of the 
economy by the leftist government Resālat. As a result of which, Ṣobḥ-e Āzādegān, the most 
outspoken newspaper of the Islamic left, openly accused him of tax fraud. Ḫomainī, who 
always tried to hide internal conflicts from the public, eventually ordered the closure of Ṣobḥ-
e Āzādegān in the beginning of 1986. The newspaper was soon replaced by the less 
aggressive successor Abrār (Good Men). However, the fact that the only newspaper of the 
Islamic left was closed points to a growing influence of the traditional right.683 
 
 Arguably as a means to control the belligerent press, the parliament passed a new 
press law on 13th March 1986 – only seven years after the Islamic Republic’s first press law. 
Neither faction is known to have protested against this new restrictive law, maybe because 
both hoped they could use the law against the rival faction.684 
 
The press law of 1986685 
 The new press law introduced a number of further duties and responsibilities on the press. 
Newspapers explicitly had to serve the Islamic Republic in its “fight against the manifestations of the 
colonialist culture [] and the promotion and propagation of the noble Islamic culture” (mobārezeh bā 
maẓāher-e farhang-e este‘mārī […] va tarvīǧ va tablīġ-e farhang-e aṣīl-e eslāmī). Publication licenses, 
furthermore, now officially had to be obtained from the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND 
GUIDANCE. (§2). To be sure, the press was given the right for criticism, and press censorship continued 
to be prohibited. But in contrast to the law of 1979, criticism had to take place within – not further 
defined – ‘Islamic norms’ (mavāzīn-e eslāmī) and the expediency of the society (maṣāleḥ-e ǧāme‘eh); 
and the law did not specify any sanctions against the violation of the freedom of the press. (§3). 
Violations against the mentioned norms and expediency of the Islamic society, by contrast, were 
defined in detail in the next article: liable to punishment were for instance atheist (elḥādī) articles; 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
682  On Āḏarī-Qommī, who even criticized the political system of velāyat-e faqīh, and his brainchild Resālat: 
Akhavi (1987a), 184ff.; Akhavi (1987b), 54;  Siavoshi (1992), 32, 45. 
683  On the accusations of Ṣobḥ-e Āzādegān, whose closure was notably – though probably not voluntarily – 
ordered by state prosecutor Ḫoʼainīhā: Akhavi (1987a), 185; Šahrvand-e Emrūz (1364). 
684  Rawan (2000), 114. 
685  Rasāneh (2008). 
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articles against Islamic norms (mavāzīn-e eslāmī) or the foundations of the Islamic Republic (asās-e 
ǧomhūrī-ye eslāmī); the publication of prostitution (faḥšāʼ); the propagation of extravagance and 
profligacy (tablīġ va tarvīǧ-e esrāf va tabḏīr); inciting persons and groups to commit activities against 
the security (tašvīq-e afrād va groūh-hā be ertekāb-e a‘mālī ‘alai-he amniyyat); offending the religion 
of Islam (ehānat-e dīn-e mobīn-e eslām); or publishing issues that are against the principles of the 
constitution (oṣūl-e qānūn-e asāsī), the Supreme Leader (maqām-e mo‘aẓẓam-e rahbarī), the grand 
āyatollāhs (marāǧe‘-e mosallam-e taqlīd) or generally all officials and clerical persons (§5). The same 
article furthermore provided for the creation of a SUPERVISORY BOARD FOR THE PRESS (haiʼat-e neẓārat 
bar maṭbū‘āt) consisting of five members, which was to take responsibility to issue or withdraw media 
licenses, to observe press content, and to initiate legal measures against contravening publishers and 
editors (§5).686 In praxis, the board even could withdraw licenses without a court order, as could other 
institutions such as the state prosecutor.687  
 
 Towards the end of the 1980s, the left and right factions of the ISLAMIC REPUBLIC 
PARTY had become so alienated that Rafsanǧānī Ḫāmenehʼī approached Ḫomainī to ask for 
his permission to dissolve the party.688 The opposing political camps did, however, not 
disband. Instead they simply gathered around different organizations. The clerics of the 
traditional right took control of the COMBATANT CLERGY ASSOCIATION (ǧāme‘eh-ye 
rūḥāniyyat-e mobārez), which had been created before the revolution by some of the most 
important politicians of the Islamic Republic, among them Ḫāmenehʼī and Rafsanǧānī. The 
clerics of the Islamic left, by contrast, left this association and founded their own, competing 
body, ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS (maǧma‘-e rūḥānī-yūn-e mobārez).689 These two 
bodies rather acted as umbrella organizations for a variety of political actors than as proper 
political parties. 
 
 The traditional right meanwhile had become increasingly influential, while the Islamic 
left gradually started to loose influence. This development was accelerated and emphasized 
by a number of crucial events. First, Āyatollāh Ḥossain-‘Alī Montaẓarī, one of Ḫomainī’s 
closest associates and from the beginning of the 1980s his designated successor, fell from the 
grace of the Supreme Leader. He was an outspoken representative of the Islamic left and 
vehemently opposed any ties with the West. In 1986, his son-in-law, Mehdī Hāšemī, was 
found guilty to have disclosed the arms deal with the USA and Israel – better known as the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
686  Rawan (2000), 11f.; Shahidi (2007), 123f.; Shahidi (2008), 746f. 
687  Rawan (2000), 114; Shahidi (2007), 123; Shahidi (2008), 746f. 
688  On the dissolution of the IRP: Milani (1994), 200; Buchta (2000), 12; Keddie (2004), 260.  
689  On the COMBATANT CLERGY ASSOCIATION, which continued to be led by Moḥammad-Reżā Mahdavī-Kanī, 
and on the ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS, which was led by Mehdī Karrūbī: Siavoshi (1992), 28f.; 
Buchta (2000), 11ff., 17f. 
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Iran-Contra affair – to a Lebanese newspaper, and consequently was sentenced to death by the 
SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS (dādgāh-e vīžeh-ye rūḥāniyat), which specifically was created 
for this purpose. This seems to have been the decisive moment that turned Montaẓarī into a 
critic of the system. When he publicly criticized the assassination of thousands of imprisoned 
political opponents in July 1988, he definitively fell out of favor with Ḫomainī and 
consequently was dismissed as prospective successor.690 
 
The demise of the founder of the Islamic Republic on June 3, 1989, took away the 
most important protector of the Iranian left. Already during his lifetime, Ḫomainī had to 
accommodate to the often more pragmatic positions of the traditional right, often rather 
against his own will. When on July 18, 1988, he had to agree to a ceasefire with Iraq, his 
position was further weakened, as was the Islamic left, which had been ardent proponents of 
the continuation of the war. Ḫomainīs age and illness further reduced his influence.691 The 
young Islamic Republic, still weak and unstable due to the long war and the increasing 
factionalism, was faced the challenge of managing the transition towards a new generation. 
Still in 1988, the EXPEDIENCY DISCERNMENT COUNCIL OF THE SYSTEM (maǧma‘-e tašḫīṣ-e 
maṣlaḥat-e neẓām) was created, in order to solve the chronic stalemate between the 
parliament and the GUARDIAN COUNCIL.692 On June 4, 1989, the ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS FOR 
THE CONSTITUTION (maǧles-e ḫobre-gān-e qānūn-e asāsī) elected ‘Alī Ḫāmenehʼī, the long-
time president of the Islamic Republic, as successor of Ḫomainī.693 Even before, it had started 
to draft a new constitution, which was put to a public referendum on July 28, 1989. The new 
constitution dissolved the office of the prime minister (naḫost-vazīr) and conferred his 
competences to the office of the president (raʼīs-e ǧomhūr), to which Akbar Rafsanğānī was 
elected on August 16, 1989.694 It subsequently conferred new powers to the office of the 
Supreme Leader.695 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
690  On Montaẓerī’s dismissal: Akhavi (1987a), 198-201; Akhavi (1987b), 83; Milani (1994), 211ff.; Buchta 
(2000), 92, 97f.; Keddie (2006), 260-262. 
691  On the ceasefire: Milani (1994), 213f.; Keddie (2006), 250, 259; as a reaction on the ceasfire, the 
MOǦĀHEDĪN-E ḪALQ, launched their operation “eternal light” (forūġ-e ǧāvīdān) against the Islamic 
Republic, in September 1980, thousands of imprisoned members of the MKO and other opposition groups 
were executed: Milani (1994), 215, 220; Buchta (2000), 52, 92, 114; Keddie (2006), 260. 
692  On the EXPEDIENCY COUNCIL: Milani (1994), 200; Keddie (2006), 260. 
693  On Ḫāmenehʼī’s election by the ASSEMBLY OF EXPERTS: Siavoshi (1992), 44f.; Milani (1994), 224f.; 
Keddie (2006), 261;  
694  On Rafsanǧānī’s election: Siavoshi (1992), 42; Milani (1994), 225ff.; Keddie (2006), 261ff. 
695  On the amended constitution of 1989: Milani (1994), 221ff.; particularly on the new constitutional rights 
and duties of different institutions: Buchta (2000), 22ff., 46ff., 61ff., 73ff. Keddie (2006), 260f. 
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From left vs right 
to  reformist vs conservative 
 With the shifts in the power structure of the Islamic Republic, the political landscape also started to 
change. The Islamic right (rāst-e eslāmī) continued to gain influence at a much accelerated pace as the 
new Supreme Leader Ḫāmenehʼī increasingly started to align with them to secure and expand his power. 
It was now rather called the traditional right (rāst-e sonnatī). The Islamic left (čāp-e eslāmī), in contrast, 
started to be increasingly excluded from the echelons of power – at least for the moment. This was, 
however, also caused by the emergence of a new faction: the modern right (rāst-e modern), which 
gathered around the new president Rafsanǧānī.  
 
The modern right 
Even during the first decade of the Islamic Republic, there had always existed more independent and 
pragmatic persons, who did not easily align with one of the opposing – left or right – factions. Initially, 
however, they did not form a discernable entity. Arguably the most outstanding representative of this 
current was Rafsanǧānī, who at least ever more developed into a pragmatist during the 1980s.696 After 
becoming president in 1989, Rafsanǧānī saw himself confronted with the huge challenge of rebuilding the 
destroyed country and in particular its ruined economy. He consequently called for a new way of thinking 
(andīšeh-ye nou) and gathered a group of professional technocrats (sg. teknōkrāt) around himself, among 
them Ġolām-Ḥossain Karbāsčī, the mayor of Tehrān from 1990. These pragmatists shared the liberal 
economic positions of the traditional right and accordingly started a gradual privatization campaign – 
admittedly also to secure a badly needed credit from the World Bank. However, they exceeded the realm 
of the traditional right and opened the market to foreign products.697 In order to attract highly qualified 
Iranians, many of which had left Iran after the revolution and during the war, Rafsanǧānī, however, also 
promised an easing of the rigorous social and cultural restrictions. This definitively contradicted the 
positions of the traditional right and initially at times even those of the Islamic left.698 
 
The traditional right / the conservatives 
The traditional right, who would soon simply be called conservatives (oṣūl-gerāyān), further 
expanded their power in the Islamic Republic. In August 1989, Ḫāmenehʼī appointed the extremely 
conservative Āyatollāh Moḥammad Yazdī as new head of the Judiciary, replacing the leftist Āyatollāh 
Mūsavī-Ardebīlī.699 In 1992, the GUARDIAN COUNCIL, which had always been controlled by members of 
the traditional right, disqualified a quarter of all candidates to the fourth parliament elections. The 
conservatives consequently gained a majority of seats in the fourth parliament. Many former leftist 
members of parliament were not allowed to compete again, among them the “hanging judge” Ḫalḫālī, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
696  Hassan still counted Rafsanǧānī – together with Montaẓerī – among the radical (leftist) wing: Hassan 
(1984), 685; Rafsanǧānī’s economic pragmatism might have been influenced by his treatise on the eminent 
Qāǧār grand-vizier Amīr Kabīr: Buchta (2000), 16; 
697  On the political ascent of the modern right and their pragmatism: Siavoshi (1992), 31f., 42f.; Milani (1994), 
228ff.; Corstange (2000), XX; Buchta (2000), 16f.; Keddie (2006), 261ff. 
698  Hassan (1984), 685ff.; Siavoshi (1992), 29ff.; Milani (1994), 198f., 205ff.; Buchta (2000), 16f.; Keddie 
(2006), 255;  
699  Yazdī already stood out as ultraconservative during his parliamentary mandate: Siavoshi (1992), 43. 
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Ḫoʼainīhā, Moḥtašamīpūr, Behzād Nabavī and even parliamentary speaker Mehdī Karrūbī. The 
conservative cleric ‘Alī-Akbar Nāṭeq-Nūrī was elected as his successor instead.700 
 
The Islamic left / the reformists 
The Islamic left had therefore lost its influence both in the executive and the legislative: their 
traditional spheres of influence. While the economic politics and their ideological foreign policy 
contributed to their loss of power, their demise coincided with the perceived failure of the leftist ideology 
in the wake of the collapse of the Soviet Union.701 But the Islamic left underwent a catharsis of sorts and 
would soon reappear as reformists (eṣlāḥ-talab-ān), spearheading democratic concepts like democracy 
(mardom-sālārī), human rights (ḥoqūq-e bašar), women’s rights (ḥoqūq-e zanān), and civil society 
(ǧāme‘eh-ye madanī). They might have been influenced in their repositioning by Āyatollāh Montaẓerī, 
arguably the first Islamic leftist to openly advocate respect for human rights. However, they also realized, 
that Iranian society had changed after the war and that the Islamic Republic thus was in need of new 
political and social prescriptions.702 In this transformation process, the press would prove crucial both as 
purpose and means for advancing such progressive ideals and safeguarding popular support. 
 
The boundaries between the different factions have, however, always been blurred as there always 
were personal contacts and often family ties between them. Thus a constant ideological cross-fertilization 
took place between the different factions, which continued to contribute to the longevity of the Islamic 
Republic.703 
  
Arguably the most important member of president Rafsanǧānī’ cabinet for the 
reawakening of both the Islamic left as reformists and a reinvigorated press was Moḥammad 
Ḫātamī. He had been the supervisor of the KAIHĀN PUBLISHING INSTITUTE (moʼasseseh-ye 
maṭbū‘āt-e kaihān), and as such editor of the newspaper Kaihān from 1981, and minister for 
ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE from 1982. In this function, he had been responsible for a 
certain easing of the otherwise strict cultural policy and press landscape.704 Already from the 
mid 1980s, a first controlled cultural and intellectual opening had taken place in Kaihān-e 
Farhangī, to which many Islamic leftist intellectuals contributed.705 In 1989, he had approved 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
700  Already during these elections, the Islamic left presented themselves as “followers of the line of the imam 
[Ḫomainī]” (pairūyān-e ḫaṭṭ-e emām) while the members of traditional right rather depicted themselves as 
guardians of the velāyat-e faqīh: Siavoshi (1992), 27, 41ff.; the selection criteria for the members of the 
GUARDIAN COUNCIL were changed too, which naturally disadvantaged the religiously less educated 
members of the Islamic left: Milani (1994), 229; Corstange (2000), XX; Keddie (2006), 266. 
701  Siavoshi (1992), 46; Keddie (2006), 266f. 
702  After the war, the authorities of the Islamic Republic’s realized that the Iranian society had changed 
dramatically: Yavari d’Hellencourt (1995), 96, 113. 
703  On the blurred factional borders: Siavoshi (1992), 27f.  
704  Such new cultural liberties were for instance less strict dress codes for women and the readmission of 
female musician in public concerts: Milani (1994), 229; Keddie (2006), 269. 
705  Some of the contributors to Kaihān-e Farhangī later founded the influential journal Kiyān: Yavari 
d’Hellencourt (1995), 98. 
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eighty five new publications, and until 1995, again 500 newspapers and journals appeared. 
Partly responsible for this increase in publications was the re-allowance of commercial 
advertisements in the media, which had been banned before. 706  Many of these new 
publications were published from so-called “different-minded” (sg. degar-andīšeh), 
intellectuals who did not represent the official ideological line of the Islamic Republic but 
were still tolerated.707 Ḫātamī was a member of the leftist ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT 
CLERICS, but seems to have been more pragmatic and moderate than the bulk of the Islamic 
left. He nevertheless maintained close ties to the Islamic left and arguably was at the forefront 
of their transformation into the reformists.708  
 
Naturally, it was especially the reform-minded Islamic leftist who took advantage of 
Ḫātamī’s liberal press policy. The media soon appeared to be the stage of bitter political feuds, 
as actually had always been the case in the history of the press in Iran during periods of 
greater press freedom. This was all the more true because political parties officially were not 
allowed resulting in the press serving as a substitute for political parties.709 The Iranian media 
scholar Gūʼel Kohan aptly described the ensuing result: “those different groups and their 
factional disputes have turned the press into an instrument of their own interests, like in a 
feudal and despotic society”.710 It was exactly in this process that the Islamic left – partly 
joined by member of the modern right – gradually turned into reformists. 
 
 The most important new publications of the early 1990s were literary or religious-
philosophical journals, which were to have a huge impact on the development of new critical 
thinking in Iran. Also appearing were new women’s journals and newspapers, which illustrate 
the invigorated self-consciousness of Iran’s women as active members of Iranian society. 
However, as crucial as they were as pioneers for a new atmosphere of intellectual openness 
and criticism, these specialized journals and magazines never attained a wide readership.711 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
706  According to Yavari d’Hellencourt, in 1988 a total of 183 publications appeared: Yavari d’Hellencourt 
(1995), 93; according to Rawan, 531 publications appeared in 1995: Rawan (2000), 136; according to 
Shahidi, the number of daily newspapers increased from 10 in 1988 to 19 in 1990: Shahidi (2007), 47. 
707  Merat mentions in particular secular intellectuals, yet the degar-andīšeh were not all secularists: Merat 
(1999), 33, 351. 
708  Merat denies that Ḫātamī had any decisive role in initiating these new cultural liberties: Merat (1999), 32; 
Tarrock mentions Ḫātamī as the main driving force behind the reforms: Tarrock (2001), 588f. 
709  Kian (1995); Sarkoohi (1999), 139; Rawan (2000), 141f.; Tarrock (2001), 585. 
710  Rawan (2000), 142. 
711  The only exception is probably Kiyān, which found a considerable readership among the modern and 
Islamic middle classes in Iran: Yavari d’Hellencourt (1995), 99. 
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In 1990, the author ‘Abbās Ma‘rūfī launched the literary journal Gardūn 
(Firmament).712 In 1991, Reżā Tehrānī started to publish the arguably most influential 
philosophical journal Kiyān (Existence), which later would be edited by Mašāʼollāh 
Šamsolvā‘eẓīn, one of the most prominent Iranian journalists. Both had been on the editorial 
board of Kaihān-e Farhangī before.713 Further contributing to Kiyān were such famous 
intellectuals as ‘Abd-ol-Karīm Sorūš714 and Moḥammad Moǧtahed Šabestarī.715 The journal 
soon acquired fame for questioning and reinterpreting the role of religion in the Iranian state. 
Some of Kiyān’s articles even explicitly questioned aspects of the ruling system of the 
Guardianship of the Jurist (velāyat-e faqīh).716 In the same year, ‘Ezzatollāh Ṣaḥābī from the 
FREEDOM MOVEMENT together with the progressive cleric Ḥasan Yūsefī-Eškevārī launched 
Īrān-e Fardā (Iran of Tomorrow). This journal dared to open up the discussion on the 
relationship between religion and democracy, requested the admission of political parties and 
condemned the widespread corruption in the wake of Rafsanǧānī’s economic privatization.717 
 
It was not long after that other journals started to address similarly fundamental topics. 
Goft-o-Gū, which was edited from 1992 by Morād Saqafī, wrote profound analyses of social 
and historical events and dealt with the concepts of “civil society” (ǧāme‘eh-ye madanī), 
“democracy” (mardom-sālārī) and “dialogue of civilizations” (goft-o-gū-ye tamaddon-hā) – 
all of which would become hallmarks of Ḫātamī’s election campaign and government.718 
Negāh-e Nou for its part excelled with translations of foreign authors; 719  and Takāpū 
reproduced poems of dissident Iranian authors. 720 Other important literary-philosophical 
journals were Ǧāme‘eh-ye Ṣāleḥ (Healthy Society) and Kelk (Pen). Furthermore, still 
important were the journals Ādīneh and Donyā-ye Soḫan, which had been published from 
1985.721 A more political monthly was the leftist Bayān (Expression), published by the leftist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
712  Generally on the new specialized journals: Yavari d’Hellencourt (1995), 97; Merat (1999), 33; Rawan 
(2000), 155. 
713  Khiabany & Sreberny (2001), 204. 
714  On Sorūš, who wrote his famous treatise „Sturdier than Ideology“ (far-behtar az īdeyōlōžī) for Kiyān: 
Keddie (2006), 305f. 
715  On „reform-theologian“ Šabestarī: Rawan (2000), 157f.; Keddie (2006), 307f. 
716  Generally on Kiyān: Kian (1995), XX; Yavari d’Hellencourt (1995), 98ff.; Merat (1999), 33; Rawan 
(2000), 156f.; Khiabany & Sreberny (2001), 204; Shahidi (2007), 59; Kiyān’s articles provoked fervid 
reactions among the conservatives: Yavari d’Hellencourt (1995), 107f. 
717  On Īrān-e Fardā and its critical discussion of theoretical and practical concepts of politics: Yavari 
d’Hellencourt (1995), 100 no. 11; Merat (1999), 33; Rawan (2000), 155f. 
718  On the journal Goft-o-Gū:Yavari d’Hellencourt (1995), 100 no. 11; Merat (1999), 35. 
719  Translated authors were for instance Hannah Arendt, Isaiah Berlin or Karl Popper: Merat (1999), 35. 
720  On Takāpū: Shahidi (2007), 49. 
721  Yavari d’Hellencourt (1995), 97; Merat (1999), 33; Rawan (2000), 155;  
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cleric ‘Alī-Akbar Moḥtašamīpūr from 1990, which was banned again in 1991.722 Adjacent to 
these literary and philosophical journals a number of further academic journals appeared and 
amongst them were Fārād (Farad, the capacitance unit of measure according to Faraday), Yād 
(Memory) or Nāmeh-ye Farhang (Culture Journal).723 
 
 Before the new cultural opening, only three women’s magazines had been published in 
Iran: Zan-e Rūz (Women of Today) belonging to Kaihān, Rāh-e Zainab (The Path of Zainab, 
daughter of emām ‘Alī) belonging to Eṭṭelā‘āt, and Payām-e Hāǧer (Message of Hagar), 
published by A‘ẓam Ṭāleqānī, who was the daughter of Āyatollāh Ṭāleqānī, co-founder of the 
FREEDOM MOVEMENT. In 1991, Kiyān started to publish the women’s newspaper Zanān 
(Women), which, however, soon was published independently by Šahlā Šerkat, the long-time 
editor of Zan-e Rūz. Zanān was the first journal to criticize the existing patriarchal structures 
and to vehemently defend women’s rights. Another famous contributor was the lawyer and 
feminist Mehrāngīz Kār. 724  Meanwhile in 1991, Zahrā Mostafavī, Āyatollāh Ḫomainī’s 
daughter, launched her newspaper Nedā (Call), which became the organ of the WOMEN’S 
SOCIETY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC (ǧāme‘eh-ye zanān-e ǧomhūrī-ye eslāmī). In 1992, 
another famous woman launched the newspaper Payām-e Zan (Message of the Woman). This 
was launched by Ma‘ṣūmeh Ebtekār, who had participated in the occupation of the American 
embassy in 1979, and later proceeded to become vice president under Ḫātamī.725 
 
 The MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE also started to publish its own 
organ Resāneh (Media). This quarterly was a journal for media professionals and critically 
discussed theoretical, historical and social aspects of the media. Ḫātamī invited many 
independent and respected media professionals to contribute to Resāneh and allowed an open 
discussion of the problems of the Iranian press.726 In 1991, Ḫātamī furthermore convened a 
first national media seminary under the motto “discussion of the problems of the Iranian 
press”, in which the participants in an unprecedented openness discussed topics like state 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
722  Siavoshi (1992), 32; HRW (1993). 
723  Fārād was banned in 1992 due to an allegedly offensive cartoon depicting a bearded foot-ball player; Yād 
was the organ of the FOUNDATION FOR THE HISTORY OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC (bonyād-e tārīḫ-e enqelāb-
e eslāmī), which Rafsanǧānī had co-founded; Nāmeh-ye Farhang among other topics discussed negative 
and positive aspects of Western influence: Rawan (2000), 151ff.; Shahidi (2007), 47, 49.  
724  On Zanān and its outspoken articles on women’s rights: Rawan (2000), 149; Keddie (2006), 294; Shahidi 
(2007), 86f. 
725  On the women’s press in Iran after 1989: Yavari d’Hellencourt (1995), 97f.; Motamed-Nejad (1995); 
Rawan (2000), 149; detailed in: Shahidi(2007), 82ff. 
726  Resāneh was published by the OFFICE FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MEDIA (daftar-e 
moṭāle‘eh va touse‘eh-ye rasāneh-hā) of the MINISTRY FOR ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE: Yavari 
d’Hellencourt (1995), 95; Rawan (2000), 134ff.; Shahidi (2007), 116f. 
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censorship, self-censorship, the lack of professional staff and economic difficulties.727 Ḫātamī 
himself said in the opening speech: 
 
“We cannot impose the will of the governing on the people in the name of Islam 
[…] We are not allowed to restrict the natural potential of the people of our 
society to develop their personality. We have to strive to develop the people of our 
society in such a way that they can resist in a political dispute with different-
minded. No country can be interested in a homogenization of the political 
ideology”728 
 
 The daily press, otherwise, largely had remained unchanged. However, the most 
important newspapers were Kaihān, Eṭṭelā‘āt, Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, Abrār, Resālat and Kār va 
Kārgar. Eṭṭelā‘āt and Kaihān’s editors-in-chief continued to be appointed by the Supreme 
Leader, now Ḫāmenehʼī. But while the moderate Eṭṭelā‘āt supported Rafsanǧānī’s 
modernization campaign, Kaihān initially still seems to have continued its traditional leftist 
tone.729 Resālat continued to be the official organ of the COMBATANT CLERGY ASSOCIATION 
OCIATION and the COALITION OF ISLAMIC ASSOCIATIONS. It initially appeared to have 
supported Rafsanǧānī’s liberal economic policies but vehemently opposed his social and 
cultural reforms.730 Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī first appeared to have been officially edited by 
Ḫāmenehʼī, who, however, soon transferred it to the COMBATANT CLERGY ASSOCIATION. It, 
too, initially supported Rafsanǧānī’s economic policies, but vehemently defended the velāyat-
e faqīh 731 . Although still controlled by the WORKER’S HOUSE, Kār va Kārgar as a 
governmental newspaper, it appeared to have voiced support for Rafsanǧānī,732 while Abrār 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
727  Yavari d’Hellencourt (1995), 95ff.; Rawan (2000), 134f.; Shahidi (2007), 47.  
728  Rawan (2000), 134. 
729  The circulation of both newspapers seems to have been between 100,000 and 300,000 copies: Rawan 
(2000), 137f.; Hyman assumes a circulation of 150,000 copies for Kaihān and 120,000 for Eṭṭelā‘āt: 
Hyman (1990), 26; Motamed-Nejad assumes a circulation of below 100,000 copies – probably for the later 
years: Motamed-Nejad (1995), no. 4; certainly too high are the estimated 400,000 to 500,000 copies: 
Malek & Mohsenian-Rad (1994), 77, 89; next to the daily Kaihān, the publishing house Kaihān continued 
to publish Kaihān-e Farhangī, Kaihān-e Varzešī, Kaihān-e Havāʼī, the English Kayhan International and 
the Arabic al-Kaihān al-‘Arabī: HRW (1993); Motamed-Nejad (1995), no. 29; Eṭṭelā‘āt also published 
Eṭṭelā‘āt-e Haftegī, Donyā-ye Varzeš, Gavān-e Emrūz, and Rāh-e Zainab: Motamed-Nejad (1995). 
730  HRW (1993); Rawan (2000), 140: Hyman (1996), 26. 
731  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī’s circulation was approximately 30,000: Hyman (1990), 26; HRW (1993); Rawan 
(2000), 138f. 
732  In 1993, however, Kār va Kārgar still seems to have been a newspaper of the Islamic left: HRW (1993). 
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ceased to be the organ of the ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS and gradually became a 
moderately conservative newspaper.733 
 
 Yet, the ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS had launched a new organ in October 
1990, before losing its dominance in the election to the third parliament: the newspaper Salām 
(Hello). The editor was the former state prosecutor Moḥammad Mūsavī-Ḫoʼainīhā, an 
influential member of the ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS. Initially, Salām continued 
to voice economic protectionism and a radical foreign policy position; the traditional positions 
of the Islamic left. But the newspaper was published in a new, attractive style. In the popular 
column Ālō Salām (Hello, Hello – a greeting used on telephone), alleged critical reader 
comments were published, which, however, often seem to have been written by Salām’s 
journalists. In the column Grew News (aḫbār-e ḫākestarī), Salām also introduced 
investigative stories disclosing political scandals, which it soon had to halt due to 
governmental pressure.734 Another newspaper representing the views of the ASSOCIATION OF 
COMBATANT CLERICS was Ǧahān-e Eslām (World of Islam), which Hādī Ḫāmenehʼī, the 
‘maverick’ brother of the Supreme Leader, published from 1991.735 Simultaneously, starting 
to side with the Islamic left was the newspaper Ḫorāsān, which had existed since 1949 and 
was one of the few local newspapers distributed countrywide. It belonged to the influential 
MARTYR’S FOUNDATION (bonyād-e šahīd), which was under direct control of the Supreme 
Leader. But it was still edited by the leftist cleric Aboʼ l-Fażl Mūsavīyān.736 Further reformist 
publications launched during the early 1990s were the women’s magazine Farzāneh 
(Erudite); 737  Hešmatollāh Ṭabarzadī’ important student newspaper Payām-e Dānešǧū-ye 
(Message of the Student);738 and Hamšahrī’s youth magazine Āftābgardān (Umbrella)739. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
733  According to HRW, Ġāfūr Ǧasābī seems to have been the editor of the allegedly still leftist Abrār in 1993: 
HRW (1993); Siavoshi (1992), 39; Abrār also continued to publish its sports magazine Abrār-e Varzešī: 
Motamed-Nejad (1995); according to Rawan, Abrār again served as the organ of the ASSOCIATION OF 
COMBATANT CLERICS: Rawan (2000), 140 
734  On the beginnings of the influential leftist – and later reformist – newspaper Salām, which according to 
HRW initially was critical towards Rafsanǧānī’s liberal cultural policies: HRW (1993); Haeri (1993), 39; 
Milani (1994), 230; Rawan (2000), 140; Shahidi (2007), 47f. 
735  Ǧahān-e Eslām had to cease its publication for a certain period during Rafsanǧānī’s second term in office: 
Menashri (2001), 329; Shahidi (2007), 49. 
736  On the newspaper Ḫorāsān: HRW (1993); Malek & Mohsenian-Rad (1994), 77f.; on Mūsavīyān’s 
conviction: Shahidi (2007), 125. 
737  On Farzāneh: Rawan (2000), 149f. 
738  Ṭabarzadī was a member of the ISLAMIC STUDENT UNION, which originally was the youth organization of 
the COMBATANT CLERGY ASSOCIATION; in the early 1990s, the ISLAMIC STUDENT UNION fell out with the 
traditional right and turned into a radical, leftist organization – similar to the OFFICE FOR STRENGTHENING 
UNITY (daftar-e taḥkīm-e vaḥdat): Menashri (2001), 331. 
739  On Āftābgardān, which was banned in 1996 due to an allegedly offensive statement on IRIB: Rawan 
(2000), 147; Shahidi (2007), 55. 
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 Concurrently, the modern right also started to publish its own newspapers. In 1992, 
Karbāsčī, the popular mayor of Tehrān and close ally of Rafsanǧānī, launched Hamšahrī 
(Fellow Citizen) as the newspaper of the Tehrān municipality. The first editor-in-chief was 
Aḥmad Saṭṭārī, who managed to turn Hamšahrī within a few months into Iran’s widest-read 
daily newspaper, reaching a circulation of approximately 300,000 – more than Kaihān and 
Eṭṭelā‘āt.740 In 1995, the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) (ḫabar-gozārī-ye ǧomhūrī-ye 
eslāmī-ye īran), which was under the control of the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND 
GUIDANCE, started to publish the newspaper Īrān (Iran), the first real governmental 
newspaper of the Islamic Republic. Although Īrān was seen as the mouthpiece of 
Rafsanǧānī’s government, it soon developed a reputation as a reliable and serious newspaper. 
Also due to its modern, colorful layout, it soon became popular as well.741 More conservative, 
though still supporting Rafsanǧānī-Far, were the newspapers Āfarīneš and Aḫbār. Āfarīneš 
(Creation) was published from 1991 by ‘Abdollāh Ǧāsebī, co-founder and director of the 
ISLAMIC AZAD UNIVERSITY (dānešgāh-e āzād-e eslāmī); while Aḫbār (News) was launched 
by the journalist Aḥmad Ṣafāʼī-Far in 1994742 
 
 As has always been the case in Iran, this new opening of the intellectual and media 
sphere, soon led to a backlash of the powers that be. The traditional right or rather the 
conservatives, who always had been stern in cultural matters, vehemently opposed these new 
liberties. They consequently started to push back against the increasingly critical press, editors 
and journalists, using the same tactics that had been used to silence the independent media at 
the beginning of the Islamic Republic.  
 
Therefore, in 1991, Moḥtašamīpūr’s monthly Bayān and the scientific journal Fārād 
were banned by a court decision. In 1992, the parliament, which was now dominated by the 
conservatives, finally succeeded in dismissing Ḫātamī as minister of Islamic Culture and 
Guidance, who was replaced by Moṣṭafā Mīr-Salīm.743 In 1993, a court issued an occupational 
ban against Ḫoʼainīhā, the editor-in-chief of Salām, based on the accusation of “spreading 
defamation and lies”. This verdict, was in fact the first issued by a jury court, as actually 
required by to the press law of 1986. The implementation of his punishment was, however, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
740  HRW (1993); Motamed-Nejad (1995); RAWAN questions the self-declared circulation of 360,000 copies: 
Rawan (2000), 139ff.; due to his modern approach to journalism, Saṭṭārī was called the “father of the 
modern journalism” in Iran: Shahidi (2007), 48. 
741  On the newspaper Īrān: Ghaffari-Farhangi (1995), 226f.; Rawan (2000), 139, XX; Shahidi (2007), 49. 
742  On Aḫbār: Rawan (2000), 147; Menashri (2001), 326. 
743  Siavoshi (1992), 32; HRW (1993). 
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postponed for five years. In October 1993, a revolutionary court (dādgāh-e enqelābī) banned 
‘Abbās Ma‘rūfī’s Gardūn for a short time and in 1995 Ma‘rūfī himself was convicted to 
imprisonment and lashes while Gardūn was banned for two years.744 In the following years, 
the revolutionary courts and the SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS would ban many more 
newspapers, while the press law of 1986 only vaguely had given this competence to 
“competent courts”. In 1994, the conservative majority in the parliament tried to ban the 
newspaper Hamšahrī albeit without success. In 1997, the youth magazine Āftgābgardān, 
published by the municipality of Tehrān was banned, because it had called the national 
television “the constant babbler” of the Supreme Leader.745  
 
The court procedures often were preceded by verbal attacks of conservative 
newspapers, such as particularly Kaihān, by accusations in Friday prayers, or by public 
speeches of the Supreme Leader himself against the critical press.746 In 1996 for instance, 
Ḫāmenehʼī lashed out against the critical press calling them hostile towards the Islamic 
Republic and extremely Marxist and asking them to correct their attitude and to respect the 
red lines. 747  By controlling the allocation of subsidized paper and advertisements, the 
government had further means to apply pressure on the critical press, and indeed largely 
privileged the conservative press. Concomitantly, security agencies and pressure groups again 
resorted to intimidation tactics, including demonstrations against disliked newspapers, 
physical assaults on publishers and journalists and arson attacks on publishing houses. They 
initially targeted Eṭṭelā‘āt and Kaihān by attempting to bring them into the line of the new 
Supreme Leader, to be followed by attacks against the leftist publications Abrār, Salām, 
Gardūn and Donyā-ye Soḫan.748  
 
In 1995, the judiciary decided to assemble a first press jury, as the press laws of 1979 
1986 always had required. This jury, whose members were elected for two years, exclusively 
consisted of well-known conservatives, among them Ḥabībollāh Asgar-Oulādī, Rūḥollāh 
Ḥossainiyān or Ġolām-Ḥossain Elhām. Yet, the press jury only convened once during 
Rafsanǧānī’s presidency, tellingly acquitting – rather than sentencing – Ḥossain Šarī‘atmadārī, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
744  On the incident leading to the short ban of Gardūn: HRW (1993); Rawan (2000), 159. 
745  Rawan (2000), 139; Buchta (2000), 195; on Āftābgardān: Rawan (2000), 147; Shahidi (2007), 55. 
746  Generally on the tactics of the traditional right in intimidating the critical and rival press: Yavari 
d’Hellencourt (1995), 95; Rawan (2000), 144. 
747  Rawan (2000), 144; Shahidi (2007), 53f. 
748  On physical attacks against disliked newspapers, editors and journalists: HRW (1993). 
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the sharp-tongued editor-in-chief of Kaihān, of a case.749 In 1995, the parliament additionally 
tried to amend the press law by adding a teacher (modarres) of the theological seminaries in 
Qom to the PRESS SUPERVISORY BOARD.  However, in the face of the opposition of virtually 
all publishers in Iran, it eventually withdrew the bill.750 After the dismissal of Ḫātamī, even 
the MINISTRY FOR ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE was brought into line. On occasion of 
the annual press festival of 1994, Ḥossain Enteẓāmī, a senior official of the ministry, 
classified the press into four categories: progressive and goal-oriented newspapers, which 
have a “correct understanding” of society; neutral newspapers, whose presence would not 
make any difference; superficial newspapers like sports or entertainment publications; and 
intellectual “sleeper” publications, which always had been sick.751 The topic of the press 
festival in 1996 was compliance with “ethical standards”, which caused ‘Abbās ‘Abdī, 
Salām’s then editor-in-chief, to sarcastically comment that one could only speak of ethics in a 
society where the rule of law already had been established.752 
 
 Towards the end of Rafsanǧānī’s second term as president, the modern right had 
become increasingly estranged with the traditional right or conservatives. This was due not 
last to an increasing competition between Rafsanǧānī and Ḫāmenehʼī, but also to the social 
and cultural policies of Rafsanǧānī’s administration.753 As a consequence, the modern right 
and the meanwhile reformed Islamic left increasingly grew closer, eventually forming a new 
political entity: the reformists (eṣlāḥ-talabān). This rapprochement was especially triggered 
by the upcoming parliamentary and presidential elections. In the run-up to the elections of the 
fifth parliament in 1996, Karbāsčī formed the quasi-party EXECUTIVES OF CONSTRUCTION 
(kārgozārān-e sāzandegī), which comprised various technocrats of Rafsanǧānī’s 
administration, and whose undeclared patron was Rafsanǧānī.754 They formed a coalition of 
interests with the leftist ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS and FIGHTERS FOR THE 
ISLAMIC REVOLUTION. The conservatives still won a majority of the seats, but with a slighter 
margin, while the EXECUTIVES OF CONSTRUCTION, the Islamic left, and a few officially 
independent representatives all gained new seats.755 The coalition between the Islamic left and 
the modern right proved all the more successful, as the EXECUTIVES OF CONSTRUCTION seem 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
749  Shahidi (2007), 44, 49, 129. 
750  Also expressing their opposition to the bill were many influential politicians and clerics: Shahidi (2007), 
52. 
751  Rawan (2000), 142f.; on Enteẓāmī’s categorization of the Iranian press: Shahidi (2007), 52ff. 
752  According to Resāneh 7:3 (Autumn 1996): Shahidi (2007), 54. 
753  On the deteriorating relationship between the modern right and the traditional right: Keddie (2006), 169. 
754  Rafsanǧānī personally never became a member of the EXECUTIVES OF CONSTRUCTION: Buchta (2000), 16.  
755  On the elections to the sixth parliament: Buchta (2000), 122; Keddie (2006), 267. 
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to have been more liberal than Rafsanǧānī. They consequently strengthened their coalition in 
the run-up to the fifth presidential elections in 1997. The two outstanding candidates facing 
each other in the elections were Nāṭeq-Nūrī, then present speaker of parliament, and 
Moḥammad Ḫātamī, then president of the NATIONAL LIBRARY OF IRAN (ketāb-ḫāneh-ye 
mellī).756 With Karbāsčī as campaign manager, Ḫātamī ran a progressive campaign, in 
particular targeting the women and the youth. His election program centered on the concepts 
of democracy (mardom-sālārī), civil society (ǧāme‘eh-ye madanī), women’s rights (ḥoqūq-e 
zanān), the rights of ethnic minorities, freedom of speech, press freedom, and the release of 
political prisoners, XXX – in short, all the concepts and demands that the intellectuals of the 
Islamic left had developed in their respective publications during the previous years.757 Finally, 
the tactic of the reformists succeeded. Ḫātamī was elected president on 2nd Ḫordād 1376 (23rd 
May 1997) with a landslide of 69% of the votes.758 Thus, the former Islamic left managed to 
reassert political influence, against the explicit wish of the conservatives. 
 
In the run-up to these elections, ‘Aṭāʼollāh Mohāǧerānī, a member of the EXECUTIVES 
OF CONSTRUCTION and later Ḫātamī’s culture minister, launched the weekly Bahman 
(Bahman – the penultimate month of the Iranian year), whose publication he ceased again 
immediately after the elections.759 Other publications being launched by degar-andīšeh were 
the political weeklies Bahār (Spring) and Mobīn (Manifest).760 Together with the newspapers 
Hamšahrī and Salām, and with the women’s magazines Zanān, Nedā and Payām-e Zan, these 
publications served as the main forum for the elections campaign of the reformists. 
 
III. 4. Iran’s fifth press spring during the reformist administration of Ḫātamī 
 
Almost immediately after Ḫātamī’s election to the presidency, the conflict between the 
reformists and the conservatives started to escalate. The battles between the factions in 
particular took place in and over the media, which experienced a new period of openness and 
freedom. The reformists virtually only had the public sphere at disposal. The MINISTRY FOR 
ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE consequently initiated a liberal press policy. As a result, 
the number of reformist and progressive newspapers exploded with many reaching a much 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
756  On the presidential elections: Buchta (2000), 124; Keddie (2006), 269. 
757  On Ḫātamī’s election program: Merat (1999), 34f.; Buchta (2000), 123; Tarrock (2001), 590; Keddie 
(2006), 269f. 
758  Buchta (2000), 124; Keddie (2006), 269. 
759  Mohāǧerānī later was to republish Bahman as a daily newspaper: Rawan (2000), 155, 159; Menashri 
(2001), 372. 
760  On the two political weeklies: Merat (1999), 33f.; Menashri (2001), 372.  
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wider circulation than the traditional main newspapers Kaihān and Eṭṭelā‘āt. The 
conservatives also used their media to strike back but they additionally had the judiciary and 
security services at their disposal, which they continued to use to silence the critical, reformist 
press. This led to a phenomenon the Iranian press had experienced at various intervals before 
– the appearance of so-called “serial newspapers”. In other words, newspapers that 
immediately were published under a new name after being shut by the courts. In this political 
fight, the reformists were naturally disadvantaged due to the increasing pressure of the 
conservatives which led to a split within the reformist camp and eventually to a loss of 
influence. This was exemplified by the closure of practically all reformist newspapers in the 
years 2000-2001, even though Ḫātamī would secure a second term and govern until 2005. 
Despite this backlash, the reformist press was to have a lasting effect on the media scene, 
which has continued to be relatively critical and self-confident to this day.761 
 
Ḫātamī assembled a cabinet consisting predominantly of members of the Islamic left 
and the modern right. The most important member of his cabinet for the development of the 
reformist press was the Minister for Islamic Culture and Guidance, ‘Aṭāʼollāh Mohāǧerānī. 
Mohāǧerānī was the deputy leader of the EXECUTIVES OF CONSTRUCTION, and in this position 
also had launched his – meanwhile defunct – newspaper Bahman.762 On the occassion of his 
confirmation in the parliament, he set the tone for his cultural policy: 
 
“I disagree with almost all of the present practices in the culture ministry. We 
have to protect artists and provide an atmosphere for creativity, tranquillity, and 
freedom. […] I condemn the burning of bookshops, the beating of university 
lecturers and attacks on magazine offices”.763 
 
In 1997, he gave permission for the formation of the TRADE UNION OF JOURNALISTS IN IRAN 
(anǧoman-e ṣanafī-ye rūz-nāmeh-negār-ān-e īrān), the quasi-successor to the SYNDICATE OF 
NEWSPAPER WRITERS AND JOURNALISTS (sandīkā-ye nevīsandegān va ḫabarnegārān-e 
maṭbū‘āt), which was dissolved in 1990.764  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
761  Generally on the reformist press during Ḫātamī’s presidency (1997-2001): Merat (1999), 35; Buchta 
(2000), 196; Mobasser calls the reformist newspapers ‚the people’s chosen representatives’ – in contrast to 
the members of parliament: Mobasser (2001) 86; Tarrock (2001), 589; Keddie (2006), 270f. 
762  Mohāǧerānī was married to Ǧamīleh Kadīvar, sister of the famous intellectual Moḥsen Kadīvar: Buchta 
(2000), 124, 180f. 
763  Quoted in Reuters (20th August 1997): Samii (2001), 2. 
764  Shahidi (2007), 56. 
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 It would, however, take another half a year until new reformist newspapers started to 
be launched. Until February 1998, the press situation in Iran had remained the same as during 
the end of Rafsanǧānī’ second term. The conservatives still published the newspapers Kaihān, 
Resālat, Ğomhūrī-ye Eslāmī and Āfarīneš; rather neutral and moderate were the dailies 
Eṭṭelā‘āt and arguably Īrān and Abrār; and the reformists continued to publish Hamšahrī and 
Salām, with Kār va Kārgar now also turning into a reformist paper. Of these newspapers, 
however, members of the former Islamic left published Salām. But this would soon change. 
 
 On February 5, 1998, Ḥamīd-Reżā Ǧalāʼīpūr, an academic from Tehran, and Moḥsen 
Sāzegarā, co-founder of the IRGC, launched the newspaper Ǧāme‘eh (Society). Editor-in-
chief was Māšāʼollāh Šams ol-Vā‘eẓīn, a well-known journalist, former contributer to Kaihān 
and Kaihān-e Farghanī, and once editor of the outspoken journal Kiyān. Another popular 
contributor to Ǧāme‘eh was ‘Emād al-Dīn Bāqī, who later founded the COMMITTEE FOR THE 
DEFENSE OF THE PRISONERS’ RIGHTS (komīteh-ye defā‘ az ḥoqūq-e zandānī-yān). 
Innovatively, all articles were signed with the authors’ real names. Ǧāme‘eh thus took open 
responsibility for the sharp criticism it started to direct at the political class, including the 
allied president Ḫātamī. It furthermore demanded full freedom of speech, including for 
Marxists and Communists. As a result, Ǧāme‘eh became very popular, reaching a circulation 
of 300,000.765 In the same month, Fāʼezeh Hāšemī, herself a member of parliament since 1996, 
launched Zan (Woman), Iran’s first daily that specifically targeted women. Hāšemī was closer 
to the reformist policies than her father Rafsanǧānī’s. Zan consequently advocated for gender 
equality and informed readers about women’s rights such as divorce or blood money. Famous 
contributors were for instance the lawyers and women activists Mehrāngīz Kār and Šīrīn 
‘Ebādī.766 In May 1998, the prominent journalist Akbar Ganǧī launched the weekly Rāh-e 
Nou (New Way). Ganǧī became particularly famous for his attacks on Rafsanǧānī and on the 
conservatives and Rāh-e Nou, which wrote on a wide range of topics, became popular due to 
its humorous columns and interviews with degar andīšeh-hā.767 
 
 The conservatives, increasingly confronted with criticism and embarrassing 
disclosures, reacted as usual, particularly through the courts. By 1997, the popular student 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
765  On the newspaper Ğāme‘eh: Mobasser (1998), 16f.; Sarkoohi even assumes a circulation of 400,000: 
Sarkoohi (1998), 136ff.; Merat (1999), 34; Karimian & Bahrampour (1999), 38f.; Buchta (2000), 144; 
Mobasser (2000), 86; Samii (2001), 2; Menashri (2001), 329; Shahidi (2007), 59f., 78. 
766  Zan was predominantly edited by women: Karimian & Bahrampour (1999), 38f.; Merat (1999), 34; 
Samii (1999), 3; Rawan (2000), 149f.; Buchta (2000), 149;  Menashri (2001), 332; Samii (2001), 4f.; 
Shahidi (2007), 56, 87f. 
767  Merat (1999), 35; Menashri (2001), 331. 
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newspaper Payām-e Dānešǧū-ye Basīǧī has been banned768 because it had called for the 
election of the Supreme Leader by direct popular vote. Ṭabarzadī, however, soon replaced it 
with Hovviyyat-e Ḫvīš (Self-Identity) as the new organ of the ISLAMIC STUDENT UNION.769 In 
May 1998, the FOUNDATION OF THE OPPRESSED AND DISABLED (bonyād-e mostaż‘afān va 
ǧān-bāzān), nota bene the publisher of the newspaper Kaihān and Eṭṭelā‘āt, and Yaḥyā 
Raḥīm-Ṣafavī, the commander of the IRGC, filed a lawsuit against against Ğāme‘eh. They 
accused it of having printed Raḥīm-Ṣafavī threats against the critics of the Islamic Republic 
and having compared him to Pol Pot and Ṣaddām Ḥussain.770 In April 1998, a court sentenced 
Karbāsčī, the mayor of Tehrān and publisher of Hamšahrī, for corruption and 
mismanagement to a five-year prison term and a two-year ban from political activities. 
Hamšahrī and Salām tried to defend him publicly by pointing to financial irregularities of the 
FOUNDATION OF THE OPPRESSED AND DISABLED. Hamšahrī subsequently was edited by 
Mortażā Alvīrī, another member of the EXECUTIVES OF CONSTRUCTION.771  
 
Concomitantly, pressure groups attacked the premises of the newspaper Īrān-e Fardā, 
which was published by the brother of the Supreme Leader.772 On June 22, 1998, a court 
eventually banned Ǧāme‘eh.773 Following this, the pro-reformist daily Gozāreš-e Rūz (Report 
of the Day) and the weekly Pančšambeh-hā (Thursdays) were banned as well.774 Ǧalāʼīpūr, 
the editor of Ǧāme‘eh, had, however, anticipated this move and had already secured a new 
license for the newspaper Ṭūs (Ṭūs – a city in NE-Iran). The design and layout of Ṭūs were 
exactly the same as for Ǧāme‘eh and this continuity was even explicitly made clear in 
headline of the first issue, which described the new paper as “Ṭūs in the Service of the Society 
/ Ǧāme‘eh“ (ṭūs dar ḫedmat-e ǧāme‘eh). Head of judiciary Moḥammad Yazdī immediately 
condemned this strategy as a tactic that had been applied in the mid of the 20th century by the 
communist TŪDEH PARTY and warned that this time, the people would not be deceived by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
768  The organ of the ISLAMIC STUDENT UNION apparently added the name basīǧī to its former title (Payām-e 
Dānešǧū): Menashri (2001), 331.  
769  Hovviyyat-e Ḫvīš was banned by a press court in spring/summer 1999: Samii (1999), 2; Samii (2000); 
Menashri (2001), 329; Samii (2001), 5. 
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property tax: Sarkoohi (1998), 137; Buchta (2000), 140ff.; Keddie (2006), 274f. 
772  Rawan (2000), 144. 
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774  Editor-in-chief of Gozāreš-e Rūz was ‘Alī-Moḥammad Mahdavī-Ḫorramī: Sarkoohi (1998), 136; 
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such practices.775 As a result, pressure groups destroyed the editorial offices of Ṭūs on the next 
day and beat up its editor-in-chief Šams-ol-Vā‘eẓīn. A day after, the press court issued a ban 
against Ṭūs, arguing that it is not a different newspaper from Ǧāme‘eh.776 The newspaper staff, 
however, immediately launched the next newspaper Āftāb-e Emrūz (Sun of Today), yet this 
time with a distinctive logo and a different layout.777 As the closure of Ṭūs led to large student 
demonstration, culture minister Mohāǧerānī pleaded for the re-allowance of the banned 
newspaper, and on 4th August 1998, Ṭūs could appear again. Thus, there were now actually 
two successors to Ǧāme‘eh.  
 
 The conservatives consequently continued to attack the reformist press. Āyatollāh 
Ǧannatī, the chairman of the GUARDIAN COUNCIL and an influential member of the 
COMBATANT CLERGY ASSOCIATION accused the “mushrooming” press of insulting religious 
leaders. The Supreme Leader soon after lashed out against the newspapers accusing them of 
paving the way for cultural attacks by the West (tahāǧom-e farhangī-ye ġarb).778 This resulted 
in a next court procedure against Ṭūs. The newspaper was accused on September 17, 1998 of 
having published material jeopardizing national security.779 The real reason for the procedure 
might, however, have been the publication an interview with Valéry Giscard D’Estaing, 
according to whom Āyatollāh Ḫomainī had asked for asylum in France in 1978. Twelve days 
later, the PRESS SUPERVISORY BOARD withdrew the license of Ṭūs. It appeared that 
Mohāǧerānī supported this move by pretending to support Ḫātamī when in reality it was an 
organ of the FREEDOM MOVEMENT. Concurrently, the editors Ǧalāʼīpūr and Šams-ol-Vā‘eẓīn, 
as well as the satirist Ebrāhīm Nabavī were accused of “fighting against God” (moḥāreb bā 
ḫodā), an act which usually results in the death penalty. This charge was, however, later 
dropped. With Ṭūs banned and its editors behind bars, Āftāb-e Emrūz was edited by Feraidūn 
‘Ammūzādeh Ḫalīlī.780 But the conservative attacks continued unabatedly. The parliament, in 
which the conservatives still dominated, prepared a bill aimed at prohibiting the publication of 
articles on women’s right, which would create a conflict between men and women.781 
Ḫāmenehʼī continued to complain about the press, calling the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
775  Shahidi (2007), 61f. 
776   Ǧalāʼīpūr and Šams-ol-Vā’eẓīn used the dormant license of the newspaper Ṭūs, which had been published 
in the province of Ḫorāsān: Mobasser (1998), 171; Karimian & Bahrampour (1999), 38f.; Merat (1999), 
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AND GUIDANCE to finally enforce the limits of the press.782 Even though Mohāǧerānī promised 
to reign in the reformist newspapers, he could not avoid the dismissal of his deputies Aḥmad 
Borqānī and ‘Īsā Ṣaḥarḫīz, both staunch advocates of press freedom.783 
 In October 1998, the conservatives further escalated their attacks, when the 
intelligence division of the IRGC arrested four well-known authors, among them Hūšang 
Golšīrī.784 This was, however, only the prelude to a much more ferocious assault: a string of 
assassinations of famous opposition figures, which became known as the “chain murders” 
(qatl-hā-ye zanǧīrehʼī). On 22nd November, Dāryūš and Parvāneh Forūhar, the leaders of the 
small NATION PARTY OF IRAN (ḥezb-e mellat-e īrān), who had been publishing a weekly 
bulletin on the situation of human rights in Iran, were stabbed at their home. While still 
speculating on the murders of these famous former members of the NATIONAL FRONT, 
Hamšahrī reported two days later, that the critical journalist Maǧīd Šarīf was assassinated as 
well. Not long after, the press reported the assassination of the authors Moḥammad Moḫṭārī 
and Ǧa‘far Pūyāndeh.785 While the judiciary and the INTELLIGENCE MINISTRY ostensibly led 
their own investigations into these murders, Ḫātamī commissioned his own investigative team 
comprising of Alī Yūnesī, ‘Alī Rabī‘ī and Sa‘īd Ḥaǧarīyān-Kāšānī. Yūnesī and Rabī‘ī had 
both earlier worked for the INTELLIGENCE MINISTRY. Rabī‘ī also had been the long-time editor 
of Kār va Kārgar and Ḥaǧarīyān-Kašānī was preparing to launch the newspaper Ṣobḥ-e 
Emrūz. Yet, the investigations yielded no results.786  
 
 In 1999, Ḫātamī organized the first elections for the local councils, which, despite 
being envisioned in the constitution of 1979, had never taken place so far. The reformists 
camp again formed a coalition consisting of the ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS, the 
ORGANIZATION OF THE FIGHTERS FOR THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, the WORKER’S HOUSE, the 
OFFICE FOR STRENGTHENING UNITY, the EXECUTIVES OF CONSTRUCTION, and a new political 
organization Ḫātamī specifically had launched for this purpose called the ISLAMIC IRAN 
PARTICIPATION FRONT (ǧebheh-ye mošārekat-e īrān-e eslāmī)787. The participation front 
practically included important leftist reformists, namely Moḥammad Ḫātamī, Ma‘ṣūmeh 
Ebtekār, ‘Abdollāh Nūrī, Sa‘īd Ḥaǧariyān-Kāšānī, Ğamīleh Kadīvar, ‘Abbās ‘Abdī. It was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
782  Buchta (2000), 144f.; Shahidi (2007), 61f., 65. 
783  Buchta (2000), 145; Shahidi (2007), 150 no. 39. 
784  Buchta (2000), 145. 
785  Maǧīd Šarīfī in an article had advocated for a separation of religion and politics; Moḫtārī and Pūyāndeh had 
requested for more freedom of opinion in a letter to Rafsanǧānī in 1994: Buchta (2000) 156f.; Keddie 
(2006), 275. 
786  ‘Alī Yūnesī had been the highest military judge before: Buchta (2000), 158. 
787  Buchta (2000), 178ff.; Keddie (2006), 276, 
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headed by Moḥammad-Reżā Ḫātamī,788 and launched its own organ Mošārekat (Participation), 
whose editor-in-chief was ‘Alī Ḫātamī – both brothers of the president.789 Mošārekat was 
however not the only new paper to be launched before these elections.  
 
In December 1998, Ḫātamī’s first interior minister, ‘Abdollāh Nūrī, started to publish 
Ḫordād (Ḫordād - the month of Ḫātamī’s election). Due to Nūrī’s ongoing popularity and its 
outspoken style, Ḫordād soon became a widely read newspaper in Iran. The newspaper even 
served as platform for Āyatollāh Montaẓerī, who had been the religious teacher of Nūrī in the 
1980s.790 In December 1998, Sa‘īd Ḥaǧariyān-Kāšānī started to publish the newspaper Ṣobḥ-e 
Emrūz (Morning of Today). Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz was even more belligerent than Ḫordād and 
became particularly famous for its incessant attacks on the conservatives, in particular during 
the disclosure of the perpetrators of the chain murders.791 In the same year, a whole range of 
other reformist publications appeared. These include the newspaper Āzād (Free), which was 
published in the free trade zone in Kīš; Abo ʼl-Qāsem Golbāf’s newspaper Bāmdād-e Nou 
(New Morning)792; and Moḥammad-Reżā Zohdī’ newspaper Āryā (Arian)793. Arguably the 
most exceptional newspaper was, however, Enteḫāb (Choice). Enteḫāb was published by 
Ṭāhā Hāšemī of the ISLAMIC PROPAGATION ORGANIZATION (sāzmān-e tablīġāt-e eslāmī) in 
Qom, an organization under the supervision of the Supreme Leader. Despite this affiliation, 
the newspaper soon turned into an extremely open-minded and critical newspaper.794 On 19th 
February 1999, Ǧalāʼīpūr and Šams-ol-Vā‘eẓīn, who had been released from prison, launched 
the newspaper Našāṭ (Joy) as the factual successor to Ṭūs. Due to its blunt style, Našāṭ soon 
gained a wide readership.795 It is also interesting to note that in 1999, Hādī Ḫāmenehʼī’s 
newspaper Ǧahān-e Eslām resurfaced for a short time.796 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
788  On the ISLAMIC IRAN PARTICIPATION FRONT: Buchta (2000), 180. 
789  Mošārekat was launched on 2nd January 2000: Mobasser (2000), 86; Buchta (2000), 180; Menashri 
(2001), 330. 
790  On the newspaper Ḫordād: Samii (1999), 2f.; according to Karimian & Bahrampour, Ḫordād was close to 
the modern right: Karimain & Bahrampour (19999), 39; Merat (1999), 34; Mobasser (2000), 86; 
Buchta (2000), 186, 194f.; Menashri (2001), 330; Tarrock (2001), 593; Samii (2001), 4; Shahidi (2007), 
78f. 
791  On Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz: Merat (1999), 34; on Ḥaǧarīyān-Kāšānī: Buchta (2000), 161, 167, 195; Mobasser 
(2000), 86; Samii (2000), XX; Menashri (2001), 332; Shahidi (2007), 78f. 
792  Menashri (2001), 327. 
793  Karimian & Bahrampour (1999), 39; Menashri (2001), 327; Shahidi (2007), 78f. 
794  On the newspaper Enteḫāb: Karimian & Bahrampour (1999), 39; Menashri (2001), 328. 
795  Našāṭ’s editor-in-chief was Laṭīf Ṣafarī, a former member of parliament: Samii (1999), 4; Karimian & 
Bahrampour (1999), 39; Merat (1999), 34; Buchta (2000), 193ff.; Menashri (2001), 331; Tarrock 
(2001), 591; Samii (2001), 3f; Shahidi (2007), 63. 
796  On the republication of Ǧahan-e Eslām: Menashri (2001), 329. 
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During the run-up to the elections of the local councils, the press intensified the 
speculations as to who was behind the chain murders. Ostensibly, the obscure group 
DEVOTEES OF THE PURE ISLAM OF MOḤAMMAD (fadāʼī-y-ān-e eslām-e nāb-e moḥammadī) 
had taken responsibility for it. Salām, in contrast, published parts of the report of Ḫātamīs 
commission of inquiry, which identified members of the INTELLIGENCE MINISTRY as the true 
perpetrators. The chain murder had, however, not yet stopped. In January 1999, another four 
persons were assassinated. As a result of these revelations, the newspapers Salām and Resālat 
started a heated dispute centering on the dismissal of intelligence minister Dorrī-Naǧafābādī, 
who was eventually replaced by ‘Alī Yūnesī and ‘Alī Rabī‘ī, both members of Ḫātamī’s 
commission of inquiry.797 The reformist eventually won the elections with a large margin.798 
 
As a result, the conservatives again intensified their campaign against the reformist 
press. By September 1998, a pressure group physically attacked former vice-president Nūrī, 
the editor of Ḫordād, and the minister for Islamic Culture and Guidance Mohāğerānī, when 
they attended a Friday prayer in Qom. In November 1998, Rafsanǧānī’s former interior 
minister and publisher of Bayān, Moḥtašamīpūr, had to leave Mašhad because of a bomb 
threat. In January 1999, a bomb was detonated in the editorial offices of Ḫordād, while a 
death list was left behind, including the names of Nūrī, Montaẓerī, Fāʼezeh Hāšemī, Mehdī 
Karrūbī, and the Supreme Leaders’ brother Hādī Ḫāmenehʼī.799 In the spring of 1999, a 
revolutionary court closed down Hāšemī’s newspaper Zan, after it had published Nourūz 
greetings of the former queen Faraḥ Dībā.800 Yet, they increasingly felt, they had to proceed 
more systematically and comprehensively against the press. Therefore, on May 30, 1999, the 
conservative dominated parliament started to discuss an amendment to the press law of 1986. 
On June 6, 1999, Salām revealed an interesting detail on the press bill: Sa‘īd Emāmī had 
recommended a law that would legalize the security measures which to date had been applied 
against media professionals and would also hold journalists responsible. This same Emāmī in 
question was a member of the Intelligence Ministry, who as the main suspect behind the chain 
murders allegedly had committed suicide only a few weeks before due to his implication.801 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
797  MERAT ascribes the disclosure of the perpetrators of the chain murders to the newspapers Ḫordād and 
Ṣobh-e Emrūz: Merat (1999), 34; Buchta (2000), 159ff.; Keddie (2006), 275f. 
798  Buchta (2000), 181f.; Keddie (2006), 276. 
799  On the physical attacks on these famous media professionals and reformists: Buchta (2000), 176ff. 
800  On the closure of Zan: Karimian & Bahrampour (1999), 38; according to Samii, Zan’s closure was 
caused by a cartoon on gender (un-)equality: Samii (1999), 3; Buchta (2000), 183; Menashri (2001), 332; 
Samii (2001), 4. 
801  On Sa‘īd Emāmī’s (also known als Sa‘īd Eslāmī) letter and on his involvement in the chain murders: 
Karimian & Bahrampour (1999), 39; Samii (1999), 2, 5f.; Buchta (2000), 169f, 187; Samii (2001), 10; 
Tarrock (2001), 590f.; Shahidi (2007), 66. 
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Despite resolute opposition of jurists, media professionals and politicians, the parliament 
eventually passed the amendment on June 7, 1999.802 
 
The 1999 Amendment to the Press Law803 
The amendment to the press law of 1986 eventually added a teacher of the religious seminaries in 
Qom as well as a clerical member of the ISLAMIC PROPAGATION ORGANIZATION to the PRESS 
SUPERVISORY BOARD. The PRESS SUPERVISORY BOARD, which not only regulated the licenses of 
publications but also the allocation of subsidized paper and advertisement, furthermore obtained the right 
to close down a publication even before a court trial took place. 
The press court for its part obtained the right to choose the members of the jury itself. This would 
greatly empower then president Sa‘īd Mortaẓavī, a nephew of Āyatollāh Yazdī and a radical judge, to 
shut down disliked newspapers. Furthermore, revolutionary courts and the SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS 
now explicitly were named as competent courts to deliver judgments on press offenses, which they had 
done for a long time in practice. 
The most disputed amendment was, however, that not only the publishers and editors could be held 
responsible for possible offenses, but also the journalists and even the photographers. They were 
furthermore newly forced to disclose their sources. 
Finally, the publishers were prohibited from replacing a banned publication by a new publication 
bearing a similar name, logo or layout thus explicitly trying to prevent the appearance of serial 
newspapers 
  
With the approval of the amendment, the SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS accused Salām’s 
publisher Ḫoʼainīhā and editor-in-chief ‘Abdī of having revealed classified documents by 
disclosing information on Emāmī, and consequently banned the newspaper Salām. The 
Minister for Islamic Culture and Guidance Mohāǧerānī publicly reacted by stating that the 
newspaper would have deserved an award for having revealed the “trend, which had started 
with the threat of intellectuals, the press and authors and which had ended with the 
assassination of authors”.804 Immediately after, the new press law and the closure of Salām 
evoked the protest the students Tehrān University because Ḫoʼainīhā had been the founder of 
the students’ organization OFFICE FOR STRENGTHENING UNITY. Since Ḫātamī’s election, there 
had been regular student demonstrations, the last of which only dating back a few weeks after 
the closure of Ṭabarzadī’s newspaper Hovviyyat-e Ḫvīš. The police and pressure groups like 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
802  Merat (1999), 35; Karimian & Bahrampour (1999), 39; Samii (1999), 1f.; Buchta (2000), 187; Samii 
(2001), 3; Keddie (2006), 276; quoted in: Shahidi (2007), 66. 
803  On the amendments to the press law: Karimian & Bahrampour (1999), 39; according to Samii, the head 
of the press law even had the right to overrule the decision of the PRESS SUPERVISORY BOARD: Samii 
(1999), 5, 9; Buchta (2000), 187; Samii (2001), 10f.; Shahidi (2007), 65, 128f.; Shahidi (2008), 748. 
804  Merat (1999), 35; Karimian & Bahrampour (1999), 39; Samii (1999), 1f.; Buchta (2000), 187; Samii 
(2001), 3; Keddie (2006), 276; Shahidi (2007), 66. 
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ANṢĀR-E ḤEZBOLLĀH violently suppressed the protests on the campus, which only further 
infuriated the students. The students subsequently poured out in large numbers into the streets 
asking for the punishment of the responsible police forces and the readmission of Salām. 
Provoked by ANṢĀR-E ḤEZBOLLĀH, the demonstrations, which lasted for days and 
increasingly attracted other people, turned violent and was brutally suppressed by the police 
and Basīǧ units. The student leaders were arrested and later paraded on television with forced 
confessions.805  
 
After the repression of the largest demonstration since 1979, the conservatives started 
to blame Ḫātamī for the escalation. On 19th July 1999, Kaihān published a letter signed by 
twenty-four commanders of the IRGC, who threatened Ḫātamī with removal if he did “not 
make revolutionary decisions and act in accordance with [your] Islamic and national 
mission”.806 Ḫātamī reacted to the letter by publicly distancing himself of the “seditious” 
student leaders, but also by condemning the attacks of the ANṢĀR-E ḤEZBOLLĀH. His cautious 
reaction, however, only contributed to further alienate him from the more progressive and 
radical wing of the reformists.807 Like Salām before, Kaihān was also accused of having 
published confidential information but it eventually was acquitted of all charges.808 In contrast, 
the SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS issued a five-year ban for Salām and a three-year 
professional ban for its publisher Ḫoʼainīhā on August 5, 1999. 809  As a reaction, 
Moḥtašamīpūr reactivated his weekly Bayān (Expression) and started to publish it as the daily 
organ of the ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS.810 As a calming measure, Ḫāmenehʼī 
ordered the release of most students except the alleged ‘ringleaders’, and opened court 
hearings against more than one hundred policemen. Additionally, as requested repeatedly by 
the reformists he dismissed the hardline head of judiciary Yazdī and replaced him with 
Maḥmūd Hāšemī-Šāhrūdī.811 But these appeasement measures proved to be only a short 
reprieve. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
805  On the student demonstrations of July 1999: Samii (1999), 2; Samii (2000), XX; Buchta (2000), 187ff.; 
Tarrock (2001), 591; Samii (2001), 1; Keddie (2006), 276f.; Shahidi (2007), 66. 
806  Buchta (2000), 190. 
807  On reactions of the reformists to the suppression of the student unrest: Samii (2000), XX; Keddie (2006), 
277. 
808  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī and the radical newspaper Ǧavān, which both also had reprinted the letter of the IRGC 
commander, were not even charged: Samii (1999), 2; Buchta (2000), 190; Samii (2001), 3. 
809  On the conviction of Ḫoʼainīhā and ‘Abdī: Karimian & Bahrampour (1999), 39; Samii (1999), 2; 
Buchta (2000), 191; Tarrock (2001), 590f.; Samii (2001), 3. 
810  On Moḥtašamīpūr’s – now daily – newspaper Bayān: Menashri (2001), 327; Mianeh (8th July 2010). 
811  Buchta (2000), 191ff.; Tarrock (2001), 595; Keddie (2006), 277. 
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The Supreme Leader himself soon continued his attacks against the press, accusing 
them of exposing the Iranian youth to the “poisonous forces” of the enemy, lying to the 
people and being mouthpieces of Radio Israel and Radio America. His accusations in 
particular targeted Ǧalāʼīpūr and Šams ol-Vā‘eẓīn’s newspaper Našāṭ, the successor of Ṭūs, 
which recently had sharply criticized the existing retaliation laws (qeṣāṣ), and in which 
‘Ezzatollāh Ṣaḥābī, the ninety-five year old leader of the FREEDOM MOVEMENT had publicly 
requested to limit the powers of the Supreme Leader. At the same time, Ḫāmenehʼī expressed 
his dissatisfaction with Mohāǧerānī and his MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND 
GUIDANCE.812 Repeating the already established pattern, the prosecutor general, the police, the 
SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS, the ISLAMIC ĀZĀD UNIVERSITY and a number of conservative 
lawmakers filed a lawsuit against Našāṭ. On September 5, 1999, the press court eventually 
banned Našāṭ and opened court proceedings against the managing director Laṭīf Ṣafarī and 
the columnist and satirist Ebrāhīm Nabavī.813  
 
Unimpressed, Ǧalāʼīpūr and Šams-ol-Vā‘eẓīn proceeded to publish yet another 
newspaper, ‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān (Afternoon / Age of the Free), which was edited primarily by 
Maḥmūd Šams and subsequently by Ġāfūr Ǧasābī, the former editor-in-chief of Abrār. 
Further, ‘Īsā Ṣaḥarḫīz, who after his dismissal from the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND 
GUIDANCE had become a regular contributor to Ǧalāʼīpūr and Šams-ol-Vā‘eẓīn’s serial 
newspapers, took over the recently dormant license of Aḫbār, and published it as Aḫbār-e 
Eqteṣādī (Economic News). Both, ‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān and Aḫbār-e Eqteṣādī often published 
articles, which had appeared in Āftāb-e Emrūz before, the other successor to Ṭūs.814 
 
On October 30, 1999, the SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS summoned ‘Abdollāh Nūrī, 
the publisher of Ḫordād, and accused him of long litany of transgressions: libel against state 
officials, defamation of Ḫāmenehʼī, spreading lies, propagating war against the system, 
breaching religious taboos, supporting negotiations between Iran and America, advocating for 
the official recognition of Israel and in particular promoting the views of Āyatollāh Montaẓerī, 
his former mentor. Nūrī’s trial gained huge public attention since he eloquently defended 
himself and categorically questioned the legitimacy of the SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS. He 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
812  Buchta (2000), 193f.; Shahidi (2007), 66. 
813  On the closure of Našāṭ: Samii (1999), 3f.; Buchta (2000), 193f; another plaintiff apparently was IRIB: 
Samii (2001), 3; according to Tarrock, Našāṭ was closed by the SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS – which 
seems questionable, as neither Ǧalāʼīpūr nor Šams-ol-Vā‘eẓīn were clerics: Tarrock (2001), 591. 
814  ‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān’s deliberately seems to have chosen its name in reference to the defunct Islamic leftist 
newpaper Ṣobḥ-e Āzādegān: Samii (1999), 7f.; Menashri (2001), 326f.; Samii (2003), 3, 8. 
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was eventually sentenced to a five-year prison sentence and a further five-year publication 
ban while Ḫordād was shut down. But the real reason for his conviction arguably was to 
prevent his candidacy for the upcoming elections to the sixth parliament in February 2000.815 
It was not long after that ‘Emād al-Dīn Bāqī and ‘Alī Ḥekmat, both contributors to Ḫordād, 
launched the newspaper Fatḥ (Conquest), as a quasi-successor to Ḫordād.816  
 
Meanwhile, due to the constant attacks by the conservatives, the reformist became 
somehow estranged from each other. While they still maintained the common interest in 
winning the parliamentary elections, the constant attacks of the conservatives had left the 
more centrist members of the former modern more cautious. Ḫātamī and the leftist members 
of the reformists consequently formed their own political election campaign group, the 
SECOND ḪORDĀD FRONT (ǧebhe-ye dovvom-e ḫordād). It included the ASSOCIATION OF 
COMBATANT CLERICS, the ORGANIZATION OF THE FIGHTERS FOR THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION, 
the ISLAMIC IRAN PARTICIPATION FRONT and some smaller reformist groups, but not the 
EXECUTIVES OF RECONSTRUCTION. Contributing to the alienation were the continued attacks 
of radical reformists against the former modern right. In his famous article “The Red 
Eminence and the Grey Eminence” (‘ālī-ǧanāb-e sorḫ-pūš va ‘ālī-ǧanāb-e ḫākestarī), Akbar 
Ganǧī accused Rafsanǧānī for being responsible for many political murders in the early 
1990s.817 It must be noted that in the end, the SECOND ḪORDĀD FRONT eventually won the 
elections again with a landslide, securing over 70% of the seats.818 
 
This freshly heralded reformist victory proved to be the straw that broke the back of 
the camel of the independent press. Using their well-proven tactics, the conservatives 
consequently set about finally silencing the reformist newspapers, editors and journalists once 
and for all. On 5th March 2000, unidentified persons tried to kill Ḥaǧariyān-Kāšānī, the 
publisher of Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz and the main strategist of the reformists. He survived the 
assassination attempt but was permanently paralyzed.819 Ḫāmenehʼī publicly condemned the 
attack. However, in the same speech again lashed out at “the tongues and pens intensively 
creating turbulence and rumours […] leveling unfounded accusations against named 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
815  On the conviction of Nūrī: Samii (1999), 2f.; Mobasser (2000), 86; Buchta (2000), 194; Samii (2001), 4. 
816  On the launch of Fatḥ: Menashri (2001), 328; Tarrock mentions Fatḥ as a newspaper close to the ideas of 
Monataẓerī: Tarrock (2001), 592. 
817  Generally on the attacks by different journalists on Rafsanǧānī: Tarrock (2001), 596f. 
818  On the elections to the sixth parliament and the SECOND ḪORDĀD FRONT: Samii (2000); Tarrock (2001), 
596; not only radical conservatives but also members of the modern right – and even Fāʼezeh Hāšemī – lost 
their mandates: Keddie (2006), 278f. 
819  Samii (2000); Keddie (2006), 279; Shahidi (2007), 66f. 
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individuals and even raising doubts about trusted organizations such as the [Revolutionary] 
Guards and the baseej”. Two days later, he became even more explicit stating there are “10 
to 15 newspapers” in Iran, which are “directed by the same centre […] making the people 
pessimistic about the system”.820  
 
It was not long after, as usual, different conservative bodies immediately proceeded to 
shut down the remaining independent reformist newspapers. This was made easier as the 
amendment to the press law of 1986 was finally passed on 14th April 2000.821 Soon after, the 
INTELLIGENCE MINISTRY, the PRESS SUPERVISORY BOARD, the SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS 
and even the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE filed lawsuits against exactly 
fifteen reformist newspapers. On 23rd April 2000, the courts consequently shut down the 
newspapers Fatḥ, successor to Ḫordād; ‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān, successor to Našāṭ, itself successor 
to Ṭūs; Āftāb-e Emrūz, the other successor to Ṭūs; Ṭabarzadī’s Gozāreš-e Rūz; the newspapers 
Bāmdād-e Nou, Āryā, Āzād and Payām-e Āzādī; the weekly Ābān; Ṣaḥābī’s monthly Īrān-e 
Fardā; and A‘ẓam Ṭāleqānī’s women’s magazine Payām-e Ḥāǧer. On 27th April 2000, a 
court also banned Ḥaǧarīyān-Kāšānī’s Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz on the sarcastic basis that the disabled 
publisher was incapable of managing it; as well as Mošārekat, the organ of Ḫātamī’s ISLAMIC 
IRAN PARTICIPATION FRONT; and Avā, a weekly from Eṣfahān, which was close to Āyatollāh 
Montaẓerī.822 By April 10, 2000, Šams-ol-Vā‘eẓīn had been sentenced to imprisonment, 
which was followed soon after by the sentencing of Akbar Ganǧī and other journalists.823 
 
This mass-closure of reformist newspapers was a major blow to the reformist camp 
but not yet its total demise. The ISLAMIC IRAN PARTICIPATION FRONT still managed to replace 
Mošārekat with the newspaper Nourūz (New Year);824 and Ǧalāʼīpūr, co-publisher with Šams-
ol-Vā‘eẓīn of the serial newspapers ‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān, launched the newspaper Gūnāgūn 
(Miscellaneous) 825 . But these newspapers would remain more cautious in tone and 
consequently never reached the same circulation as their predecessors. The other reformist 
and moderate newspapers, such as Īrān, Hamšahrī or Kār va Kārgar, had meanwhile become 
more cautious, refraining from publishing polarizing editorials. The courts nevertheless 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
820  Samii (2000); Samii (2001), 5; Shahidi (2007), 67f. 
821  On the passing of the press law: Keddie (2006), 278; Shahidi (2007), 68. 
822  On the first mass closure of reformist newspapers in April 2000: Mobasser (2000), 86f.; Samii (2000); 
according to Samii, the weekly Arzeš (Value) was also closed on 23rd April 2000: Samii (2001), 5; 
Tarrock (2001), 592f. 
823  On the conviction of Šams-ol-Vā‘eẓīn, Ganǧī and others: Mobasser (2000), 87; Tarrock (2001), 594f; 
Shahidi (2007), 67. 
824  On the launch of Nourūz: Shahidi (2007), 72f.. 
825  On the launch of Gūnāgūn: Samii (2001), 5. 
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continued to ban further reformist newspapers and journals in the following months.826 These 
included the newspaper Bahār, which Sa‘īd Pūr-‘Azīzī had published as a pro-reform paper 
since the mass closure of newspapers in April 2000; the newspaper Bayān, which 
Moḥtašamīpūr had published as the new organ of the ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS; 
the newspaper Ham-Mīhan (Compatriot), which Karbāsčī had launched after his release from 
prison and shortly before the parliamentary elections; the extremely critical newspaper Mellat 
(Nation), which Sa‘īd Ḥaqqī and ‘Alī Moṯbat had published from 22nd May 2000; and the 
newspaper Hambastegī (Correlation) – which all were banned on 8th August 2000. Soon after, 
the ban was extended to the newspaper Gūnāgūn; the popular youth magazine Īrān-e Ǧavān 
(Young Iran) of the publication group IRNA; the weekly Mobīn (Manifest), which ‘Alī-
Moḥammad Ġarībāʼī and Kamāl Morād had published from the mid 1990s; and finally the 
famous journal Kiyān, which once had lit the spark of a reinvigorated critical media 
discourse.827 
 
Additionally, many prominent journalists were now convicted on the basis of the new 
press law. These included on 29th May 2000  ‘Emād al-Dīn Bāqī, the freelance journalist and 
editor-in-chief of Fatḥ; on 7th August 2000 Aḥmad Zaidābādī; on 9th August 2000 Mas‘ūd 
Behnūd; on 12th August the satirist Ebrāhīm Nabavī; and on 13th August Moḥammad Qūčānī. 
These were all prominent journalists who would continue to play an important role in Iran’s 
media landscape, in particular, Qūčānī, the later editor of the newspaper Šarq (East).828 
 
When the sixth parliament convened for the first time on 27th May 2000, the reformist 
majority, in a last defensive effort, immediately planned the revision of different laws, among 
them in particular a reversion of the recently amended press law. Yet, before the discussion 
on a new press bill really could take off, Ḫāmenehʼī in an exceptional move directly 
intervened and explicitly prohibited all further discussions, stating: “the present law has been 
able to some extent to prevent this great calamity from occurring and it would not be 
legitimate or in the interests of the system and the country to change it”.829 On the occasion of 
the press festival of 2000, the head of the TRADE UNION OF JOURNALISTS IN IRAN 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
826  According to Shahidi, 23 publications were banned until August 2000, and another 23 until May 2001: 
Shahidi (2007), 69f. 
827  On the second mass closure of newspapers in August 2000: Samii (2001), 6f.; Menashri (2001), 327f., 330.  
828  On the conviction of dozens of journalists, media professionals and intellectuals: Mobasser (2000), 87; 
Samii (2000); Samii (2001), 8; Keddie (2006), 278f.; Shahidi (2007), 67, 69. 
829  On the reformist draft for a new press bill: Samii (2001), 6; Tarrock (2001), 586; 597ff.; Keddie (2006), 
278; Shahidi (2007), 67f. 
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appropriately called it a press funeral.830 By the end of the year 2000, the Minister of Islamic 
Culture and Guidance ‘Aṭāʼollāh Mohāǧerānī eventually had to give in to the constant attacks 
on his person and resigned from his post.831 As a result by the end of the year 2000, the 
reformist media were largely silenced and contained, as the press spring had come to an 
end.832 The reformists admittedly still were popular, as was revealed by the re-election of 
Ḫātamī in 2001, and the era of cultural and intellectual openness proved to have a lasting 
influence on the Iranian public sphere, which continued despite tightly controlled limits 
during Aḥmadīnežād’s presidency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
830  Shahidi (2007), 69. 
831  Keddie (2006), 278; Shahidi (2007), 70. 
832  Until spring 2001, the courts were to ban dozens of other publications, among them: Aḥrār (Freemen) from 
Tabrīz; Dourān-e Emrūz (Today’s Era); Gonbad-e  Kabūd (Azure Cupola); Nousāzī (Rebuilding); 
Rūzdārā; Arzeš (Value); Amīn-e Zanǧān (Trustee of Zanǧān);  Bāzār-e Rūz (Market of Today); Češmeh 
(Source / Eye); Fardā-ye Roušan (Bright Tomorrow); Golbāng-e Īrān (Cry of Iran); Ḥadīṯ-e Qazvīn 
(Narration of Qazvīn); Ḥarīm (Frontage); Ǧahān-e Pezeškī (Medical World); Ḫalīǧ-e Fārs (Persian Gulf); 
Mīhan (Motherland); Mīlād (Birth); Naḫl (Date-Palm); Qeṣṣeh-ye Zendegī (Stories of Life); Sepīdeh-ye 
Zendegī (Dawn of Life); Ṣobḥ-e Omīd (Morning of Hope); Tavānā (Powerful); Ǧavānān-e Qorveh (Youth 
of Qorveh); or Payām-e Emrūz (Message of Today): Samii (2001), 6. 
 132 
IV. Aims, Sources and Methodologies of the Analysis  
 
IV. 1. Aims and Scope of the Analysis of the Iranian Press Discourse on Drugs 
 
The present analysis begins at the intersection of a political and cultural reform 
movement in Iran that has its beginnings during the administration of Rafsanǧānī, but in 
reality gained pace under the reformist administration of Ḫātamī. The policy changes induced 
by the two consecutive administrations are of crucial relevance for the subsequent analysis; in 
as far as they affected both the drug policy and the press. As has been shown, first drug policy 
changes already took place under Rafsanǧānī, and continued with ever more progressive drug 
demand reduction measures under Ḫātamī. The same applies to the press: cultural and media 
freedoms were first introduced during the Rafsanǧānī administration, specifically by then 
culture minister Ḫātamī, and greatly expanded during the beginning of Ḫātamī’s presidency. 
 
 While the media around the world have been reporting on the increasingly progressive 
Iranian drug policy for years, little is known about how Iranian public opinion perceives this 
topic. The present analysis aims to fill this gap by analyzing Iranian press discourse on drugs. 
The press in Iran comes closest to the concept of a public sphere, where the widest variety of 
voices are expressed and heard, particularly during the administrations of Rafsanǧānī and 
Ḫātamī. At the same time, however, the press also fulfills a basic function in simply 
informing public opinion about drug-related issues, and thus becomes itself a crucial tool for 
drug prevention. National television and radio channels, in contrast, are a much more closed 
venue, because they are under direct supervision of the Supreme Leader.  
 
Iranian newspapers serve as organs for the different, often competing political factions 
in Iran. It is, thus, not surprising the many reformist newspapers that appeared after the 
inauguration of Ḫātamī took advantage of the new media freedom to advance their opinions 
and positions. As a result, the press can be expected to express differing opinions on matters 
of drug policy, and thus becomes an interesting field of investigation. As a consequence, the 
conservative faction, diametrically opposed to the reformists, used various means to silence 
the reformist newspapers, especially through the courts. They eventually succeeded in 
banning practically all reformist newspapers by the year 2000. 
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 Against this background, the present study analyzed Iranian press discourse on drugs 
over a time period comprising the transition from the Rafsanǧānī to the Ḫātamī administration. 
This seemed particularly promising because the most important changes in the official drug 
policy took place during this time, and because the press turned into a hotly disputed arena, in 
which the competing political factions used their respective newspapers to attack each other. 
Iranian press discourse during these years, thus, can be expected to reflect both, major 
changes in the drug policy, and heated debates over it. Such a diachronic analysis, despite 
being time-consuming, permits the following of the gradual changes that are taking place both, 
within the official drug policy and Iranian press discourse on drugs. The author analyzed 
drug-related press coverage between the years 1995-2000. This period looks at the 
development, which started with the first liberalizations in the fields of the drug and the press 
policy under Rafsanǧānī, and continued with almost unprecedented reforms in both fields, and 
finally ended shortly before the mass closure of reformist newspapers. 
 
 Within this period, the study aims at addressing three basic aspects of the Iranian press 
discourse on drugs: the range of predominant topics, arguments and further characteristics; 
shifts within this order over the sample period; and finally inconsistencies and differences 
within the press. This last aspect is of particular interest. Through such differing opinions and 
discrepancies, discourses are renegotiated and constantly change. But all three aspects are 
naturally closely interwoven, as the subsequent methodological chapter will further elaborate 
(chapter IV. 3) A follow-up aspect that will be addressed at the end of the analysis, is the 
possible impact this interplay might have on the development of a new self-consciousness of 
the press and of a more professional journalism. 
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IV. 2 Sources: Selection, Quantity and Quality of Drug-Related Iranian Newspaper 
Articles 
 
 The task of the present analysis first consisted in the procurement and identification of 
drug-related newspaper articles that appeared in the Iranian press during the sample period of 
1995-2000. Baring in mind that the Iranian newspapers basically serve as organs for the 
various political factions in Iran, the political affiliation of the respective newspapers as well 
as the peculiarities of the development of the Iranian press are of crucial importance for their 
characterization and a first assessment of their significance for the public drugs discourse.  
 
 Ideological affiliation 
 
A first essential consideration in this regard is the probably changing political 
affiliation of a specific newspaper over the years. In the present analysis, such changes are 
gradual but nevertheless worth mentioning. Thus, Hamšahrī for instance remained a 
newspaper affiliated with the modern right or more concretely with the EXECUTIVES OF 
CONSTRUCTION, who were in control of the municipality of Tehrān during the entire sample 
period. Initially, it was edited by the outspoken mayor Ġolām-Ḥossayn Karbāsčī, who turned 
into one of the main architects of the reformist victory in the presidential elections of May 
1997. He was succeeded as the mayor of Tehran and consequently as the publisher of 
Hamšahrī by Mortażā Alvīrī. Alvīrī also was a member of the EXECUTIVES OF CONSTRUCTION, 
but was, in general, more cautious than his predecessor. This change could of course also be 
reflected in Hamšahrī. The same applies to the governmental newspaper Īrān, which after 
Ḫātamī’s election changed hands from the pragmatist to the reformist administration, 
although here, too, the expected changes might rather be gradual. A similar political 
repositioning could however also be assumed for the more conservative newspapers of the 
modern right, such as Āfarīneš, which might have rather become more conservative. 
 
A second consideration concerns the reformist newspapers, in particular the new 
reformist papers that appeared from the beginning of 1998. Due to the increasing pressure of 
the judiciary, which forced the closure of many newspapers, their qualitative representation in 
the Iranian press discourse on drugs most probably is distorted. The publishers of the banned 
newspapers usually managed to publish a successive newspaper within a short time. Yet gaps 
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between the closure of the old and the appearance of the new publication, as well as the 
difficulties of organizational restructuring probably still affected the output of these papers. 
 
At the beginning of the sample period – 1995 – Iran was still governed by the 
pragmatic president Rafsanǧānī, who had initiated first liberalizations in the official drug and 
press policy. The variety of newspapers increased under his presidency, adding a few popular 
newspapers to the traditional set of newspapers in the Islamic Republic. Practically all 
established newspapers, namely Kayhān, Eṭṭelā‘āt, Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, and Resālat now 
were affiliated with the traditional right, as did for instance the local newspaper Qods, the 
newspaper of the vast and wealthy administration of the shrine of Emām Reżā – known as 
Āstān-e Qods-e Rażavī – in Mašhad. Eṭṭelā‘āt was however an exceptional case, as it always 
has been a comparatively moderate newspaper, and as it continued to address a more 
moderate constituency. Similarly, nestled between the traditional and the modern right was 
the newspaper Āfarīneš of the ISLAMIC ĀZĀD UNIVERSITY.  
 
The modern right around Rafsanǧānī particularly controlled the popular newspapers 
Īrān and Hamšahrī, both of which had appeared at the beginning of the 1990s. But other 
newspapers that originally had been controlled by the Islamic left now also seem to have 
become close to them. This is especially true for Kār va Kārgar and Abrār, which had 
replaced Ṣobḥ-e Āzādegān, itself the successor of the famous Āyandegān.  
 
Initially, thus, the views of the Islamic left only seem to have been reflected in the 
newspaper Salām, and probably in Ḫorāsān, the newspaper of the MARTYR’S FOUNDATION 
(bonyād-e šahīd), which at the time was still headed by the leftist cleric Raḥīmīyān. This 
situation initially remained unchanged after Ḫātamī’s elections in May 1997. The first new 
reformist newspapers only appeared from the beginning of 1998 – with the notable exception 
of Payām-e Dānešǧū-ye Basīǧī and its more famous successor Hovviyaat-e Ḫvīš of the 
ISLAMIC STUDENT UNION. They were all published by influential members of the former 
Islamic left, who thus now had an entire armada of newspapers at their disposal. Since the 
conservatives controlled the national television and radio channels, these newspapers became 
all the more important to the reformists. Next to their outspokenness, the most obvious 
characteristic of these newspapers is their appearance as ‘serial newspapers’. This practice of 
practically continuing banned newspapers by simply launching new ones was of course not 
voluntary. The most prominent of these serials were Ǧāme‘eh – Ṭūs – Āftāb-e Emrūz – Nešāṭ 
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– ‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān – Aḫbār-e Eqteṣādī – Gūnāgūn, published by a circle of leftist and 
reformist intellectuals around Ḥamīd-Reżā Ǧālāʼīpūr and Māšāʼollāh Šams-ol-Vā‘eẓīn; as 
well as Ḫordād – Fatḥ, published by Ḫātamī’s first interior minister ‘Abdollāh Nūrī; and 
Salām – Bayān, published by the influential leftist cleric Moḥammad Mūsavī-Ḫoʼaynīhā and 
the important intellectual ‘Abbās ‘Abdī. Further important reformist newspapers were Ṣobḥ-e 
Emrūz, published by Sa‘īd Ḥaǧarīyān, one of the architects of the reformist movements; and 
Mošārekat, the newspaper of Ḫātamī’s ISLAMIC IRAN PARTICIPATION FRONT and published by 
his brother Moḥammad-Reżā Ḫātamī. Other, smaller reformist newspapers were Gozāreš-e 
Rūz, the newspaper of the student leader Ḥešmatollāh Ṭabarzadī; Dāvūd Bahrāmī 
Sīyāvošānī’s Payām-e Āzādī; Karbāsčī’s new publication Ham-Mīhan; and the newspapers 
Āryā, Āzād, Vohūman. There were certain ideological differences between the reformist 
newspapers, reflecting certain diversity within the reformist camp, which accrued from 
ideological and organisational differences between the former member of the Islamic left and 
the modern right. The same is true for the more traditional newspapers Hamšahrī, Īrān and 
Kār va Kārgar, which now sided with the reformists. 
 
The conservatives, too, launched a few new publications in addition to their 
newspapers Kayhān, Resālat, Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, Qods, and the more moderate Eṭṭelā‘āt and 
Āfarīneš. These include Aḥmad Tavakkolī’s Fardā and the radical Ǧavān, which both were 
launched in 1998. A peculiar case was the newspaper Enteḫāb. Although published by the 
ISLAMIC PROPAGATION ORGANISATION, which is directly controlled by the Supreme Leader, 
Enteḫāb was in many regards equally critical and outspoken as the reformist newspapers. The 
executive manger Ṭaha Hāšemī and the editor Moḥammad-Mehdī Faqīhī both belonged to the 
current of the ‘religious new thinking’ (nou-andīšī-ye dīnī). Enteḫāb eventually stopped 
publishing in 1383 (2004-05).  
 
The IRANIAN NATIONAL LIBRARY 
The author visited the IRANIAN NATIONAL LIBRARY (ketāb-ḫāne-ye mellī-ye īrān), 
which recently had relocated to northern Tehran where it was greatly expanded, for a first 
time in 2006. This library dates back to the Qāǧār time, when the scientific college Dār ol-
Fonūn had founded a small library in the early 1860s. The library was, however, only 
officially inaugurated in 1941. 
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Initially, the plan consisted of searching through consecutive volumes of individual 
newspapers, which would have been a time-consuming task. Yet, as part of the profound 
organizational restructuring, which the director at the time, Moḥammad Ḫātamī, had 
commissioned, the NATIONAL LIBRARY had undertaken a comprehensive digitalization project. 
It had developed an electronic library called Namāye (index), which theoretically contains 
scanned and digitalized newspapers and magazine from at least 1995. A keyword search 
allows identifying, and more importantly, directly accessing relevant articles as electronic 
files. In practice, the newspapers and magazines have, however, only systematically been 
stored in digital form from 1998 onwards. Articles from earlier years still had to be copied 
from hardcopy issues. 
 
In initially applying a rather improvised trial-and-error method, the author started to 
search for newspaper arcitles with the simple keywords “drugs” (mavādd-e moḫadder) and 
“addiction” (e‘tiyād). Eventually, the used keywords became ever more refined, including:  
‘addict’ (mo‘tād), ‘opium’ (taryāk / afyūn), ‘heroin’ (herōʼīn), ‘crack’ (krāk), ‘methadone’ 
(metādōn), ‘hashish’ (ḥašīš), ‘cannabis’ (kānābīs), ‘marihuana’ (mārī-ǧuvānā), ‘cocaine’ 
(kōkāʼīn), ‘ecstasy’ (ekstāsī), ‘poppy’ (ḫaš-ḫāš), ‘opium addict’ (taryākī), ‘syringe’ (sorang), 
‘traffic’ (qāčāq), or ‘trafficker’ (qāčāq-čī). 
 
These keywords already yielded hundreds of drug-related articles for the years 1995-
2000, and even more for the subsequent years. As a result, the author decided to take into 
consideration only every alternate year within this time span, three years in total. The analysis 
thus will start with the drug-related newspaper articles of the year 1374 (1995-96), when 
Rafsanǧānī still was president; the second year in consideration is 1376 (1997-98), during 
which Ḫātamī was elected president; and the third and last year is 1378 (1999-2000), which 
represents the peak of the reformist press and thus the period of the greatest press freedom. 
 
In analyzing the results yielded by the search in Namāyeh, it became obvious that the 
Iranian press is addressing the drug problem already in 1374 (1995-96), but with increasing 
frequency over the course of the years. The drug-related newspaper articles that were listed in 
Namāyeh for the years 1374 and 1376 could, however, not all be found in hardcopy, due to 
incomplete recordings of the library. Since the missing articles were equally distributed 
among conservative and reformist newspapers, this should not lead to a major distortion of 
the press discourse. Accordingly, in 1374 (1995-96), the Iranian press published fifty-one 
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articles, of which only thirty-three could be identified. In 1376 (1997-98), a total of sixty-nine 
drug-related articles appeared, of which sixty-four could be identified. And in 1378 (1999-
2000) the press published one hundred and twenty-five drug-related articles, of which all but 
two were accessible. The sample for the subsequent analysis consequently consists in total of 
two hundred and forty-five articles. 
 
Number of drug-related newspaper articles appearing over the course of the sample period 
 
The following paragraph lists the newspapers of each year in order of the amount of 
drug-related articles that have been published. The distribution of drug-related articles shows 
that the newspapers adequately represent the situation of the press, including all important 
reformist newspapers. At the end of the chapter, a complete list of the newspapers represented 
in the Iranian press discourse on drugs will be reproduced. 
 
In 1374 (1995-96), the fifty-one articles are distributed as follows among the 
newspapers. The newspaper publishing most drug-related articles is the moderate newspaper 
Eṭṭelā‘āt (ten articles), followed by the progressive Hamšahrī (nine articles) and the radically 
conservative Kayhān (eight articles). Slightly fewer articles are published by the 
governmental newspaper Īrān (seven articles), the moderate Abrār (seven articles) and the 
staunchly conservative Resālat (five articles); the conservative Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī as well as 
the Islamic left Salām each only print two drug-related articles; and Aḫbār, a newspaper close 
to the modern right only one article. Although this overview does not yet reveal, how exactly 
the newspapers discuss the topic of drugs, it already points to the relative importance of 
specific newspapers in shaping the Iranian press discourse on drugs. Strikingly, the 
newspapers of the modern right – including the moderately conservative Eṭṭelā‘āt – are more 
represented than both the newspapers of the traditional right and Salām, the only newspaper 
of the Islamic left. 
 
Drug related articles in Iranian newspapers 
1374 (1995-96) 
Total Eṭṭelā‘āt Hamšahrī Kayhān Īrān Abrār Resālat Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī Salām Aḫbār 
51 10 9 8 7 7 5 2 2 1 
 
In 1376 (1997-98), still the same newspapers are dominating the drug coverage; yet, 
this time their order of importance changed. Still most drug-related articles were published by 
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the moderate newspapers Hamšahrī (sixteen articles) and Eṭṭelā‘āt (fourteen articles). Next 
come the two important conservative newspapers Resālat (nine articles) and Ǧomhūrī-ye 
Eslāmī (eight articles), which increased their coverage compared to two years ago; and the 
moderately conservative Āfarīneš (six articles), the usually very conservative Qods (four 
articles), the moderate Abrār (five articles), the radical Kayhān (four articles), and the 
moderate Aḫbār (two articles). Astonishingly the leftist Salām (one article) again comes last. 
This distribution suggests that Hamšahrī, meanwhile a reformist newspaper, definitively had 
started to take a leading role in the media scene. The governmental newspaper Īrān, however, 
is conspicuously absent from the Iranian press discourse on drugs this year. In contrast, the 
conservative newspapers had become much more vocal. 
 
Drug related articles in Iranian newspapers 
1376 (1997-98) 
Total Hamšahrī Eṭṭelā‘āt Resālat Ǧomhūrī-ye 
Eslāmī 
Āfarīneš Abrār Kayhān Qods Aḫbār Salām 
69 16 14 9 8 6 5 4 4 2 1 
 
In 1378 (1999-2000), not only much more newspapers are reporting on drug-related 
issues, but the reformist newspapers are now clearly dominating the discourse – at least 
quantitatively. Remarkably, however, most articles are published by the conservative 
newspaper Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī (fourteen articles). It is followed by Nūrī’s reformist serial 
Ḫordād – Fatḥ (together twelve articles); the more religious but reformist newspaper Ḫorāsān 
(ten articles); and by the governmental newspapers Īrān and Kār va Kārgar (each nine 
articles). Then comes the nominally conservative, but still progressive newspaper Enteḫāb 
(eight articles). Āftāb-e Emrūz, Nešāṭ, ‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān, and Aḫbār-e Eqteṣādī, all successors 
to Ǧalāʼīpūr’s famous reformist newspaper Ǧāme‘eh, together publish an equivalent number 
of drug-related articles as the serial Salām – Bayān (seven articles each). They are followed 
by moderately conservative Abrār (six articles), which publishes about the same number of 
articles as in the previous years; and Eṭṭelā‘āt and Hamšahrī (both five articles), which thus 
have much less articles than in the previous years. An equal number of drug-related articles is 
published by the reformist Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz (six vs. five articles). Fewer articles appear in the 
reformist newspapers Payām-e Āzādī (four articles) and Gozāreš-e Rūz (three articles), as 
well as in the staunchly conservative newspapers Ǧavān and Qods (three articles each). Much 
lesss significant than in the previous years have become the radical Kayhān (two articles) and 
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Resālat (one article), as well as the moderately conservative Āfarīneš (one article). Last rank 
Ḫātamī’s party organ Mošārekat (one article) and Karbāsčī’s Ham-Mīhan (one article). 
 
The strong representation of the reformist newspapers in the ranking of drug-related 
newspaper articles is not further astonishing. The strong standing of Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī and 
Entaḫāb, in contrast is remarkable, probably indicating at first glance, that the conservative 
circles in Qom were more adept in responding to the reformist challenge than other 
conservatives represented by Kayhān, Resālat or even Eṭṭelā‘āt and Āfarīneš. Even the radical 
Ǧavān and Qods wrote more articles than these latter newspapers. Also worth mentioning is 
the reinvigorated role of the governmental newspapers Īrān and Kār va Kargar, which had 
both been absent two years ago. 
 
Drug related articles in Iranian newspapers in 1378 (1999-2000) 
Total Ğomhūrī-ye 
Eslāmī 
Ḫordād Fatḥ Ḫorāsān Īrān Kār va 
Kārgar 
Enteḫāb Āftāb-e 
Emrūz 
Nešāṭ 
125 14 5 (12) 7 (12) 10 9 9 8 3 (7) 1 (7) 
 ‘Aṣr-e 
Āzādegān 
Aḫbār-e 
Eqteṣādī 
Salām Bayān Abrār Ṣobḥ-e 
Emrūz 
Hamšahrī Eṭṭelā‘āt Payām-
e Āzādī 
 1 (7) 2 (7) 5 (7) 2 (7) 6 6 5 5 4 
 Ǧavān Gozāreš-e 
Rūz 
Qods Āzād Āryā Kayhān Āfarīneš Ham-
Mīhan 
Mošārek
at 
 3 3 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 
 Tarǧomān-e 
Rūz 
Vohūman Resālat       
 1 1 1       
 
 In total, the distribution of drug related newspaper article over the course of the 
sample period thus closely corresponds to the general development of the press, namely the 
increasing importance of the reformist newspapers. Surprising, however, is a reinvigorated 
presence of new conservative newspapers from the second year in consideration, as well as 
the continuing influence of conservative newspapers, in particular of Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī. 
 
Formal details 
 A serious content analysis in the field of media studies not only requires taking into 
account the political and personal affiliation of newspapers, but also additional details such as 
the genre and style of the articles, the rubric in which they appear, the authors of the articles, 
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as well as their length, format, and layout. Unfortunately, this is only possible to a limited 
extent in the present analysis. The NATIONAL LIBRARY’s electronic program Namāyeh only 
displays the newspaper articles in isolated form, cut out from the whole page. Additionally, 
articles from the year 1378 (1999-2000) are often saved in BMP (bitmap) format, which does 
not depict the original format of the articles. Further details, such as for instance the rubric, 
advertisements, images, charts, and page numbers, are thus often missing. Only from 2005 
onwards, articles are saved in PDF format, which adequately reproduces the original 
appearance. Additionally, authorship is, in general, only rarely disclosed in the Iranian press. 
 
The lack of such details, therefore, makes a consistent analysis of the formal aspects 
impossible. This is certainly detrimental to carrying out a thorough analysis comprising form 
and content, as particularly requested by the critical discourse analysis. Since the present 
analysis, however, is more interested in the topics and arguments of the Iranian press 
discourse on drugs, this has to be accepted. Nevertheless, based on the author’s observation of 
the press discourse on drugs, especially also in later years, a general formal characterization 
will be given here. 
 
 The newspaper articles all consist of longer reports or comments on various aspects of 
drugs in Iran and abroad. Shorter agency reports on drug seizures or the arrest of drug 
traffickers, which are a common feature in the Iranian press, are not recorded by Namāyeh, 
and consequently will not be considered in the present analysis either. The newspapers are 
usually published in DIN-A2 or DIN-A3 format. Drug-related articles typically cover a space 
ranging from an eighth of a page up to an entire page. They are arranged in up to nine 
relatively narrow columns, and the font-size is usually small.  
 
Not all newspapers have the same rubrics, which makes a comparison difficult. Based 
on an analysis of the drug-related articles of 1374 (1995/96), where the author had access to 
the original newspapers, the articles typically appear in the rubrics “social” (eǧtemā‘ī – 
fourteen articles); “comment” (gozāreš – twelve articles) or “daily comment” (gozāreš-e rūz – 
2 articles); or “news” (aḫbār – eight articles), which at times is differentiated between 
“foreign news” (aḫbār-e dāḫelī – five articles) and “domestic news” (aḫbār-e dāḫelī – two 
articles). Further irregular rubrics are “roundtable” (mīz-gerd – one article), “political” (siyāsī 
– one article) and “miscellaneous” (bā ḥādeṯeh-hā – one article). The fact that most articles 
appeared in the rubric “social” at least indicates, that already in the first year of the analysis, 
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the press openly acknowledged a domestic problem of drug addiction. More light will of 
course only be shed by the subsequent content analysis.  
 
List of consulted Iranian newspapers  
 
Name Political  
affiliation833 
Date of  
appearance 
Circulation License holder / editor 
Newspapers of the traditional right / conservatives 
Kayhān 
(Universe) 
radical / traditional 
right –  
conservative 
1942 – ongoing  < 250,000 
-  license holder: FOUNDATION OF THE 
OPPRESSED AND DISABLED (bonyād-e 
mostaż‘afān va ǧānbāzān) 
-  editor-in-chief: from 1992, Ḥossain 
Šarī‘at-Madārī, directly appointed by 
Ḫāmenehʼī 
 
-  long-time rival of the newspaper 
Eṭṭelā‘āt, both of which have 
dominated the Iranian press scene for 
decades 
-  from the Islamic revolution, the most 
radical newspaper: first, however, 
close to the Islamic left, since the early 
1990s close to the traditional right 
-  radical mouthpiece of the Supreme 
Leader ‘Alī Ḫāmenehʼī 
Resālat 
(Message / Mission) 
radical / traditional 
right –  
conservative 
1985 – ongoing 50,000 
-  license holder: Mortażā Nabavī, a 
member of the EXPEDIENCY COUNCIL  
-  editor-in-chief: Amīr Moḥebbiyān 
 
-  main organ of the COALITION OF 
ISLAMIC ASSOCIATIONS (hayʼat-e 
moʼtalafe-ye eslāmī)  
-  also close to the traditional right 
COMBATANT CLERGY ASSOCIATION 
Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī 
 (Islamic Republic) 
traditional right –  
conservative 
1979 – ongoing  50,000 
-  license holder & editor-in-chief: first 
‘Alī Ḫāmeneʼī, then Masīḥ Mohāǧerī 
 
-  originally the organ of the ISLAMIC 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
833  Referring to the political affiliation of the newspaper during the sample period (1995-2000). 
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REPUBLIC PARTY 
-  today close to the SOCIETY OF 
TEACHERS OF QOM THEOLOGICAL 
SEMINARIES and the COMBATANT 
CLERGY ASSOCIATION 
Qods 
(Jerusalem) 
radical / traditional 
right – conservative 
1987 – ongoing < 50,000 
-  license holder: Āstān-e Qods-e 
Rażavī, the administration of the 
shrine of Emām Reżā in Mašhad  
-  managing director: Ǧalāl Fayyāżī 
Ǧavān 
(Young)834 
radical / 
conservative 
1981 – ongoing  50,000 
-  radical newspaper close to the the 
IRGC 
Eṭṭelā‘āt 
(Information) 
moderate - 
progressive / 
traditional right – 
conservative 
1926 – ongoing > 120,000 
-  license holder: FOUNDATION OF THE 
OPPRESSED AND DISABLED  
-  editor-in-chief: Maḥmūd Do‘āʼī, 
directly appointed by Ḫāmenehʼī 
 
-  the oldest still existing Iranian daily  
-  always more moderate, and especially 
since the Islamic revolution more 
factual, than its rival Kayhān 
-  moderate mouthpiece of the Supreme 
Leader ‘Alī Ḫāmenehʼī 
Āfarīneš 
(Creation) 
moderate / modern 
right – conservative  
1991 – ongoing 
unknown / 
average 
-  license holder: ‘Abdollāh Ǧāsbī, co-
founder and president of the ISLAMIC 
ĀZĀD UNIVERSITY 
Abrār 
(the Pious) 
moderate / modern 
right –  
conservative  
1986 – ongoing < 50,000 
-  license holder & editor-in-chief: 
Moḥammad Ṣāfīzādeh 
 
-  originally the organ of the Islamic left 
and successor to their newspaper 
Ṣobḥ-e Āzādegān, itself the successor 
of the prestigious Āyandegān 
-  from the beginning of the 1990s, 
increasingly conservative 
Enteḫāb 
(Choice) 
progressive / 
(officially) 
conservative 
1998 – 2004 50,000 
- license holder: ISLAMIC PROPAGATION 
ORGANISATION OF QOM 
- publisher & editor-ion-chief: Ṭaha 
Hāšemī and Moḥammad Mehdī Faqīhī 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
834  According to Samii, Ǧavān is a hardliner or radical conservative weekly newspaper: Samii (1999), 2; 
Samii (2001), 3. 
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-  supervised by āyatollāh Ḫāmenehʼī 
-  despite being affiliated with the 
conservatives, Enteḫāb was an 
outspoken and critical newspaper 
Newspapers of the modern right / later mostly reformists 
Hamšahrī 
(Fellow-Citizen) 
moderate – 
progressive / 
modern right –
reformist 
1992 – ongoing 
350,000 – 
450,000 
- license holder: municipality of Tehrān 
 
-  founded by Tehrānʼs popular mayor 
Ġolām-Ḥosayn Karbāsčī 
-  as such: the unofficial organ of the 
EXECUTIVES OF CONSTRUCTIONS 
-  later a reformist newspaper, although 
still close to the pragmatists 
Īrān 
(Iran) 
moderate – 
progressive / 
modern right – 
reformist 
1995 – ongoing 
330,000 – 
350,000 
-  license holder: Islamic Republic 
News Agency (IRNA), government of 
Iran (executive) 
-  editor-in-chief: Ḥosayn Żiyʼāī 
 
-  the only official governmental 
newspaper 
-  as such changing its affiliation with 
the respective governments 
-  during the sample period: always a 
moderate, informative newspaper 
Kār va Kārgar 
(Work and Worker) 
moderate / modern 
right – reformist 
1984 – ongoing 
50,000 – 
100,000? 
-  license holder: WORKER’S HOUSE / 
‘Alī Rabī‘ī 
-  editor-in-chief: Morteżā Loṭfī 
 
-  a publication of the official Iranian 
workers association 
-  as such originally close to the Islamic 
left, then to the modern right 
-  with Rabī‘ī as publisher, it moved to 
the reformist camp, especially after the 
chain murders 
-  later again more moderate  
Aḫbār 
(News) 
moderate / 
conservative 
1994 – mid 
1999? 
unkown / low 
-  license holder & editor-in-chief: 
Aḥmad Ṣafāʼī-Far 
 
-  close to the modern right / pragmatists 
around Rafsanǧānī 
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Newspapers of the Islamic left / reformists 
Ḫorāsān 
(Khorasan) 
Moderate – 
progressive  / 
Islamic left – 
reformist 
1949 – ongoing 
unknown / 
average 
-  license holder: MARTYR’S 
FOUNDATION (bonyād-e šahīd) 
-  managing director: Ḥossain Ġazālī  
 
-  after the Islamic revolution first 
published by the FOUNDATION OF THE 
OPPRESSED AND DISABLED 
-  in 1984, transferred to the MARTYR’S 
FOUNDATION and thus close to the 
Islamic left 
Salām 
(Hello) 
progressive / 
Islamic left –
reformist 
October 1990 – 
July 2000 
50,000 – 
100,000 
-  license holder & managing director: 
Moḥammad Mūsavī-Ḫoʼainīhā  
-  editor-in-chief: ‘Abbās ‘Abdī 
 
-  unofficial organ of the Islamic left 
ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS  
-  very critical and popular 
-  banned on 6 June 1998 
Bayān 
(Statement) 
progressive / 
reformist 
autumn 1999 – 
April 2000 
> 200,000 
-  license holder & managing director: 
‘Alī-Akbar Moḥtašamī-Pūr 
 
-  Bayān already had appeared from June 
1990 – March 1991 as the unofficial 
organ of the FREEDOM MOVEMENT 
-  replaced Salām as the organ of the 
ASSOCIATION OF COMBATANT CLERICS 
Āftāb-e Emrūz 
(Todayʼs Sun) 
progressive/ 
reformist 
July 1998 – 
August 2000 
  
< 100,000? 
-  license holder: Feraidūn ‘Ammūzādeh 
Ḫalīlī 
 
-  successor of Ǧalāʼī-Pūr und Šams-ol-
Vā‘eẓīnʼs newspaper Ṭūs, successor of 
Ǧāme‘eh 
Nešāṭ 
(Joy) 
progressive / 
reformist 
February – 
September 1999 
150,000 – 
200,000 
-  license holder: Māšāʼollāh Šams-ol-
Vā‘eẓīn 
-  editor-in-chief: Laṭīf Ṣafarī 
 
-  the more famous and later successor of 
the newspapers Ṭūs, successor of 
Ǧāme‘eh 
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‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān 
(Afternoon of the 
Free) 
progressive / 
reformist 
September 1999 
– April 2000 
 
> 200,000? 
-  license holder & publisher: Ḥamīd-
Reżā Ǧalāʼī-Pūr & Māšāʼollāh Šams-
ol-Vā‘eẓīn 
-  editor-in-chief: Maḥmūd Šams 
 
-  successor of the newspaper Nešāṭ, 
successor of Ṭūs and Ǧāme‘eh 
Aḫbār-e Eqteṣādī 
(Economic News) 
progressive/ 
reformist 
September 1999 
– August 2000? 
Unknown /  
> 50'000? 
-  publisher: ‘Īsā Ṣaḥarḫīz 
 
-  successor of the newspaper Nešāṭ, 
successor of Ṭūs and Ǧāme‘eh  
-  taking over the recently dormant 
license of Aḫbār 
Ḫordād 
(Khordad – the 
month of Ḫātamī’s 
election) 
progressive/ 
reformist 
December 1998 
– October 1999 
150,000 – 
200,000 
-  managing director: ‘Abdollāh Nūrī 
 
-  close to the ISLAMIC IRAN 
PARTICIPATION FRONT 
Fatḥ 
(Victory) 
progressive/ 
reformist 
November 1999 
– April 2000 
> 150,000? 
-  license holder & managing director: 
‘Alī Ḥekmat and ‘Emād-al-Dīn Bāqī 
 
-  close to the ISLAMIC IRAN 
PARTICIPATION FRONT  
-  successor of the newspaper Ḫordād 
Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz 
(Todayʼs Morning) 
progressive / 
reformist 
December 1998 
– April 2000 
150,000 – 
200,000 
-  license holder & managing director: 
Sa‘īd Ḥaǧariyān-Kāšānī 
 
-  close to the ISLAMIC IRAN 
PARTICIPATION FRONT 
Mošārekat 
(Partnership) 
progressive / 
reformist 
December 1998 
– April 2000 
50,000 – 
100,000? 
-  license holder: ISLAMIC IRAN 
PARTICIPATION FRONT 
-  editor-in-chief: Moḥammad-Reżā 
Ḫātamī 
 
-  official organ of the ISLAMIC IRAN 
PARTICIPATION FRONT 
Gozāreš-e Rūz 
(Daily Report) 
progressive / 
reformist 
early 1998? – 
April 2000 
 < 50,000? 
- publisher: Hešmatollā Ṭabarzadī 
- editor-in-chief: ‘Alī-Moḥammad 
Mahdavī-Ḫorramī 
 
-  close to the ISLAMIC STUDENT UNION  
-  somehow a successor to Ṭabarzadīs 
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student newspapers Payām-e Dānešğū 
and Hovviyyat-e Ḫvīš 
Payām-e Āzādī 
 (Free Message) 
progressive / 
reformist 
early 1998 – 
April 2000 
< 20,000 
-  managing director: Davūd Bahrāmī 
Siyāvūšānī 
 
Ham-Mīhan  
(Compatriot) 
progressive / 
reformist 
early 2000 – 
August 2000 
< 100,000 
-  license holder & editor: Ġolām-
Ḥosayn Karbāsčī 
 
-  published on occasion of the sixth 
parliamentary elections  
Āzād 
(Free) 
moderate / 
pragmatist to 
reformist 
early 1998 – 
April February 
1999 
50,000 
-  license holder: administration of the 
free trade zones of Kīš and Qešm 
islands 
-  managing director: Moḥammad-Reżā 
Yazdān-Panāh 
-  editor-in-chief: Sa‘īd Laylāz 
 
-  sometimes also referred to as 
Manāṭeq-e Āzād (free zones) 
-  emphatic on economic reforms, 
generally reformist 
Āryā 
(Arian) 
nationalist / 
reformist 
early 1998 – 
April 2000 
< 50,000 
-  managing dirctor: Moḥammad-Reżā 
Zohdī 
 
-  presumably a paper of the nationalists, 
close to the reformist camp 
Vohūman 
(Vohu-Mana / Good 
Spirit) 
 
reformist? 2000?? unknown 
-  probably successor to the newspaper 
Bahman, which had been published by 
‘Aṭāʼollāh Mohāǧerānī before the 
1996 parliamentary elections 
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IV. 3. The Methodology of Critical Discourse Analysis 
 
 The present analysis of the Iranian press discourse on drugs is based on the general 
epistemological assumption of pragmatism and the linguistic turn that a society interprets 
reality by an active – that is speaking and thinking – examination of the social and material 
world. Foucault’s discourse analysis sees language or more generally discursive practices, 
decisive for the interpretation and even the constitution of social realities. It naturally presents 
itself as an adequate methodology for the analysis of the Iranian press discourse on drugs, 
which concentrates more on the discussion of the drug problem than on the ‘realities behind’. 
discourse analysis, therefore, is an adequate methodological tool, as it essentially concentrates 
on power effects of discourses. 
 
 Discourse analysis maintains that specific discourses rule, by relatively consistent 
orders of discourse, how a society perceives and talks about social realities. Discourses thus 
actually exercise power on individual members of society by regulating what is considered to 
be true and real. This power also contributes to the continuity of discourse orders or certain 
elements within. Yet, at the same time, discourses are always characterized by inconsistencies 
and contradictions. These reflect past and present hegemonic struggles in a society because 
the discourse itself becomes a tool for attaining sovereignties of interpretation. Like social 
power relations, orders of discourse thus are unstable. Individual members accordingly can 
choose discursive strategies to influence these orders of discourse, and consequently are 
responsible for the discontinuity of discourses or certain elements within. 
 While providing to be the fundamental methodological tools for the analysis of the 
Iranian press discourse on drugs, Foucault’s discourse analysis or Jäger and Fairclough’s 
critical discourse analysis respectively do have certain disadvantages. In identifying the 
topical and formal structures of the discourse, it does not address the problem of the 
relationship between necessarily existent previous knowledge and the generation or discovery 
of new knowledge that is adequate to the data material. This is, however, of crucial 
importance in the present analysis, as the topics of the European (or more generally the 
international scientific) drug discourse are not automatically congruent with the topics of the 
Iranian drug discourse. The present analysis, therefore, additionally takes inspiration from the 
grounded theory in developing an appropriate relational model of concepts present in the 
Iranian press discourse on drugs, yet by continuing to principally follow the procedure of 
discourse analysis. 
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Pragmatism as an epistemological background 
The philosophical theory of pragmatism in the tradition of Charles Sanders Peirce 
(1839-1914) and later of Hilary Putnam (b. 1926) or Richard Rorty (1931-2007) questions the 
assumption of rationalism or classic transcendentalism, which says that there are supra-
historical and stable theoretical explanations of the world. Instead of such deterministic 
universal rules, pragmatism claims that the world is constructed in a pluralistic and procedural 
way; hence, it is not possible to reduce explanations of the world to one ideal organizing 
principle, but different theories forcibly reflect multiple perspectives.835 Theories on the social 
world are only valid for a specific location and time, and they remain open for falsification 
and amelioration.836 Particularly this latter view of Peirce and Rorty has been criticized for 
eventually still pursuing an idealistic, more comprehensive and truer description of the 
world.837 What remains still crucial is the pragmatist proposition that terms such as judgments 
and theories are finite tools to describe a temporary reality.838 
 
To attain nevertheless an adequate and valid explanation of phenomena of the “real” 
world, pragmatism proposes a methodological procedure called belief-doubt-belief scheme. 
Accordingly, it puts previous knowledge into doubt and generates new knowledge by asking 
abductive or suggestive questions, whose practicability has to be proven by the material of 
investigation. 839  Important in pragmatism is, however, not an – always illusionary – 
objectivity of such an explanation, but its validity in terms of how practical and effective it is 
in describing a specific social reality. 840 
 
This basic epistemological assumption of pragmatism is an important point of 
reference for the grounded theory, which the present analysis uses as an auxiliary 
methodological tool to identify the topical structure of the Iranian press discourse on drugs. It 
applies, however, generally to the present study, which is aware of its inevitable subjectivity 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
835  Particularly William James and Richard Rorty have accentuated this pluralistic world outlook: Nagl (1998), 
7-19, 67f.; Strübing (2004), 37ff. 
836  This view is shared by Peirce, James, George Herbert Mead, John Dewey and Rorty: Nagl (1998), 29ff., 
65ff., 89ff., 113f., 116ff., 123ff. 167ff. 
837  James, in contrast, stresses the pluralism of experiences and explanations, which always will retain their 
provisional character: Nagl (1998), 47, 58ff., 170ff. 
838  Particularly Dewey understands his version of pragmatism as instrumental, that is as a situational tool 
instead of a universal theory: Nagl (1998), 113ff. 
839  In his pragmatic maxim, Peirce has differentiated between four historical strategies to resolve a practical 
(as opposed to a categorical) doubt: Nagl (1998), 23ff., 32ff., 115ff.; Strübing (2004), 40ff. 
840  Nagl (1998), 22ff. 
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but attempts to provide the reader with a comprehensible and valid description of the Iranian 
press discourse on drugs.841 
 
In talking about “reality”, pragmatism is however aware that a society always 
interprets external phenomena – that are independent of language – through the lens of 
language. Objects of the “real” world only gain meaning by the active – that is thinking or 
speaking – interaction of human beings with elements of the social and material world.842 A 
specific society thus always mediates “reality” through particular sets of language signs.843 
This mediation consequently not only represents elements of “reality”, but a specific society 
or community of investigators as Peirce has called it, actually constitutes its own reality – or 
the conception of it – by deciding what is real and true.844 Such a society consequently 
influences the constitution of its individual members and their actions and opinions 
respectively. 845  This assumption of pragmatism is a crucial point of reference for the 
discourse analysis, which serves the present analysis of the Iranian press discourse on drugs 
as the main methodological tool. 
 
Discourse Analysis 
 Consistent with pragmatism and more particularly with the current of linguistic turn, 
Michel Foucault’s discourse analysis, too, postulates that each – historically or 
geographically distinctive – society constitutes its specific reality through language and 
especially through various and often overlapping discourses. 846  Discourse analysis 
understands a discourse as a regulated way of talking – and thus thinking – about different 
social and other phenomena of the “real world”, and maintains that such discourses rule what 
is to be considered true or wrong, real or unreal. The relationship between discourses and 
other social elements is indeed an intricate one. Discourses do not passively represent existing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
841  Discourse analysis also assumes that there are no external and objective but only temporary and historical 
truths: Jäger (2004), 54f.; the inevitable selectivity and thus subjectivity also applies to discourse analysis: 
Fairclough (2003), 14. 
842  Dewey regards cognition as an active process: Nagl (1998), 153. 
843  Already Peirce has deliberated on semiotics and maintained that only the mediating act of an interpreter of 
signs establishes a link between object and subject; later, James, Mead and especially Putnam have 
sharpened this argument by emphasizing the somehow arbitrary distinction between object and subject: 
Nagl (1998), 21f., 39ff., 85f., 92., 148f., 157ff.; Strübing (2004), 48. 
844  James and Putnam, too, have emphasized that the human beings claim truth – and not the ‘ready made 
world’: Nagl (1998), 28, 66. 
845  This point is particularly highlighted by Mead: Nagl (1998), 92f. 
846  On the constitutive function of language for the perception of reality and the reality itself: Landwehr 
(2001), 9-64; Sarasin (2003), 10-31; Fairclough (2003), 24; Jäger (2004), 94. 
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social “realities” but contribute to construct and organize them.847 Discourses – or more 
generally language – thus have the function of depicting reality in a particular way, in which a 
society perceives it.848 
 
A discourse indeed organizes itself according to particular – linguistic, intellectual, 
social, economic, political, and so forth – conditions of a society, or according to an order of 
discourse as Foucault has called it. Orders of discourse regulate the discourse by the 
recurrence of contents, forms, classifications, symbols or strategies; as a result, such orders of 
discourse are relatively strict and forcibly subject the participants of a discourse to its rules 
and regulations.849 Yet, within this regulatory framework, the individual discourse participants 
retain a certain degree of interpretative autonomy – or in other words a possibility to 
formulate their own discourse positions and strategies.850 Orders of discourse thus contain 
both homogenizing and heterogenizing elements, which are the result of historical continuities 
and discontinuities as well as of discursive entities and the overlapping of such entities.851 
While both forces are present to various degrees in discourses, it also depends on the focus of 
the analysis, whether it puts the stress more on the homogenizing or the heterogenizing 
aspects of a discourse. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
847  Foucault regards a discourse as an ‘organisational principle’ regulating scattered events: Foucault (1981), 
34; Jäger defines discourse as an articulatory practice, which actively constitutes and articulates social 
conditions ‘als Fluss von sozialen Wissensvorräten durch die Zeit’ (as a flow of stocks of knowledge 
through time): Jäger (2004), 23.; Fairclough regards discourses as ways describing ‘processes, relations 
and structures of the material world, the ‘mental world’ of thoughts, feelings, beliefs’, but also focuses on 
the ‘dialectical relationship’ between discourses and other elements of the social life: Fairclough (2003), 
18f., 22ff., 126, 207f.: Fairclough (2009), 4., 59, 131; Link defines discourse as ‘geregelte Redeweise mit 
Machteffekt in einem beschränkten sabarkeitsraum’ (a regulated way of speaking with power effect in a 
restricted area of what is capable of being said): Link (2006), 407, 410. 
848  Generally on the intricate relationship between language or discourses and reality, or between subject and 
object (and mediating (discursive) action): Jäger (2004), 83ff., 88ff., 144ff. 
849  Foucault differentiates particularly between formations, topics, modalities of expression, concepts, 
strategies, and consequences: Focault (1981), 33-112, esp. 33-47; Jäger does not explicitly use the term 
order of discourse when referring to such regularities of a discourse: Jäger (2004), 170, 208; Link (2006), 
420f.; Fairclough sees the orders of discourse as representations of social practices that are networked to a 
social order; he puts a particular emphasis on classifications as a constituent of orders of discourse and 
following Bourdieu calls them ‘unconscious instruments of construction’; : Fairclough (2003), 3, 124f., 
130f., 206f. 
850  Foucault (1981), 56f., 100ff.; Jäger puts more emphasis on the homogenising effects of discourses and 
accordingly regards individual discourse positions as ‘Spielart des Gleichen’ (variation of the same): Jäger 
(2004), 107f., 169f., 208f.; Link also emphasises that individual discourse positions use the same inter-
discourse: Link (2006), 419f.; BERNSTEIN (1996) has described the possibility for an individual discourse 
position as follows: ‚every time a discourse moves, there is a space for ideology to play’ – quoted in: 
Fairclough (2009), 57, 78. 
851  Jäger (2004), 208f.; these forces are responsible for both continuity and change in discourses: Fairclough 
(2003), 3; Fairclough (2009), 57f., 73. 
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 Both, these unifying and dis-unifying forces reflect power struggles within a society. 
Foucault, in his definition of discourse analysis, has put a particular emphasis on the power 
effects of discourses.852 On the one hand, a discourse is indeed exercising power by actually 
constituting – that is producing and defining – knowledge and thus establishing dominant 
representations of the world or ideologies that claim to have universal status. Only due to such 
hegemonic discourse practices and strategies, a specific society considers certain opinions to 
be true or wrong. A discourse thus actually exerts power on its participants by predetermining 
a specific, relatively consistent and uniform set of rules and regulations.853 Yet on the other 
hand, a specific discourse is also a reflection of power relations in a society. Such past and 
present contestations of power are consequently also responsible for contradictions, 
ambivalences and heterogeneities inherent in a discourse. A discourse does, however, not 
only passively reflect such struggles for hegemony and in particular for ideological 
domination, but the discourse itself becomes a crucial tool for the exertion of power, as it 
establishes sovereignties of interpretation.854 Owing to this dual power effects, Fairclough 
perceives discourses as one of various social actions to exercise and contest power; yet more 
often, discursive power relations are not separate form other social power relations, but they 
are in fact also innate to them as Foucault emphasizes.855 As the equilibrium of power in a 
society is always unstable and temporary, power relations shift, and so do the discourses, with 
which respective social actors seek to achieve interpretative hegemony over others.856 Such 
changes in the orders of discourse typically happen by a rearrangement of different elements 
constituting a discourse or for instance by a recontextualisation of elements of one discourse 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
852  Foucault particularly exposed the power-effects of discourses in his first volume of the History of Sexuality 
(The Will To Knowledge): Foucault (1976); Jäger (2004), 23f., 127ff., 142ff., 149ff.; Landwehr (2001), 
83ff. 
853  Focault (1981), 33-47, 58; Jäger put more emphasis on the (homogenizing) power effects of discourses 
than on hegemonic struggles within – yet without ignoring the latter: Jäger (2004), 54f., 149ff., 210ff.; 
Fairclough maintains that social actors try to influence and dominate discourses in order to dominate and 
exploit others; and that the struggle for ideological hegemony is tied to action not to truth: Fairclough 
(2003), 9; Fairclough (2009), 29, 62, esp. 127ff.; 
854  Foucault (1981), 56f., 96ff.; Jäger (2004), 127, 153, 210f.; Fairclough puts more emphasis on the 
hegemonic struggle within discourses than on the power effects of dominant discourses, and thus considers 
discourses to be less ‘closed or rigid’ than Jäger does; he has developed his view of hegemonic struggle on 
the basis of Gramsci’s concepts of hegemonic strategies: Fairclough (2003), 41, 45f., esp. 55ff., 207; 
particularly such contradictions create room for individual discourse positions and changes of the orders of 
discourse: Fairclough (2009), esp. 61f. 
855  There are of course other factors of power in a society – such as for instance physical violence; Foucault 
(The Will To Knowledge) quoted in: Jäger (2004), 142ff, 152; Fairclough admits that hegemonic struggles 
‚to a substantial extent’ take place in and by means of discursive practices: Fairclough (2009), 129. 
856  Discourse participants can oppose dominant discourses by adapting specific discourse tactics; at times, 
different dominant discourses are also fighting each other: Jäger (2004), 23f., 127ff., 142ff., 149ff. 
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into another.857 The new orders of discourse continue, however, to be characterized by both 
homogeneous and heterogeneous aspects.858  
In analyzing discourses, the materials of investigation are generally texts as the 
immediate product of the human action of speaking, comprising any forms of written or 
otherwise recorded forms of speech production.859 Individual texts – like individual persons – 
consequently are not only the expression of individual opinions, but they are always part of 
and thus regulated by specific discourses.860 Discourse analysis consequently predominantly 
consists in analyzing text corpora, albeit other discursive practices do exist as well. 861 
 
 Jäger provides the probably most concrete instruction manual for the practical 
application of discourse analysis or critical discourse analysis as he and Fairclough each call 
their version of this methodology.862 For the sake of the analysis, he proposes to differentiate 
between different levels and aspects of discourses.863 Essentially, he makes a distinction 
between the totality of discourses in a society, which he calls discourse swarm or entire 
discourse; and discourse strands, which differ from each other by covering distinctive topical 
entities but which are entangled within each other. Such discourse strands usually correspond 
to the common use of the term discourse, and together they constitute the entire discourse of a 
society.864 In the present study, the relevant discourse strand is accordingly the Iranian drug 
discourse in all its occurrences. The smallest entities to analyze such a discourse strand are the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
857  Jäger (2004), 128; regarding orders of discourse as intersections of different discourses, Fairclough also 
talks about the mediation of meaning from one text (or also discourse) to another, or of denaturalisation of 
existing conventions: Fairclough (2003), 30f., 128; such strategies for a transformation of the orders of 
discourse are not only pursued by rival social actors but also by the already dominant actors, which either 
try to preserve the existent order of discourse or to restructure and renew it themselves; Fairclough also 
talks of a “continual ‘negotiation’ of differences of meaning”: Fairclough (2009), 78, 127ff.. 
858  Fairclough (2003), 3, esp. 55ff., and 126ff.; Fairclough (2009), 9, esp. 62ff., and 127ff. 
859  Jäger defines text as “das sprachlich gefasste Ergebnis einer mehr oder minder komplexen individuallen 
Tätigkeit” (the result of a more or less complex, individual actions packed in language); in seeing 
discourses as social actions he closely follows Aleksei Leontiev’s activity theory: Jäger (2004), 78-112; 
118f., 167ff.; according to Fairclough, any examples of “language in use” is text: Fairclough (2003), 3. 
860  Jäger (2004), 22, 117f., 169ff.; according to Fairclough, however, texts also “bring about changes”: 
Fairclough (2003), 8. 
861  Foucault later has put more emphasis on non-linguistic discursive practices – as for instance visible in 
institutions, apparatus or architecture – the totality of which he called dispositif (device): Foucault (1981), 
99f.; Jäger (2004), 24; Link defines dispositif as a relatively stable interlinking of a specific inter-
discursive combination with a specific power relation: Link (2006), 418f. 
862  Even though both authors call their methodology critical discourse analysis, their theoretical presumption 
and methodological procedure differ from each other, as especially Jäger stresses: Jäger (2004), 122.  
863  On the practical implementation of discourse analysis: Jäger (2004), 158ff.; Landwehr (2001), 103-134; 
Fairclough also proposes a ‘relational approach’ to discourse analysis by analyzing different levels (such as 
for instance genres or styles) of a discourse and the relation between them: Fairclough (2003), 37f. 
864  Jäger emphasizes the mutual influence between the entire discourse and the different discourse strands that 
constitute it: Jäger (2004), 167ff. 
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discourse fragments, which Jäger defines as texts or particular parts of texts.865 In the case of 
the Iranian drug discourse, this comprises all written – or otherwise recorded –texts dealing 
with the issue of drugs. The analysis of the entire Iranian drug discourse would however go 
beyond the scope of the present study. Jäger additionally differentiates between various 
discourse levels, which correspond to functionally different settings, in which the same topic 
is discussed.866 In the case of the Iranian drug discourse, there are for instance the discourse 
levels of politics, the medical profession, religious institutions or the media, which all are 
discussing the international and national drug problem.  
 
This research undertakes an analysis of the discourse level of media, and within it the 
sector of the daily press. 867  This choice presents itself because the relevant discourse 
fragments – that is drug related articles from the Iranian press – are readily accessible in the 
NATIONAL LIBRARY OF IRAN. On the other hand, however, and more importantly, the press 
represents the most contested section of the public sphere in Iran and thus mirrors the widest 
variety of opinions or discourse positions – in particular during the years of the sample period 
(1995-2000). As a rule, Iranian newspapers serve as political organs for the various 
ideological factions of the Islamic Republic; but the press fulfills a more complex function in 
the Iranian society, as the present study will show. The press, furthermore, reflects many 
aspects of other discourse levels as well, thus being sort of an intersection between the 
different discourse levels. The Iranian press consequently can be considered the best segment 
to analyze the various homogenizing and heterogenizing forces within the Iranian drug 
discourse.868 
 
 Discourses on the level of media are indeed particular discourses, because media 
discourses can be seen as bringing together – or according to Fairclough mediating – various 
specialized discourses for mass communication.869 Media, especially in the Iranian context, 
and the press in particular are an important tool in the hegemonic struggle for the control of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
865  Jäger (2004), 159f.; Landwehr (2001), 106f. 
866  Jäger (2004), 163. 
867  Jäger also advises to concentrate on only one sector if the data abound: Jäger (2004), 189. 
868  The Iranian television and radio channels for instance, all belong to the IRIB, which the Supreme Leader 
and his conservative allies control; they would accordingly reflect a much narrower bandwidth of discourse 
positions as the Iranian press. 
869  Link – and partly based on him Jäger – define general, non-scientific discourses – such as for instance in 
the media – as inter-discourses – which they define as locations where different discourses are entangled 
with each other; Link additionally sees discourses of the public sphere as a combination of inter-discourses 
and elementary discourses (that is everyday discourses with anthropological constants such as death, love 
or generations): Link (2006), 408, 412, 414; Jäger (2004), 159; on the particularity of media discourses, 
which Fairclough not explicitly subsumes under inter-discourses: Fairclough (2009), 78f. 
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the public opinion and generally for the political and ideological sovereignty of interpretation. 
As such they are a prime example for the dual power effects of discourses: on the one hand 
they reflect the dominant drug discourse as specified by the Iranian state870; on the other hand, 
they mirror ideological differences concerning drug policy, which not only exist between 
different political factions and between different state institutions, but also reflect historical 
discontinuities.871 
 
 Having thus chosen the object and scope of research, Jäger then proposes the 
following practical procedure. As a first step, he recommends assembling the material corpus 
or the relevant discourse fragments, which in the present case comprises all drug related 
newspaper articles having appeared during the sample period. The task consists of arranging 
these articles in chronological order, of thoroughly reading them through, and of recording 
first details such as the date of publication, the ideological alignment of the respective 
newspaper, the author, the genre and the type of the article, the column where it appeared, and 
other details into a database. 872 
 
 Jäger suggests identifying simultaneously the discursive context, which he defines as 
the chronological sequence of discursive events. Discursive events are events of the “real life”, 
which appear as important events in a discourse. As such, they typically cause – or at least 
indicate – a transformation of discourse, because they spark off new elements to be discussed 
or existing elements to be reassessed, either by all discourse members in the same way or by 
different members in different ways.873 Not all significant events are however discursive 
events, as shows for instance the Iranian press’ astonishing silence on the opening of an 
UNODC office in Tehran in the year 1998. In the present analysis, the identification of the 
discursive context, however, only follows the main analysis, because some discursive events 
only have become evident in the course of the analysis.874 
 
 After the survey of the material corpus, Jäger proposes what he calls structural 
analysis or summary analysis as the next methodological step. The structural analysis 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
870  Fairclough calls mass media a tool of governance and generally sees them as an important instrument in 
ideological processes and struggles: Fairclough (2003), 34; Fairclough (2009), 69, 78f. 
871  Foucault (Truth and Power) has also stressed that the state is far from being omnipotent and occupying all 
power relations: Jäger (2004), 156. 
872  Jäger (2004), 171, 175, 191. 
873  Jäger (2004), 132, 190f., 210. 
874  Foucault has emphasised that the exact appearance of such (discursive) events are often obscure: Foucault 
(1981), 38f. 
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consists of identifying the qualitative width of the topics of a discourse, that is the thematic 
diversity of the main and secondary topics. In the Iranian press discourse on drugs, such main 
topics are for instance drug trafficking, drug addiction or addiction therapy, while the sub-
topics of addiction therapy for example include medicinal addiction withdrawal, 
psychological therapies or acupuncture. Whereas discourse analysis – unlike grounded theory 
– basically incorporates a prefixed amount of texts to analyse a certain discourse, it does not 
request the mentioning of all instances for a topic, if they do not contribute new aspects. 
Discourse analysis is more concerned with the qualitative distribution of the topics than with 
their quantitative occurrence – even though the quantity is in as far revealing, as it indicates 
certain trends and emphases of a discourse. The result of the structural analysis is the dossier, 
which is complete when all aspects of the different topics have been identified.875 In ideally 
depicting the topics and their constitutive sub-topics in a relational model, Jäger advises 
thinking in terms of the data material.876 This is indeed essential advice. However, Jäger, 
Fairclough and other discourse analysts do not deliberate enough on the problem of how to 
proceed from necessarily existent previous knowledge to the generation – or rather discovery 
– of new knowledge.877 But this analytical step is of crucial importance for the present 
analysis, where the concepts of the European – or more generally the “international” scientific 
(and political) – drug discourse are not automatically congruent with the concepts of the 
Iranian drug discourse. To enhance the adequacy of the structural analysis, the present 
analysis therefore additionally takes inspiration from the methodology of grounded theory. 
 
Grounded Theory878 
 Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss have developed grounded theory as a variation of qualitative 
social research in the 1960s.879 Based on the fundamental assumptions of pragmatism, they maintain that 
explanations – or theories as they call them – of elements of the social and material world are always 
provisional and thus adaptable to new insights.880 And like discourse analysis, grounded theory aims at 
detecting social structures and strategies behind the surface of individual texts. It puts, however, more 
emphasis on the necessity to develop such theories directly from the empirical material, in particular from 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
875  Jäger talks about the qualitative width or qualitative totality of topics: Jäger (2004), 192f., 204. 
876  Jäger (2004), 197. 
877  Jäger is nevertheless aware of the inevitable bias of every researcher: Jäger (2004), 59ff.,; Fairclough 
admittedly seeks inspiration from qualitative social analysts such as Wordsmith in identifying keywords in 
a text corpus, but does not provide a concrete description for such a procedure: Fairclough (2003), 6.  
878  Grounded Theory denominates both the ‚theory’ or explanation that is developed and the methodological 
procedure: Strübing (2004), 13f.; Böhm (2004), 475f. 
879  Glaser and Strauss laid the foundation for the grounded theory in particular in their book The Discovery of 
Grounded Theory: Glaser & Strauss (1974). 
880  Strauss is located within the tradition of the Chicago School of pragmatism: Strübing (2004), 37f. 
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written material.881 In practice, the methodological approach of grounded theory is admittedly different 
from discourse analysis, in as far as the latter presupposes a theoretical model for the analysis, while the 
latter develops its case-related and material-based theory only in the course of the analysis. 
 
 The analysis of the Iranian press discourse on drugs generally follows the theoretical assumptions 
and methodological procedure of (critical) discourse analysis. It is, however, only partly convinced of the 
discourse analytical assumption, that in identifying the topics of a discourse, these emerge quasi 
automatically from the texts. Since grounded theory has developed a more convincing procedure to detect 
new concepts that are adequate to the material of investigation, the present analysis additionally consults 
this method; yet, it does so only in as far as grounded theory helps to identify the system of topics but 
without developing a proper theory.882 
  
 Similar to the identification of topics in the discourse analysis, grounded theory aims at discovering 
the – increasingly abstracted – main categories and sub-categories of a subject area and at merging them 
into a ‘theoretical’ relational model.883 As category, grounded theory defines a “theoretical” concept, 
whose structural attributes it obtains by comparing different empirical phenomena of texts with each 
other.884 It is however aware, that in this process each researcher is initially guided by previously acquired 
concepts or generally by a specific previous knowledge, which do not forcibly correspond to the concepts 
present in the area of investigation. To identify new and adequate concepts, which are grounded in the 
research material, the researcher has to actively and creatively proceed from his previous knowledge to a 
new knowledge; this, he attains by a methodological procedure grounded theory calls theoretical 
sampling.885 
 
 Theoretical sampling denotes a process, in which the researcher simultaneously samples data, 
encodes them and analyses or interprets them in order to decide which data he has to sample next. The 
theoretical sampling contributes to the conceptual denseness of a theory (or explanation) by 
systematically identifying all variants of the concepts or categories.886 Since in the present case, the 
amount of data has already been established in advance by including all drug related newspaper articles of 
the sample period, the encoding and interpretation of the data actually follows the data collection. Within 
this comprehensive set of data, however, the procedure of identifying the categories – or as the discourse 
analysis would say the topics – does not differ in practice from the procedure of grounded theory.887 The 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
881  Strübing (2004), 19; the Grounded Theory analyses texts in the broadest sense: Böhm (2004), 476. 
882  “Theory” in terms of the Grounded Theory is admittedly rather to be understood as a plausible and fit 
interpretative model than an abstract, universal theory of a specific reality; important of such a theory is 
that it is reliable and valid (that is internally consistent and reflecting the social reality adequately), while 
it’s representativeness (and repeatability respectively) is only possible to a limited degree: Strübing (2004), 
31f., 59f., 75ff. 
883  Strübing (2004), 55. 
884  Böhm (2004), 476; Strübing (2004), 19f. 
885  Generally on the relationship between previous knowledge and the generation of new knowledge that is 
grounded in the text material: Strauss (1994), 36f., 48; Strübing (2004), 53ff.;  
886  On the fundamental methodological procedure of theoretical sampling, which requires that the material 
provides concrete examples for the theory: Strübing (2004), 29ff., 44f.; Strauss (1994), 43f., 49ff. 
887  Consequently, not all instances for a specific phenomenon have to be mentioned, if they do not add a new 
aspect to the categories: Strübing (2004), 32f. 
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procedure of theoretical sampling starts with asking relatively open, tentative questions to the text 
material, which the researcher bases more or less consciously on his previous knowledge. Only then, he 
looks for new, adequate concepts and new attributes and dimensions of such concepts by using generative 
or in other words hypothetical questions, which he develops in accordance with the text material.888 
  
 In order to discover the relational model of categories, grounded theory has developed the essential 
process of coding.889 Coding is a procedure, according to which the researcher constantly compares 
different phenomena of the textual corpus with each other by noting their differences, commonalities, and 
specifications as codes or annotations next to the respective passages. In this way, categories that are 
natural to the material slowly emerge from the texts – or obtain their full dimension, as grounded theory 
also says.890 The concrete process of coding takes place in three steps; in a first step, the open coding aims 
at detecting as many categories and sub-categories as possible; in a second step, the axial coding 
generates a phenomenal model by relating the different categories to each other, and by identifying core 
categories or key categories, which fundamentally structure the subject area; and in a third and last step, 
the selective coding again revises the material in regard to the key categories, and if necessary codes them 
once more, in order to check and reassert the importance of single key categories in relation to others and 
in relation to the constitutive sub-categories.891 
 
The process of coding has to be repeated until all aspects of the phenomenal model of categories are 
identified and assigned. Grounded theory calls this accomplishment theoretical saturation, which 
basically corresponds to the qualitative width of topics in discourse analysis – yet, with the difference that 
grounded theory puts more emphasis on an interrelation of the categories.892 As an important feature of 
coding, grounded theory in addition recommends the writing of analytical memos simultaneously with the 
process of coding, in order to improve the process of data analysis and to enhance the analytical 
creativity.893  
 
The present study makes use of grounded theory to discover categories or topics that are natural and 
innate to the data material, and thus tries to avoid imposing previous, inadequate concepts on the material 
of investigation. Generally, however, it follows the methodological procedure of critical discourse 
analysis, because it is better suited for considering argumentative entities and thus probably distinct 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
888  Strauss and particularly Glaser are talking about inductive questions when actually referring to abductive 
questions in the sense of pragmatism: Strauss (1994), 37-40; Strübing (2004), 44-48, 63-73; Böhm (2004), 
476f. 
889  The process of coding – together with the writing of analytical memos – accounts for the essential method 
of the Grounded Theory: Strübing (2004), 17. 
890  The codes are constantly developed into more analytical concepts and later into categories, for whose 
purpose the data material generally has to be re-coded; one aim herein consists of making implicit decisions 
(of the texts) explicit: Strauss (1994), 49; Strübing (2004), 22-26. 
891  On the three steps of coding: Strauss (1994), 40ff., 49, 56ff., 65ff., Strübing (2004), 19ff., 26ff.; Böhm 
(2004), 478ff.  
892  Strauss (1994), 54f.; Strübing (2004), 31; Böhm (2004), 477. 
893  On the importance of the analytical memos as a thinking tool and a documentation of the theoretical 
process of decision-making: Strauss (1994), 33, 45f.; Strübing (2004), 33ff.; Jäger also recommends the 
writing of memos in discourse analysis: Jäger (2004), 187. 
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discourse positions within individual texts, which can be expected in the context of the Iranian press 
discourse on drugs. 
 
 Following the structural analysis, Jäger proposes in a second step what he calls fine 
analysis. The fine analysis consists of a detailed topical and formal – that is in particular 
linguistic – examination of selected texts that are considered typical for the afore-established 
topics or the discourse in general.894 The fine analysis should comprise a more exhaustive 
examination of the institutional frame of the drug related newspaper articles, such as for 
instance an ideological characterization of the respective newspapers, information on the 
authors and the supposed target audiences, a description of the locations or columns of the 
articles within the newspapers, or an identification of the styles and genres of the articles. It 
should entail a comprehensive analysis of the surface of the newspaper articles including a 
description of their layouts, fonts, titles, photographs, illustrations, and in particular a 
fragmentation of the texts into different paragraphs, which are characterized in compliance 
with their contents and their assumed entanglement to other discourse strands. Last, but not 
least, it should conduct a thorough examination of the linguistic and rhetorical means such as 
for instance speech acts or transitions, noun categories or verb modalities, which are 
structuring the text and contributing to its coherence.895 Even though he does not differentiate 
between a structural and fine analysis, Fairclough also puts crucial emphasis on such formal 
and linguistic aspects of a discourse.896 Both authors generally emphasize the close functional 
relationship between form and content of discourses, as has already Foucault with his 
formation of concepts.897 
 
Both Jäger and Fairclough particularly point out to the significance of automatic 
mechanisms of speech and of essential metaphorical images for detecting collective 
discursive patterns of a specific society. Jäger for instance calls such discursive or linguistic 
automatisms routines and operations, which are speech acts the producers and recipients of 
texts mostly use mechanically and unconsciously. He deems these routines to be of particular 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
894  Jäger refers to the fine analysis as the core of discourse analysis; as criteria for choosing typical articles he 
mentions the respective discourse position of the article, its thematic main focus, its style, or its 
entanglement with other discourse strands: Jäger (2004), 171ff.; Link (2006), 420; Landwehr similarly 
differentiates between two levels of analysis, but calls them macro- and micro-structure: Landwehr (2001), 
111ff. 
895  Jäger (2004), 171ff., esp. 176-184. 
896  On Fairclough’s linguistic aspects – such as for instance different categories of nouns or adjectives, and 
different moods or voices of verbs – of discourse analysis: Fairclough (2003), 12f., 35ff., 129ff.; 
Fairclough (2009), 129ff. 
897  Foucault (1981), 83-103; Generally on the correspondence between form and content of discourses: Jäger 
(2004), 113, 179ff., 184ff.; Fairclough (2003), 12f.; Fairclough (2009), 60.  
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importance, because he understands discourses as groupings of such routines, which have 
historically grown into formal rules and regulations.898  The fundamental imagery of a 
language of a specific society becomes visible in metaphors or collective symbols as Jäger 
calls them in following Jürgen Link, which comprise the totality of a society’s allegories, 
emblems, metaphors, topics, analogies or comparisons. This synchronous system of collective 
symbols (sysycol) is in as far significant, as it reveals fundamental patterns of perception of a 
society, which its members typically also follow unconsciously.899 
 The accentuation of the close relationship between form and content is undeniably 
crucial to any discourse analysis, and by no means restricted to linguistic analyses. Yet, as 
Jäger emphasizes, such a detailed linguistic and topical analysis needs much time and effort 
and can only be carried out for a limited number of texts.900 The issue at stake is how detailed 
such an analysis of both the contents and the forms of a discourse has to be, or which aspect is 
considered more important respectively. Since the present study locates itself within the field 
of historical discourse analysis, its focus is admittedly more on the topics of the Iranian press 
discourse on drugs, and particularly on the – probably different – lines of argumentation. Such 
argumentation is defined here as the rhetoric and logical combination of different sub-topics 
and topics into argumentative strategies. The present study nevertheless recognizes the 
importance of the formal and linguistic aspects of a discourse, but only takes into 
consideration in as far as they help to explicate the topical combinations and argumentative 
logics of the Iranian press discourse on drugs. 
 
 Accordingly, the present analysis does not differentiate in principle between a 
structural and fine analysis, as neither does Fairclough. Instead, it conducts a more 
comprehensive structural analysis, which also includes elements Jäger subsumes under fine 
analysis – such as particularly the internal rhetorical and argumentative logic of the drug 
related newspaper articles.901 These aspects are of crucial importance in the context of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
898  Jäger has developed the concept of operations on the basis of Leontiev’s activity theory: Jäger (2004), 97f., 
180, 211; Fairclough generally talks about presuppositions, implicatures, general assumptions, and 
conventions, which he considers crucial in defining the ‘common ground’ of a specific knowledge of a 
society: Fairclough (2009), 60. 
899  Such collective symbols always imply elementary ideological judgements and basically depict what is 
familiar in a positive way, and what is unfamiliar in a negative way: Link (2006), 413, 420; Jäger (2004), 
133ff., 180; Fairclough simply talks about metaphors and differentiates between a lexical metaphor and 
grammatical metaphor: Fairclough (2009), 131f. 
900  Jäger (2004), 171f. 
901  Jäger considers such topical entanglements or knots – together with the collective symbols – to form the 
cement of discourses; he suggests to analyse them as part of the analysis of the text surface: Jäger (2004), 
168, 178,  
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Iranian press discourse on drugs, because the focus of the analysis is not only on the common 
topical patterns but also on different discourse positions and lines of argumentation.  
 
The present analysis nevertheless makes an exception of the decision not to 
differentiate between a structural and a fine analysis, by separately carrying out a linguistic – 
or more concretely semantic – examination of the imagery of the Iranian drug discourse. The 
analysis of these collective symbols is of particular interest, as they indeed reveal common 
and often traditional patterns of perception in Iran. The focus on the collective symbols is 
admittedly also owed to the comparatively easy identification of such terms if compared to 
the disclosure of the routines and operations of speech. 
 
 Yet, the more crucial reason for not conducting a more detailed formal and linguistic 
analysis is the study’s focus on the development of the Iranian press discourse on drugs. 
Instead of just analyzing one synchronic section of a discourse, it is more interesting to 
analyze the development of the discourse as seen in a sequence of synchronous sections.902 
Foucault, in his Archaeology of Knowledge has paid special attention to such a diachronic 
view of discourses. The analysis of the historical development of a discourse is in as far more 
revealing for the present study, as only in its evolution the importance of discursive events for 
the future development of the discourse can be assessed. This is true for the hegemonic or 
ideological struggles taking place in a discourse. Only in a diachronic analysis it becomes 
clear, how different hegemonic strategies bring about a transformation of the orders of 
discourse by re-contextualizing elements of the discourse and by restructuring discursive 
strategies.903 
 
 The aim of the entire analysis and interpretation of the Iranian press discourse on 
drugs consequently not only consists of identifying its constitutive topics and arguments 
regarding commonness and difference, continuity and discontinuity, consistency and 
inconsistency. More importantly, it includes an examination of the various effects of the 
hegemonic or more precisely ideological struggle for the sovereignty of interpretation, which 
are as well responsible for a certain uniformity of the discourse as for certain inconsistencies. 
Of particular importance is the analysis of the collective symbols, which reflect a common, 
homogenizing ground in the discourse, and of the discursive events, which are contested and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
902  Generally on the historical, diachronic discourse analysis and the choice of the exact synchronous sections: 
Jäger (2004), 169, 196ff. 
903  Foucault (1981); Jäger (2004), 169, 196ff.; Link (2006), 408f.; Fairclough (2009), 20, 61ff., 78, 130f.. 
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result in heterogeneities and changes of the discourse.904 Thus, the analysis of the Iranian 
press discourse on drugs is essentially an ideological analysis905, which will consider the 
wider social context – including other discourses and non-discursive practices – in the final 
interpretation.906 
 
 To conclude, the question remains what exactly makes critical discourse analysis of 
Jäger and Fairclough critical? Accordingly, a critical approach in research is a matter of self-
evidence, and critical discourse analysis indeed aims higher. Both authors stress the 
importance of critically assessing discursive structures and especially the motivations behind 
– the dominant or competing – hegemonic strategies within a discourse. They suggest 
interpreting discourses against an ethical guideline of universal human values, with the aim of 
improving the circumstances for a specific society and its individuals.907 Yet, such allegedly 
universal values remain forcibly linked to the system of values and norms of the specific 
society, in which a researcher lives, as well as to his personal convictions.908 Hence, this 
critical approach has to be rather seen as an idealistic approach. Crucial for critical discourse 
analysis – as for all methodologies – is therefore the criterion that the necessarily subjective 
and selective analysis and its inherent judgments are comprehensible and verifiable in an 
intersubjective way. The study remains, however, open to new interpretations and insights in 
the future. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
904  Fairclough conceptualizes such external and internal influences on discourses in a slightly different way; he 
talks about “intertextuality” when referring to external influences – that is the influence of one text on 
another/others, which the present analysis subsumes under discursive events; and he speaks of (general) 
assumptions as being internal influences, which here more or less correspond to the routines and operations 
and to the collective symbols: Fairclough (2003), 39-61. 
905  Fairclough (2009), 79. 
906  On the importance to consider the entire social context in order to fully comprehend the significance and 
role of discourses: Jäger (2004), 184ff.; Fairclough (2009), 130f. 
907  Detailed on the critical Discourse Analysis: Jäger (2004), 62ff., 215ff.; Fairclough (2003), 24f., esp. 
202ff.; Fairclough has shifted his attention from a critique of (social) structures to a critique of (social and 
discursive) strategies in his later works: Fairclough (2009), 7f., 10f., esp. 14ff. 
908  Jäger also addresses this problem: Jäger (2004), 230f. 
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V. Analysis of the Iranian Press Discourse on Drugs 
 
V. 1. The Iranian Press Discourse on Drugs: Discourse events: the Basic Structure 
 
In a first step, the present content analysis will demonstrate the distribution of drug-
related newspaper articles over the course of each respective year of the sample period. The 
articles often appear in clusters, centering on specific events, which have triggered their 
publication. These discourse events, as the discourse analysis calls them, fundamentally 
structure the Iranian press discourse on drugs. They can be divided into different types, each 
having different effects on the overall discourse.  
 
First, the newspapers naturally do not write about all drug-related events of 
importance in the real world, either internationally or domestically. Not all events thus 
become discourse events. Additionally, not all events the newspapers report on forcibly 
become discourse events in the narrower sense. The present analysis basically differentiates 
between main discourse events, which fundamentally influence both the quantitative 
distribution of articles and the distillation of central topics; and minor discourse events, which 
only might be addressed by a few newspapers 
 
Second, the present analysis differentiates between international and national 
discourse events. Both international and domestic developments and incidents in the fields of 
drug production, drug consumption and drug policy elicit the newspapers to publish relevant 
articles. Admittedly, a differentiation cannot always be made, since certain events might both 
be of international and national importance. The present analysis focuses more on national 
events; while only considering international events, if they are of relevance to the domestic 
context. 
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Quantitative distribution of newspaper articles over the course of the sample period 
(1374-1378 / 1995-2000) 
 
 
At first glance noticeable is that all three charts show a particular peak in June. More 
precisely, most drug-related articles appear around 26 June. This date has been defined by 
resolution 42/177 of the United Nations as international day against drug abuse in illicit 
trafficking on 7 December 1987. This international event thus is the single most important 
event that triggers Iranian newspapers articles on drugs. 
 
Particularly the second and third year, however, show further peaks. While the exact 
reasons for the appearance of these clusters of articles cannot be guessed without a closer look 
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at the content, it is nevertheless obvious, that the next most distinct peak takes place in August 
1997, the month of Ḫātamī’s presidential inauguration. Further reasons will become evident 
from the following analysis of discourse events, based on the titles and contents of the 
newspaper articles. 
 
Discourse events in 1374 (1995-96) 
 
 The fact, that most drug-related newspaper articles of the first sample year appear 
around 26 June is indeed not a mere coincidence. The newspapers explicitly refer to the 
international day against drug abuse and illicit trafficking (rūz-e ǧahānī-ye mobārezeh bā 
mavādd-e moḫadder).909 Especially in the first year of the sample period, this day is clearly an 
international discourse event. The newspapers reproduce much information on the 
international drug situation and on the general phenomenology of drugs from reports provided 
by relevant UN bodies, such as the UN OFFICE FOR DRUG CONTROL AND CRIME PREVENTION 
(UNDCP) or the WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO), in particular by the World Drug 
Report (gozāreš-e ǧahānī-ye mavadd-e moḫadder). A second, albeit minor international 
discourse event might be the meetings of the ECONOMIC COOPERATION ORGANIZATION (ECO) 
in November 1995, to which however only Abrār explicitly refers.910  
 
 But it becomes already evident here, that such international events have an impact on 
domestic events, which themselves cause the appearance of related newspaper articles. In fact, 
the international day against drug abuse and illicit trafficking had inspired the Iranian 
government to organize related events only a few weeks earlier. Thus, in May 1995, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
909  Resālat, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995) I; Resālat, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995) II; Resālat, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 
1995) I; Resālat, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) II: Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995); Salām, 5 
Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I; Salām, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) II; Īrān, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995); 
Hamšahrī, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 11 Tīr 1374 (1 July 
1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 12 Tīr 1374 (3 July 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 13 Tīr 1374 (4 July 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 14 Tīr 1374 (5 
July 1995). 
910  Abrār, 14 Ābān 1374 (5 November 1995). 
0 2
7
15
12
2 0
3 2 3 2 2 1
Number of articles per month (1374) (1995-96)	

 166 
newspapers report on a workshop organized by the STATE WELFARE ORGANIZATION (SWO) 
in Gačsar, where a ‘draft for a national program of addiction prevention and rehabilitation 
(pīš-nevīs-e barnāmeh-ye mellī-ye pīš-gīrī va bāz-parvarī-ye e‘tiyād) was presented. On the 
same occasion, the creation of a NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST ADDICTION (komīteh-ye 
kešvarī-ye mobārezeh bā e‘tiyād ) was announced, and the press and a delegation of the 
INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD (INCB) were invited to visit the rehabilitation 
center (markaz-e bāz-parvarī) of Qarčak Varāmīn.911 
 
Discourse events in 1376 (1997-98) 
 
 Like in the first sample year, again many drug-related newspaper articles are published 
around the international day against drug abuse and illicit trafficking of June 26.912 In 1376 
(1997-98), however, another international event triggers drug-related newspapers in a broader 
sense: the WHO’s world no tobacco day or more precisely week according to the Iranian 
newspapers (hafteh-ye bedūn-e doḫānīyāt), which takes place on 31 May.913 Conspicuously, 
this specific attention of the Iranian press on smoking is only observable in this second year, 
although tobacco continues to be discussed as starter drugs in later years. Admittedly, it 
remains unclear, whether the press later ignored the world no tobacco day, or whether the 
NATIONAL LIBRARY’s Namāyeh did not index it any more with the keywords „drugs“ or 
„addiction“. Also directly triggered by the international drug day are reports on the Taliban as 
emerging rulers of Afghanistan, their role in the increasingly thriving drug production and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
911  Hamšahrī, 19 Ordībehešt 1374 (9 May 1995); Kaihān, 15 Ābān 1374 (6 November 1995); Hamšahrī, 27 
Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995) II; Īrān, 8 Ḫordād 1374 (29 May 1995); Kaihān, 25 Ḫordād 1374 (15 
June 1995); Kaihān, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 
28 Ḫordād 1374 (18 June 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 29 Ḫordād 1374 (19 June 1995); and much later: Īrān, 18 Āḏar 
1374 (9 December 1995).  
912  Resālat, 26 Ḫordād 1376 (16 June 1997); Hamšahrī, 3 Tīr 1376 (24 June 1997); Resālat, 3 Tīr 1376 (24 
June 1997); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 4 Tīr 1376 (25 June 1997); Aḫbār, 8 Tīr 1376 (29 June 1997); Ǧomhūrī-
ye Eslāmī, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997); Kaihān, 17 Tīr 1376 (8 July 1997). 
913  Kaihān, 7 Ḫordād 1376 (28 May 1997); Kaihān, 8 Ḫordād 1376 (29 May 1997); Hamšahrī, 10 Ḫordād 
1376 (31 May 1997); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 18 Ḫordād 1376 (8 June 1997); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 19 Ḫordād 1376 (9 June 1997); 
Eṭṭelā’āt, 1 Tīr 1376 (22 June 1997); Eṭṭelā’āt, 2 Tīr 1376 (23 June 1376). 
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trafficking, and the consequences for the transit country Iran.914 This development might, 
however, also be assessed as an international discourse event in its own right. A first 
domestic discourse event, by contrast, is a speech of Āyatollāh Makārem-e Šīrāzī on occasion 
of a Friday prayer on blurring borders between habits (sg. ‘ādat) and addiction (e‘tiyād).915 
 
 Next important discourse events can only be identified after Ḫātamī’s inauguration in 
August 1997. The graph actually shows a series of peaks, continuing for several months. The 
new press freedom under Ḫātamī might itself have caused an increasing coverage of the 
national drug problem, and thus be considered a domestic discourse event in its own right. 
More directly discernable is, however, the upcoming amendment to the drug law of 1988, 
which the EXPEDIENCY COUNCIL was to pass in November 1997. This is arguably the most 
interesting discourse event of the entire sample period, because it causes a disagreement 
between the conservative and the reformist press. All newspapers generally use the 
amendment to describe the legal situation of drug consumption and drug addiction in Iran. 
And practically all welcome the amendment, which put new addiction therapy and prevention 
measures on a legal basis. But the radical Resālat explicitly refutes the changes by advocating 
the traditional, repressive drug policy of the Islamic Republic.916 This discussion especially 
centers around the most crucial question of the Iranian press discourse on drugs, namely 
whether “the addict [is] a sick or a criminal” person (moǧrem – bīmār yā moǧrem?)917. The 
DRUG CONTROL HEADQUARTER (DCHQ) seems to have explicitly provided the Iranian press 
with drug-related information on occasion of the drug law amendment, by translating drug-
related articles of foreign newspapers and magazines.918 Additional domestic discourse events 
are an exhibition on drug addiction Ḫātamī’s administration had organized under the title  
“war without borders” (ǧang bedūn-e marz) in Tehrān;919 an “interregional session on the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
914  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 4 Tīr 1376 (25 June 1997); Aḫbār, 6 Tīr 1376 (27 June 1997); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 4 
Dey 1376 (25 December 1997). 
915  This is, admittedly, only mentioned by Eṭṭelā‘āt, and, thus, not really a discourse event: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 20 
Farvardīn 1376 (9 April 1997). 
916  Hamšahrī, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 September 1997); Hamšahrī, 17 Šahrīvar 1376 (7 September 1997); for 
Resālat’s article: Resālat, 6 Ābān 1376 (28 October 1997); and the reply of the DCHQ: Resālat, 14 Ābān 
1376 (5 November 1997); Āfarīneš, 20 Ābān 1376 (11 November 1997); Āfarīneš, 21 Ābān 1376 (12 
November 1997); Āfarīneš, 22 Ābān 1376 (3 November 1997); Āfarīneš, 24 Ābān 1376 (15 November 
1997); Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997); Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997); Qods, 9 Dey 1376 
(30 December 1997); Qods, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997). 
917  Thus the title of: Hamšahrī, 24 Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997). 
918  Kaihān, 18 Šahrīvar 1376 (8 September 1997); Hamšahrī, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997); 
Hamšahrī, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997); Salām, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997); 
Hamšahrī, 24 Šahrīvar 1376 (14 September 1997); except probably the article on the role of the CIA in the 
international drug traffic: Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 27 Šahrīvar 1376 (18 September 1997). 
919  Abrār, 12 Šahrīvar 1376 (3 September 1997). 
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drug war” (eǧlās-e bain-ol-manṭaqehʼī-ye mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḫadder) in Eṣfahān;920 
a workshop by the clerical establishment in Qom on the national drug policy, which 
particularly focused on addiction prevention;921 and the publication of a research study on the 
influence of addicted fathers on their families, which Eṭṭelā‘āt describes as one of the first 
drug addiction studies in Iran.922 However, the most interesting domestic discourse event is 
the second anniversary of the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS (NA) (mo‘tād-ān-e gom-nām), the 
first private organization officially permitted to be active in the field of addiction therapy and 
prevention in the Islamic Republic.923 
 
Discourse events in 1378 (1999-2000) 
 
 In the year 1378 (1999-2000), international day against drug abuse and illicit 
trafficking is again the most important discourse event, triggering most drug-related articles. 
The newspapers accordingly report on the celebrations organized on this occasion by the 
DCHQ, in which it publicly burned tons of seized drugs.924 The newspapers also print 
interviews with various drug policy officials, in particular with officials of the DCHQ, the 
SWO, with Pino Arlacchi, the secretary general of the UNDCP, and with further academic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
920  Hamšahrī, 2 Mehr 1376 (24 September 1997); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 13 Mehr 1376 (5 October 1997); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 14 
Mehr 1376 (6 October 1997); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 15 Mehr 1376 (7 October 1997); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 16 Mehr 1376 (8 
October 1997); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 17 Mehr 1376 (9 October 1997); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997). 
921  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 23 Dey 1376 (13 January 1998). 
922  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 20 Bahman 1376 (9 February 1998). 
923  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 24 Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997); Hamšahrī, 24 Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997). 
924 Salām, 2 Tīr 1378 (23 June 1999); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999); Īrān, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 
June 1999); Ḫorāsān, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999); 
Ḫorāsān, 5 Tīr 1376 (26 June 1999); Ḫorāsān, 5 Tīr 1376 (26 June 1999); Enteḫāb, 5 Tīr 1378 (6 June 
1999); Nešāṭ, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999); Hamšahrī, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 6 & 7& 8 & 9 & 
13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999); Abrār, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999); Ḫordād, 6 Tīr 
1378 (27 June 1999); Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999); Ḫorāsān, 6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 
1999); Kār va Kārgar, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999); Qods, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999); Enteḫāb, 7 Tīr 1378 
(28 June 1999); Īrān, 8 Tīr 1378 (29 June 1999). 
0
7 9
27
9
3
10 8
15
11
3
13 11
Number of articles per month (1378) (1999-2000)	

 169 
and private addictions specialists.925 Noticeable in this regard is the fact, that only the 
newspaper Tarǧomān-e Rūz mentions the opening of the UNDCP country office in Tehran in 
the previous year;926 and that only few newspapers refer to Antonio Mazitelli, the UNDCP 
representative of the Tehrān office at the time.927 The newspaper, however, point to other 
international contacts, such as a visit of representatives of the UNDCP and the MINI DUBLIN 
GROUP to the Eastern border with Afghanistan, in order to inspect Iran’s combat against drug 
trafficking;928 or the posting of a French trainer of sniffing dogs in Iran.929 
 
Like in the previous years, the government and further national and international 
organizations organized specific events on different drug-related topics: for instance a 
congress on the “immunization of the children and adolescents against the appearance of 
harms” (maṣūn-sāzī-ye koudak-ān va nou-ǧavān-ān dar barābar-e āsīb-zāyī); 930  an 
“educational congress on drugs for judicial assistants of the ECO member countries” 
(hemāyeš-e āmūzešī-ye mo‘āvenat-hā-ye qażāʼī-ye mavādd-e moḫadder-e kešvar-hā-ye ‘ożv-e 
ekō) 931 ; the “second conference on addiction prevention among high school students” 
(dovvomīn hemāyeš-e pīš-gīrī az e‘tiyād-e dāneš- āmūzān);932 or the “conference on socio-
economic issues of economically developing countries” (hemāyeš-e masāʼel-e eǧtemāʼī-ye 
eqteṣādī-ye kešvar-hā-yī keh marḥaleh-ye goḏar-e (enteqāl-e) eqteṣādī-rā ṭayy mī-konand).933 
 
 Of increased importance in the year 1378 (1999-2000) is the reporting on domestic 
drugs statistics and addiction research. The newspapers often cite the DCHQ with statistics on 
national drug seizures and addiction rates;934 and present an increasing number of research 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
925  Particularly on interviews with Arlacchi: Kār va Kārgar, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999); Qods, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 
June 1999); Abrār, 14 Tīr 1378 (5 July 1999); Vohūman, 7 Šahrīvar 1378 (29 August 1999). 
926  Taǧomān-e Rūz, 8 Esfand 1378 (27 February 2000); a superficial survey of the drug-related newspaper 
articles of 1377 (1998/99) did not yield an explicit reference to the opening of the UNDCP office either: 
Eṭṭelā‘āt, 21 & 22 Šahrīvar 1377 (12 & 13 September 1998). 
927  Ḫorāsān, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999); Ḫorāsān, 7 Āḏar 1378 (28 November 1999); Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 5 
Esfand 1378 (25 February 2000). 
928  Enteḫāb, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999); Qods, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999). 
929  Īrān, 11 Āḏar 1378 (12 December 1999). 
930  Īrān, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999). 
931  Enteḫāb, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999). 
932  Mošārekat, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000). 
933  Enteḫāb, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999). 
934  Kār va Kārgar, 21 & 22 & 24, Farvardīn 1378 (10 & 11 & 13 April 1999); Enteḫāb, 28 Farvardīn 1378 
(17 April 1999); Salām, 1 Ḫordād 1378 (22 May 1999); Payām-e Āzādī, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 
1999); Qods, 25 Ābān 1378 (16 November 1999); Āftāb-e Emrūz, 26 Ābān 1378 (17 November 1999); 
Īran, 29 Ābān 1378 (20 November 1999); Ḫordād, 1 & 2 Āḏar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999); Īrān, 2 
Āḏar 1378 (23 November 1999); Kaihān, 8 Āḏar 1378 (29 November 1999); ‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān, 17 Āḏar 
1378 (8 December 1999); Bayān, 28 Āḏar 1378 (19 December 1999); Payām-e Āzādī, 7 Bahman 1378 (27 
January 2000); Āftāb-e Emrūz, 27 Bahman 1378 (16 February 2000). 
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studies,935 notably the Rapid Situation Assessment (arz-yābī-ye sarī‘-e vaz‘iyat), the first 
comprehensive study on drug addiction since the revolution of 1979, which established the 
hitherto official figure of two million drug users in Iran; and a study on intravenous drug use 
and HIV in the prisons of Kermānšāh and Kahnavaǧ.936 The DCQH, furthermore, still seems 
to have provided the press with translations of international articles on drugs, even though it 
remains unclear, whether this also applies to the Newsweek article on poppy cultivation and 
opium production under the Taliban that is quoted by various newspapers.937 
 
 This short overview on the most important preliminary discourse events reveals two 
main characteristics. First, the Iranian press discourse is strongly influenced by international 
events and reports as inspired by the UNDCP, the WHO, or international newspaper and 
magazine articles. This is particularly true for the first sample year, but continues in the other 
two years. Secondly, these international discourse events are increasingly embedded in a 
domestic context, thus, eventually becoming domestic discourse events. These national 
discourse events are predominantly influenced by the government, especially by events and 
publications originating from the DCQH and the SWO. But the Iranian press also starts to 
increasingly refer to private organizations and researchers, thus indicating a shifting 
relationship between the Iranian state and the Iranian civil society. The subsequent content 
analysis will shed further light on the development of such characteristics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
935  Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḫordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999); Ḫorāsān, 5 Tīr 1376 (26 June 
1999); Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999); Īrān, 8 Tīr 1378 (29 June 1999); Ḫorāsān, 7 & 9 
Mordād 1378 (29 & 31 July 1999); Vohūman, 7 Šahrīvar 7 1378 (29 August 1999); Kār va Kārgar, 28 
Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999); Kār va Kārgar, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999); Qods, 25 Ābān 1378 (16 
November 1999); Āftāb-e Emrūz, 26 Ābān 1378 (17 November 1999); Ḫordād, 1 & 2 Āḏar 1378 (22 & 23 
November 1999); Kaihān, 8 Āḏar 1378 (29 November 1999); ‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān, 17 Āḏar 1378 (8 
December 1999); Āftāb-e Emrūz, 27 Bahman 1378 (16 February 2000). 
936  On the RSA: Kār va Kārgar, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999); on the prison research: Ḫordād, 1 & 2 
Āḏar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999). 
937  Bayān, 28 Āḏar 1378 (19 December 1999); Abrār, 8 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999); Fatḥ, 18 Esfand 1378 
(8 March 2000). 
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V. 2. The Iranian Press Discourse on Drugs: a Chronology of Topics and Arguments 
 
 Concomitantly with the perusal of drug related articles that the Iranian press published 
during the three sample years of 1374 (1995-96), 1376 (1997-98), and 1378 (1999-20000) 
respectively, the author has recorded various details in a FileMaker database that was created 
specifically for the purpose of analysis. This database contains for each article: the Iranian-
Islamic (heǧrī-šamsī), and the Christian date of appearance; if provided, the specific rubric, 
page(s) and genre; the title; topical keywords – or codes to speak with the grounded theory – 
allocated by the author; a summary of the important arguments according to their logic 
sequence; and further details such as the author of the article, or the quoted sources. These 
details have particularly served to identify the most important topics of the Iranian press 
discourse on drugs and their changing interrelation over the course of the sample period. That 
part of the analysis will, however, only follow in the second step. In a first step, the content of 
the newspaper articles will be described in the chronological order of their appearance. 
 
 In a rather descriptive analytical step, a chronological narrative of the development of 
the contents and arguments of the Iranian press discourse on drugs over the course of the 
sample period (1995-2000) is given here. This description serves to put the reader of this 
study in the place of an average newspaper reader in Iran, and allows him to trace the 
emerging changes of topics and arguments. Since the Iranian newspapers are affiliated to 
different political factions, each has its own audience; an Iranian newspaper reader thus might 
not follow the drug related coverage of all newspapers. An habitual reader of the radical 
newspaper Kaihān might at times nevertheless also read the conservative Resālat or 
Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī; as might a reader of Hamšahrī do with Īrān or Eṭṭelā‘āt. Iranian 
newspapers are commonly sold in specific newspaper stands on the street, rather than being 
distributed to the households. Since all the different newspapers are spread out on the street or 
even fixed on the wall, an average costumer will first read the headlines of different 
newspapers before buying one or several. Many passers-by will not even buy a copy, but 
simply read the most interesting headlines on the spot. Consequently, reader loyalty indeed 
might be less developed in Iran than elsewhere. This could also explain the often-imaginative 
titles of drug related newspaper articles, with which the respective newspapers arguably try to 
attract readers.  
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V. 2. a. The Iranian press on drugs in 1374 (1995-96) 
 In 1374 (1995-96), Iranian newspapers publish fifty-one articles on drug-related issues. 
Probably one of the first apparent characteristics are series of articles appearing in a 
newspaper over the course of several days, in which the respective newspaper cover different 
aspects of the international and national drug problem in depth. Most of these article series 
appear around June 26, the UN-determined International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit 
Trafficking. In this first sample year, the press basically already has established the range of 
the most important topics of the press discourse on drugs, although a few important new 
topics will be added in later years. Already in this first year, the press writes openly about the 
situation of drug addiction in Iran, and about drug supply and new drug demand reduction 
activities of the Iranian government. Some newspapers express critical opinions towards the 
official drug policy. Particularly represented in this first year of consideration are the 
traditional and conservative newspapers of the Islamic Republic, like Eṭṭelā‘āt, Kaihān, 
Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī and Resālat; but also the newspapers of the modern right, Īrān and 
Hamšahrī; as well as Salām, the only newspaper of the Islamic left. 
 
Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī on the occasion of a Friday prayer in April: Iran is a victim of drug 
trafficking from Afghanistan 
 The first drug-related newspaper article of 1374 (1995-96) appears, as one would 
probably expect, on the occasion of a religious event, namely a Friday prayer. Yet, this article 
of the conservative newspaper Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī is in fact very atypical of the Iranian press 
discourse on drugs, as religion is rarely mentioned in relation to drugs. By emphasizing that 
Iran suffers as the main transit country from the trafficking of Afghan drugs towards Europe 
and that it is paying a heavy price for its drug combat, Interior Minister ‘Alī-Moḥammad 
Bašāratī points to a crucial and typical argument of the press discourse on drugs.938  
 
Hamšahrī in April and May: the annual world drug report of the INCB & religion plays no 
important role in drug prevention & liberal drug laws in the Netherlands 
 In the Iranian month Ordībehešt, the moderate newspaper Hamšahrī of the 
municipality of Tehrān publishes a series of consecutive articles. The first article covers the 
international situation of drugs according to the 1994 annual drug report of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
938  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 14 Farvardīn 1374 (3 April 1995): “The president on the occasion of the ceremony of 
the Friday prayer of Tehran: the Supreme Leader’s emphasis on monetary and economic discipline, and on 
the prevention of lavishness and dissipation is a constructive recommendation for the Islamic System” 
(Raʼīs-e ǧomhūr dar marāsem-e namāz-e ǧom‘ah-ye tehrān: taʼkīd-e rahbarī dar moured-e enżebāṭ-e mālī 
va eqteṣādī va ǧelou-gīrī az esrāf va tabḏīr-e yek touṣiyyeh-ye banāʼī barāye neẓām-e eslāmī ast). 
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INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL BOARD (INCB) (sāzmān-e bain-ol-melal-e kontrol-e 
mavādd-e moḫadder), indicating like most articles of Hamšahrī the name of the author. In 
describing the international drug situation, Hamšahrī also introduces Albert Hofmann, the 
inventor of LSD, namely as a victim of this “hallucinogenic” (tavahhom-zā) – at a time, when 
Hoffmann actually still was in best health.939 No less questionable are the arguments that 
nicotine addiction is less dangerous than addiction to other drugs; and that one of the main 
causes for drug addiction in Europe is the uninhibited freedom and lack of religiosity. In the 
next articles, Hamšahrī is covering the problem of drug addiction in Iran. It is, thus, the first 
newspaper during the sample period to talk about drug demand rather than drug supply 
reduction. The author of the article is Aḥmad Moḥīṭ, a member of the WHO (sāzmān-e beh-
dāšt-e ǧahānī), who maintains that religion does not play an important role in drug prevention 
because drug addicts are not religious but considered to be rather immoral persons. While 
discussing social, economic, cultural and individual causes for drug addiction, Moḥīṭ stresses 
the more important role of education and research for drug prevention.940 Hamšahrī continues 
its drug coverage with a translation of a Hungarian police report on the drug trafficking route 
in the Balkans; and with a translation of a rather critical BBC report on the liberal drug policy 
in the Netherlands. Such information on the drug policies of European countries arguably 
would have a big impact on preparing Iranian public opinion to the subsequent liberalization 
of the Iranian drug policy.941 
An article of the moderately conservative newspaper Abrār on the relation between 
drugs smuggling and economic crimes could not be identified.942 
 
May and June: a new national plan for addiction treatment and drug prevention &  
the rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn 
 As has already been pointed out, one of the main local discourse events in 1374 (1995-96) is the 
workshop on drug prevention and addiction treatment that was organized by the STATE WELFARE 
ORGANIZATION (SWO) (sāzmān-e behzīstī-ye kešvar). Part of this increased state activity in the field of drug 
demand reduction was apparently also the opening of a rehabilitation center of the new generation in Iran in the 
small town of Qarčak Varāmīn south of Tehran. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
939  Hofmann only deceased in 2008: Swissinfo (2008). 
940  Hamšahrī, 6 Ordībehešt 1374 (26 April 1995): “The Golden Triangle and the black powder” (Moṯallaṯ-e 
ṭalāʼī, gerd-e siyāh); Hamšahrī, 14 Ordībehešt 1374 (4 May 1995): “Clouded brains” (Maġz-ha-ye abr-
ālūdeh) – not available; Hamšahrī, 19 Ordībehešt 1374 (9 May 1995): “Where should we start – in 
preventing addiction?” (Az koǧā āġāz konīm – barāye pīš-gīrī az e‘tiyād? 
941  Hamšahrī, 23 Ordībehešt 1374 (13 May 1995): “A flood of the entrance of drugs to Europe” (Sail-e vorūd-
e mavādd-e moḫadder beh orūpā) & Hamšahrī, 27 Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995): “Europe’s criticism 
of Holand’s laws handling with drugs” (Enteqād-e orūpā az qavānīn-e bar-ḫord bā mavādd-e moḫadder 
dar holand). 
942  Abrār, 20 Ordībehešt 1374 (10 May 1995): “Economic crime” (Ǧenāyat-e eqteṣādī). 
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Hamšahrī in May: addiction withdrawal without medication 
 Hamšahrī publishes the first article on the workshop organized by the SWO, in which 
different public health specialists discussed the need for a comprehensive social plan to 
address the ever-growing addiction problem in Iran. The participants issued a declaration, 
according to which Iran should commit itself in increasing and coordinating its efforts on the 
field of drug “prevention” (pīš-gīrī), addiction “treatment” (darmān) and “rehabilitation” 
(bāz-parvarī) and in training the required specialists on the field of psychology, sociology and 
biology. A central role in this new approach was to play the newly created NATIONAL 
COMMITTEE AGAINST DRUG ABUSE (komīteh-ye kešvarī-e sūʼ-maṣraf-e mavādd-e moḫadder) 
under the supervision of the MINISTRY OF HEALTH, THERAPY AND MEDICAL EDUCATION 
(vezārat-e behdāšt, darmān va āmūzeš-e pezeškī). Despite this emphasis on drug prevention, 
Hamšahrī still warns that information on drugs could also incited people to take drugs. Also 
still prevalent during the entire year is the handed down logic that withdrawal without 
medication – referred to in English as “cold turkey” – is better than withdrawal with 
medication.943 
 
Īrān in May: treatment-seeking addicts are still in danger of being imprisoned 
 The workshop on drug treatment and drug prevention that was held the small town 
Gačsar, near Šīrāz, led to the governmental newspaper Īrān publishing an article in which it 
accentuates that drug demand reduction is not only more effective but also cheaper than drug 
supply reduction. As an example, it describes the new therapy strategies implemented in the 
rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn (markaz-e bāz-parvarī-ye mo‘tādān-e qarčak 
varāmīn). It mentions, that many drug addicts in this center have started their addictive 
behavior with cigarette smoking – an argument the press subsequently would often repeat. 
More significantly, Īrān points to the problem that addicts are still in danger of being legally 
persecuted when referring themselves to rehabilitation centers, while what they really need is 
“guidance and direction” (eršād va rāh-nemāʼī), because they are „human beings in need of 
help” (ensān-e niyāz-mand beh komak). To underline this argument, Īrān portrays the 
personal stories of these clients, which later, too, becomes a regular feature of the Iranian 
press discourse on drugs.944 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
943  Hamšahrī, 27. Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995): “What needs to be done? Summary of the preliminary 
national programme of addiction prevention and therapy” (Čeh bāyad kard? Ḫolāṣeh-ye pīš-nevīs-e 
barnāmeh-ye mellī-ye pīš-gīrī va bāz-parvarī-ye e‘tiyād). 
944  Īrān, 8. Ḫordād 1374 (29 May 1995): Deliverance from the high fortification of addiction (Rahāʼī az 
ḥeṣār-e boland-e e‘tiyād). 
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Kaihān in a series of articles in June: the world-devouring colonialists vs. the international 
praise of Qarčak Varāmīn  
 The radical Kaihān is the first newspaper in the sample period to publish a 
comprehensive series of articles on the Iranian drug problem. Such article series would turn 
out to be a regular feature of the Iranian press discourse on drugs. On the same occasion of 
the opening of the rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn, it first accuses the “world-
devouring” (ǧahān-ḫvārān) “colonialists” (este‘mār-garān), that is Great Britain and the USA, 
to aim at the destruction of the Iranian society and particularly its youth; while concomitantly 
proudly reporting that a visiting INCB delegation praised the rehabilitation center. While still 
maintaining that drug addiction is not a major problem in Iran, Kaihān also emphasizes that 
addiction is an “illness” (bīmārī) not a “crime” (ǧorm), thus introducing the most crucial 
argument of the Iranian press discourse on drugs. It further describes the rehabilitation 
measures of the center in consisting of religious courses, music classes and reading hours in 
the library; and mentions that drug addicts are referred to as ‘assistance-seeking’ (madad-ǧū) 
here.945 
 
Īrān in a series of articles in June: sending 500,000 drug addicts to an island is no solution 
 Eṭṭelā‘āt in a series of three articles also covers the visit of the INCB delegation to the 
rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn, which is being described as one of a total of eleven 
rehabilitation centers in Iran, which together have a capacity to treat 2,500 addicts at a time. 
Eṭṭelā‘āt sharply refutes the alleged Western claims that Iran kills its drug addicts; but 
nevertheless accentuates that sending them to a “remote islands” (ǧazāyer-e dūr-oftādeh) will 
not solve the problem. This is clearly an allusion to earlier prevailing drug policy opinions in 
the Islamic Republic. It further informs the reader that the number of drug addicts in Iran has 
dropped from two millions before the revolution to actually 500,000. Reproducing the WHO 
definition of drug addiction, addiction therapy, and drug prevention, it emphasizes that drug 
addiction never can be rooted completely. And it, too, provides personal addiction stories of 
individual patients of rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn.946 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
945  Kaihān, 25 Ḫordād 1374 (15 June 1995): “Growth of the rose of ‘hope’ and ‘life’ in the brackwater of 
addiction” (Rūyeš-e gol-e ‘omīd’ va ‘zendegī’ dar šūre-zār-e e‘tiyād) & Kaihān, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 
1995): “Rehabilitation, emergence of the ‘bright morning’ from the dark evening of addiction” (Bāzparvarī, 
damīdan-e ‘ṣobḥ-e roušan’ az ‘šām-e tīreh-ye’ e‘tiyād) – both articles are part of a series titled “On the 
occasion of the formation of the NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST ADDICTION” (Be monāsebat-e taškīl-e 
komīteh-ye kešvarī-ye mobārezeh bā e‘tiyād). 
946  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995): “Rehabilitation centre of Qarčak. Here, life smiles again for 
cured addicts” (Markaz-e bāz-parvarī-ye ‘qarčak’, īnǧā zendegī do bāreh beh rūy-ye mo‘tādān-e 
šafā’yāfteh labḫand mizanad) & Eṭṭelā‘āt, 28 Ḫordād 1374 (18 June 1995): “Cooperation between the 
family and the society – a necessity for a success of the program of the rehabilitation of addicts” (Ham-
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Hamšahrī in June: an interview with Hamid Ghodse, president of the INCB 
 An next article in Hamšahrī states that ‘Abd ol-Ḥamīd Qods, better known as Hamid 
Ghodse, the Iranian-born president of the INCB, was part of the delegation that visited the 
new rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn. The paper subsequently publishes an interview 
with him, in which he, however, rather talks about money laundering in Latin America.947 
 
The International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking on 26 June 
 The event, on which the Iranian newspapers write most drug related articles in 1374 (1995-96), is the 
International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking (rūz-e ǧahānī-ye mobārezeh bā mavādd-e 
moḫadder), which takes place on June 26. Already the announcement of the creation of the NATIONAL 
COMMITTEE AGAINST DRUG ABUSE and the visit of the INCB delegation to the rehabilitation center of Qarčak 
Varāmīn were related to this event. Also on this occasion, the press regularly mentions the annual report of the 
INCB, or more probably the WORLD DRUG REPORT of the UNDCP, and cites further international sources such 
as the WHO. 
 
Resālat in a series of articles in June: Iran has a religious duty to combat drug trafficking; 
but benefitting most is the West 
 On the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, the radical 
conservative newspaper Resālat, too, publishes a series of articles. Repeating established 
patterns, it reports on the situation of drug trafficking in the Golden Triangle (moṯallaṯ-e 
ṭalāʼī) and in Afghanistan and Pakistan, however not labeling it Golden Crescent (helāl-e 
ṭalāʼī); on the malicious role of the colonialists and in particular, of the British “old fox” 
(rūbāh-e pīr) in Iran’s history of drugs. At the same time, it describes the costly drug supply 
reduction efforts of the DRUG CONTROL HEADQUARTER (DCHQ) (setād-e mobārezeh bā 
mavādd-e moḫadder) to be a religious duty, from which particularly the European countries 
would benefit, which in turn only accuse Iran of human rights violations.948 Resālat also 
emphasizes the official opinion according to which only a drug trafficker is considered a 
criminal while a drug addict has to be treated as an ill person. Yet, the description of drug 
addicts as suffering from cultural difficulties (mo‘żelāt-e farhangī) at least indicates an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
kārī-ye ḫāne-vādeh va eǧtemā‘ – żorūrat-e movaffaqiyyat-ye barnāmeh-ye bāz-parvarī-ye mo‘tādān) & 
Eṭṭelā‘āt, 29 Ḫordād 1374 (19 June 1995): “Rehabilitation centres – protection of the society and 
deliverance of the individual from the captivity of addiction” (Marākez-e bāz-parvarī – ṣiyānat-e ǧāme‘ah 
va rahāʼī-ye fard az esārat-e e‘tiyād) - the three articles are part of a series titled “On occasion of the visit 
of UNODC experts to the country’s  rehabilitation centres” (Be angīzeh-ye bāz-dīd-e kār-šenāsān-e 
kontrol-e mavadd-e moḫadder-e sāzemān-e melal-e mottaḥed az marākez-e bāz-parvarī-ye mo‘tādān-e 
kešvar). 
947  Hamšahrī, 31 Ḫordād 1374 (21 June 1995): “How is the money from drug trafficking laundered?” (Pūlhā-
ye teǧārat-e mavādd-e moḫadder čegūneh taṭhīr mīšavad?). 
948  Resālat, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995): ‘Drugs - a weapon against the well-being of humankind’ (Mavādd-e 
moḫadder - ḥarbeʼī ‘alai-he salāmat-e bašariyyat). 
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ongoing moralistic view.949 This becomes even more apparent, when Resālat quotes Āyatollāh 
Ḫomainī with the opinion that drugs are “yeast for moral corruption” (māyeh-ye fesād). 
Despite also mentioning the number of 500,000 predominantly young drug addicts, Resālat 
still maintains that Iran can face the future with a “calm mind” (bā ārāmeš-e ḫāṭer).950 
 
Salām in June: an inter-regional cooperation is needed in the combat against drugs 
 While an article of Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī could not be identified,951 the leftist newspaper 
Salām also prints two articles on drugs on the international drugs day. Apparently based on 
the same source as the other newspapers, it provides a much more detailed anti-imperialist 
version of the history of drugs in Iran.952 The second article deals with the international drug 
situation after the fall of the USSR and calls for a closer cooperation between the regional 
neighbors Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Central Asian countries to jointly solve the 
problem of drug cultivation and trafficking in the region.953 
 
Īrān in June: The family as cause and solution for the drug addiction of the youth 
 Īrān for its part publishes another article, in which it concentrates on addiction causes 
among adolescents, arguably the most central concern of the Iranian press discourse. Based 
on interviews with young street addicts, it lists different addiction causes, among which in 
particular drug-addicted family members such as often the father. It consequently discusses 
appropriate family relationships and educational models to prevent children from turning to 
drugs, by rather controversially recommending a strict control of their daily routines. At the 
same time, it emphasizes the crucial role of the schools and the mass media in drug 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
949  Resālat, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995):”The interior minister has announced on occasion of the international 
[global] day of drugs combat: a smuggler is a criminal, and an addict an ill person’ (Vazīr-e kešvar dar 
āstāneh-ye rūz-e ǧahānī-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-ye moḫadder e‘lām kard: qāčaqčī moǧrem ast, va 
mo‘tād bīmār). 
950  Resālat, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995):”The people {say} - the combat of the Islamic state against drugs has 
guaranteed the well-being of humankind’ (Mardom - mobārezeh-ye neẓām-e eslāmī ‘alai-he mavādd-e 
moḫadder salāmat-e bašariyyat-rā tażmīn karde ast); another article titled”The judicial organization is the 
pillar of safeguarding justice’ (Dastgāh-e qażāʼī rokn-e taʼmīn-e ‘edālat ast) dated from the same day on 
the role of the judiciary could not be identified. 
951  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995):”The world's drug day’ (Rūz-e mavādd-e moḫadder dar 
ǧahān). 
952  Salām, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995):”A short history of drugs in the world and in Iran - on the occasion of the 
world day of the combat against drug addiction and drug trafficking’ (Tārīḫčeh-ye mavādd-e moḫadder dar 
ǧahān va īrān - be bahāneh-ye rūz-e ǧahānī-ye mobārezah bā e‘tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḫadder). 
953  Salām, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995):”The gloomy shadow of the octopus of death over the world’ (Sāyeh-ye 
šūm-e oḫtāpūs-e marg bar ǧahān). 
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prevention, apparently reflecting opinions of the NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST DRUG 
ABUSE in this regard.954 
 
Hamšahrī in July: liberal drug laws in the Europe vs. the need of exacts statistics in Iran 
 While also publishing an article containing the meanwhile common version of the 
history of drugs in Iran, Hamšahrī explicitly mentions the pre-revolutionary practice of 
distributing opium tablets to drug addicts as a failure. The introduction of methadone therapy 
in Iran will, however, soon make this opinion obsolete. It subsequently, nevertheless pays 
particular attention to the liberal drug policies of European countries such as the Netherlands, 
Germany, and Switzerland, while not forcibly approving of these liberal practices. In 
contrasting these liberal policies the domestic drug policy, it particularly bemoans the lack of 
exact statistics on drug addiction, and the insufficiency of the existing therapy facilities in 
Iran, thus clearly admitting a bleaker reality than the conservative newspapers. Hamšahrī 
mentions that fifty percent of the prison inmates have been convicted for drug felonies; and 
that seventeen therapy facilities have treated eighty thousand drug addicts so far.955 
 
Eṭṭelā‘āt in another article series in July: the āyatollāhs Gīlānī and Moqtadāʼī have 
prepared the ground for addiction treatment measures  
 In a five-part series titled “every day has to be an international day against addiction 
and drug trafficking” (hameh rūz bāyad “rūz-e ǧahānī-ye mobārezeh bā e‘tiyād va qāčāq-e 
mavādd-e moḫadder” bāšad), Eṭṭelā‘āt publishes the so far most comprehensive and realistic 
report on drugs. While explicitly mentioning a small treatise of the DCHQ as the source for 
the history of drugs – which all newspaper apparently are using – it adds the new and 
factually correct detail that the family of Moḥammad-Reżā Šāh was involved in drug 
trafficking. Estimating the costs of Iran’s supply reduction efforts along the Eastern border at 
10 million US$, Eṭṭelā‘āt requests financial assistance from European countries. Iran is 
portrayed with not only fighting against drug trafficking with building fortifications along the 
border, but with also having proposed a crop substitution program in Afghanistan to the UN. 
Citing a fatvā of Āyatollāh Ḫomainī as the reason for the traditional criminalization of drug 
use in the Islamic Republic, Eṭṭelā‘āt also mentions that Iran’s new health-based policy 
approach towards addiction treatment was legally prepared fatāvā of the āyatollāhs Gīlānī and 
Moqtadāʼī. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
954  Īrān, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995):”White powder, black death – reasons for addiction among adolescents’ 
(Gerd-e Sefīd, Marg-e Siyāh – ‘elal-e gerāyeš-e ǧavānān beh e‘tiyād). 
955  Hamšahrī, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995):”The world in the trap of addiction’ (Ǧahān dar dām-e e‘tiyād). 
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 Less convincing is, however, the claim that the courts meanwhile have renounced the 
imprisoning of drug addicts if they are willing to undergo treatment. Eṭṭelā‘āt even mentions 
twenty existing rehabilitation centers in Iran, whose therapy measures it lists in detail. It also 
still repeats that detoxification without medication is preferable to withdrawal with 
pharmaceuticals. But in an interview with the private physician Ṣāleḥ Šīvā, a US trained 
acupuncture specialist, it accepts alternative supportive methods such as herbal medicine or 
acupuncture. Concomitantly it introduces another regular feature of the Iranian press 
discourse on drugs by warning of deceiving advertisements for dubious private addiction 
treatment, ironically printing such advertisements next to the very same article. Finally, it 
mentions for the first time the spread of HIV by ways of needle sharing, although not directly 
in connection with Iran.956 
 
Resālat on the occasion of a Friday Prayer in July: Iran’s police are successful in the drugs 
combat  
 In July, more articles touching on the subject of drugs appear in the newspapers Abrār, 
Eṭṭela‘āt, and Kaihān, which either could not be identified or do not add new details to 
Iranian press discourse on drugs.957 Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that an unidentified 
article of Hamšahrī was published on tobacco smoking,958 a focus that will become more 
important in the sample year 1376 (1997-98). Resālat writes a further article on occasion of a 
Friday prayer speech, in which police commander Reżā Saif-Elāhī emphasized the success of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
956 Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995):”The Western colonialists, criminal circulators of drugs in the world’ 
(Este‘mār-garān-e ġarbī, ravāǧ-dehandegān-e tabahkār-e mavādd-e moḫadder dar ǧahān) & Eṭṭelā‘āt, 11 
Tīr 1374 (2 July 1995):”The fight against addiction and drug smuggling is resolutely continued’ 
(Mobārezah bā e‘tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḫadder qāṭe‘āneh edāmeh miyābad) & Eṭṭelā‘āt, 12 Tīr 
1374 (3 July 1995):”Drug trafficking, an inauspicious activity that is more profitable than the oil trade’ 
(Qāčaq-e mavādd-e moḫadder, fa‘‘āliyyatī-ye šūm ke az teǧārat-e naft sūd-āvartar ast) & Eṭṭelā‘āt, 13 Tīr 
1374 (4 July 1995):”Addiction withdrawal in 6 days, illusion or reality?’ (Tark-e e‘tiyād dar 6 rūz, sarāb 
yā vāqe‘iyyat?) & Eṭṭelā‘āt, 14 Tīr 1374 (5 July 1995):”The medical treatment with acupuncture has to 
take place within the framework of good order and legal provisions’ (Modāvā-ye mo‘tādān bā ṭebb-e 
sūzanī bāyad dar čārčūb-e naẓm va moqarrerāt-e qānūnī dar āyad) – all five articles are part of a serial 
titled”Every day has to be a Global Day against Addiction and Drug Smuggling’ (Hameh rūz bāyad ‘rūz-e 
ǧahānī-ye mobārezah bā e‘tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḫadder’ bāšad). 
957  Abrār, 15 Tīr 1374 (6 July 1995)”The Interior Minister in conversation with Abrār: The fifth Parliament 
[says] – we guarantee a healthy election’ (Vazīr-e kešvar dar goft-o-gū bā Abrār: maǧles-e pančom – 
salāmat-e enteḫābāt-rā tażmīn mīkonīm); Kaihān, 22 Tīr 1374 (13. July 1995):”Statement[s] of the police 
commander on the security of the borders, and the combat against the networks of merchandise smuggling, 
theft and social evils’ (Eẓhārāt-e farmāndeh-ye nīrū-ye enteẓāmī dar bāre-ye amniyat-e marzhā va 
mobārezah bā šabake-hā-ye qāčāq-e kālā, serqat va mafāsed-e eǧtemā‘ī); Abrār, 24 Tīr 1374 (15 July 
1995):”The drug cartels prefer the East’ (Kārtel-hā-ye mavādd-e moḫadder šarq-rā tarǧīḥ mīdehand); 
Eṭṭelā‘āt, 26 Tīr 1374 (17 July 1995):”Biological, psychological and sociological foundations of addiction’ 
(Bonyād-hā-ye zīst-šenāḫtī, ravān-šenāḫtī va ǧāme‘ah-šenāḫtī-ye e‘tiyād) – could not be identified. 
958  Hamšahrī, 21 Tīr 1374 (12 July 1995):”Cigarette[s] – a death caravan from the 16th century until today’ 
(Sīgār – kārvān-e marg az sadeh-ye 16 tā emrūz): could not be identified. 
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his troops in combatting drug trafficking as proven through the seizure of 135 tons of drugs in 
the previous year.959  
 
ĪRĀN in July: poverty, unemployment and lacking recreational facilities as addiction causes 
 In a roundtable interview with the two sociology professors Ṣādeq Farbod and Manṣūr 
Voṯūqī, Īrān covers the important topic of the role of the family in preventing drug addiction. 
Although emphasizing that in combatting drugs, drug supply and drug demand reduction 
measures are of equal importance; the following article nevertheless only covers Iran’s drug 
demand reduction measures. The two academics are quoted with a revealing argument, 
namely that the rehabilitation centers in Iran should not resemble prisons, while many in fact 
arguably still did. In flavoring its articles as usual with interviews with drug addicts, Īrān 
eventually writes critically about addiction causes in Iran, mentioning the problem of lacking 
recreational facilities for the youth next to the commonly reported poverty, unemployment, or 
family problems.960 
 
Abrār and Īrān in August: drug production around the world 
 As one of only two articles appearing in August, the conservative newspaper Abrār 
writes about the creation of the UNDCP in 1987 while actually criticizing its insufficient 
activities on the field of drug supply reduction. In describing the whole complex of drug 
cultivation, drug trafficking and money laundering in a rather conspiratorial way, it also 
points to poverty as the most crucial reason for drug production in the Golden Triangle and 
the Golden Crescent.961 Īrān for its part writes an article on the drug situation in Colombia, 
which, however, could not be identified.962 
 
 Kaihān in October: drugs from the viewpoint of Islam 
 While two articles of the newspapers Īrān and Kaihān on the international situation of 
drugs could not be identified either;963 Kaihān publishes one of the most interesting articles in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
959  Resālat, 24 Tīr 1374 (15 July 1995):”I say it from the heart [tongue] of the people that our nation is not on 
reconciliating terms with America’ (Az zabān-e mardom migūyam, mellat-e mā bā āmrikā sar-e āštī nīst). 
960  Īrān, 29 Tīr 1374 (20 July 1995):”The role of the family in the salvation and rehabilitation of the addicts – 
roundtable of [the newspaper] Īrān on families and youth addiction’ (Naqš-e ḫāne-vādeh dar naǧāt va bāz-
parvarī-ye mo‘tādān – mīz-gerd-e ‘īrān’ dar bāreh-ye ḫāne-vādeh-hā va e‘tiyād-e ǧavānān). 
961  Abrār, 19 Mordād 1374 (10 August 1995):”High concern for the combat against an inauspicious global 
trade’ (Hemmat-e ‘ālī barāye mobārezah bā teǧārat-e šūm-e ǧahānī). 
962  Īrān, 3 Šahrīvar 1374 (25 August 1995): The heavy shadow of the drug smugglers in the Colombian 
society’ (Sāyeh-ye sangīn-e qāčāqčīyān-e mavādd-e moḫadder dar ǧāme‘ah-ye kolombiyā). 
963  Īrān, 26 Mehr 1374 (18 October 1995):”Hungary – a passageway for heroin smugglers’ (Maǧārestān – 
goḏar-gāh-e qāčāqčīyān-e herōʼīn); Kaihān, 27 Mehr 1374 (19 October 1995):”Confessions of an 
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1374 (1995-96). This happens to be the only article in which religion and religious laws are in 
the center of argumentation. Interestingly, none of the cited fatāvā of the āyatollāhs Ḫomainī, 
Golpāyegānī or Moṭahharī argues for drug prohibition in analogy to the Koranic alcohol 
proscription – as is the case in different Sunni countries.964 Instead, it mentions as reasons for 
a prohibition of drugs: that drug addiction is causing the commitment of “illegal crime[s]” 
(ǧorm-e nā-mašrū‘), “physical and psychic illnesses” (bīmārī-hā-ye ǧesmī va ravānī), 
“premature death” (marg-e zūd-ras) and “suicide” (ḫvod-košī); and that since the Quran has 
forbidden “wastefulness” (esrāf) and “squandering” (tabḏīr), and since drug addicts “paralyze” 
(falaǧ mī-konand) the family and national economy by “committing sins and crimes” 
(mortakeb-e gonāh-ān va ǧarāyem), the consumption of opium, šīreh and morphine has been 
forbidden in Islam. “Therefore, punishing a producer […], a supplier […], and an abuser, and 
the admonishing of a criminal is necessary like in case of all other crimes for the protection 
and preservation of the community and for the prevention of evils […]” (laḏā moǧāzāt 
kardan-e toulīd-konandehʼī […] ‘arżeh-konandeh va sūʼ-maṣraf-konandeh beh ḫāṭer-e ḥefẓ 
va ṣiyānat-e eǧtemā‘ va ǧelou-gīrī az mafāsedī […] va tanabboh-e moǧrem mānand-e har 
ǧorm-e dīgarī lāzem bāšad).965 
 
Following a report on the cocaine trade in Europe, which could not be identified 
either; Kaihān publishes another interesting article.966 This article is written by the DCHQ and 
is in fact an answer to Kaihān’s previous argumentation. The DCHQ defends its current 
policy of preferably treating drug addicts and lists its successes so far in having applied a 
combined strategy of drug supply and drug demand reduction measures. Reaffirming the 
official plan of the SWO to enhance the country’s drug demand activities, the DCHQ, 
however, also implicitly admits that concerning drug prevention even half a year after the 
announcement of this plan not much has happened. Concomitantly, it mentions the debate on 
the appropriate confrontation of drug traffickers that took place in Iran before the passing of 
the ANTI NARCOTICS LAW in 1988. In this regard, it provides a new detail by mentioning that 
certain drug traffickers in the East are pardoned when renouncing further trafficking activities 
instead of being executed as the drug law 1988 demands.967 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
American official concerning the crimes of the White House and the reality behind’ (E‘terāfāt-e yek 
maʼmūr-e āmrīkāʼī dar bāreh-ye ǧenāyat-e kāḫ-e sefīd va vāqe‘iyyat-e pošt). 
964  Opwis (1999), 161ff. 
965  Kaihān, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995):”Drugs from the viewpoint of Islam’ (Mavādd-e moḫadder az 
dīd-gāh-e eslām). 
966  Kaihān, 11 Ābān 1374 (2 November 1995):”Cocaine trafficking in Europe’ (Qāčāq-e kōkāʼīn dar orūpā). 
967  Kaihān, 15 Ābān 1374 (6 November 1995):”Iran’s aims and positions concerning the fight against drugs’ 
(Ahdāf va dīd-dgāh-hā-ye īrān dar mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder). 
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Abrār on the occasion of an ECO session in Eṣfahān in November: an inter-regional 
cooperation is needed in the drugs combat 
 On the occasion of a session of the member countries of the ECONOMIC COOPERATION 
ORGANIZATION (ECO) (ekō), comprising Iran, Pakistan, Turkey and the states of Central Asia, 
which took place in Eṣfahān in November 1997, Abrār again stresses the need for an inter-
regional cooperation in the field of drug supply reduction.968 
 
Īrān in December: the role of the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS in relapse prevention 
While Kaihān in a next article only mentions drugs in passing when explaining the 
function of the public prosecutor’s office, 969  Īrān dedicates an entire article to the 
rehabilitation center Qarčak Varāmīn. Again emphasizing that drug addicts should be referred 
to as “assistance-seeking” (madad-ğū-yān), and reproducing interviews with some of the 
center’s patients, it mentions that only ten per cent of them are there voluntarily, and that the 
others were sent there by court order. It elaborates in detail on the rehabilitation measures 
such as sports in the traditional gymnasium (zūr-ḫāneh) or the production of handicraft; and it 
explains the functions of the various specialists working in Iran’s totally eleven rehabilitation 
centers. Most importantly, however, Īrān reveals, that every Wednesday, drug addicts and 
former addicts meet in a session organized by the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS (NA) (mo‘tād-ān-
e gom-nām). It describes this private therapeutic community as having been launched by 
Iranians, who had become addicted in Europe and the USA, and once cured, had returned to 
Iran. Consequently, it presents the ‘twelve steps’ (marāḥel-e davāz-dah-gāneh) program of 
the NA, whose success in Iran certainly can be explained by the fact that the withdrawal 
occurs without medication.970 
 
Īrān in January: economic underdevelopment contributes to drug trafficking in Sīstān va 
Balūčestān 
 In describing Iran’s physical fortification measures along the long and porous border 
with Afghanistan and Pakistan, Īrān mentions that these measures have cost Iran two hundred 
and fifty million US$ so far. Apparently, part of this strategy also consisted in the relocation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
968  Abrār, 14 Ābān 1374 (5 November 1995): “The policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the field of the 
inter-regional cooperation in the combat against drugs” (Siyāsat-hā-ye ǧomhūrī-ye eslāmī-ye īrān dar 
bo‘d-e ham-kārī-hā-ye manṭaqeʼī-ye mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḫadder). 
969  Kaihān, 4 Dey 1374 (26 December 1995):”In a special interview with Kaihān it is announced - the public 
prosecutor in his function as the public plaintiff officially intervenes in public crimes’ (Dar goft-o-gū-ye 
eḫteṣāṣī bā Kaihān e‘lām šod – dād-setān-e koll-e kešvar dar ǧarāyem-e ‘omūmī beh ‘onvān-e modda‘i-ol-
‘omūm raʼsan modāḫeleh mī-konad). 
970  Īrān, 18 Āḏar 1374 (9 December 1995):”Hard days of waiting – a report on the rehabilitation centre for 
addicts (in Qarčak)’ (Rūz-hā-ye saḫt-e enteẓār – gozārešī az markaz-e bāz-parvarī-ye mo‘tādān {qarčak}). 
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of border villages to the interior. However, instead of blaming local traffickers for bringing 
havoc on Iranian society, it rather reports on the economic difficulties of the province of 
Sīstān va Balūčestān, through which the bulk of drug trafficking takes place and consequently 
asks the government to develop this province by creating employment, developing 
infrastructure and extending health services and education. In doing so, Īrān is one of the few 
newspapers questioning a mere security-driven approach at the border and pointing to a more 
complex relationship between poverty and drug trafficking in Iran.971 
 
Abrār in March: only a healthy family life and religious education can help 
 After two articles on drug trafficking in Latin America appeared in the newspapers 
Aḫbār and Eṭṭelā‘āt;972 the newspaper Abrār writes about the situation of drug addiction in 
Iran. It again blames the “filthy aims of the global colonialism” (ahdāf-e palīd-e estekbā-e 
ǧahānī) for imposing this problem on Iran, and even directly accuses Iran’s “parasitic” 
(angalī) drug addicts of having a bad influence on the Iranian society. As a protective wall 
against drug addiction, it again promotes healthy families and religious education.973 
 
V. 2. b.  The Iranian press on drugs in the year 1376 (1997-98) 
 With sixty-nine articles, the Iranian newspapers in 1376 (1997-98) have increased the 
publication of drug related newspaper articles compared to two years ago. Many of these 
articles still appear around the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking; 
equally important is however, president Ḫātamī’s inauguration in August 1997, and in 
particular the amendment to the ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of November 1997. In comparison to 
the year 1374 (1995-96), a few additional newspaper contribute to the Iranian press discourse 
on drugs, yet these are conservative newspapers like Qods and Āfarīneš and not yet the new 
reformist newspapers. The range of topics the newspapers write about largely remains the 
same. But a few new arguments are introduced: the significant topic of tobacco smoking; and 
arguably of more importance, women as victims of drug addiction. Additionally, the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
971  Īrān, 28 Dey 1374 (19 January 1996):”Improvement of the East from the traders of death – a report on the 
governmental measures in the fight against drug trafficking at the Eastern borders” (Beh-sāzī-ye šarq az 
soudā-garān-e marg – gozārešī az eqdāmāt-e doulat dar mobārezah bā qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḫadder dar 
marz-hā-ye šarqī); an article of Abrār appearing in the same month could not be found: Abrār, 18 Dey 
1374 (9 January 1996): “Golden Triangle” (Moṯallaṯ-e ṭalāʼī). 
972  Aḫbār, 19 Bahman 1374 (8 February 1996): “The conviction of a president” (Moḥākemah-ye yek raʼīs-e 
ǧomhūr); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 2 Esfand 1374 (21 Ferbruary 1996): “Drug traffickers – a threat to democracy in Latin 
America” (Soudā-garān-e mavādd-e moḫadder, tahdīdī ‘alai-he demōkrāsī dar āmrīkā lātīn) – not 
available. 
973  Abrār, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 March 1996): “The addiction phenomenon” (Padīdeh-ye e‘tiyād) – could not be 
identified.  
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importance of the individual newspapers regarding the number of drug related articles and the 
quality of arguments in the Iranian press discourse is changing as well.  
 
Eṭṭelā‘āt on the occasion of a Friday prayer in April: addiction vs. habit 
The first drug-related newspaper article in 1376 (1998/99) is again written on the 
occasion of Friday prayer. Yet, unlike two years ago, Eṭṭelā‘āt does not write about drug 
supply reduction, but cites the main speaker Āyatollāh Makārem-e Šīrāzī with a speech on the 
Iranian youth, sophisticatedly differentiating between ‘addiction’ (e‘tiyād) and habits (sg. 
‘ādat), the latter of which being part of every human being.974 
 
Resālat in April: Germany has legalized drugs 
Like Hamšahrī two years ago, Resālat publishes an article about the liberal drug 
policy of certain European countries. The article is, however, written or at least prepared by 
the DCHQ, using as a source the newspaper algōmnāniyeh (mūreh), probably the Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung. The article considers the – rather distortedly presented – German and 
Swiss drug policy examples to be a failure: in Switzerland, despite its liberal drug policy that 
allegedly includes the “free distribution” (touzī‘-e āzād) of heroin, there would apparently 
still be hundreds of drug-related deaths.975 
 
The No Tobacco Week in May 
 Additionally to the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, the Iranian press uses 
another international date to raise the awareness of the Iranian public on drugs: the world no tobacco day of the 
WHO, which takes place on May 31 and which the Iranian newspapers rather call no tobacco week (hafteh-ye 
bedūn doḫānīyāt). Yet, this day is only mentioned in 1376 (1997-98).  
 
Kaihān in a series of articles in May: why are you drinking? To forget that I’m drinking 
With a series consisting of two articles, Kaihān initiates one of the most important 
topics of the Iranian press discourse in this year, namely the widespread addiction to 
cigarettes, which it describes as even more addictive than heroin or cocaine. This is 
remarkable, as two years ago, the newspaper Hamšahrī considered tobacco smoking a lesser 
evil than the consumption of other drugs, although still mentioning it as an important starter 
drug. Kaihān describes the global situation of tobacco smoking according to information of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
974  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 20 Farvardīn 1376 (9 April 1997):”A serious issue of the adolescents’ (Mas’ala-ye ǧeddī az 
masāʼel-e ǧavānān). 
975  Resālat, 21 Farvardīn 1376 (10 April 1997):”Did the trade and consumption of drugs in Germany become 
free!?’ (Ḫarīd, forūš va maṣraf-e mavādd-e moḫadder dar ālmān āzād šod!?). 
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the WHO and mentions that in Iran there are six million tobacco smokers. Referring to the 
smoker’s stated desire to lower stress, it even cites the famous sentence from Antoine de 
Saint-Exupéry’s Petit Prince (šāh-zadeh-ye kūčūlū) “pourquoi bois-tu? […] pour oublier que 
j’ai honte […] de boire” albeit slightly altering it to “why do you drink? […] To forget that I 
am drinking and always be drunk” (čerā mašrūb mīnūšī? […] barāye īn keh farāmūš konam 
ke mašrūb mīnūšam va dāʼem ol-ḫamr hastam!).976 
 
Hamšahrī in May: foreign cigarette brands are more addictive than domestic brands 
 While an article of Abrār highlighting the parents’ influence on the behavior of their 
children could not be identified;977 Hamšahrī also publishes an article during no tobacco week. 
While Iran’s Health Minister points to the deplorable fact that in Iran, approximately fifty 
thousand people die each year due to tobacco smoking or passive smoking, the interviewed 
director of a local tobacco company rather unconvincingly maintains that foreign cigarette 
brands are more addictive than domestic cigarettes.978 
 
Eṭṭelā‘āt in a series of articles in June: smoking leads to social deviations such as illegal 
relationships 
Like its sibling Kaihān, the newspaper Eṭṭelā‘āt also publishes a series of two articles 
on smoking. The author, Dr. Eḥsān ol-Dīn Naṣīrzādeh, points to the importance of education 
in preventing the tendency to start smoking at an early age. Citing the opinion of “most 
researchers” (akṯar-e moḥaqqeqīn), he accentuates an alleged correlation between tobacco 
smoking and “social deviations” (enḥerāfāt-e eǧtemā‘ī) such as “illegal relations” (ravābeṭ-e 
nāmašrū‘) – that is pre- or extramarital sexual relations – or the consumption of illegal drugs; 
and bizarrely claims that smokers are more likely to die in an accident or to be infected by 
HIV.979 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
976  Kaihān, 7 Ḫordād 1376 (28 May 1997): „6 million smokers in Iran – put it out!’  (6 mīliyūn sīgārī dar 
īrān - ḫāmūš kon); Kaihān, 8 Ḫordād 1376 (29 May 1997):”Smoker are buying poison and thus spread 
pollution’ (Sīgārī-hā sem mīḫarand tā ālūdegī touzī‘ mīkonand) – both articles are part of a series 
titled”On the occasion of the week without tobacco products / smoking’ (beh monāsebat-e hafte-ye bedūn 
doḫāniyyāt) 
977  Abrār, 7 Ḫordād 1376 (28 May 1997): „Children are more inspired by the deeds than the words of their 
parents’ (Kūdakān az raftār-e vāledain bīštar elhām mīgīrand tā goftārešān). 
978  Hamšahrī, 10 Ḫordād 1376 (31 May 1997): „Cigarettes, a smoke that affects everyone’s eyes’ (Sīgār, dūdī 
ke beh čašm-e hameh mīravad). 
979  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 18 & 19 Ḫordād 1376 (8 & 9 June 1997): „Cigarettes, a big menace to the hygiene of schools’ 
(Sīgār, tahdīdī-ye bozorg barāye behdāšt-e madāres). 
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Resālat in June: economic development prevents drug trafficking 
Preceding the international drugs day, the newspaper Resālat gives a summary of the 
activities of the Islamic Republic in fighting drug trafficking by emphasizing as usual its 
success. The entire article is based on information provided by the DCQH. These include 
statistics on seized drugs (733 tons in the last five years), arrested drug traffickers (146,548), 
and cured addicts (66,623). Resālat still holds the opinion that Iran has less drug addicts than 
before the revolution. It also states that Iran is not only fortifying its Eastern borders with 
physical barriers, but indeed also develops the poor border provinces economically in order to 
prevent the local inhabitants of turning to drug trafficking.  Less success is, in contrast, 
ascribed to the governmental efforts in the field of drug demand reduction, which is 
particularly explained by often-uncoordinated programs. Among drug prevention measures 
discussed in official circles, Resālat also mentions the forced separation of children from 
addicted parents, thus again emphasizing the importance of the family in the Iranian press 
discourse on drugs.980 
 
Eṭṭelā‘āt in June: smoking must be prohibited in public places 
In yet another series of articles on smoking, Eṭṭelā‘āt again establishes a relation 
between smoking and specific social phenomena such as for instance “divorce” (ṭalāq) or 
“illiteracy” (bī-savādī). Providing new details, it also mentions that there are four 
governmental and private anti-smoking organizations in Iran, among which it particularly 
names the SOCIETY AGAINST SMOKING (ǧam‘iyyat-e mobārezeh bā este‘māl-e doḫānīyāt). 
Conducting interviews with different addiction specialists, it supports a smoking-ban in public 
spaces, as would allegedly already be the case in seventy per cent of all countries; and 
requests the EXPEDIENCY COUNCIL, the decisive legal body in drug matters, to obligate 
tobacco companies to print health warnings on cigarette packages.981  
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
980  Resālat, 26 Ḫordād 1376 (16 June 1997): „A resumé of some operations of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 
the combat against drugs’ (Ḫolāṣah-ye baḫšī az ‘amal-kard-e ǧomhūrī-ye eslāmī-ye īrān dar amr-e 
mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder). 
981  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 1 Tīr 1376 (22 June 1997): „Smoking in public places has to be forbidden: (Kešīdan-e sīgār dar 
maǧāme‘-e ‘omūmī bāyad mamnū‘ šavad)  & Eṭṭelā‘āt, 2 Tīr 1376 (23 June 1376):”Recommendations of 
the Society to Fight Smoking to quit smoking’ (Pīš-nehād-hā-ye ǧam’iyyat-e mobārezah bā este’māl-e 
doḫāniyyāt barāy-e tark-e sīgār) – the two article are part of a series titles”A glance at smoking and its 
unpleasant consequences (negāhī beh este‘māl-e doḫāniyāt va peyāmad-hā-ye nā-govār-e ān)’, which 
actually consist of at least four articles, of which, however, only two could be identified. 
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Still the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking of June 26 
 Like in 1374 (1995-96), international drugs day still motivates the press to publish many drug-related 
newspaper articles, although less than two years ago. This might be due to reduced drug-related activities of the 
government during the transitional period from the Rafsanǧānī to the Ḫātamī administration. This might 
arguably also have affected the DCHQ, which in turn could why the press publishes more articles on smoking. 
 
Hamšahrī: the problem of addiction relapse  
The press has already partly discussed the relapse risk for treated drug addicts in 1374 
(1997-98), when talking about the crucial role of the addicts’ families in their rehabilitation. 
Unsurprisingly, it is again the liberal newspaper Hamšahrī that broaches this topic. It reports 
that eighty per cent of heroin addicts and fifty per cent of other drug addicts relapse within the 
first three months after their withdrawal in Iran. It therefore demands more scientific 
programs to prevent former drug addicts from relapsing, requesting such programs to pay 
particular attention to the interrelationship between drug addiction and other mental 
disturbances.982 
 
Resālat: drug addiction has decreased in Iran; a cultural combat is nevertheless necessary 
In a next article, Resālat emphasizes the need for a comprehensive governmental 
effort in combating the national drug problem, including drug demand reduction programs. 
But it nevertheless rather continues to describe Iran’s successful combat against drug 
trafficking, demonstrating its success through the use charts displaying seizures of opium and 
morphine by different regional countries. It also claims that heroin is still predominantly 
produced in Turkey, while the bulk of heroin actually takes place in Afghanistan. Less 
astonishing is Resālat’s persisting – albeit increasingly solitary – opinion that drug addiction 
has decreased since the revolution.983 In another article, published on the occasion of the day 
of the judiciary (rūz-e qovveh-ye qażāʼīyeh), Āyatollāh Yazdī, the ultra-conservative head of 
the Judiciary, asks the domestic media to actively contribute to the “cultural aspects” 
(masāʼel-e farhangī) of the drugs combat.984 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
982  Hamšahrī, 3 Tīr 1376 (24 June 1997): „The silent chemical war. A study of the effective causes that bring 
an addict to an afresh drug consumption’ (Ǧang-e šīmīyāʼī-ye ḫāmūš. Bar-rasī-ye ‘avāmel-e moʼaṯṯer dar 
dar rūy āvordan-e far-e mo‘tād be maṣraf-e moǧaddad-e māddah-ye moḫadder). 
983  Resālat, 3 Tīr 1376 (24 June 1997): „The combat against drugs needs a comprehensive and harmonious 
program; the efforts have to be on demand reduction – On occasion of 5 Tīr, the International Day against 
Drug Addiction and Drug Trafficking’ (Mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder niyāz beh barnāmeh-ye 
ǧāme‘ va hāmahang dārad; talāš-hā bāyad baraye kāheš-e taqāżā bāšad – beh monāsebat-e 5 tīr māh, rūz-
e ǧahānī-ye mobārezah bā e’tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḫadder). 
984  Resālat, 4 Tīr 1376 (25 June 1997): We investigate the plaints without regard to the postion of the persons’ 
(Bedūn tavaǧǧoh beh mouqa‘‘iyyat-e ašḫāṣ beh šekāyat resīdegī mīkonīm). 
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Still on the occasion of the international drugs day, Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī and the 
moderately conservative Aḫbār, publish articles on the soaring drug production under the 
Ṭālibān in Afghanistan, both of which could not be identified.985 Aḫbār also publishes another 
article on cannabis or marihuana (mārī ǧovānā) as a starter drug, yet concerning the USA and 
without mentioning Iran.986 
 
Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī in July: long summer holidays and lacking recreational facilities as 
addiction causes 
After writing an article that states that most prisoners in Iran are drug-related convicts, 
both drug traffickers and drug addicts;987 the newspaper Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī again talks about 
the important topic of drug addiction among adolescents. It particularly mentions the long 
summer holidays as a problem, since the youth have plenty of leisure time, yet no 
corresponding recreational facilities such as “cultural places” (amāken-e farhangī) or sports 
facilities at their disposal. Other mentioned addiction causes are “crisis of faith” (boḥrān-e 
e‘teqādī) and the “imitation of Western behaviors” (taqlīd az algū-hā-ye ġarbī). As remedy, 
Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī advises stricter family control and, more pronouncedly than two years 
ago, religious education and further religious activities for the youth. More astonishingly, it is 
the first newspaper to mention the problem of HIV/AIDS among intravenous drug users in 
Iran.988 
 
Kaihān in July: self-help groups play a crucial role in the prevention of addiction relapse 
Also writing about „addiction relapse prevention” (ǧelou-gīrī az bāz-gašt beh e‘tiyād) 
is Kaihān in one of its few drug-related articles in this year. As one such relapse cause, it 
mentions the fact that cured drug addicts often continue to frequent the same places and 
people; although it rather strangely assumes that they do this in order to prove their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
985  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 4 Tīr 1376 (25 June 1997): „The Ṭālibān – promoters of drugs inside and outside of 
Afghanistan’ (Ṭālebān – moravveǧ-e mavādd-e moḫadder dar dāḫel va ḫāreğ az afġānestān) & Aḫbār, 6 
Tīr 1376 (27 June 1997): „The Ṭālibān – planters […] of the white death’ (Ṭālebān – kāšeġān-e […] marg-
e sefīd). – both articles could not be identified. 
986  Aḫbār, 8 Tīr 1376 (29 June 1997): „The destructive effect of marijuana – this is the first step!’ (Aṯar-e 
moḫarreb-e „mārī ǧūwānā’ – īn qadam-e avval ast). 
987  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 9 Tīr 1376 (30 June 1997): „The president [announces]: the Islamic society wants the 
Judiciary to be decisive in confronting violators’ (Raʼīs-e ǧomhūr: ǧāme‘ah-ye eslāmī ḫvāhān-e qāṭe‘iyyat-
e dast-gāh-e qażāʼī dar bar-ḫord bā motaḫallefān ast). 
988  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997): „Caution! The swirl of addiction lies in the ambush of the 
youth!’ (Hošdār! Gerdāb-e e‘tiyād dar kamīn-e ǧavānān ast). 
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steadfastness. Kaihān also emphasizes the importance of ‘self-help groups’ (gorūh-hā-ye 
ḫvod-yārī) as well as the family and friends in providing relapse prevention.989 
 
Eṭṭelā‘āt in July: the ANTI NARCOTICS LAW must be reformed to allow for addiction treatment 
The last newspaper article that appears before the inauguration of Ḫātamī in August 
1997 again covers the legal problem of drug addiction. In stressing the importance of religion 
as a crucial prevention tool, and by advocating a “cultural revolution” (enqelāb-e farhangī) in 
this regard, Eṭṭelā‘āt criticizes that there is still no appropriate prevention plan in Iran. It 
consequently demands a more scientific approach to – and crucially control over – drug 
demand reduction measures; and requests a revision of the relevant laws, to finally put 
addiction therapy measures on a clear legal basis.990 The request would in fact soon be 
fulfilled, namely by the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of November 1997. 
 
Ḫātamī’s inauguration in August 
As has been shown in the chapter on discursive events, Ḫātamī’s inauguration gave the press discourse 
on drugs a major boost. This impact is, however, not only observable in the number of drug related newspaper 
articles, but more importantly also in the range of topics and arguments. Ḫātamī’s new reformist government 
started to put even more emphasis on the drug demand reduction side; and the competent authorities, in 
particular the DCHQ, the SWO and the Health Ministry, immediately after the inauguration, set about putting 
this new policy into practice. Still in 1376 (1997-98) they organized a series of events: an exhibitions on drug 
addiction in Tehran; a workshop on addiction prevention in Qom; but also an interregional session on drug 
supply reduction in Eṣfahān. The most important event in the second half of the year was, however, the 
AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW, which was passed in November 1997. 
 
Abrār on the occasion of the exhibition “war without borders”: more scientific addiction 
research is needed 
The moderately conservative Abrār writes the first article after Ḫātamī’s inauguration, 
on the occasion of an exhibition with the title “war without borders” (ǧang bedūn-e marz) that 
organized by the DCHQ. Like the newspaper Eṭṭelā‘āt has done before, it asks the new 
government to explain its plans for drug prevention, because addicts not only inflict damage 
on themselves but on society in general. Abrār consequently also demands that the 
government undertake more scientific studies on addiction causes; and due to the lack of such 
reports instead reproduces statistics of drug interceptions by the police and the UNDCP 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
989  Kaihān, 17 Tīr 1376 (8 July 1997): „How can addiction be defeated?’ (Če-gūneh mītavān bar e‘tiyād 
ġalbah kard?). 
990  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 28 Tīr 1376 (19 July 1997): „Epidemic of addiction’ (Epīdemī-ye e‘tiyād). 
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instead. More addiction research by governmental institutions and universities would, 
however, soon follow. In stressing the importance of addiction prevention, it again focuses on 
the role of a healthy, affective and religious family environment.991 
 
Hamšahrī in a series of articles in September: a preview of the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS 
LAW & new addiction consultation centers 
 By September, the newspaper Hamšahrī provides its readers with a first impression of 
the amendments to the ANTI NARCOTICS LAW. In a series of two articles, it explicitly states 
the reason for the legal revision consisting in finally creating a legal basis for the medical 
treatment of drug addicts, as they could still be convicted simply on the grounds of being 
drug-addicted. Yet, despite insisting that drug addiction is an illness, Hamšahrī still displays a 
moralistic view by calling listing addiction as a “social crime” (bezeh-e eǧtemā‘ī), which 
would lead to further social crimes such as “theft” (serqat) or even “prostitution” (faḥšāʼ). It 
further explains that the DCHQ, whose structure it describes concomitantly, helped in drafting 
the new law, together with the “religious seminary” (ḥouzeh-ye ‘elmīyeh) in Qom. At the 
same time, it introduces newly created “consultation centers” (marākez-e mošāvereh-ye 
ḥożūr) and “telephone help-lines” (marākez-e mošavereh-ye telefonī) by the SWO. It provides 
another interesting detail when describing that in certain regions of Iran, still an opium pipe 
(vāfūr) might be offered as part of the traditional hospitality. This is one of the few allusions 
to the indeed continued existence of more traditional drug consumption patterns in Iran.992 
 
Kaihān and Hamšahrī in September: hints for parents to detect signs of drug addiction 
among their children 
Kaihān and Hamšahrī affirm the reinvigorated efforts of the new administration on 
the field of drug demand reduction by printing advices for parents on how to detect possible 
signs of drug addiction among their children, and how to educate them in an attentive way in 
order to prevent drug addiction. However, it also warns “this parental supervision should not 
be meddlesome and unfoundedly intrusive” (īn neẓārat nabāyad ǧanbeh-ye fożūlī va deḫālat-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
991  Abrār, 12 Šahrīvar 1376 (3 September 1997): „Addiction – what are our prevention policies? An account 
of the exhibition „A war without border’, organized by the Drug Control Headquarter’ (E‘tiyād – tadābīr-e 
pīšgīrāneh-ye mā čīst? Gozāreš az nemāyeš-gāh-e ǧang bedūne-e marz be hemmat-e setād-e mobārezah bā 
mavādd-e moḫadder). 
992  Hamšahrī, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 September 1997): „Addiction – Prevention or Combat? (E‘tiyād – pīšgīrī 
yā mobārezah?) & Hamšahrī, 17 Šahrīvar (7 September 1997): „The family – a solid fortification in the 
confrontation with addiction’ (Ḫāne-vādeh - ḥeṣār-e moḥkam dar moqābelah bā e‘tiyād) – both articles are 
part of a series titled „On the margins of the ratification of the law{s} for the combat agains drugs in the 
EXPEDIENCY DISCERNMENT COUNCIL OF THE SYSTEM’ (Dar ḥāšiyya-ye taṣvīb-e qavānīn-e mobārezah bā 
mavādd-e moḫadder dar maǧma‘-e tašḫīṣ-e maṣlaḥat-e neżām) 
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e bī moured paidā konad). Both articles are interestingly written by the same author, and thus 
probably have been authored by the Health Ministry or another governmental institution.993 
 
Translations from foreign newspapers and journals 
 As Resālat writes in an article from April 1997,994 many translations of foreign articles that are 
published by the press are in fact prepared and put at the media’s disposal by the DCHQ. While this might not 
always be the case, it is nevertheless striking that some of the articles appearing after Ḫātamī’s inauguration are 
either translations of such foreign sources or generally broach the issue of foreign drug policies. This might 
indeed have been a deliberate strategy of the government to prepare the public to the amendment of THE ANTI 
NARCOTICS LAW and to more progressive addiction treatment measures respectively. 
 Hamšahrī and Salām for instance provide direct translations from foreign articles. While Hamšahrī 
reprints an article on the drug policy of Germany that appeared in the German tabloid Bild am Sonntag; Salām 
reprints an article from leftist journal Le Monde Diplomatique on the hegemonic role of the US drug policy in 
Colombia. This is the only drug-related article published in Salām in 1376 (1997-98), soon one of the most 
outspoken reformist newspapers.995 
 
Hamšahrī in September: an accurate and positive report about the liberal Swiss drug policy 
In a next article, Hamšahrī describes at length the recent drug policy shift in 
Switzerland towards distributing medically controlled heroin to long-time addicts. This report 
is not only the first accurate account on the Swiss drug policy, but proceeds to conclude with 
the assessment that this approach is more effective in reducing crimes than simply addressing 
drug-related crimes in a repressive way. At least implicitly, an important space is thus opened 
for the later discussion of harm reduction measures in the Iranian press. Hamšahrī explicitly 
refers to the importance of studying best practices and experiences of different countries.996 In 
another article, Hamšahrī puts forward an explicit criticism of the conservative judiciary and 
the security forces, adding that in Iran the widespread issue of tobacco smoking is less 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
993  Kaihān, 18 Šahrīvar 1376 (8 September 1997): „How should we educate our infants, so that they are not 
caught by addiction in their young days’ (Kūdakān-emān-rā čegūneh tarbiyyat konīm tā dar ǧavānī 
gereftār-e e’tiyād našavand?); Hamšahrī, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997): „How do we keep our 
children away from drugs? (Čegūneh farzandān-e ḫodrā az mavādd-e moḫadder dūr negah-dārīm?). 
994  Resālat, 21 Farvardīn 1376 (10 April 1997):”Did the trade and consumption of drugs in Germany become 
free!?’ (Ḫarīd, forūš va maṣraf-e mavādd-e moḫadder dar ālmān āzād šod!?). 
995  Salām, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997): „Drugs, a pretext to suppress the people’ (Mavādd-e 
moḫadder – bahānaʼī barāye sar-kūb-e mardom). 
996  Hamšahrī, 24 Šahrīvar 1376 (14 September 1997): „In fighting drugs, prohibition is not sufficient’ (Dar 
mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder, mamnū‘iyyat kāfī nīst) & Hamšahrī, 25 Šahrīvar 1376 (15 September 
1997): „In fighting drugs, prohibition is not sufficient. What is the solution?’ (Dar mobārezah bā mavādd-e 
moḫadder, mamnū‘iyyat kāfī nīst. Rāh-e ḥall čīst?). 
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discussed than the alleged problem of indecent veiling of women (bad-ḥeǧābī). This, of 
course at least in 1376 (1997-98), is hardly true.997 
 
Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī in September: the CIA’s role in the global drug traffic 
As if to establish a counterweight to the discussion of the liberal drug policies of 
foreign countries, Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī reminds its readers that the drug policies of foreign 
countries often have less noble aims, by highlighting the indeed often dubious role of the CIA 
in the global drug traffic.998 
 
The inter-regional session on combatting drug trafficking in September 
 As stated previously, Ḫātamī’s administration not only organized events in the field of drug demand 
reduction, but also continued Rafsanǧānī’s international efforts in the field of drug supply reduction measures. 
Ḫātamī’s efforts in this regard included the organization of a session on behalf of the ECO, as well as the 
“interregional session on drugs” (eǧlās-e bain-e manṭaqehʼī-ye mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḫadder) convened by 
Interpol in Eṣfahān. 
  
Hamšahrī in an interview with professor Fīrūz Ğalīlī: the number of drug addicts in Iran is 
approximately one and a half million 
On the occasion of Interpol’s “interregional session on drugs” on 28 September 1997, 
Hamšahrī publishes an interview with Fīrūz Ǧalīlī-Ḫiyābānī, a professor for addiction 
psychology from the UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN. Critically assessing Iran’s drug policy 
measures, Ğalīlī not only deplores a lack of scientific research on the situation of drug 
addiction in Iran, but reproduces an estimation of the WHO, according to which 2.4% of the 
Iranian population are addicted to drugs. This would amount to one and a half million people, 
three times as much as the Iranian government has admitted so far. He also questions the 
prevalent opinion previously expressed by the newspapers, namely that addiction withdrawal 
should not be done by the help of medication; but rather maintains, that in addition to 
medication, psychological and social support is also important.999 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
997  Hamšahrī, 25 Šahrīvar 1376 (15 September 1997): „Cigarettes – choice or compulsion?’ (Sīgār, enteḫāb 
yā eǧbār?). 
998  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 27 Šahrīvar 1376 (18 September 1997): „Clinton’s support for fifty years of 
conspiracy and crime of America’s spy organization ‘CIA’’ (Ḥemāyat-e klīntōn az 50 sāl-e tūṭeʼe va 
ǧanāyat-e sāzemān-e ǧāsūsī-ye āmrīkā, ‘SIA’); on the past involvement of the CIA in the drug trafficking 
for instanc in Southeast Asia, Central America, Colombia, or in Afghanistan and Pakistan: McCoy (2003). 
999  Hamšahrī, 2 Mehr 1376 (24 September 1997): „Medicine alone is no remedy for addiction. Causes for a 
lacking success of the drug combat – in an interview with Professor Fīrūz Ǧalīlī’ (Faqaṭ dārū, čāreh-ye 
e‘tiyād nīst. ‘Elal-e ‘adam-e movaffaqiyyat-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder dar goft-o-gū bā prōfesōr 
Fīrūz Ǧalīlī).  
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Eṭṭelā‘āt in a series of articles in October: the international community supports Iran’s drug 
supply reduction efforts  
During the interregional session on drugs combat in Eṣfahān, Eṭṭelā‘āt publishes the 
most comprehensive series of articles so far, consisting of six articles. The articles cover 
Iran’s drug supply reduction efforts, its cooperation with regional countries and the UNDCP, 
and the drug policies of specific foreign countries. While requesting the international 
community to financially contribute to Iran’s costly drug combat, Eṭṭelā‘āt also mentions that 
the DCHQ staff are trained in special courses by the UNDCP, and that some DCHQ 
specialists have travelled to European countries to study best practices. It further adds that the 
UNDCP financially supports a common project between Pakistan and Iran. 
Contrary to Hamšahrī, Eṭṭelā‘āt, however, still refutes liberal drug policy measures as 
applied in Switzerland. It even maintains that the Swiss policy of “legalization” (āzād-sāzī) 
resulted in more drug addicts. It emphasizes, in contrast: “the way to the eventual solution has 
to be searched in the spreading of religion, in the return to religious believes, and in 
spirituality” (rāh-e ḥall-e nehāyī-rā bāyad dar gostareš-e maḏhab va bāz-gašt beh e‘teqād-āt-
e dīnī va ma‘navīyat ǧost-o-ǧū kard). While still maintaining the official estimation of 
500,000 drug addicts in Iran, it also promotes marriage as a way to prevent drug addiction, 
thus voicing an opinion that will soon be challenged by other newspapers.1000 
 
Resālat in October: increasing drug addiction in Iran & Islamic remedies  
 In October, Resālat for the first time admits that Iran has a growing addiction problem. 
Similar to Eṭṭelā‘āt, it considers following the Islamic rules to be the best drug prevention: 
“let us strive to [follow] as perfect as possible the examples of the impeccable imams (peace 
be upon them) and the noblemen of knowledge and religion in order to preserve growth, 
progression, freshness and succulence” (rah-nemūdeh-ye aʼemmeh-ye ma‘ṣūmīn (‘alaihom 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1000  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 13 Mehr 1376 (5 October 1997): „Drugs – a supra-national problem and a serious menace to all 
earth dwellers’ (Mavādd-e moḫadder - moškelī-ye farā-mellī va tahdīdī-ye ǧeddī barāye ǧahāniyān) & 
Eṭṭelā‘āt, 14 Mehr 1376 (6 October 1997): „Iran is not a safe route for the international drugs smuggling 
networks anymore’ (Īrān dīgar masīr-e amnī barāye šabakeh-hā-ye bain-ol-melalī-ye qāčāq-e mavādd-e 
moḫadder nīst) & Eṭṭelā‘āt, 15 Mehr 1376 (7 October 1997): „The fight against drugs production and 
distribution needs a global approach (Mobārezah bā toulīd va touzī‘-e mavādd-e moḫadder, niyāz-mand-e 
ravī-kardī-ye ǧahānī ast) & Eṭṭelā‘āt, 16 Mehr 1376 (8 October 1997): „The international drugs trade – a 
spread of the exceeding breath of the inauspicious deathly shadow of addiction’ (Teǧārat-e ǧahānī-ye 
mavādd-e moḫadder – gostareš-e dam-e afzūn-e sāyeh-ye šūm-e marg-bār-e e‘tiyād) & Eṭṭelā‘āt, 17 Mehr 
1376 (9 October 1997): „Important background [knowledge] for the visibility of an inclination towards 
drug consumption” (Zamīneh-hā-ye momehh padāī-ye gerāyeš beh maṣraf-e mavādd-e moḫadder) & 
Eṭṭelā‘āt, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997): „The young – the first victims of the greediness and 
criminality of the drug traffickers’ (Ǧavānān, naḫostīn qorbāniyān-e āzmandī va tebeh-kārī-ye 
qāčāqčīyān-e mav¯dd-e moḫadder) – the six articles are part of a series titled „Performance of the inter-
regional session on drugs combat’ (Bar-gozārī-ye eǧlās-e bain-e manṭaqeʼī-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-e 
moḫadder). 
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salām) va bozorgān-e ‘elm va dīn dar rāstā-ye taḥaqqoq-e ārmān-hā-ye moqaddas-e eslāmī 
va rošd va taraqqī va ṭarāvat va šādābī har če tamāmtar bekūšīm).1001 
 
Eṭṭelā‘āt and Hamšahrī in October: the second anniversary of the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS in 
Iran 
 In October 1997, two newspaper articles describe in depth the aims and activities of 
the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS (NA) branch in Iran. Eṭṭelā‘āt describes how the Iranian branch 
of the NA had been launched approximately two years ago; and it cites Moḥammad Fallāḥ, 
director general of the DCHQ, effusively praising this first private addiction treatment 
organization in Iran; while also mentioning a booklet of the NA with the title ‘Who is an 
addict?’ (mo‘tād kīst?). Hamšahrī’s article bears the title “the addict – ill or criminal?” 
(mo‘tād – bīmār yā moǧrem?). It provides some additional information on the NA, namely 
the addresses of different branches in Tehrān. Hamšahrī’s article is written by Hūtan Golsorḫī, 
an Iranian addiction specialist residing in Canada, who is also cited by Eṭṭelā‘āt. He is also 
the first author in the press discourse on drugs to explicitly compare drugs to alcohol, by 
slightly misquoting a Koranic verse as “verily, wine belongs to the best handiworks of Satan” 
(innama ʼl-ḫamru aḥsanu mi[n?] ‘amali ʼš-šaiṭāni’)1002 
 
Hamšahrī in a series of two articles in October: half of the addicts are younger than twenty-
four 
 In a series consisting of two articles, Hamšahrī again pays attention to the 
international drug trafficking, concentrating on Istanbul and Dubai as the most important 
trafficking hubs in Southwest and West-Asia respectively. Hamšahrī makes an important 
claim by stating that drug trafficking needs a consumer market, thus pointing to the indeed 
intricate relationship between drug supply and drug demand and admitting a certain self-
responsibility of Iran for the problem of drug addiction. In this article, it again reproduces the 
official number of 500,000 drug addicts, despite having earlier published the WHO estimation 
of around 1,5 million drug addicts. Additionally, it maintains that fifty per cent of the drug 
addicts are under the age of twenty-four. While mentioning prostitution as a common “social 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1001  Resālat, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997): „The use of drugs [is] an alarm bell! On occasion of start of the 
manoeuvre ‚prognosis’’ (Este’māl-e mavādd-e moḫadder, zang-e ḫaṭar! Beh monāsebat-e šorū‘-e mānovr-
e „enḏār’) – the text itself doesn’t refer to this presumably military or police manoeuvre. 
1002  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 24 Mehr 1376 (14 October 1997): „Addiction, prevention, therapy and follow-up ...” (E‘tiyād, 
pīš-gīrī, darmān va pey-gīrī ...); Hamšahrī, 24 Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997): „The addict – an ill or a 
criminal person?’ (Mo’tād – bīmār yā moǧrem?); the exact wording of Sūrat 5 (al-Māʼidat), Verse 91 is: 
“wine and the game of hazard and idols and divining arrows are only an abomination of Satan’s 
handiwork” (inna-ma ʼl-ḫamru wa-l-masīrū wa-l-anṣābu wa-l-azlāmu riǧsun min ‘amali ʼš-šaiṭāni). 
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evil” (mafsad-e eǧtemā‘ī) related to drug addiction, it explicitly excludes Iran from this rule. 
Additionally, it cites different expert opinions holding that Iran’s drug policy is not 
successful; but subsequently rather concentrates on neglecting duties of the police in 
confronting “drug dealing” (ḫarīd va forūš-e mavādd-e moḫadder). 1003 
 
The AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW in November 
 Certainly the most important discourse event of the second half of the year 1376 (1997-98) is the amendment to the 
ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of 1988, which the Expediency Council passed in November 1997. This amendment explicitly grants 
drug addicts the right to addiction treatment and protection from prosecution – at least during the period. The courts in fact 
merely tolerated the government’s previous addiction treatment measures, and indeed sent many addicts to such centers. But 
according to the previous law, this practice was illegal. Already in 1374 (1995-96), the newspapers have lamented this 
inconsistency between law and practice and have pointed to the danger of drug addicts being arrested when referring 
themselves voluntarily to rehabilitation centers. In 1376 (1997-98), they, consequently, display much interest in the 
amendment and publish many drug-related articles, albeit not always agreeing in their judgment of these legal changes. 
 
Resālat in October: drug addiction among the youth is worrisome & prevention is better than 
therapy 
 Sharing Hamšahrī’s concern for the widespread drug addiction among Iranian 
adolescents, Resālat mentions drug addiction – or as it quotes the WHO-preferred term 
“medical dependence” (vābastegī-ye dārūʼī) – as “one of the biggest social problems” (az 
mohemmtarīn mo‘żal-āt-e eǧtemā‘ī). To defend themselves against the “filthy aims” (ahdāf-e 
palīd) of the “death merchants” (soudā-gar-ān-e marg), it advises parents to provide their 
children with a secure and calm environment and aks the government to conduct more 
scientific addiction research since “prevention has priority over therapy” (pīš-gīrī moqaddam 
bar darmān ast). 1004 
 
Resālat: the existing laws are very good; executions, prisons and labor islands are the best 
prevention 
 In November 1997, Resālat publishes an extreme criticism of Iran’s current drug 
policy, contradicting previous and subsequent articles of its own. The article with the ironic 
title “what does public education even mean?” (āmūzeš-e ‘omūmī ya‘nī čeh?!)  is written as a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1003  Hamšahrī, 27 Mehr 1376 (19 October 1997): „From the Golden Triangle of  opium to the thousands mazes 
of the Mafia. A glance at the global drug production centres and market(s)’ (Az moṯallaṯ-e ṭalāʼī-ye taryāk 
tā hezār-tū-ye māfiyā. Negāhī beh kānūn-hā-ye toulīd va bāzār-e ǧahānī-ye mavādd-e moḫadder) & 
Hamšahrī, 28 Mehr 1376 (20 October 1997): „The necessity for a common contract to put an end to the 
global drugs networks. A glance at the ways of production, trafficking and markets of drugs’ (Żorūrat-e 
peymān-e dast-ǧam’ī barāye barčīdarn-e šabakeh-hā-ye ǧahānī-ye mavādd-e moḫadder. Negāhī beh kam-
o-keyf-e toulīd, qāčāq, va bāzār-e mavādd-e moḫadder). 
1004  Resālat, 5 Ābān 1376 (27 October 1997): „Addiction – the role of the parents and the supervisory levers of 
the society’ (E‘tiyād – naqš-e vāledain va ahram-yā-ye neẓāratī-ye ǧāme‘ah). 
 196 
reaction to the imminent amendment to the ANTI NARCOTICS LAW, and asks for an active 
involvement of the Basīǧ in the drug combat. More explicitly, it considers the existing drug 
laws to be “very good” (besyār ḫūb) and “[completely] codified” (modavvan), and does not 
see a need for more drug demand reduction activities. On the contrary, it explicitly states that 
in confronting drug addiction “you have to close a polluted spring, not teaching not to drink 
from the polluted water” (šomā bāyad češmeh-ye ālūdeh-rā kūr konīd, nah īnkeh ṭarīqeh-ye 
maṣraf nakardan az āb-e ālūdeh-rā āmūzeš dehīd).1005 
 It took the DCHQ a week to respond to this exceptional attack on the liberal 
reorientation of the official drug policy. The response is published in a subsequent article of 
Resālat. The DCHQ’s public relations office defends itself by highlighting the mixture of “a 
cultural and a physical and disciplinary combat” (mobārezeh-ye farhangī ham zamān bā 
mobārezeh-ye fīzīkī va enteẓāmī) – that is of drug demand and drug supply reduction – as a 
specific “third thinking” (andīšeh-ye sevvom). It also points to the many difficulties to be 
faced in achieving success in this “silent war” (ǧang-e ḫāmūš) against the addiction enemy 
who “has a veil over his face” (neqāb bar čehreh dārad). It further explictily expresses its 
disappointment that the cultural newspaper Resālat has published such criticism. Resālat 
subsequently indeed apologizes by accentuating that this article only reflects the personal 
opinion of the author; however, it immediately even escalates the rhetoric and states: “the best 
way to prevent an inclination towards drugs would be a determined application of the death 
penalty, of long prison sentences, and of the expulsion of addicts to labor islands” (agar 
moǧāzāt-hā-ye e‘dām va zandān-hā-ye ṭavīl ol-moddat beh hamrāh-e e‘zām-e mo‘tādān beh 
ǧazāyer-e maḫṣūṣ-e kār bā qāṭe‘iyyat eǧrā šavad, ḫod behtarīn ‘āmel dar pīš-gīrī az gerāyeš 
beh mavādd-e moḫadder ast).1006 
 
Āfarīneš in a series of four articles in November: the craving for drugs is stronger in prisons 
than outside  
 Following the publication of an article in Hamšahrī on cigarette smoking and the role 
of the Philipp Morris Company in the global tobacco business,1007 the moderately conservative 
newspaper Āfarīneš publishes a series of four articles on drug addiction in the world and in 
Iran. While expressing disapproval with liberal drug policies of foreign countries like the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1005  Resālat, 6 Ābān 1376 (28 October 1997): „What does public education mean?“ (Āmūzeš-e ‘omūmī ya‘nī 
čeh?). 
1006  Resālat, 14 Ābān 1376 (5 November 1997): „The answer of the Drug Control Headquarter and 
explanations of Resālat’ (Ǧavābiyya-ye setād-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder va toużīḥāt-e resālat). 
1007  Hamšahrī, 18 Ābān 1376 (9 November 1997): „The roads of tobacco – the nighmare of cigarettes instead 
of food (Ǧādde-hā-ye tūtūn – kābūs-e sīgār beh ǧā-ye ġaḏā). 
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Netherlands, it concentrates, however, particularly on Iran. It revives the personal stories of 
drug addicts that were a regular feature of the press discourse on drugs in 1374 (1995-96); yet 
writes them in a much more dramatized style. It also mentions increased heroin consumption 
among people who recently have moved from the countryside to the big cities; and more 
importantly, maintains that in prisons, the temptation to consume drugs is actually bigger than 
outside. To fight against this “calamity” (āfat) it promotes a traditional, religious way of 
family life, where the pater familias (pedar-e ḫānevādeh) is still at the center, so that there 
would be no need of a psychologist or sociologist. Despite this conservative view, Āfarīneš 
nevertheless describes the existing prevention and therapy measures in a positive way. It also 
quotes ‘Alī-Reżā Ǧazāyerī, the new director of the SWO, stating that Iranian drug policy is 
still in need of more addiction research, therapy facilities, and a closer cooperation between 
governmental and private addiction treatment centers.1008 
 
Resālat in November: despite a low culture and hygiene, Afghan refugees take fewer drugs 
 While an article of Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī that appeared in November could not be 
identified,1009 Resālat publishes a further report on drug trafficking and drug addiction in 
Zāhedān, the capital of the province Sīstān va Balūčesān. Displaying a typical Iranian racist 
attitude, it wonders why drug addiction is less common amongst Afghan refugees, who 
“concerning cultural and hygienic standard{s} are one hundred per cent worse off than [even] 
the people from our remote regions” (az naẓar-e saṭḥ-e farhang va beh-dāšt ṣad-dar-ṣad az 
mardom-e manāṭeq-e dūr-oftādeh-ye mā badtar hastand), than amongst the local inhabitants. 
Still promoting a rather repressive understanding of drug policy, it additionally asks the courts 
to imprison drug-addicted fathers who would force their children to sell drugs on the street.1010 
 
Abrār in a series of two articles in December: Afghan refugees have contributed to the rise of 
drug addiction in Iran 
 In December, the moderately conservative newspaper Abrār writes a series of two 
articles on the history of drugs in Iran. Although emphasizing rather questionably that opium 
“has no Iranian roots” (rīšeh-ye īrānī nadārad), it explicitly admits that the Islamic Republic 
has failed to root out the problem of drug trafficking and drug addiction in Iran from the 
beginning. It attributes this, admittedly, at least partly to the armed conflict between the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1008  Āfarīneš, 20 & 21 & 22 & 24 Ābān 1376 (11 & 12 & 13 & 15 November 1997):”Addiction – an issue of 
yesterday, today and tomorrow’ (E‘tiyād ... masʼaleh-ye dīrūz ... emrūz ... fardā ...!). 
1009  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 21 Ābān 1376 (12 November 1376): Do we know ...? (Āyā mī-dānīm ...?). 
1010  Resālat, 26 Ābān 1376 (17 November 1197) „The combat [!] against drugs addicts from words to actions’ 
(Mobārezah bā mo‘tādān-e mavādd-e moḫadder az ḥarf tā ‘amal). 
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opposition groups directly after the revolution; to the war against Iraq; but also to the Afghan 
refugees who have fled in high numbers to Iran during the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. 
Yet, it also acknowledges that at least during the first years after the revolution, Iran’s 
government “had not acquired enough experience in this field” (taǧrobeh-ye kāfī dar īn 
zamīneh kasb nakardeh būd).1011 
 
Hamšahrī in December: progressive addiction therapy measures in Iran 
 In writing an article about increasingly scientific addiction treatment measures by the 
SWO, Hamšahrī introduces an important argument by claiming that in order to quit a 
“destroying habit” (‘ādat-e moḫarreb) such as drug addiction and adopt a “good and laudable 
habit” (‘ādat-e ḫūb va pasandīdeh), “his own will” (ḫāst-e ḫod-e ū) is the most decisive factor. 
Based on interviews with different physicians and psychologists, it continues to describe in 
detail the different stages of addiction therapy consisting of physical withdrawal with the help 
of mediation or without any. It introduces different types of therapy such as psychological 
therapy, group therapy, and family therapy, the latter of which for instance concentrating on 
problems such as the “absence of the father” (feqdān-e pedar) or the “dominant behavior of 
the mother” (raftār-e solṭeh-ǧuyāneh-ye mādar).1012 
 
 Further drug-related articles in December appear in Āfarīneš: one on the “satanic 
plague” (āfat-e šaiṭānī) of tobacco smoking,1013 and the other on the historical and present 
situation of drug addiction in Iran.1014 Both do not add new details to the Iranian press 
discourse on drugs. Based on a report that was aired by Radio Köln, Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī 
further mentions the Ṭālibān as the “largest drug exporter{s}” (bozorgtarīn ṣāder-konandeh-
ye mavādd-e moḫadder) in the world, annually producing 2,800 tons of opium.1015 
 
Qods in a series of four articles in December: women as victims of drug addicted husbands & 
a warning to the international community 
  On the occasion of the recent passing of the amendment to the ANTI NARCOTICS Law 
in November 1997, Qods, the newspaper of the wealthy administration of the shrine of Emām 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1011  Abrār, 10 & 11 Āḏar 1376 (1 & 2 December 1997): „A Short History of drugs in the world and in Iran’ 
(Tārīḫčeh-ye mavādd-e moḫadder dar ǧahān va īrān). 
1012  Hamšahrī, 11 Āḏar 1376 (2 December 1997): „How do we help the addicts? The role of the family in 
addiction prevention’ (Čegūneh beh mo‘tādīn komak konīm? Naqš-e ḫāne-vādeh dar pīš-gīrī az e‘tiyād). 
1013  Āfarīneš, 16 Āḏar 1376 (7 December 1997):”The Satanic plague’ (Āfat-e šaiṭānī). 
1014  Āfarīneš, 16 Āḏar 1376 (7 December 1997): „The young and the global black calamity of today’ (Ǧavānān 
va balā-ye siyāh-e donyā-ye emrūz). 
1015  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 4 Dey 1376 (25 December 1997): „’The Ṭālibān’ – the biggest drug exporters’ 
(„Ṭālebān’ – bozorgtarīn ṣāder-konandeh-ye mavādd-e moḫadder). 
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Reżā in Mašhad, publishes a series consisting of four long articles on the situation of drug 
trafficking and drug addiction in Iran. It concentrates, however, on its home province Ḫorāsān, 
which like Sīstān va Balūčestān, shares a long border with Afghanistan and, thus, is an 
important passageway for drug trafficking. It provides a detailed description of opium and 
heroin production in Afghanistan, and states, that in Ḫorāsān, three quarters of the prison 
population are imprisoned for drug related crimes. The head of the local DCHQ office is 
quoted with the opinion that the police seize a “very considerable bulk” (ḥaǧm-e besyār čašm-
gīrī) of the drugs that are trafficked through the province. He additionally and rather 
unconvincingly maintains that most of these drugs are trafficked to Europe, and that only 
“little consumption of opiates” (maṣraf-e kam-e mavādd-e afyūnī) takes place in Iran; and he 
warns the European countries that Iran might have to halt its drug combat, if it does not 
receive more assistance from the international community. He nevertheless assures them that 
Iran will continue its “holy combat” (mobārezeh-ye moqaddas) “according to the aims of the 
rich religion of Islam” (bar asās-e ahdāf-e maktab-e ġanī-ye eslām).  
 
Also reporting personal stories of drug addicts, Qods is the first newspaper in the press 
discourse on drugs that explicitly mentions women in connection with drug addiction. The 
female reporter of Qods presents women and girls predominantly as victims of drug addicted 
husbands or fathers respectively, but crucially also as drug addicts themselves. One 
interviewed woman even admitted that “you give your body for every work” (va tan beh har 
kārī bedehī), thus clearly alluding to prostitution. This is the most obvious reference to 
prostitution in Iran during the whole sample period. Qods also puts forward new arguments 
concerning addiction causes, when citing the psychologist Ṣāleḥpūr with the opinion that 
poverty is not an all-explaining addiction cause, since drug addiction is also prevalent in more 
affluent classes; and that a crucial reason for addiction relapses is the social stigmatization of 
drug addicts.1016 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1016 Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997): „200 million addicts (are) vitctims to the death trade in the world’ 
(200 mīlīyūn mo’tād, qorbānī-ye teǧāra-e marg dar ǧahān) & Qods, 8 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997): 
„Those, who turn health and zeal into smoke’ (Ānān keh salāmat va ġairat-rā bā ham dūd mīkonand) & 
Qods, 9 Dey 1376 (30 December 1997): „The production of 5 thousand tons of opium in Afghanistan; the 
Ṭālibān are the largest factor for the spread of addiction in the world’ (Toulīd-e 5 hezār ton-e taryāk dar 
afġānestān; ṭālebān bozorgtarīn ‘āmel-e gostareš-e e‘tiyād dar ǧahān ast) & Qods, 10 Dey 1376 (31 
December 1997): „Iran ist he mose successful country of the world in the area of the drugs combat’ (Īrān 
dar ‘arṣah-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder, movaffaqtarīn kešvar-e ǧahān ast) – the four articles are 
part of a series titled „On the occasion of the new passing [of law] of the Expediency Discernment Council 
of the System’ (Be angīzeh-ye moṣavvabah-ye ǧadīd-e maǧma‘-e tašḫīṣ-e maṣlaḥat-e neẓām). 
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In the same month, Hamšahrī publishes a translated article on “drug mules” (sg. 
qāṭer) or dealers in Colombia, which originally has appeared in the Miami Herald.1017 
 
Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī in January: AIDS and trafficking in girls as problems in Iran’s border 
provinces 
In January 1998, Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī publishes an article following a conference on 
“addiction and some other crimes” (e‘tiyād ba‘żī ǧarāyem-e dīgar) in Qom. In this 
conference, the different members of the DCHQ together with the missionaries (moballeġīn), 
preachers (ḫotabāʼ), and clerics (rūḥāniyūn) from Qom discussed ways to improve the 
“cultural combat” (mobārezeh-ye farhangī) against drug addiction. The newspaper 
particularly stresses that the people and institutions involved in drug prevention first need 
appropriate information on drugs and drug addiction themselves. As further critical aspects 
that were discussed during the meeting it mentions the existence of AIDS and the “selling of 
girls” (forūš-e doḫtar-ān) in Iran’s border provinces.1018 
 
In yet another article appearing in February, Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī again argues along a 
more traditional line. It presents Iran as a victim of the “global arrogance” (estekbār-e 
ǧahānī) and the international drug trafficking; and it repeats the accusation that the UN is not 
supporting Iran in its drug combat, while annually assisting Pakistan with millions of US. Yet, 
it presents also a new argument when explaining the increase in heroin addiction in Iran due 
to the high price of opium, which was indeed a major cause for the development of heroin 
addiction in the 1960s.1019 
 
Eṭṭelā‘āt on a research study in February: women should have the right to seek divorce from 
addicted husbands 
The last article of the year 1376 (1997-98) again touches on the crucial topic of the 
role of the family in causing or preventing drug addiction. In this regard, Eṭṭelā‘āt presents a 
research study on the influence of addicted fathers on their families, which was conducted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1017  Hamšahrī, 9 Dey 1376 (30 December 1997): „The mules don’t even have pity with themselves. The role 
of the middleman in the distribution and trafficking of drugs’ (Qāṭerhā beh ǧān-e ḫodešān ham raḥm 
nemīkonand. Naqš-e vāseṭah dar touzī‘ va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḫadder). 
1018  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 23 Dey 1376 (13 January 1997): „’Octopus of addiction. The fight against addiction 
has to be [undertaken] from all sides’ (Oḫtāpūs-e marg. Mobārezah bā e’tiyād bāyad hameh-ye ǧānebah 
bāsad). 
1019  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 19 Bahman 1376 (8 February 1997): „Iran in the siege of the drugs. The Islamic 
Republic of Iran remains alone on the front of the combat against drugs’ (Īrān dar moḥāṣerah-ye mavādd-e 
moḫadder. Ǧomhūrī-ye eslāmī-ye īrān dar ǧebha-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder tanhā māndeh 
ast!). 
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among drug addicts in the rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn. However, contradicting its 
earlier assertion that a marriage can prevent drug addiction, Eṭṭelā‘āt now vocally supports 
the right for women to seek a divorce from their drug-addicted husbands, because the women 
“normally strive to safeguard the family” (ma‘mūlan talāš-e ḫod-rā barāye hefẓ va baqā-ye 
ḫānevādeh mikonand). Today, drug addiction is indeed one of the few reasons, for which 
women can seek a divorce from their husbands.1020 
 
 
V. 2. c.  The Iranian press discourse on drugs in the year 1378  (1999-2000) 
 With a total of one hundred and twenty-five drug-related articles in 1378 (1999-2000), 
the last year of the sample period, many more newspapers cover the drugs issue than two 
years ago. Many traditional conservative newspapers now almost cease to report on drugs, 
while other conservative and the new reformist newspapers are appearing. Yet popular are 
article series appearing over the course of several days. The press still writes most of their 
articles on the occasion of the international drugs day. However, other domestic discourse 
events like conferences or the publication of statistics and research findings become important 
as well. The range of topics remains the similar to two years ago, with the noticeable 
exception of HIV/AIDS among intravenous drug addicts, particularly inside prisons. But the 
newspapers put forward many new arguments and increasingly become critical of the official 
drug policy.  
 
Ḫamšahrī in April: LSD, cocaine, amphetamines – not important in Iran 
 The newspaper Hamšahrī begins the drug coverage of 1378 (1999-2000) with an 
article listing different drugs like hashish, LSD, cocaine and amphetamines and describing 
their properties and effects, even though most of these drugs are hardly of concern in Iran, 
where opiates by far are the drugs of choice.1021  
 
Kār va Kārgar in a series of three articles in April: drug addiction in Iran has doubled 
within the last four years 
In April, Kār va Kārgar, the newspaper of Iran’s official workers union, publishes a 
series of articles, in which it gives a very scientific definition of drug addiction by listing in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1020  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 20 Bahman 1376 (9 February 1997): „The influence of a father’s addiction on [the outputs of] 
the family. A glance on the study of the [...]” (Āṯār-e e‘tiyād-e pedar bar kār-kard-hā-ye ḫānevādeh. 
Negāhī beh pažūhešī-ye […]). 
1021  Hamšahrī, 17 Farvardīn 1378 (6 April 1999): „What are the effects of addiction to hallucinogenic and 
stimulant drugs?’ (Āṯār-e e’tiyād beh mavādd-e tavahhom-zā va moḥarrek čīst?). 
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detail different physical, psychological, social, economic, cultural or political causes and 
effects of drug addiction. It also provides a survey of the official drug policy measures the 
Islamic Republic has implemented so far; and it prints statistics on the arrests of drug addicts, 
which ostensibly demonstrate that drug addiction has increased twofold during the last four 
years in Iran. Based on the official estimation of 500,000 drug addicts in the previous years, 
Kār va Kārgar thus insinuates a number of one million drug addicts in Iran.1022 
 
Qods in April: Religious negligence and divorce as important addiction causes 
In the same month, the newspaper Qods equally assumes an increase in drug addiction. 
While also explaining the reasons for drug prohibition in Iran, it discusses possible causes for 
such an increase. Apart from more commonly accepted reasons such as “depression” 
(afsordegī), “peer pressure” (gorūh-e dūstān), or corollaries of “modern civilization” 
(tamaddon-e emrūz), it also mentions “divorce” (ṭalāq) and a “pleasure-seeking, material life” 
(zendegī-ye leḏḏat-ṭalabāneh-ye māddī), or in short a loss of religiosity.1023 
 
Enteḫāb on the occasion of an ECO conference in April: 6 million Iranians are affected by 
drug addiction 
In reporting on the “educational conference for judicial deputies for drug {issues} of 
the member countries of ECO” (hemāyeš-e āmūzešī-ye mo‘āvenat-hā-ye qażāyīyeh-ye 
mavādd-e moḫadder-ye kešvar-hā-ye ‘ożv-e ekō), the nominally conservative, but factually 
very progressive Enteḫāb, also mentions a total of one million drug addicts in Iran. However, 
it also points to the fact, that in reality, six million Iranians are affected by addiction. It 
furthermore concentrates especially on drug addiction among young people and students, 
where the increase in addiction seems to be most pronounced. Additionally, it quotes Ġolām-
Reżā Anṣārī, the new director of the SWO, with the reminder that since the amendment to the 
ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of 1997, drug addicts should not be looked upon as criminals any 
more.1024 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1022  Kār va Kārgar, 21 & 22 & 24 Farvardīn (10 & 11 & 13 April 1999): „A view at the phenomenon of 
addiction and ist causes and effets’ (Negāhī beh padīdeh-ye e’tiyād va ‘elal va ‘avāreż-e ān)  
1023  Qods, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999): „Why addiction’ (E‘tiyād čerā?) 
1024  Enteḫāb, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999): „Drugs – youth – addiction. This fire burns wet and dry. 6 
Millions are overtaken, 60 Millions are in danger’ (Mavādd-e moḫadder – ǧavānān – e‘tiyād. Īn āteš, tar 
va ḫošk-rā mīsūzānad. 6 mīlīyūm dar-gīrand, 60 mīlīyūn dar ḫaṭar). 
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Abrār, in the same month, also touches the subject of addiction causes among the 
Iranian youth, however, still refers to a corresponding research study in the USA because 
similar research would still be lacking in Iran.1025 
 
Ḫordād in May 1999: a new drug called ‘crack’ & a doubling of drug addicted students 
 While the reformist newspaper Āryā again publishes an article about the drug 
cultivation under the Ṭālibān, based on a translation from TIME Magazine article,1026 the 
outspoken reformist newspaper Ḫordād, published by Ḫātamī’s first interior minister 
‘Abdollāh Nūrī, mentions for the first time names the new drug “crack” (krāk), which it 
describes as being a form of heroin in Iran. Explicitly referring to a newspaper article of 
Resālat from 1377 (1998-99), it further accentuates that drug consumption amongst students 
“has increased 100 per cent” (100 dar ṣad afzāyeš yāfteh), while the starting age has 
decreased to between fifteen and nineteen years. The interviewed deputy of the DCHQ, 
Moḥammad-Ǧavād Ḥešmatī, blames this trend on an increasing orientation of the adolescents 
towards the “cultures of the West” (farhang-hā-ye ġarb). As a result, he emphasizes the need 
for increased efforts in the field of drug prevention instead of repressive tactics. In this 
context he mentions the SUPREME COUNCIL FOR RESEARCH AND PLANNING (šūrā-ye ‘ālī-ye 
taḥqīq-āt va barnāmeh-rīzī), which was recently created within the DCHQ in order to 
coordinate the prevention measures of various involved institutions such as the MINISTRY OF 
ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE, the MINISTRY OF EDUCATION. Ḫordād furthermore 
proudly reports that the US has finally withdrawn Iran from its “annual list of countries that 
support the drug transit” (līst-e sālyāne-ye kešvar-hā-ye komak-konandeh beh trānzīt-e 
mavādd-e moḫadder) or list of major illicit drug producing, drug-transit, significant source, 
precursor chemical, and money laundering countries as it is officially called. 1027 
 
Next, three articles written on the same day by the newspapers Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 
Ǧavān and Āryā report on cigarettes as a starter drug; on Iran’s drug laws; and on the 
international framework, in which Iran’s drug combat takes place. Even the most radical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1025  Abrār, 9 Ordībehešt 1378 (29 April 1999): „What are the motives of drug use? An investigative study of 
addiction as a rough social phenomenon’ (Angīzeh-hā-ye este‘māl-e mavādd-e moḫadder čīst? Bar-rasī-ye 
taḥqīqī-ye e’tiyād beh ‘onvān-e yek padīdeh-ye nā-hanǧār-e eǧtemā’ī). 
1026  Āryā, 11 Ordībehešt 1378 (1 May 1999): „Opium, the winner in the war’ (Taryāk, barandeh-ye ǧang). 
1027  Ḫordād, 13 Ordībehešt 1376 (3 May 1999): „The hands that wave a net of death. The adolescents are the 
main victim of drugs’ (Dastānī keh dām-e marg mītanand. Ǧavānān qorbānīyān-e aṣlī-ye mavādd-e 
moḫadder). 
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newspaper Ǧavān pays equal attention to drug demand reduction including addiction therapy 
as to drug supply reduction.1028  
 
Resālat in May: Drug prevention can incite drug consumption 
Resālat, infamous for its belligerent article against the liberal reorientation of the 
official drug policy in the year 1376 (1997-98), still seems to be reserved vis-à-vis drug 
prevention in 1378 (1999-2000). In reporting about an increased drug addiction among 
Iranian adolescents, it accordingly holds the opinion that information on drugs “incite{s} a 
sentiment of curiosity in the children and adolescents to try drugs and to earn an income’ (va 
ḥess-e kanǧkāvī-ye aṭfāl va ǧavānān-rā barāye āzmāyeš-e mavādd-e moḫadder va kasb-e 
dar-āmad bar mīyangīzad). As the first newspaper, Resālat, however, also correctly 
compares addiction to (illegal) drugs with addiction to legal pharmaceuticals.1029  
 
Abrār-e Eqteṣādī in May: Iran has two million drug users, 1,2 million of which are drug 
addicts 
In May 1999, Abrār-e Eqteṣādī, the economic journal of the newspapers Abrār, for 
the first time reports a new official estimation of the number of drug addicts: 1,2 million drug 
addicts and further 800’000 recreational users. These numbers, which are based on the Rapid 
Situation Assessment (RSA) the SWO has realized in 1377 (1998-99), have become 
sacrosanct ever since, although they would soon be doubted by other newspapers.1030  
 
Salām in May: 100,000 prisoners in Iran are drug addicted 
Following the publication of an article on an obscure Vietnamese medicine to cure 
drug addiction, the newspaper Salām mentions that the “drug-related prison inmates” 
(zandāniyān-e mavādd-e moḫadderī) make up sixty – and not fifty as it was stated two years 
ago – per cent of the whole prison population of one hundred thousand persons. It furthermore 
depicts the youth as victims of drug smugglers and dealers, a particularly important argument 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1028  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999): „Drug addiction, a fire that doesn’t know wet or 
dry’ (E‘tiyād beh mavādd-e moḫadder, āteşī keh tar va ḫosk-rā nemīšenāsad); Ǧavān, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 
(6 May 1999): „Some reasons and backgrounds for the spread of drug addiction’ (Barḫī dalāyel va 
zamīneh-hā-ye gostareš-e e‘tiyād beh mavādd-e moḫadder); Āryā, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999): 
„Addiction, the virus of the devil’ (E‘tiyād, vīrūs-e eblis). 
1029  Resālat, 21 Ordībehešt 1378 (11 May 1999): „Drugs and the reasons why adolescents turn towards them’ 
(Mavādd-e moḫadder va ‘elal-e gerayeš-e ǧavānān beh ān). 
1030  Abrār-e Eqteṣādī, 23 Ordībehešt 1378 (13 May 1999): „How much cost take the drugs with them” 
(Mavādd-e moḫadder če meqdār arz bā ḫod mibarad?). 
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in the year 1378.1031 In yet another article, Salām once again implores the lack of therapy 
facilities in the country. By citing Hešmatī, the deputy of the DCHQ, it mentions a further 
problem, namely the fact that even according to the amended ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of 1997, 
mere drug addicts still can be – and really are – sentenced to “flogging” (żarbeh-ye šallāq), 
“financial fines” (ǧazā-ye naqdī) and even “imprisonment” (zendān) – even though they 
should be considered as ill persons.1032 
 
Still the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking on 26 June 
 The International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking is yet the most important event 
causing the Iranian press to publish drug-related newspaper articles. In 1378 (1999-2000), however, the press 
increasingly prints interviews with state officials such as particularly from the DCHQ, and with private addiction 
specialists, next to the previously more common interviews with representatives of international organizations. It 
also includes more detailed recent statistics and particularly new addiction research from within Iran. 
 
Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz in a series of articles based on a field report in June: insufficient therapy 
facilities & AIDS in prisons 
 Sa‘īd Ḥaǧariyān’s reformist newspaper Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz also publishes a series of two 
articles on the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking. The author has 
written the after having spent a week with an expert for addiction prevention, and touches 
several crucial subjects. Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz is the first newspaper to mention AIDS in the year 
1378 (19992000), clearly in an Iranian context: specifically as a problem in Iran’s prisons 
where many drug addicts are incarcerated and sharing needles. While repeating the need for 
more therapy facilities, the newspaper also points to the necessity of the national prevention 
programs to consider cultural peculiarities (bā tavaǧǧoh beh vīžegī-hā-ye farhangī-ye 
kešvaremān), in order to be effective. Like in the year 1376 (1997-98), “prevention” is called 
“always better than therapy” (pīš-gīrī hamīšeh behtar az darmān ast)1033  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1031  Salām, 23 Ordībehešt 1378 (13 May 1999): „Heantos, a medicine that causes to abandond addiction? Dan 
made himself addiction in order to discover a method for curing addicts’ (Hāntoz, dārūyī keh e’tiyād-rā 
tark mīdehad? Dān, be-manẓūr-e kašf-e yek raveš-e moʼaṯṯar dar mo‘āleǧah-ye mo‘tādīn, ḫod-rā beh 
e‘tiyād rūy mi-āvarad); Salām, 1 Ḫordād 1378 (22 May 1999): „A second warning for drug control’ 
(Hošdārī-ye dō bāreh barāye kontrol-e mavādd-e moḫadder). 
1032  Salām, 13 Ḫordād 1378 (3 June 1999): „Strong and weak points of the national combat against drugs and 
addiction. A special interview of Salām with the deputy secretary of the Drug Contro Headquarter’ (Noqāṭ-
e qovvat va ża‘f dar mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder va e’tiyād-e kešvar. Dar goft-o-gū-ye eḫteṣāṣī-ye 
salām bā ǧā-nešīn-e dabīr-e setād-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder ‘onvān šod); this article is 
followed by yet another article: Salām, 20 Ḫordād 1378 (10 June 1999): „We’re still worried. Addiction, a 
ladder to commiting crimes’ (Hanūz negarānīm. E‘iyād, nardebān-e ertekāb-e ğorm). 
1033  Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḫordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999): „In search of a die-hard devil / 
Ahriman. A week with addiction prevention specialists’ (Dar ǧost-o-ǧū-ye ahrīmanī-ye ǧān-saḫt. Yek 
hafteh bā kāršenāsān-e pīšgīrī az e’tiyād). 
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Reflecting on the present state of addiction research in Iran and pointing to increasing 
drug addiction amongst Iranian youth, the newspapers Salām and Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī publish 
further articles on occasion of the international drugs day. The readers are also informed that 
more than two thousand law enforcement officials have died in the combat against drug 
trafficking since the beginning of the Islamic Republic.1034  
 
Īrān on the occasion of a conference on drug prevention for children in June: changing drug 
addiction patterns 
On the occasion of the congress “immunization of children and adolescents against the 
appearance of harms” (maṣūn-sāzī-ye koudak-ān va nou-ǧavān-ān dar barābar-e āsīb-zāyī), 
the governmental newspaper Īrān points to an important topic: changing drug consumption 
patters in Iran. It urgently calls for the Iranian adolescents to be informed about drugs, which 
it calls a “time-bomb” (bomb-e sā‘atī); and it requests a volte-face in the Iranian therapy 
models that are “180 degrees opposed to the international rehabilitation principles” (bā oṣūl-e 
bāz-parvarī-ye bain-ol-melalī 180 daraǧeh tafāvot dārad).1035  
 
ḪORĀSĀN in an interview with UNDCP representative Mazzitelli in June: Iran’s drug combat 
is a “religious jihad” 
Still on occasion of the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, 
Ḫorāsān publishes an interview with Antonio Mazzitelli, the head of the UNODC office in 
Tehran at the time. This is however done without mentioning that this office was just opened 
recently. Interestingly, Mazzitelli reminds the interviewer that the combat against drugs is a 
“holy jihad” (ǧehād-e moqaddas). The Iranian press otherwise never uses this term, while 
Qods in January 1998 only used the similar expression “holy combat” (mobārezeh-ye 
moqaddas). It remains, however, unclear which expression was used by Mazzitelli in 
English.1036 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1034  Salām, 2 Tīr 1378 (23 June 1999): „The youth and the global abyss of addiction’ (Ǧavānān va varṭeh-ye 
ǧahānī-ye e‘tiyād); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999):”Drug Addiction – a piece of sorrow 
with an unacceptable ending’ (E‘tiyād beh mavādd-e moḫadder – ġam-nāmeh-ye pāyān-e nāpaḏīr). 
1035  Īrān, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999): „The people cannot be defrauded. A report on the scientific and practical 
‚social health’ congress with the title ‚Immunization of the children and adolescents against the appearance 
of harms” (Sar-e mardom nemīšavad kolāh goḏāšt! Gozārešī az hemāyeš-e ‘elmī-kārbordī „selāmat-e 
eǧtemā’ī’ be-‘onvān-e „maṣūn-sāzī-ye kūdakān va nouǧavānān dar barābar-e āsīb-zāyī). 
1036  Ḫorāsān, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999): „The Golden Crescent, drug trafficking towards Europe and the costs 
only the regional countries pay. A report on the region of the Golden Crescent and drug transit’ (Helāl-e 
ṭalāyī, qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḫadder beh orūpā va hazīneh-hāyī keh tanhā kešvar-hā-ye manṭaqe 
mīpardāzand. Gozārešī az manṭaqeh-ye helāl-e ṭalāyī va trānzīt-e mavādd-e moḫadder). 
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 On the very date of the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, 
further four newspapers publish articles on drugs. The conservative Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī and 
the reformist Ḫorāsān both report meanwhile well-known facts concerning Iran’s situation of 
drug addiction. Ḫorāsān, however, also provides new details when writing about student 
parties in Kermān, where girls smoke hashish (ḥašīš) and drink alcohol (alkol), subsequently 
becoming one of the few articles that explicitly talk about the consumption of these two 
certainly widespread drugs in Iran.1037  
 
Enteḫāb in June: there are no 200,000 addicted students in Iran 
Next, Enteḫāb again writes about drug consumption amongst the youth. It cites Ḥamīd 
Ṣarāmī, then the DCHQ’s director of research and studies, with an explicit refutation of the 
alleged number of more than two hundred thousand addicted students in Iran. Ṣarāmī contests 
this estimation, which he attributes to a French press agency, “because the phenomenon of 
addiction is a hidden phenomenon, one cannot rely on any statistics” (az ānǧāyī keh padīdeh-
ye e‘tiyād padīdeh-ye maḫfī ast, dar natīǧeh ne-mī-tavān beh hīč āmārī estenād kard). He 
seems not to have been aware that the same would apply to the statistics of the DCHQ.1038  
 
Našāṭ in June: income distribution as an addiction cause 
Drug addiction causes are the subject of a next article appearing in the outspoken 
reformist newspaper Našāṭ. The newspaper introduces a few new and important historical and 
sociological causes: the previous “legality of opium” (eǧāzeh-ye maṣraf-e taryāk) in Iran; the 
“inequality between the society and the economy” (nābarābarī-ye eqteṣādī-ye eǧtemā‘ī), and 
“unemployment” (bīkārī); as well as ‘lacking recreational facilities’ (na-būdan-e emkān-āt-e 
goḏarān-e ouqāt-e farāġat). At the same time, however, it still reveals an on-going moral 
view of drug addiction by counting it among “social deviations” (enḥerāf-hā-ye eǧtemā‘ī).1039 
 
Hamšahrī in June: the importance of self-help groups like the Narcotics Anonymous 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1037  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999): „The global profession of drug business’ (Ḥarfeh-ye 
ǧahānī-ye dād-o-setad-e mavādd-e moḫadder); Ḫorāsān, 5 Tīr 1376 (26 June 1999): „Addiction from a 
scientific and psychological viewpoint. The application of scientific methods in addiction withdrawal is 
necessary’ (E‘tiyād az dīd-gāh-he ‘elmī va ravān-šenāsī. Be-kār-gīrī-ye raveš-hā-ye ‘elmī barāye tark-e 
e‘tiyād żorūrī ast). 
1038  Enteḫāb, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999): „The addict is not a criminal. Why aren’t you taking his pain serious?’ 
(Mo’tād moǧrem nīst. Čerā dardeš-rā ǧeddī nemīgīrīd). 
1039  Našāṭ, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999): „On the occasion of the Global Day of Drugs Combat. The nightmare of 
addiction casts its shadow in this way’ (Beh angīzeh-ye rūz-e ǧahānī-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-e 
moḫadder. Kābūs-e mavādd-e moḫadder ham-čonān sāyeh mīyafkanad). 
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 A day later, the newspaper Hamšahrī writes according to established pattern about the 
drug policy of different foreign countries. In particularly highlighting the efficacy of “self-
helping and cooperating groups” (gorūh-hā-ye ḫod-yārī va ham-yārī) in the rehabilitation of 
former drug addicts, it also proposes the establishment of more such groups in Iran.1040  
 
Eṭṭelā‘āt in June: drug users keep the business running 
Eṭṭelā‘āt once again is responsible for the most comprehensive coverage of the Iranian 
drug problem in 1378 (1999-2000), by publishing  - like every year – a series of this time five 
articles on the international drugs day. These articles naturally cover a wide range of topics 
and principally depict the same anti-Western and zealous religious tone as in the previous 
years. The newspaper again more or less openly warns the international community: “we 
don’t have a duty to prevent the drug transit from a legal viewpoint” (mā taklīfī barāye ǧelou-
gīrī az trānzīt-e mavādd-e moḫadder az naẓar-e šar‘ī nadārīm); but immediately reassures 
that Iran will continue the drug combat “according to the order of the Islamic religion” (beh 
ḥokm-e maktab-e eslām). In a short treatise on the history of opium, it mentions for the first 
time the widespread consumption of opium (taryāk) and kūknār in Ṣafavīd times, although it 
still blames the “colonialists” (este‘mār-garān ) for their protection of “criminal gangs” 
(bānd-hā-ye tabah-kār). 
 
Eṭṭelā‘āt, once again, stresses the importance of drug prevention to be culturally 
adapted to Iran. It claims this is necessary because of “the insistence of the Westerners to 
penetrate our culture and to subjugate with the most subtle tricks the brains of our youth” 
(eṣrār-e ġarbī-hā barāye sorūḫ dar farhang-e mā keh mī-ḫāhand beh laṭāyef ol-ḥeyal-e 
maġz-hā-ye ǧavānān-e mā-rā tasḫīr konand).  
 
The newspaper further accuses drug addicts of “keeping running the market of 
smuggling, dealing and storing of different types of drugs and tranquillizing pills […] and in 
addition to ruining their life capital, committing other crimes such as theft, murder, evil, 
perversion, prostitution, and instances against the moral” (bāzār-e qāčāq ḫarīd, forūš, ḥaml 
va negah-dārī-ye anvā‘-e mavādd-e moḫadder va qorṣ-hā-ye ārām-baḫš-rā dāyer negah-
dāšteh and […] ‘allāveh bar nābūdī sarmāyeh-ye zendegīyešūn, mortakeb-e ǧarāyem-e dīgar 
čūn serqat, qatl, fesād, faḥšāʼ va mavārede ḫalāf-e aḫlāq mī-šavand). And in an astonishing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1040  Hamšahrī, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999): „Is there a solution for the problem of addiction?’ (Āyā rāh-e ḥall 
barāye masʼalah-ye e’tiyād voǧūd dārad?) 
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twist, it mentions that “former addicts should not be presented in the media” (az mo‘tād-ān-e 
behbūd-yāfteh dar resāneh-hā beh hīč vaǧh na-bāyad estefādeh kard), so as not to trivialize 
drug addiction. By touching on a central point of the reformist administration, it additionally 
promotes the active participation of the people in the drug combat by stating: “considering the 
truth that our government is from the people, we must discuss the problems frankly with the 
people” (bā tavaǧǧoh be īn ḥaqīqat keh ḥokūmat-e mā mardomī ast, bāyad ṣādeqāneh 
moškelāt-rā bā mardom maṭraḥ konīm).1041 
 
Ḫordād in June: substitution and maintenance treatment could work in Iran as well 
 While the conservative Abrār in a next article identifies drug addiction as a cause for 
many “crimes” (ǧarāyem) and “social ruptures” (gasīḫtegī-hā-ye eǧtemā‘ī);1042 the reformist 
newspaper Ḫordād repeats that drug demand reduction is more effective and cheaper than 
drug supply reduction. While refuting the number of five million drug addicts that apparently 
was already discussed in certain circles, Ḫordād nevertheless reports the estimation of the 
RSA numbering two million drug users. Amīr Hūšang Mehryār , the specialist interviewed in 
this regard concomitantly states: “with a physical combat, with a suppression of the addicts, 
with killing, massacring and executing […] the problem of addiction will not be solved” (bā 
mobārezeh-ye fīzīkī va sar-kūb-e mo‘tād-ān va košt va koštār va e‘dām va […] mo‘żal-e 
e‘tiyād ḥall ne-mī-šavad). He instead emphasizes drug therapy by means of medication and 
points to an ongoing need for new addiction therapy facilities. He even maintains that 
medication-supported therapy was neglected to a certain degree in 1376 (1997-98) in favor of 
drug prevention. Even more pronouncedly, he openly propagates substitution treatment – or 
treatment with “analogous material” (mavādd-e mošābeh) – for non-curable addicts, as well 
as the distribution of clean “syringes” (serang).1043  
In Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, Ṣarāmī from the DCHQ, mentions as further new addiction causes: 
„advertisement” for drugs “on the internet” (tablīġ beh rū-ye īnternet) and the “wrong beliefs” 
(bāvar-hā-ye ġalaṭ) that drugs are effective painkillers.1044 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1041  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 6 & 7& 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999): „The drugs combat, an 
encompassing battle that doesn’t know a border’ (Mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder, nabardī-ye farā-gīr 
keh marz nemīšenāsad). 
1042  Abrār, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999): „214 Million addicts world wide. The inauspicous owl of addiction, the 
black shadow of destruction. On the occasion of 26 June, the global day of drugs combat” (214 mīlīyūn 
mo‘tād dar saṭḥ-e ǧahān. Ǧoġd-e šūm-e e‘tiyād, sāyeh-ye siyāh-e tabāhī. Beh bahāneh-ye 5 tīr māh, rūz-e 
ǧahānī-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder). 
1043  Ḫordād, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999): „The average age of addiction has reached 27 years’ (Miyāngīn-e 
senn-e e‘tiyād beh 27 sāl resīd). 
1044  Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999): „Reżā Ṣarāmī, the general director of research and studies of 
the Drug Control Headquarter: The war against drugs is a war without borders’ (Reżā Ṣarāmī, modīr-e koll-
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Interviews with Pino Arlacchi, secretary-general of the UNDCP 
 One of the peculiarities of the year 1378 is a number of interviews with Pino Arlacchi, the secretary-
general of the UNDCP, who apparently visited Iran on the occasion of the international drugs day. 
 
ḪORĀSĀN, KĀR VA KĀRGAR, and QODS: Europe and the UNDCP finally contribute to Iran’s 
drug combat – but only with dogs and vests 
On the same occasion, the newspaper Ḫorāsān reports more generally on the financial 
contributions by the UN and different European countries to Iran’s drug supply reduction 
efforts. While earlier reports were rather complaining about not receiving enough support, 
Moḥammad Fallāḥ, the secretary general of the DCHQ, this times explicitly appreciates the 
assistance by listing the specific examples of the UK and France, who contributed with 
“tracking devices” (dastgāh-hā-ye radd-yāb), “sniffing dogs” (sag-hā-ye kāšef) and 
“bulletproof vests” (ǧalīqeh-ye żedd-e golūleh). At the same time, however, Ḫorāsān also 
gives a bleak assessment of the Islamic Republic’s initial drug combat, by mentioning that the 
underlying “hypotheses were wrong” (farżīyāt-ešān eštebāh būd). It also rather strangely 
expresses its regret that “we have no direct fatvā in declaring drugs illegal” (mā hīč fatvā-ye 
mostaqīmī dar ḥarām e‘lām kardan-e mavādd-e moḫadder nadārīm), while already in the 
first sample year, Eṭṭelā‘āt and Kaihān had cited various fatāvā in this regard.1045 
 
Still on 28 June 1999, the newspaper Kār va Kārgar again cites Pino Arlacchi with 
statement the that the UN indeed financially contributes to Iran’s drugs combat, but dismisses 
this contribution as „very insignificant” (besyār nāčīz) compared to the billions – of probably 
tūmāns – Iran so far has spent on its drugs combat.1046 From an article in Qods, the readers are 
informed that Arlacchi has come to Iran, to sign a contract granting Iran thirteen million US$, 
while admitting that Iran annually spends hundreds of millions of US$ on its drug supply 
reduction efforts.1047 
 
Enteḫāb and Īrān in June: polls among the inhabitants of ‘Oudlāǧān 
Also on 28 June 1999, the newspaper Enteḫāb provides the most comprehensive 
description of the domestic situation of drug addiction so far. It gives a vivid description of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
e moṭāle’āt va pažūheš-e setād-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder: ǧang bā mavādd-e moḫadder, ǧang 
bedūn-e marz ast). 
1045  Ḫorāsān, 6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 1999): „A conversation with the deputy for prevention of the 
Welfare Organization?’ (Goft-o-gū bā mo‘āven-e pīš-gīrī-ye sāzemān-e beh-zīstī). 
1046  Kār va Kārgar, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999): „An interview with Arlacchi’ (Soḫanī bā Ārlākī). 
1047  Qods, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999): „Iran on the frontline’ (Īran, ḫaṭṭ-e moqaddam-e ǧebhah). 
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the poor quarter ‘Oudlāǧān, which is located near the Tehrān bāzār. This quarter is described 
as “one of the important centers of drug distribution in Tehran” (yekī az marākez-e mohemme 
touzī‘-e mavādd-e moḫadder dar saṭḥ-e šahr-e tehrān), where many drug addicts live with 
their families in overcrowded mud-brick houses. In this regard, Enteḫāb, prints a poll that was 
conducted among the quarter’s inhabitants, asking them to express their opinion on the extent 
of the problem.1048 Apparently also based on this poll, the governmental newspaper Īrān 
makes a similar observation when stating that “in the south of the city the inclination towards 
drugs is more [pronounced] than in the north” (dar ǧonūb-e šahr gerāyeš beh mavādd-e 
moḫadder bīštar az šomāl ast). It further reports that when the inhabitants were asked 
whether drug addicts “have to be drowned in the sea” (bāyad dar daryā qarq šavand), “only” 
thirty-five per cent have answered with yes.1049 The publication of such polls is indeed very 
exceptional in the Iranian press. 
 
ABRĀR in July: Iran has three million drug addicts 
 In July, the conservative newspaper Abrār cites the director of the NATIONAL ADIS 
COMITEE (komīteh-ye kešvarī-ye mobārezeh bā aidz), Dr. Bahrām Yegāneh, in saying that 
there are actually three and not two million addicts in Iran, while otherwise reporting more on 
the drug supply efforts at the border.1050  
 
Enteḫāb in an interview with Ḥešmatī, deputy of the DCHQ in July: drug consumption and 
HIV/AIDS in prisons! 
Not long after, Enteḫāb again reports on the international drugs trade, and in particular 
on the danger these illegal profits pose for the legal financial market.1051 In a further series of 
three articles, it concentrates more on drug therapy and drug prevention measures in Iran. In a 
long and very critical interview with Ḥešmatī, the deputy of the DCHQ, it pushes him to 
admit many shortcomings of Iran’s drug policy. For the first time, he reveals that once the 
drugs are trafficked from Afghanistan to Iran, local smuggling gangs take over the 
distribution and the translocation to the Western borders. He eventually also acknowledges 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1048  Enteḫāb, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999): „A poll of ‚Enteḫab’ on the occasion of the global day to combat 
drugs’ (Nażar-sanǧī-ye „enteḫāb’ be mosāsebat-e rūz-e ǧahānī-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder). 
1049  Īrān, 8 Tīr 1378 (29 June 1999): „The lungs of enjoyment are full of the oxigene of death. A poll on the 
issue of drug addiction’ (Riyeh-hā-ye leḏḏat por az oksīžen-e marg ast). 
1050  Abrār, 14 Tīr 1378 (5 July 1999): „American stingers and drug caravans. A report of the political group of 
Abrār on the frightening dimensions of the drugs crisis’ (Estīnger-hā-ye āmrīkāyī va kārvān-hā-ye 
mavādd-e moḫadder. Gozāreš-e gorūh-e siyāsī-ye Abrār dar bareh-ye ab’ād-e ḫouf-nāk-e boḥrān-e 
mavādd-e moḫadder). 
1051  Enteḫāb, 18 Tīr 1378 (9 July 1999): „Globalization of the drugs trade’ (Ǧahān šodan-e teǧārat-e mavādd-e 
moḫadder). 
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that addiction cannot be rooted out, and explicitly objects to the daily arrests of thousands of 
addicts. At the same time, he calls the Iranian people to become active themselves and “not to 
permit that the environment, especially for the drug dealers, is safe” (eǧāzeh nadehand moḥīṭ 
barāye ḫoṣūṣan touzī‘-konandegān-e mavādd-e moḫadder amn bāšad), although certainly not 
calling for the establishment of vigilante groups. While excusing the shortcomings of the 
DCHQ by pointing to the fact that the “national plan to combat drugs” (ṭarḥ-e mellī-ye 
mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḫadder) is still under construction, he nevertheless concedes a 
lack of addiction therapy facilities; incorrect rehabilitation models; a lack of relapse 
prevention measures; and a lack of prevention measures by governmental institutions but also 
by the media.  
 
Even further pressured by Enteḫāb, he eventually also acknowledges that both drug 
consumption and cases of HIV/AIDS are prevalent in Iranian prisons. While successfully 
evading the repeated questions for exact numbers in this regard, he nevertheless provides 
some interesting details on the drug use in prisons. Incarcerated drug addicts accordingly 
“fabricate their own needles and share them with others (serang-hā-ye ālūdeh va serang-hā-yī 
{keh} ḫodešān dar zandān mīsāzand) and use “contaminated and non-standard drugs” 
(mavādd-e ālūdeh va ġair-e estāndārd).1052 
 
Reflecting current medical reseach, Hamšahrī next proceeds to call “addiction 
withdrawal” (tark-e e‘tiyād) an “illusion” (tavahhom), because only the intake of drugs, not 
addiction itself can be stopped..1053  
 
Ḫorāsān in series of articles in July: the ANTI NARCOTICS LAW unfortunately lacks a provision 
on drug prevention 
At the end of July, the newspaper Ḫorāsān prints a series of two articles on the 
amendment to the drug law of 1997, using this occasion as a reason to report more broadly 
about the drug problem in Iran. By correctly pointing to the always-difficult “equilibrium 
between the rights of the society and the rights of the convicted” (ta‘ādol bain-e ḥoqūq-e 
ǧāme‘eh va ḥoqūq-e maḥkūm), it states that the rights of the drug addicts are not yet fully 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1052  Enteḫāb, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999): „Are the smuggling caravans taking shape on 
this side [too]? Unfortunately, that’s true. In conversation with Moḥammad Ǧavād Ḥešmatī, deputy of the 
Drug Control Headquarter’ (Kārvān-hā-ye qāčāq īn ṭaraf taškīl mīšavad? Motaʼassefāne dorost ast. Goft-
o-gū bā Moḥammad Ǧavād Ḥešmatī, mo’āvenat-e setād-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder). 
1053  Hamšahrī, 27 Tīr 1378 (18 July 1999): „The illusion of ‚addiction withdrawl’’ (Tavahhom-e „tark-e 
e‘tiyād). 
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realized in Iran. It explains this to result from the accurate fact that “in the law that was 
approved by the EXPEDIENCY DISCERNMENT COUNCIL OF THE SYSTEM, no allusion to 
prevention or the reduction of the demand of drug consumption is made’ (dar qānūn-e 
moṣsavab-e maǧma‘-e tašḫīṣ-e maṣlaḥat-e neẓām hīč ešāreʼī beh pīšgīrī va kāheš-e taqāżā-
ye maṣraf-e mavādd-e moḫadder na-šodeh ast). Quoting Ġolām-Reżā Anṣārī, the president of 
SWO, it further states that this organization has reached the limits of its capacity to treat drug 
addicts.1054 
 
Āftāb-e Emrūz in August: drug addiction among women 
 In August, the outspoken reformist newspaper Āftāb-e Emrūz expresses its concern for 
the “social welfare” (refāh-e eǧtemā‘ī) of the society due to the growing ‘illnesses caused by 
addiction such as AIDS or hepatitis B” (bīmārī-hā-ye nāšī az e‘tiyād meṯle aidz va hepātīt B). 
For the first time it also gives a specific estimation of female drug addicts when stating that 
ninety per cent of the country’s drug addicts are males. It is the first newspaper to dedicate an 
entire article on drug addiction among women. It consequently asks – as did other newspapers 
before – for tailor-made prevention programs for specific social groups, such as women or 
young people, and for these latter in particular locally available recreational facilities.1055  
 
Vohūman in August: already the shah has not been successful with a repressive drug policy 
Again publishing a personal story and also reporting on drug addiction among women, 
the obscure newspaper Vohūman recounts the long life history of a drug-addicted, imprisoned 
woman. It further mentions that already the “previous regime” (režīm-e qablī) of the shah had 
unsuccessful in rooting out drug addiction with “judicial and disciplinary confrontation” (bar-
ḫord-e qażāyī va enteẓāmī).1056  
 
The last article appearing in the month of August is published by Īrān and gives an 
overview on the international drug laws and convention.1057 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1054  Ḫorāsān, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July 1999): „In the conversation with officials and experts it was 
performed: a study of the National Law of Strengthening the Penalties of the Drug Convicts’ (Dar goft-o-
gū bā masʼūlān va ṣāḥeb-e naẓar enǧām šod: bar-rasī-ue qānūn-e tašdīd-e moǧāzāt-e maḥkūmīn-e 
mavādd-e moḫadder). 
1055  Āftāb-e Emrūz, 2 Šahrīvar 1378 (24 August 1999): „Women – pioneers in the fight against addiction. 
Civil structures and the readiness to fight drugs’ (Zanān – pīš-gāmān-e mobārezah bā e’tiyād. Nehād-hā-ye 
madanī va āmādegī barāye mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder). 
1056  Vohūman, 7 Šahrīvar 1378 (29 August 1999): „Iran is first in the combabt, but the addiction ...’ (Īrān dar 
mobārezah avval ast, ammā e’tiyād ...). 
1057  Īrān, 9 Šahrīvar 1378 (31 August 1999): „The international laws against the chaos of drugs’ (Qavānīn-e 
bain-ol-melalī ‘alai-he hayūlā-ye mavādd-e moḫadder). 
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 In September, Resālat publishes an article on the activities of the EXECUTIVE OFFICE 
FOR THE PREVENTION OF DRUG Abuse (daftar-e eǧrāyī-ye pīš-gīrī az sūʼ-maṣrafe-e mavādd-e 
moḫadder), which is a part of the Education Ministry. Revealing the ongoing bleak situation 
of drug prevention in Iran, it, however, mentions that this office apparently still only was 
planning textbooks informing the twenty million students under its supervision about the 
dangers of drug addiction.1058  
 
Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī in September: do not send minor drug addicts to prison! 
Next, Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī publishes a series consisting of two articles on drug 
addiction treatment by means of medication and therapy. Written by Ḥassan Mūsavī, who has 
worked for several years in addiction therapy facilities, the familiar problem of addiction 
relapse (‘oud beh e‘tiyād or e‘tiyād-e moǧadded) is discussed, and self-help groups such as 
the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS are mentioned. Mūsavī in particular asks to reconsider the 
current practice of sending adolescents to prisons, lest they develop even worse addiction 
pattersn.1059  
 
A further article of Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī is also dedicated to the topic of youth 
addiction and once again stresses the importance of the role of a healthy family, where the 
father acts as “powerful tutor” (sar-parastī-ye moqtader), and the mother “can prevent the 
children from moral deviations’ (mītavānad az enḥerāfāt-e aḫlāqī-ye farzandān ǧelougīrī 
konad).1060 
 
Ḫorāsān in an interview with Ṣadīqī, director of the ĀFTĀB SOCIETY, in September: a 
shortage of therapy facilities for drug-addicted women 
Ḫorāsān next gives a rather progressive description of the situation of female drug 
addicts in the country. In this report, the director of the private AFTĀB SOCIETY (ǧam‘iyyat-e 
āftāb) and Member of Parliament, Marżīyeh Ṣadīqī, points to the crucial problem that 
currently women have less access to existing therapy and rehabilitation facilities than men in 
Iran. She also points out the generally increasing age of marriage as a possible addiction cause, 
although Ḥossain Dežākām, founder of the CONGRESS 60, later in the article, points to the fact, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1058  Resālat, 18 Šahrīvar 1378 (9 September 1999): „Education, training and the struggle for a combat against 
drugs”(Āmūzeš va parvareš vā talāš barāye mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder). 
1059  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 24 & 25 Šahrīvar 1378 (15 & 16 September 1999): „One can get out of the well of 
addiction”(Az čāh-e e’tiyād mītavān ḫāreǧ šod). 
1060  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999): „The youth are the main victim of 
drugs”(Ǧavānān ‘omdah-tarīn qorbāniyān-e mavādd-e moḫadder). 
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that “in principle, married women resort more to addiction than single girls” (oṣūlan zan-ān-e 
motaʼahhel bīštar az doḫtar-ān-e moǧarrad beh e‘tiyād rūy mī-yāvarand).1061  
 
In September, the reformist newspaper Aḫbār-e Eqteṣādī reproduces a translation of 
an article of the New York Times on the poppy cultivation in Afghanistan under the 
supervision of the Ṭālibān,1062 wile Payām-e Āzādī repeats the established opinion that “the 
first persons who propagated opium in the [Iranian] society, were English officials” (avvalīn 
kesānī keh taryāk-rā dar ǧāme‘eh ravāǧ dādadn maʼmūrān-e englīsī būdand). For the first 
time, it also explicitly doubts whether the liberal drug policies of European countries can be 
an example for Iran, because “this situation is seen differently in all countries” (īn vaż‘iyat be 
gūneh-hā-ye moḫtalef dar hameh-ye kešvar-hā dīdeh mī-šavad).1063  
 
A few days later, the newspaper Hamšahrī publishes an article that is virtually 
congruent with an article that appeared on 24 June in the newspaper Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī. 1064 
This might indicate that the article was written or at least prepared in its outlines by the DRUG 
CONTROL HEADQUARTER or another official institution. It might, however, also simply be a 
reprinted article. 
 
Āzād in September: a need for therapy facilities in prisons  
Also reporting on women’s addiction is the pragmatic reformist newspaper Āzād. It 
quotes Zohreh Zāre‘, the advisor for women’s affair of the province of Tehran, with the 
request for the installation of therapy centers (marākez-e darmān) in polluted (ālūdeh) prisons, 
where a lot of inmates are “affected by different types of diseases” (ebtelāʼ beh anvā‘-e 
bīmārī).1065 Another article in Ḫorāsān also cites Zāre‘ with her statement on prisons as 
places for the spread of HIV and AIDS. Another addiction specialist furthermore mentions for 
the first time the internationally approved model of therapeutic communities (T.C. yā 
ǧāme‘eh-ye darmānī), which haven’t been established at the time in Iran.1066 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1061  Ḫorāsān, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999): „Downfall of the woman in the ashes of 
addiction”(Ġorūb-e zan dar ḫākestar-e e’tiyād). 
1062  Aḫbār-e Eqteṣādī, 31 Šahrīvar 1378 (22 September 1999): „Afghanistan – the worlds opium 
field”(Afġānestān, kašt-zār-e taryāk-e ǧahān). 
1063  Payām-e Āzādī, 3 Mehr 1378 (25 September 1999): „Iranian, addiction and family”(Īrānī, e’tiyād va 
ḫāne-vadeh). 
1064  Hamšahrī, 5 Mehr 1378 (27 September 1999): „Addiction, a piece of sorrow with an unacceptable 
ending”(E‘tiyād, ġam-nāmeh-ye pāyān-e nāpaḏīr). 
1065  Āzād, 6 Mehr 1378 (28 September 1999): „The wives of addicted men are suffering from the social harms 
of addiction”(Hamsarān-e mardān-e mo‘tād az āsīb-hā-ye eǧtemā‘ī-ye e‘tyiād ranǧ mībarand). 
1066  Ḫorāsān, 8 Mehr 1378 (30 September 1999): „2 million addicts and the downfall of the families”(2 
mīlīyūn mo’tād va forū-pāšī-ye ḫāne-vādeh). 
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Īrān in October: the government has to respect the people’s rights! 
 In October the reformist newspaper Aḫbār-e Eqteṣādī writes about the development of 
the international drugs situation by referring to Hamid Ghodse, the president of the INCB, 
who calls attention to the growing addiction to pharmaceuticals.1067  
 
Linking the growing addiction to illegal drugs to the change of the Iranian society 
“from a traditional stage to a modern stage” (az marḥaleh-ye sonnatī beh marḥaleh-ye 
modern), the newspaper Īrān for its part emphasizes that “the government should respect the 
people’s rights” (doulat ḥoqūq-e mardom-rā ǧeddī be-gīrad). Reflecting one of the crucial 
aspects of the reformist administration, namely people participation, it further proposes that 
“non-governmental and people’s organizations (NGOs) might be able to be a vessel […] in 
paying attention to the situation of our society” (sāz-mān-hā-ye ġair-e doulatī va mardomī 
(NGO) {hā} šāyad bā tavaǧǧoh beh vaż‘iyyat-e ǧāme‘eh-ye mā be-tavānand maḥmal […] 
bāšand). And it once again asks the individual state institutions involved in the official drug 
policy to finally clarify their respective stance towards the question whether addiction is a 
crime or an illness.1068 
 
Statistics and addiction research findings by the DCHQ 
 In October 1997, the DCHQ presented its latest statistics on drug seizures, the arrest of drug traffickers 
and drug addicts, as the newspaper Qods mentions. While the RAPID ASSESSMENT SITUATION STUDY, which 
established the official estimation of two million drug users in Iran, already was published in 1377 (1998/99), the 
DCHQ only now puts these findings at the disposal of the press. The presentation of numbers and statistics is 
generally a strong incentive for the publication of drug-related newspaper articles, as shown by the following 
examples; even if the press does not limit itself to quoting exclusively official statistics. 
 
Āfarīneš in October: 19 million drug addicts in 2014?  
Next, however, the newspaper Āfarīneš repeats the claim that within ten years after the 
Islamic revolution the Islamic republic managed to lower the number of drug addicts to 
500,000. But it warns, that if the current trend continues there will be nineteen million drug 
addicts in the year 1400 (2013-14). It once again identifies the cigarettes to be the starter drug 
par excellence leading to the “world of the wizard of addiction” (donyā-ye afsūn-gar-e 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1067  Aḫbār-e Eqteṣādī, 11 Mehr 1378 (3 October 1999): „The year 2000 will be the year of combatting the 
spread of drugs in the world”(Sāl-e 2000, sāl-e mobārezah bā gostareš-e mavādd-e moḫadder dar donyā). 
1068  Īrān, 19 Mehr 1378 (11 October 1999): „The application of experimental and erroneous methods in regard 
to addiction is wrong!”(Estefādeh az raveš-e āzemūn va ḫaṭā dar moured-e e‘tiyād ġalaṭ ast!). 
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e‘tiyād), by entailing the smoking of hashish, opium-pipes (sg. vāfūr), water pipes (sg. 
qalyūn), or other pipes.1069  
 
Enteḫāb in October: 95% of all imprisoned women are drug-related convicts 
In repeating the standard claim that Europe and the USA are only profiting from Iran’s 
drugs combat while not willing to “have [even] the smallest cooperation with Iran” 
(kūčektarīn ham-kārī-rā bā Īrān dāšteh bāšad), the newspaper Enteḫāb also points to an 
interesting fact by mentioning that seventy five per cent of all male prison inmates are drug 
related, while in the case of the women this even would amount to ninety five per cent.1070  
 
 
Kār va Kārgar in October: institutions involved in DDR 
Next, the newspaper Kār va Kārgar proceeds to inform about state institutions 
involved in the field of drug demand reduction. It lists among others the MINISTRY OF 
ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE (vezārat-e farhang va eršād-e eslāmī), the EDUCATION 
MINISTRY (vezārat-e āmūzeš va parvareš), the MINISTRY OF CULTURE AND HIGHER 
EDUCATION (vezārat-e farhang va āmūzeš-e ‘ālī), the ISLAMIC PROPAGATION ORGANIZATION 
(sāz-mān-e tablīġ-āt-e eslāmī), and the religious seminaries (ḥouzeh-hā-ye ‘elmiyyeh) in Qom. 
An article of the newspaper Resālat of September 9 ostensibly influenced this article, or both 
might have been influenced by the same sources.1071  
 
Ǧavān in October: 76% of all AIDS cases are due to needle sharing 
Once again, it is astonishingly the radical newspaper Ǧavān that gives the first specific 
numbers of AIDS cases in Iran when mentioning three hundred and fourteen such cases in the 
province of Fārs, of which seventy six percent were contracted by intravenous drug use (az 
ṭarīq-e tazrīq-e mavādd-e moḫadder). Against the background of this “ruinous calamity” 
(balā-ye ḫānemān-sūz), it asks for a revision (taǧdīd-naẓar) of the existing drug policy 
practices.1072  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1069  Āfarīneš, 24 Mehr 1378 (16 October 1999): „Tomorrow it will be too late to combat the youth 
addiction”(Fardā barāye mobārezah bā e’tiyād-e ǧavānān dīr ast). 
1070  Enteḫāb, 25 Mehr 1378 (17 October 1999): „Does anyone know the price? Comfort for Europe and 
America – exorbitant costs for Iran”(Āyā kasī qadr mīdānad? Āsāyeš-e orūpā va āmrīkā – hazīneh-hā-ye 
gazāf barāye īrān). 
1071  Kār va Kārgar, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999): „Education, training and the cultural combat aganst 
drugs”(Āmūzeš va parvareš va mobārezah-ye farhangī bā mavādd-e moḫadder). 
1072  Ǧavān, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999): „Addiction – a smoke that ruins the family”(E‘tiyād – dūdī ke 
dūdmān-rā beh bād mīdehad). 
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Kār va Kārgar in October: opium, heroin, hashish – the drugs of choice in Iran 
Shortly after, Kār va Kārgar prints another article, presenting new research studies by 
the DCHQ, which show that fifty per cent of the consumed drugs consist of opium (taryāk), 
around thirty per cent of heroin (herōʼīn), and the rest mainly of opium residue (šīreh-ye 
taryāk) and hashish (ḥašīš).1073  
 
Āfarīneš on its part again reports on the growing poppy cultivation in Ṭālibān-
controlled Afghanistan and points to the fact that these are supported and recognized 
especially from Pakistan.1074 
 
Āzād and Payām-e Āzādī in November: more statistics 
 In November, the reformist newspapers Āzād and Payām-e Āzādī both report on the 
global and regional drugs trade and its consequences for Iran. Āzād accuses the mafia of “not 
caring about God nor his servants” (nah beh ḫodā negah dārand va nah beh bandeh-ye ḫodā) 
and states “their honor is like soap; the more you use it {with water} the less it gets and at the 
end it [is] a useless bubble” (šaraf barāye ān-hā čūn ṣābūn ast dar āb har čeh az ān estefādeh 
konīd kamtar ast va dar nehāyat ḥobābī bī ḫāṣiyyat). Payām-e Āzādī, in contrast, adopts a 
more conspiratorial stance in articulating the well-known opinion that drugs today “have been 
turned into a means that is applied to keep back the nations and to colonize them” (beh 
vasīleʼī tabdīl gardīdeh ke barāye ‘aqab negah-dāštan-e mellat-hā va este‘mār-e ānhā beh 
kār mīravad).1075  
 
Still in November, the newspaper Kār va Kārgar for its part mentions drug addiction 
and drug trafficking as one of the topics that was discussed on the occasion of a UN 
sponsored conference on socio-economic issues of economically developing countries 
(hemāyeš-e masāyel-e eǧtemā‘ī-ye eqteṣādī-ye kešvar-hā-ye keh marḥaleh-ye goḏar-e 
(enteqāl-e) eqteṣādī-rā ṭayy mīkonand) in Ashgabat, the capital of Turkmenistan.1076  
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1073  Kār va Kārgar, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999): „Opium smokes the enthuisiasm of the young 
generation!”(Afyūn ġairat-e nasl-e ǧavān-rā dūd mīkonad). 
1074  Āfārīneš, 2 Ābān 1378 (24 October 1999): „The Ṭālibān and opium in Afghanistan”(Ṭālebān va taryāk dar 
afġānestān). 
1075  Āzād, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999): „Drugs from the viewpoint of statistics and the 
reality”(Mavādd-e moḫadder az negāh-e āmār va vāqe‘iyyat); Payām-e Āzādī, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 
November 1999): „Opium war”(Ǧang-e taryāk). 
1076  Kār-o-kārgar, 24 Ābān 1378 (15 November 1999): „Drugs – the main problem of developing 
countries”(Mavādd-e moḫadder – ‘omdah-tarīn mo’żal-e kešvar-hā-ye dar ḥāl-e goẕār). 
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Qods in November: cities located on drug trafficking routes have higher addiction rates 
The newspaper Qods subsequently reveals that there are a large number of drug 
addicts in the provinces of Ḫorāsān, Sīstān va Balūčestān, Kermān and Kermānšāh. These are 
all provinces that lie on the main drug trafficking routes running through Iran. It also repeats 
the findings of a study carried out by the DCHQ that sixty-five per cent of all AIDS cases are 
due to needle sharing (estefādeh az serang-hā-ye moštarek-e ālūdeh).1077 
 
Āftāb-e Emrūz in November: security forces involved in drug supply reduction 
Citing results of the DCHQ’s recent research activities, the newspaper Āftāb-e Emrūz 
dedicates an article to Iran’s drug situation through the lens of statistics. On the margins, the 
readers are informed that drugs are not only seized by the LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES or the 
police (nīrū-hā-ye enteẓāmī), but also by the IRGC (sepāh), by forces of the Intelligence 
MINISTRY (vezārat-e eṭṭelā‘āt) and by the BASĪǦ. This reformist newspaper, however, not 
only blames the supply of drugs, but also the “abundant demand of the consumers” (taqāżā-ye 
farāvān-e maṣraf-konandegān) for the high addiction rate in Iran. It further states that the 
practice of drug dealers “to increase the amount of drugs by adding different materials’ 
(meqdār-e mavādd-e moḫadder-rā bā eżāfeh kardan mavādd-e moḫtalef afzāyeš mīdehand) is 
“the main cause of death for a lot of consumers” (‘omdeh-tarīn dalīl-e marg-e besyār az 
maṣraf-konande-gān mī-bāšad).1078  
 
Īrān in November: 3 million drug addicts & the role of the media in drug prevention 
Reporting on the increasing addiction amongst Iranian youth is an article of the 
newspaper Īrān.1079 Two days following the publication of this article, the same newspaper 
announces that the number of addicts in Iran is three million, of which a lot still are processed 
through courts, adding that in the last year alone 247,000 new drug-related files were opened. 
Given the multitude of drug related articles in the press, the complaint of a revolutionary court 
judge, who asks the rhetorical question “how much activities did [the press] really have in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1077  Qods, 25 Ābān 1378 (16 November 1999): „Addiction – a fire, in which all are burnt”(E‘tiyād – ātešī ke 
hameh dar ān mīsūzand). 
1078  Āftāb-e Emrūz, 26 Ābān 1378 (17 November 1999): „Drugs and addiction in the language of 
statistics”(Mavādd-e moḫadder va e’tiyād beh zabān-e āmār). 
1079  Īrān, 27 Ābān 1378 (18 November 1999): „’How’ do we keep our children away from drugs?”(‘Čegūneh’ 
farzandemān-rā az mavādd-e moḫadder dūr negāh dārīm?). 
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elucidating the people regarding drugs?’ (vaqe‘an dar roušan-gar-e mardom nesbat beh 
mavādd-e moḫadder če-qadar fa‘‘āliyyat dāšteh), is at least astonishing.1080  
 
Ḫordād in November: corruption among prison guards & a proposal to distribute sterile 
syringes to drug addicted prison inmates! 
The next series of two articles appearing in Ḫordād are the most critical and outspoken 
articles of the year 1378 (1999-2000). The articles first reflect the opinion of the president of 
the revolutionary courts in the province Čahār-Maḥāl va Baḫtiyārī, who claims that illegal 
Afghan refugees in Sīstān and Balūčestān are involved in drug smuggling. He even blames 
this on their religious believes: “because according to the fatvās of some Sunni ‘olamāʼ, the 
drugs trade is allowable and only their consumption has a legal prohibition” (čerā keh ṭebq-e 
fatāvā-ye ba‘żī az ‘olamā-ye ahl-e sonnat, ḫarīd-o-forūš-e mavādd-e moḫadder mobāḥ būdeh 
va tanhā maṣraf-e ān man‘-e šar‘ī dārad). Of more importance for the local context is, 
however, the first explicit demand for the distribution of clean syringes to addicted prison 
inmates, a practice that until now was only discussed in foreign countries. The proposal was 
apparently put forward by a deputy of the HEALTH MINISTRY (vezārat-e behdāšt) at a meeting 
of the DCHQ. Other attending officials vehemently refuted the idea by stressing “here is not 
America” (īn-ǧā āmrīkā nīst). The article further refers to recently published research on the 
extent of AIDS – or rather HIV – among “many incarcerated addicts” (šomār-e besyārī az 
mo‘tādān-e maḥbūs) in the prisons of Kermānšāh and Kahnavaǧ. Even more surprisingly, it 
also explicitly states that drugs are beings smuggled into prisons by prison guards, “naturally 
by payment of hefty bribes” (albatteh bā pardāḫt-e rešveh-hā-ye kalān).1081  
Social causes for drug addiction are again the subject of two newspaper articles in the 
month of November.1082  
 
Payām-e Āzādī in an interview with the MP Ǧeloudārzādeh in November: the only way out 
of addiction is divorce, not marriage 
The newspaper Payām-e Āzādī next quotes the reformist Member of Parliament 
Sohailā Ǧeloudārzādeh. While conveying that many families still believe that the solution for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1080  Īran, 29 Ābān 1378 (20 November 1999): „Continuation of the confrontation with the drug traffickers at 
the Eastern borders of Iran”(Edāmah-ye dar-gīrī dar marz-hā-ye šarqī-ye īran bā qāčāqčīyān-e mavādd-e 
moḫadder). 
1081  Ḫordād, 1 & 2 Āḏar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999): „Iran, the smoothest path for the passing of drug 
caravans”(Īrān, hamvar-tarīn rāh-e ‘obūr-e kārvān-hā-ye mavādd-e moḫadder). 
1082  Īrān, 2 Āḏar 1378 (23 November 1999): „How does the crooked cargo reach the dwelling?! Sugesstions of 
knowing social misbehaviors with an emphasis on the topic of addiction approaches”(Bār-e kaǧ četour be 
manzel mīresad?! Naẓariyyeh šenāsī eǧtemā’ī-ye kaǧravī bā taʼkīd bar maqūlah-ye e’tiyād). 
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an addicted woman is marriage, she stresses that in reality the solution is more often a divorce 
from the addicted husband. To support her argument, she cites official statistics which „show 
that 34 per cent of divorces result from addiction’ (nešān mī-dehad 34 dar ṣad az ṭalāqhā 
nāšī az e‘tiyād ast).1083 
A next article by Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī focuses on occupational and psychological 
therapy measures; while another article of Ḫordād asks for a gradual rethinking of the official 
drug policy altogether;1084 One of the few drug-related articles in Kaihān in this year, in turn, 
mentions bromocriptin (brōmōkrīptīn) as a one of the first pharmaceuticals used in addiction 
treatment in Iran.1085  
 
Ḫorāsān in November: how much is Europe really contributing to Iran’s drug combat? 
Again dedicated to the topic of Western financial and material support is an article in 
Ḫorāsān, which also mentions sniffing dogs and further assistance provided to Iran by France 
and the UK.1086 
 
Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī and ‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān in December: a common ground in anti-
imperialism 
Two more general articles on Iran’s drug situation appear in the beginning of 
December in Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī and ‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān. Although ideologically diametrically 
opposed, both newspapers discuss causes of drug addiction by mentioning inter alia 
“exploitation, colonization, despotism, imperialism” (esteṯmār, este‘mār, estebdād, 
emperyālīsm). And both also blame the failure of – general – rehabilitation measures in the 
Iranian prison system on the exuberant number (te‘dād-e anbūh) of incarcerated drug addicts. 
Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī even develops a certain understanding for drug dealers when stating that 
most people active in the “cultivation, production […], transport and distribution” (kešāvarzī, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1083  Payām-e Āzādī, 2 Āḏar 1378 (23 November 1999): „The world has to know ...”(Donyā bāyad bedānad ...). 
1084  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 4 Āḏar 1378 (25 November 1999): „The role of occupational and psychological 
therapy in tha salvation of the addicts from the swirl of addiction”(Naqš-e kār-darmānī va ravān-darmānī 
dar naǧāt-e mo‘tādān az gerd-āb-e e‘tiyād); Ḫordād, 4 Āḏar 1378 (25 November 1999): „We need a 
change of the theory in the combat against drugs”(Mā beh taġyīr-e negareš dar mobārezah bā mavādd-e 
moḫadder niyāz dārīm) – not available. 
1085  Kaihān, 8 Āḏar 1378 (29 November 1999): „Implementation of the research plan of addiction withdrawal 
in the country”(Eǧrā-ye ṭarḥ-e taḥqīqātī-ye tark-e e‘tiyād dar kešvar). 
1086  Ḫorāsān, 7 Āḏar 1378 (28 November 1999): „Which price do the Western countries pay for the combat 
against the drugs transit through Iran?”(Kešvar-hā-ye ġarbī čeh bahāyī barāye mobārezah bā trānzīt-e 
mavādd-e moḫadder az īrān mīpardāzand?). 
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ṣan‘at […], ḥaml-o-naql va touzī‘) are victims themselves, while the real criminals are the 
heads of the smuggling gangs.1087 
 
Īrān in December: French sniffing dogs for Iran 
Next, the newspaper Īrān dedicates an entire article to the thirty “police dogs” (sag-
hā-ye polīs) or  “educated dogs” (sag-hā-ye tarbiyyat šodeh or sag-hā-ye ta‘līm dīdeh) 
respectively, that the French government recently supplied to Iran. As dogs are often still 
considered impure animals in Iran, in particular also by the police, Īrān also describes the use 
of such dogs as guide dogs or rescue dogs in France, thus arguably trying to explain the use of 
such dogs to the Iranian public.1088  
 
Another article in Ḫorāsān, in contrast, again cites the secretary general of the DCHQ 
with the opinion that “the help of the international community for Iran in this regard is very 
insignificant” (komak-hā-ye maǧāme‘-e bain-ol-melalī beh īrān dar īn amr besyār nāčīz ast). 
It further adds, “if we didn’t combat the transit [of drugs], our problem would definitively 
would be better than it is now” (agar mā bā trānzīt mobārezeh nakonīm, moškel-e mā qaṭ‘ān 
tā ḥaddī behtar az īn ḥadd ḫvāhad šod).1089  
 
Gozāreš-e Rūz in December: the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS 
The decidedly reformist newspaper Gozāreš-e Rūz, next, writes about addiction 
therapy measures in Iran. Is provides a description of group sessions that “even astonish{es} 
the Iranians as well” (ḫvod-e īrānī-hā-rā nīz šegeft-zadeh mī-konad), and again instances the 
NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS (mo‘tād-ān-e gom-nām), whose founders apparently were suspected 
to be CIA agents (ma‘mūr-ān-e siyā) in the beginning.1090  
 
Bayān in December: 36% of all divorces are the result of a husband’s drug addiction 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1087  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 17 Āḏar 1378 (8 December 1999): „Patterns of the combat against drug smuggling 
and addiction”(Rāh-kār-hā-ye mobārezah bā qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḫadder va e‘tiyād); ‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān, 
17 Āḏar 1378 (8 December 1999): „We are not paying 11 billion dollars drug indemnities”(11 mīliyārd 
dolār tāvān-e mavādd-e moḫadder-rā na-pardāzīm). 
1088  Īrān, 11 Āḏar 1378 (12 December 1999): „Police dogs are stationed at airports and on roads”(Sag-hā-ye 
polīs dar forūd-gāh-hā-ye va ǧāddeh-hā mostaqerr mīšavand). 
1089  Ḫorāsān, 23 Āḏar 1378 (14 December 1999): „400 million square metres of cultivation of drug production 
[sic] in Afghanistan. Aid for Iran in this combat against the smuggler is an aid for the humankind”(400 
mīlīyūn metr-e morabba‘ kašt-e toulīd-e mavādd-e moḫadder dar Afġānestān. Komak beh īrān barāye 
mobārezah bā qāčāqčiyān komak beh bašariyyat ast). 
1090  Gozāreš-e Rūz, 24 Āḏar 1378 (15 December 1999): „Iran – the combat against the drugs flood”(Īrān – 
mobārezah bā sail-e mavādd-e moḫadder). 
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Also in December, Bayān, which only recently was launched as successor to the 
banned Salām, publishes two articles on drug cultivation in and drug trafficking from 
Afghanistan, as well as on drug addiction in Iran. The articles follow the established patterns 
of citing statistics, telling colorful personal stories and discussing addiction causes. New 
details are, however, given in the second article – a translation from a Newsweek article – on 
the operation mode of heroin laboratories in Afghanistan.1091  
 
Hamšahrī in December: the public opinion has to change 
Departing from addiction causes, the newspaper Hamšahrī emphasizes the importance 
of prevention and the “necessity of a change in the social viewpoints and a reform in the 
patterns of the public opinion” (lozūm-e taġyīr-e dīd-gāh-hā-ye eǧtemā‘ī va eṣlāḥ-e šīve-ye 
tafakkor-e ‘omūmī).1092  
 
Ǧavān, in a next article, lays the blame for Iran’s drug addiction on „coffee-houses” 
(qahveh-ḫāneh-hā), where the unemployed would spend their time; while at the same 
accusing the Western “colonialists” (este‘mār-gar-ān) of pursuing a strategy of “changes in 
the sexual desire, a decrease of acts of volition, a condition of dream{iness} and somnolence” 
(taġyīr-āt-ī dar mail-e ǧensī, kāheš-e ḥarak-āt-e erādī, ḥālat-e roʼyā hamrāh bā ḫvāb-
ālūdegī) against the Iranian society.1093  
 
Kaihān on the occasion of a visit of the Mini Dublin group in December: Mr. Fallāḥ, do you 
think the drug combat is over? 
Still in December 1999, the newspaper Kaihān openly taunts the DCHQ by asking 
“does the headquarter think that the combat has ended and that there is no more need for 
continuing it?” (āyā setād gomān mī-konad keh mobārezeh beh pāyān resīdeh va dīgar niyāzī 
beh edāmeh-ye ān nīst?). While subsequently positively mentioning the visit of a delegation 
of the so-called MINI DUBLIN GROUP that financially contributes to Iran’s drug combat; it 
continues to accuse the US “global arrogance” (estekbār-e ǧahānī) to “have started a war full 
of deceits and secrets against the Islamic ideals and values” (yek ǧang-e tamām-e ‘ayyār va 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1091  Bayān, 27 Āḏar 1378 (18 December 1999): „Addiction – an onesided transaction”(E‘tiyād – mo’āmelah-ye 
yek-savīyyah); Bayān, 28 Āḏar 1378 (19 December 1999): „The Golden Territory. Afghanistan was 
devastated in the war, but in opium production it is extremely flourishing”(Sar-zamīn-e ṭalāyī. Afġānestān 
dar ǧang vīrān šod ammā dar toulīd-e taryāk ābād ābād ast). 
1092  Hamšahrī, 6 Dey 1378 (28 December 1999): „Necessity of knowing the factors and motives for an 
inclination towards addiction”(Żorūrat-e šenāḫt-e ‘avāmel va angīzeh-hā-ye gerāyeš beh e‘tiyād). 
1093  Ǧavān, 6 Dey 1378 (28 December 1999): „Addiction is an illness, so let’s cure it”(E‘tiyād bīmārī ast, ān-
rā darmān konīm). 
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panhān-rā ‘alai-he ārmān-hā va arzeš-hā-ye eslāmī šorū‘ kardeh) by being complicit in the 
international drug trade.1094  
 
Apparently inspired by the same article of the Newsweek that was earlier explicitly 
cited by Bayān, the newspaper Abrār provides a more detailed, albeit also more ideological 
report of the drug situation in Afghanistan and Pakistan. It reproaches the Ṭālibān that despite 
– to a certain degree laudably – aiming at “the destruction of the unbelievers” (tabāhī-ye 
koffār), “before [the drugs] damage the Non-Muslims, they damage the Muslims” (qabl az 
ān-keh beh ġair-e mosalmān-ān loṭmeh bezanad, beh mosalmān-ān loṭmeh mīzanad).1095  
 
Aḫbār-e Eqteṣādī in January: despair over overcrowded prisons 
In a first article appearing in January 2000, Abrār-e Eqteṣādī again provides statistics 
of drugs seizures, drug related court cases and prison inmates. Increasingly distraught about 
the high number of drug-related prison inmates, lamenting: “the prisons quickly become 
crowded and the judges don’t find the time to investigate” (zendān-hā ba sor‘at por mī-šavad 
va qāżī-yān forṣat-e resīdegī na-yāband), it advises the police to rather concentrate its efforts 
in fighting drug trafficking on the border, instead of wasting its time on arresting drug dealers 
and drug addicts in the cities.1096  
 
Payām-e Āzādī and Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, which publish the two next articles, do not forward 
any new arguments on drug addiction and drug trafficking.1097  
 
Fatḥ in a series of two articles in February: vulnerable groups need specific drug prevention 
A shorter series of two articles appears in January in the reformist newspaper Fatḥ, the 
successor to the recently banned Ḫordād. Against the prevalent arguments of the press, it 
maintains that poverty and unemployment are not main addiction causes; and it claims that 
women are less addicted to drugs than men due to “their lack of relation with polluted areas 
outside the house and due to the exercise of social and family control in regard to female 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1094  Kaihān, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999): „Drugs – the war without borders between Iran and the global 
arrogance”(Mavādd-e moḫadder – ǧang bedūn-e marz-e īrān bā estekbār-e ǧahānī). 
1095  Abrār, 8 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999): „Afghanistan and the opium dollars”(Afġānestān – dolār-hā-ye 
afyūn). 
1096  Abrār-e Eqteṣādī, 14 Dey 1378 (5 January 2000): „The ‚business’ of drugs cannot be scattered by these 
{kind} of activities”(„Bīznes-e’ mavādd-e moḫadder, bā īn kār-hāa motalāšī nemīšavad).  
1097  Payām-e Āzādī, 7 Bahman 1378 (27 January 2000): „Drugs, a reality of yesterday, today and the 
future”(Mavādd-e moḫadder, vāqe’iyyat-hā-ye dīrūz, emrūz va fardā); Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 11 Bahman 1378 
(31 January 2000): „Dirty trade. The income from drugs is higher than the income from oil”(Teǧārat-e kaṯīf. 
Dar-āmad-e mavādd-e moḫadder az dar-āmad-e naft bālātar ast). 
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individuals compared with male individuals” (‘adam-e ertebāṭ-e ān-hā bā moḥīṭ-hā-ye ālūdeh 
dar ḫāreǧ az manzel va e‘māl-e kontrol-hā-ye eǧtemā‘ī va ḫāne-vādegī nesbat beh afrād-e 
moʼannaṯ dar moqāyeseh bā afrād-e moḏakkar).1098  
 
New research findings? 
 In February, several newspapers articles present new research findings and conduct interviews with 
officials of the DCHQ and the UNDCP. It is not entirely clear what caused this cluster of articles; it might have 
been prompted by the late publication of the UNDCP’s WORLD DRUG REPORT, to which the newspaper 
Tarǧomān-e Rūz (27 February 2000) explicitly refers. 
 
Āftāb-e Emrūz in February: drug addition and HIV in prison – is the Health Ministry 
distributing syringes? 
Following another article on the international drug situation and the UN conventions 
by the newspaper Kār va Kārgar,1099 Āftāb-e Emrūz dedicates an article to the problem of 
drug addiction and the spread of HIV in prisons. In the interview, the director of the STATE 
PRISON ORGANIZATION denies that non-addicted people become addicted in Iranian prisons, 
but inconsistently concedes: “at least I don’t have exact statistics on this instance” (ḥadd-e 
aqall man āmār-e daqīqī dar īn moured na-dāram). When asked whether the WHO recently 
has provided the government with syringes to be distributed in prisons, he evades an answer, 
thus arguably confirming the guess of Āftāb-e Emrūz.1100  
 
Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī in a series of four articles in February & March: more drug prevention 
is needed 
Not long after, Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī publishes a detailed series consisting of four 
articles. Concentrating on the supply side of the drug problem, the newspaper provides some 
new details concerning patterns of drug trafficking. It states for instance that recently more 
women are being involved; that heroin is increasingly produced within Afghanistan; but that, 
somehow confusingly, more opium than heroin is seized in Iran. To a certain degree 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1098  Fatḥ, 19 & 20 Bahman (8 & 9 February 2000): „The danger is serious! Addiction menaces the 
world”(Ḫaṭar ǧeddī ast! E’tiyād ǧahān-rā tahdīd mīkonad). 
1099  Kār va Kārgar, 25 Bahman 1378 (14 February 2000): „A look at the international drug 
conventions”(Negāhī beh konvānsīyūn-hā-ye bain-ol-melalī-ye kontrol-e mavādd-e moḫadder). 
1100  Āftāb-e Emrūz, 27 Bahman 1378 (16 February 2000): „Prisoners, drugs and AIDS”(Zandānīyān, mavādd-
e moḫadder va aidz). 
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contradicting the trend of the press discourse in 1378, Ǧomūrī-ye Eslāmī also requests more 
efforts in the field of drug prevention instead of drug therapy.1101  
 
Gozāreš-e Rūz in a series of two articles in February: most treatment methods are 
insufficient or even wrong 
Adopting a strongly critical note towards the past demand reduction measures, the 
student newspaper Gozāreš-e Rūz talks of a “failure of the programs of combating [addiction]” 
(šekast-e barnāmeh-hā-ye mobārezāh{-rā}) and maintains: “when the social conditions do not 
change, the programs to fight addiction eventually will not get somewhere” (agar šarāyeṭ- 
eǧtemā‘ī taġyīr nayābad eḥtemālan barnāmeh-hā-ye mobārezeh bā e‘tiyād beh ǧāʼī ne-mī-
resad).1102  
 
Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz in February: Iran still has not ratified the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic 
Substances 
Next, two articles by the newspapers Īrān and Ḫorāsān discuss the topics of youth 
addiction and advertisements for shady withdrawal centers.1103  
Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, in turn informs the reader about the purpose of the recently increased 
activities of the UNDCP, which consists in building “a security belt around Afghanistan” (yek 
kamar-band-e amniyyatī dour-e afġānestān). Of further interest is the information that – 
according to a press conference on occasion of the release of the WORLD DRUG REPORT – Iran 
has not fully ratified the 1971 UN CONVENTION ON PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES and its 
additional protocols so far.1104  
 
Tarǧomān-e Rūz in February: the opening of the UNDCP office in Tehrān 
Three days later, the newspaper Tarǧomān-e Rūz dedicates an article on the release of 
the WORLD DRUG REPORT and proudly mentions the international recognition of Iran’s 
success in combating the drug trafficking. On this occasion, it also explicitly mentions the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1101  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 30 Bahman & 1 & 2 & 19 Esfand (19 & 20 & 21 February & 9 March 2000): „A 
new theory on the increase of drug addiction and drug smuggling in the society”(Negarešī-e nou bar 
afzāyeš-e e’tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḫadder dar ǧāme’ah) 
1102  Gozāreš-e Rūz, 1 & 11 & ?? Esfand (20 February & 1 & ?? March 2000): „Addiction and a theoretical 
research”(E‘tiyād va taḥqīq-e teʼōrīk). 
1103  Īrān, 2 Esfand 1378 (21 February 2000): „Which is the way of salvation from the deep water of 
addiction?”(Rāh-e neǧāt az ġarq-āb-e e‘tiyād kodām ast?); Ḫorāsān, 5 Esfand 1378 (24 February 2000): 
„Scientific approaches to fight addiction”(Rāh-kār-hā-ye ‘elmī barāye mobārezah bā e’tiyād). 
1104  Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 5 Esfand 1378 (24 February 2000): „The representative of the United Nations Drug 
Control Program office in Iran: 1,5 to 3 percent of Iranian use drugs”(Nemāyandeh-ye daftar-e barnāmeh-
ye kontrol-e mavādd-e moḫadder-e sāzemān-e melal dar īran: 1/5 tā 3 dar ṣad-e īrānī-hā az mavādd-e 
moḫadder estefādeh mīkonand). 
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recent opening of a UNDCP field office in Tehrān, as the only newspaper during the sample 
period.1105  
The newspaper Kār va Kārgar, for its part, again publishes an article on the 
international drugs conventions by accentuating the importance of international “judicial 
cooperation” (ham-kārī-hā-ye qażāyī), including “extradition” (esterdād) agreements and 
“legal mutual aid” (mo‘āżedat-e ḥoqūqī-ye dō-ǧānebeh). Such provisions are in fact part of 
the 1988 UN CONVENTION AGAINST ILLICIT TRAFFICKING IN NARCOTIC DRUGS AND 
PSYCHOTROPIC SUBSTANCES.1106  
 
Fatḥ in March: why does Turkey have less drug addicts than Iran? 
In March 2000, the newspaper Fatḥ publishes one of the most exceptional articles on 
the Iranian drug policy during the sample period. By comparing the situation of drug 
addiction in Turkey and Iran, ‘Alī Anṣārī, the author of the article, wonders why Turkey has 
far less drug addicts than Iran, despite also being a main transit country for drugs. As the most 
probable reasons, he cites the “legality and the sale of alcoholic beverages” (āzādī va forūš-e 
mašrūbāt-e alkolī), although concomitantly pointing to an alleged twenty million alcoholics 
in Turkey. As another advantage, he mentions Turkey’s more serious drug prevention 
programs, while complaining that in Iran, even “after years, there has not been undertaken a 
special education to make our students acquainted with drug consumption in our study books” 
(pas az sāl-hā hanūz dar ketāb-hā-ye darsī-ye mā, āmūzeš-e ḫāṣṣī ǧehat-e āšnā sāḫtan-e 
dāneš-āmūzān bā maṣraf-e [mavādd-e] moḫadder ṣūrat nagerefteh ast). This is indeed a valid 
and interesting point.1107  
 
A week later, Fatḥ publishes an article on drug cultivation and trafficking in 
Afghanistan, which seems to be equally based on the Newsweek article that has been cited 
before by Bayān and Abrār.1108  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1105  Tarǧomān-e Rūz, 8 Esfand 1378 (27 February 2000): „After the publication of the annul report on drugs: 
the United Nations expressed their appreciation of Iran”(Dar pey-y gozāreš-e sālāneh dar bāreh-ye 
mavādd-e moḫadder: sāzemān-e melal az īrān qadr-dānī kard). 
1106  Kār-o-Kārgar, 9 Esfand 1378 (28 February 2000): „A look at the international drug control 
conventions”(Negāhī beh konvānsiyūn-hā-ye bain-ol-melalī-ye kontrol-e mavādd-e moḫadder). 
1107  Fatḥ, 12 Esfand 1378 (2 March 2000): „Turkey – a main drug passage with few addicts”(Torkiyyeh, goḏar-
gāh-e ‘omdah-ye mavādd-e moḫadder bā mo’tādān-e andak). 
1108  Fatḥ, 18 Esfand 1378 (8 March 2000): „The protection of the exuberant drug production in Afghanistan by 
the Taliban secures three quarters of the global opium product and 90 percent of the heroin in 
Europe”(Ḥemāyat az toulīd-e anbūb-e mavādd-e moḫadder az sūye ṭālebān seh čahārom-e koll-e maḥṣūl-e 
taryāk-e ǧahān va 90 dar ṣad-e herōʼīn-e orūpā-rā taʼmīn mīkonad). 
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Ham-Mīhan in March: the SOCIETY AGAINST ADDICTION & the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS 
Subsequently, the newspaper Ham-Mīhan, which was recently launched by Karbāsčī, 
the former mayor of Tehrān, dedicates a series of two articles on drug therapy measures. It 
particularly highlights dubious press advertisements promising addiction withdrawal within in 
six days, which are indeed a regular feature of the Iranian press; and continues to describe 
different therapy and rehabilitation measures applied by governmental institutions and non-
governmental organizations such as SOCIETY AGAINST ADDICTION (ǧam‘iyyat-e mobārezeh 
bā e‘tiyād) or the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS (mo‘tādān-e gom-nām).1109  
 
ǦOMHŪRĪ-YE ESLĀMĪ in March: drug cultivation & credit system in Afghanistan 
A next interesting report is published by Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī on the informal credit 
system (e‘tebār-e mālī) in Afghanistan, which is described as contributing to the ongoing 
misery of Afghan farmers: often deeply in debt, poppy cultivation is for many farmers the 
only viable means to pay back their lenders.1110  
 
Fatḥ in March: deceiving advertisements for addiction treatment  
Like Ham-Mīhan, the newspaper Fatḥ also warns of suspicious advertisements for 
drug therapies or strange drug withdrawal medication. This warning is apparently provided by 
the deputy for drug prevention of the SWO, who holds the lack of legally available 
pharmaceuticals for drug withdrawal co-responsible for this phenomenon. 1111  
 
Mošārekat on the occasion of a teachers’ conference on drug prevention in March: 7 million 
drug addicts in Iran, half of which under the age of 18 
While the press did not even embrace unanimously the new official assessment of a 
total of two million drug users in Iran, Mošārekat reports an even higher estimation. On the 
occasion of the “second conference on addiction prevention among high school students” 
(dovvom-īn hemāyeš-e pīš-gīrī az e“tiyād-e dāneš-āmūzān), the newspaper of Ḫātamī’s 
ISLAMIC IRAN PARTICIPATION FRONT cites undisclosed research according to which there are 
actually seven million drug addicts in Iran, fifty per cent of which under the age of eighteen. 
More astonishing for this reformist newspaper is the appointment of blame to an alleged 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1109  Ham-Mīhan, 19 & ?? Esfand (9 & ?? March 2000): „Addiction withdrawal in a week is not addiction 
withdrawal”(Tark-e e‘tiyād-e yek hafteʼī nīst tark-e e‘tiyād). 
1110  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 21 Esfand 1378 (11 March 2000): „Opium – the main source of income for the 
Taliban”(Taryāk - manba‘-e aṣlī-e dar-āmad-e ṭālebān). 
1111  Fatḥ, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000): „An interview with the deputy for prevention of the Welfare 
Organisation: Advertisements for addiction therapy can be prosecuted legally”(Goft-o-gū bā mo‘āvenat-e 
pīš-gīrī-ye sāzemān-e beh-zīstī: āgahī-hā-ye darmān-e e‘tiyād qābel-e ta‘qīb-e qānūnī ast). 
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“cultural assault” of the West, which for instance can be observed in cartoons, the Iranian 
children are watching “night and day” (az ṣobḥ tā šab).1112  
 
FATḤ before the Nourūz holidays in March: the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS  
The last two articles of the year 1378 (1999-2000) are again written by Fatḥ, which 
among many other newspapers would be banned only a month later. Both articles are 
dedicated to the discussion of the NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS, which are described to be active 
all over Tehrān as well as in further Iranian cities.1113 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1112  Mošārekat, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000): „In the second Congress for the Prevention of Addiction of 
Students it was discussed: Half of the country’s addicts are under 18 years”(Dar dovvomīn hemāyeš-e pīš-
gīrī az e‘tiyād-e dāneš-āmūzān maṭraḥ šod: Nīmī az mo’tādān-e kešver zīr-e 18 sāl hastand). 
1113  Fatḥ, 25 & 26 Esfand 1378 (16 & 17 March 2000): „We are all clean”(Mā hameh pāk hastīm). 
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V. 3. The imagery of the Iranian press discourse on drugs – reinforcing and 
contradicting images  
 
 The Persian everyday language is strongly permeated by imaginative expressions that 
are often taken from Iran’s rich poetic tradition. Hence, it is only natural that the Iranian press 
discourse on drugs, too, reflects a general affection to pictographic metaphors, allegories and 
symbols.  Similar influence on the vernacular of the media has the specific political history of 
Iran, especially religious and anti-imperialistic discourses, both from before and after the 
revolution of 1979. 
 
For an unaccustomed or generally non-Iranian reader, these linguistic images might 
seem more dramatic than for an Iranian audience, which has integrated them into its 
understanding without constantly bearing in mind their original emphasis. Frequently used 
examples for such images are the terms “merchants of death” for drug traffickers, “trap of 
addiction” for drug addiction or “global arrogance” for the USA and Great Britain, which the 
press normally uses rather mechanically. The more imaginative collocations, however, which 
are to be found especially in the titles of the drug-related newspaper articles, certainly still 
draw the attention of the readers. These are expressions like “inauspicious shadow of the 
octopus of death” or “claws of the evil-minded demon of addiction”, with which drug 
addiction is described. The newspapers use them exactly because of their sensational 
character, even though they often continue to write the subsequent article in a factual and 
somber style. Such hyperbolic expressions are indeed only rarely explicitly doubled down on 
the level of arguments. 
 
 Generally, the specific language rather dramatizes and exaggerates otherwise explicit 
or at times more implicit arguments, while still corresponding to the same line of arguing. 
Only when it comes to the moral and legal qualification of addiction, the diction often directly 
contradicts the argumentation. The language of the Iranian press discourse on drugs thus 
reveals an underlying, more unconscious and collective attitude of the Iranian society towards 
drug addiction, which is arguably stronger than the conscious rationale of the respective 
newspapers. LINK and correspondingly JÄGER have called such expressions collective 
symbols,1114 because they reveal basic perception patterns of a society, which are deep-rooted 
and therefore resistant to changes. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1114  Jäger (2004), 133ff. 
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 In the present analysis of the Iranian press discourse on drugs, most of these specific 
expressions are already present from the beginning of the sample period. Some terms and 
collocations, however, only appear later in the discourse, and might have been coined by the 
respective newspaper. As in the case of explicit arguments, it is eventually impossible to 
determine to what extent the newspapers have influenced each other concerning the language.  
 
The imaginative expressions and linguistic images used by the Iranian press to 
describe drug-related topics are arranged in a first subchapter according to different topics. A 
second subchapter then specifically lists the expressions used in discussing the question, 
whether addiction is a crime or an illness – arguably the central question of the Iranian press 
discourse on drugs.  
 
V. 3. a. The drugs vernacular of the Iranian press discourse 
 
 For every stage of the drugs chain – from the cultivation, manufacture, trafficking, 
distribution and consumption of drugs – the Iranian press displays a specific vocabulary. 
While such expressions can be found in all newspapers, the semantic analysis reveals that the 
conservative newspapers are using them more frequently than the reformist papers. 
 
To describe this chain exemplarily and pointedly, the “Western colonialists” are 
described as having initiated the “inauspicious, poisonous phenomenon” of drug addiction, 
and the “global arrogance” continues to be blamed for this “conspiracy”, by supporting the 
“cultivators of the white death” in the “golden bāzār” of Afghanistan and Pakistan. 
“Merchants of death” are then accused of trafficking this “satanic material” towards and 
through the Islamic Republic of Iran, which despite leading a “holy defence” against this 
“dirty trade”, has not been able to “block the flood at its source”. The “nightmare of drugs 
thus still casts a shadow” on the Iranian society, while the “swirl of addiction lies in the 
ambush of the youth”. This “alarm bell” seriously calls for “delivering the addicts from the 
trap of addiction” and for “vaccinating” the Iranian society against the “family-subverting and 
fatal plague” of drug addiction.  
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Western colonialist world-devourers as instigators and supporters of the drug problem 
By singling out the “Western colonialists” (este‘mār-gar-ān-e ġarbī)1115 or simply the 
“colonialists” (este‘mār-gar-ān)1116 in general, and the British “old fox” (rūbāh-e pīr) in 
particular, the Iranian press typically indulges in a rather conspiratorial view of the history of 
drugs in Iran. These are blamed for having turned drugs into a “fatal weapon against the well-
being of humankind” (ḥarbeh-ye mohlek ‘alai-he salāmat-e bašariyyat)1117, “an arrogant 
weapon against the well-being of humankind” (ḥarbeh-ye estekbārī ‘alai-he salāmat-e 
bašariyyat)1118 or “one of the biggest weapons of the enemies to annihilate the values and to 
trample down the religious zeal of the young generation” (az mohemm-tarīn ḥarbeh-hā-ye 
došman-ān barāye az bain bordan arzeš-hā va pāy-māl kardan ġairat-e dīnī-ye nasl-e 
ǧavān).1119  
 
The “global arrogance” (estekbār-e ǧahānī)1120 or “the procedures and intrigues of the 
great Satan” (tarafand-hā va dasāyes-e šaitān-e bozorg)1121 respectively – a reference to the 
USA – continue to be accused for being an “inhuman, arrogant movement” (ḥarakat-e żedd-e 
bašarī-ye estekbārī) 1122 , an “offensive movement of the world-devourers” (ḥarakat-e 
tahāǧomī-ye ǧahān-ḫvārān)1123 or simply “criminal propagators of drugs” (ravāǧ-dehandeg-
ān-e tabah-kār-e mavādd-e moḫadder).1124  
 
The West is generally reproached for applying a “strategy of the rule of opium” 
(estrātežī-ye solṭeh-ye afyūn)1125, a “destructive policy of spreading opium” (siyāsat-e vīrān-
gar-e gostareš-e afyūn)1126 and an “addicts-creating fascism” (fāšīsm-e mo‘tād-sāzī)1127. Its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1115  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995). 
1116  Kaihān, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995); Salām, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I; Kār va Kārgar, 21 & 22 & 
24 Farvardīn 1378 (10 & 11 & 13 April 1999); as “colonialism” (este‘mār): Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 17 Āḏar 
1378 (8 December 1999); for “colonialism” (este‘mār) also the words “exploitation” (esteṯmār), 
“despotism” (estebdād) and “imperialism” (emperīyālīsm) are used: ‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān, 17 Āḏar 1378 (8 
December 1999); also este‘mār-gar and esteṯmār: Ǧavān, 6 Dey 1378 (28 December 1999). 
1117  Resālat, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995) I. 
1118  Resālat, 4 Tīr 1374 (June 1995) I. 
1119  Kār va Kārgar, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999). 
1120  Also as “exploiters” (mostakber-ān): Salām, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I; Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 
1995); Abrār, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 March 1996); also as “global exploiters / arrogant persons” (mostakber-
ān-e ǧahānī): Kaihān, 25 Ḫordād 1374 (15 June 1995); Āfarīneš, 16 Āḏar 1376 (7 December 1997) I; 
Kaihān, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999). 
1121  Resālat, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995). 
1122  Resālat, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I. 
1123  Kaihān, 27 Ḫordād  1374 (17 June 1995). 
1124  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995). 
1125  Resālat, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995). 
1126  Abrār, 10 Āḏar 1376 (1 December 1997). 
1127  Kaihān, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995). 
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“colonial policies” (siyāsat-hā-ye estekbārī)1128, “colonial and culture-attacking policies” 
(siyāsat-hā-ye este‘mārī va tahāǧomī-ye farhangī)1129 and “poisoned propaganda” (tablīġāt-e 
masmūm)1130 are described as being especially directed against Iran, and against “the material 
force of the Muslim community” (nīrū-ye ǧasmānī-ye mellat-e mosalmān), thus “annihilating 
the Islamic culture and identity” (nā-būd sāḫtan-e farhang va hovviyat-e eslāmī).1131 They are, 
therefore, a “big conspiracy of the enemy” (touṭeʼeh-ye bozorg-e došman)1132 or “a conspiracy, 
with which the big powers hit us” (touṭeʼeh-ī ast keh qodrat-hā-ye bozorg beh īn vasīleh beh 
mā żarbeh mī-zanand)1133. According to the Iranian press, these Western strategies are, 
however, also more generally directed against “the oppressed nations of the world” (melal-e 
mostaż‘af-ān-e ǧahān),1134 with the aim of “creating feebleness and frailty among different 
societies” (īǧād-e reḫvat va sostī dar ǧavāme‘-e moḫtalef)1135 and particularly of “annihilating 
the Islamic culture and identity” (nā-būd sāḫtan-e farhang va hovviyat-e eslāmī)1136. 
 
According to the semantic analysis, and consistent with the general argumentation, the 
conservative newspapers Kayhān, Resālat and Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī are dominating this anti-
imperialistic discourse. Their viewpoint is, however, shared to by the moderately conservative 
newspapers Eṭṭelā‘āt, Āfarīneš and Abrār; as well as notably by Salām and Kār-va-Kārgar, 
the established papers of the Islamic left, which traditionally were arguing along this line. Of 
the new reformist newspapers, in contrast, only ‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān uses this anti-Western 
discourse. 
 
The Taliban, planters of the white death in the black Golden Triangle 
 The Iranian press, however, also increasingly blames the increased opium production 
in Afghanistan on the Taliban. No obvious difference between the reformist and the 
conservative newspapers can be observed in tis regard. While the newspapers describe drug-
producing countries in general as a “galaxy of death” (kah-kešān-e marg) or “galaxy of opium” 
(kah-kešān-e taryāk)1137, they usually specifically write about the “Golden Crescent” (helāl-e 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1128  Resālat, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I. 
1129  Kaihān, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995); simply as siyāsat-e estekbārī: Resālat, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) 
I. 
1130  Resālat, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995) I. 
1131  Abrār, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 March 1996). 
1132  Āryā, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999); also as “conspiracies of the global arrogance” (touṭeʼeh-hā-ye 
estekbār-e ǧahānī): Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995). 
1133  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 30 Bahman & 1 & 2 & 19 Esfand 1387 (19 & 20 & 21 February & 9 March 9 2000). 
1134  Salām, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I. 
1135  Here referring to the history of drugs: Salām, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I. 
1136  Abrār, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 March 1996). 
1137  Hamšahrī, 27 Mehr 1376 (19 October 1997). 
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ṭalāʼī) comprising Afghanistan and Pakistan. This region consequently becomes a “golden, 
black crescent” (helāl-e siyāh-e ṭalāʼī) 1138 , a “golden market” (bāzār-e ṭalāʼī) 1139  or a 
“crescent of death” (helāl-e marg)1140. The poppy cultivators are themselves rarely accused for 
the availability of drugs in Iran, as shows the sympathetic press coverage on poppy farmers in 
Afghanistan. Before the Taliban took control of Afghanistan, the Afghan government of then 
president Rabbānī was described as incapable “fragmented government” (literally: 
“government of the kings of the territorial divisions”) (ḥokūmat-e molūk ol-ṭavāʼefī)1141. With 
the increasing power of the Taliban, however, these are directly held responsible for drug 
supply, and hence called “propagators of drugs” (moravveǧ-e mavādd-e moḫadder)1142 or 
referring to heroin “planters of the white death” (kāšeġān-e / kāšandegān-e marg-e sefīd)1143. 
 
Ruinous mafia organizations as merchants of death 
Drug “traffickers” (qāčāqčī-hā) for their part are described again with vivid 
expressions as “death merchants” (sawdā-garān-e marg)1144, “merciless merchants of drugs” 
(sawdā-garān-e bī-raḥm-e mavādd-e moḫadder) 1145 , “caravans of opiates smuggling” 
(kārvān-hā-ye qāčāq-e mavādd-e afyūnī)1146 or “hands that weave the net of death” (dast-ān-ī 
keh dām-e marg mītanand)1147. Other, less sensational, descriptions are mafia (māfiyā)1148 
gangsters (gāngster-hā)1149 or cartels (kārtel-hā)1150 and gangs (bānd-hā).1151 They are further 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1138  Qods, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997). 
1139  Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999). 
1140  Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999). 
1141  Īrān, 28 Dey 1374 (19 January 1996); mulūk aṭ-ṭawāʼif is an expression, which Arabic historians first 
applied to the regional sovereigns of the Parthian and Arsacid Persia and later to the fragmented Muslim 
realms in Andalusia after the fall of the Umayyads: Morony (Mulūk al-Ṭawāʼīf – EI). 
1142  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 4 Tīr 1376 (25 June 1997). 
1143  Aḫbār, 6 Tīr 1376 (27 June 1997). 
1144  Hamšahrī, 27 Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995) II; Resālat, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995); Abrār, 15 Esfand 
1374 (5 March 1996); as “merchants of the black death” (soudā-garān-e marg-e siyāh): Āfarīneš, 21 Ābān 
1376 (12 November 1997); Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997); Ḫordād, 13 Ordībehešt 1376 (3 May 
1999); Ǧavān, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999); Salām, 1 Ḫordād 1378 (22 May 1999); Enteḫāb, 5 Tīr 
1378 (26 June 1999); Našāṭ, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999); Īrān, 8 Tīr 1378 (29 June 1999); Ḫorāsān, 7 & 9 
Mordād 1378 (29 & 31 July 1999); Kaihān, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999). 
1145  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995). 
1146  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 16 Mehr 1376 (8 October 1997); or as “drugs caravans” (kārvān-hā-ye mavādd-e moḫadder): 
Eṭṭelā‘āt, 6 & 7& 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999); also as “death caravan” 
(kārvān-e marg) when referring to the history of cigarettes: Hamšahrī, 21 Tīr 1374 (2 July 1995). 
1147  Ḫordād, 13 Ordībehešt 1376 (3 May 1999). 
1148  Hamšahrī, 31 Ḫordād 1374 (21 June 1995); “octopus of the mafia“ (oḫtapūs-e māfiyā) is used by: 
Eṭṭelā’āt, 11 Tīr 1374 (2 July 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 13 Mehr 1376 (5 October 1997); Resālat, 19 Mehr 1376 
(11 October 1997); Kār va Kārgar, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999); Kaihān, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999). 
1149  The word gāngster is used by Dr. Ḥamīd Qods, dirctor of the INCB: Hamšahrī, 31 Ḫordād 1374 (21 June 
1995). 
1150  Resālat, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995); Abrār, 24 Tīr 1374 (15 July 1995); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 14 Tīr 1376 
(J 5 July 1997); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 13 Mehr 1376 (5 October 1997); Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997).  
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called “aggressive organization(s)” (sāzemān-e motaǧāvez), “ruinous – lit. family-burning – 
organization(s)” (sāzemān-e hānemān-sūz)1152, “fearsome global networks” (šabakeh-hā-ye 
moḫavvef-e ǧahānī)1153 or “ghoul-like drugs trafficking cartels” (kārtel-hā-ye ġawl-āsā-ye 
qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḫadder)1154. Their activity is described as an “inauspicious trade” 
(teǧārat-e šūm)1155, “black trade” (teǧārat-e siyāh)1156, “toxic trade” (teǧārat-e masmūm)1157, 
“deadly trade” (teǧārat-e marg-bār)1158, “dirty trade” (teǧārat-e kaṯīf)1159 or “death-bringing 
transaction” (mo‘āmeleh-ye marg-āvar);1160 and they are accused of pursuing “filthy aims” 
(ahdāf-e palīd)1161. There are no apparent differences between newspapers of the different 
ideological camps when it comes to the description of drug traffickers. 
 
Drugs, the black death and the white devil 
The trafficked drugs or literally “stupefying materials” (mavādd-e moḫadder) are 
characterized with an litany of imaginative expressions, including “existence-burning, 
stupefying materials” (mavādd-e hastī-sūz-e moḫadder)1162, “ruinous, stupefying materials” 
(mavādd-e ḫānemān-sūz-e moḫadder)1163, “family-disturbing materials” (mavādd-e ḫānemān-
angīz)1164, “satanic materials” (māddeh-hā-ye šaiṭānī)1165 or “cursed materials” (mavādd-e 
la‘natī)1166; “perverted cargo” (bār-e kaǧ)1167, “death-bringing goods” (matā‘-e marg-bār)1168, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1151  As „fearsome mafia gangs“ (bānd-hā-ye moḫavvef-e māfyāyī): Eṭṭelā‘āt, 13 Mehr 1376 (5 October 1997); 
Ḫorāsān, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 17 Āḏar 1378 (8 December 1999); 
Kaihān, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999). 
1152  Both words in: Resālat, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997). 
1153  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 9 Tīr 1376 (30 June 1997). 
1154  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 30 Bahman & 1 & 2 & 19 Esfand 1378 (19 & 20 & 21 February & 9 March, 2000). 
1155  Abrār, 19 Mordād 1374 (10 August 1995). 
1156  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997). 
1157  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 
1999). 
1158  Also as „death trade“ (teǧārat-e marg): Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997); as “death-bringing trade” 
teǧārat-e marg-āvar: Qods, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997); Abrār, 14 Tīr 1378 (5 July 1999). 
1159  Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 11 Bahman 1378 (31 January 2000). 
1160  Āzād, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999); Payām-e Āzādī, 7 Bahman 1378 (27 January 2000). 
1161  Resālat, 5 Ābān 1376 (27 October 1997). 
1162  Etṭelā‘āt, 28 Ḫordād 1374 (18 July 1995). 
1163  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995); also as “ruinous material” (māddeh-ye ḫānemān-sūz): Qods, 28 
Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999) and Īrān, 9 Šahrīvar 1378 (31 August 1999). 
1164  Lit. „family-inciting material“: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 12 Tīr 1374 (3 July 1995). 
1165  Āfarīneš, 20 Ābān 1376 (11 November 1997); Āfarīneš, 21 Ābān 1376 (12 November 1997). 
1166  Resālat, 6 Ābān 1376 (28 October 1997). 
1167  Īrān, 2 Āḏar 1378 (23 November 1999). 
1168  Salām, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I; with the same meaning – but referring to tobacco – also as (kālā-ye 
marg-āvar): Hamšahrī, 18 Ābān 1376 (9 November 1997); also as kālā-ye marg-āvar, but referring to 
drugs in general: Resālat, 21 Ordībehešt 1378 (11 May 1999); also as „death-bringing material“ (māddeh-
ye marg-bār): Aḫbār-e Eqteṣādī, 11 Mehr 1378 (3 October 1999); or as “death-bringing and dangerous 
materials” (mavādd-e marg-bār va ḫaṭar-nāk): Ǧavān, 6 Dey 1378 (28 December 1999). 
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“death-creating products” (maḥṣūlāt-e marg-āfarīn)1169, “poison of death” (samm-e marg)1170; 
“white death” (marg-e sefīd)1171, “white satan” (šaiṭān-e sefīd)1172 or simply the “white 
powder” (gerd-e sefīd)1173 of heroin; but also “black death” (marg-e siyāh)1174 and rarely 
“black products” (maḥṣūlāt-e siyāh)1175 or “black powder” (gerd-e siyāh)1176. As shows the 
semantic analysis, the conservative newspapers use such words most frequently. 
 
Colorful contrasts: the white powder and the black death 
The above-cited examples point to another popular rhetoric pattern in the Iranian press 
discourse on drugs: puns with colour contrasts. A first colour is naturally provided by the denomination 
“Golden Crescent” (helāl-e ṭalāʼī), which had obtained its name in analogy to the “Golden Triangle” 
(moṯallaṯ-e ṭalāʼī) in Southeast-Asia.1177 The Golden Crescent alternatively is described as “golden 
market” (bāzār-e ṭalāʼī)1178 or a “black golden crescent” (helāl-e siyāh-e ṭalāʼī)1179.  
 
A further natural colour contrast is provided by the Iranian drugs of choice: opium and heroin. 
Raw opium is of a very dark, almost black colour, while the heroin of better quality is known as white 
heroin, and as such differs from the cheaper brown heroin or brown sugar. The Iranian press 
accordingly speaks of “black products” (maḥṣūlāt-e siyāh); 1180 and of “white powder” (gerd-e 
sefīd)1181 or alternatively “white death” (marg-e sefīd)1182 or “white satan” (šaiṭān-e sefīd).1183 Two 
newspapers mention a “black powder” (gerd-e siyāh)1184, probably referring to brown heroin.  
 
Black and dark are, however, also simply synonymous with the fatal character of drugs. Drug 
addiction consequently is described as “black death” (marg-e siyāh),1185 “black calamity” (balā-ye 
siyāh) 1186 and “black shadow of destruction” (sāyeh-ye siyāh-e tabāhī); 1187  or as “darkness of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1169  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997); or as “death bringing product” (maḥṣūl-e marg-āvar): 
Āfarīneš, 22 Ābān 1376 (13 November 1997) and Payām-e Āzādī, 7 Bahman 1378 (27 January 2000). 
1170  Īrān, 18 Āḏar 1374 (8 December 1995); or just “poison” (semm) when referring to tobacco: Kaihān, 8 
Ḫordād 1376 (29 May 1997). 
1171  Aḫbār, 6 Tīr 1376 (27 June 1997). 
1172  Īrān, 18 Āḏar 1374 (9 December 1995); Resālat, 6 Ābān 1376 (28 October 1997). 
1173  Kaihān, 25 Ḫordād 1374 (15 June 1995); Kaihān, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995). 
1174  Āfarīneš,  21 Ābān 1376 (12 November 1997). 
1175  Āzād, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999). 
1176  Hamšahrī, 6 Ordībehešt 1374 (26 April 1995); Āfarīneš, 21 Ābān 1376 (12 November 1997); for plays on 
word on drugs and drug addiction using colours cf. the box below. 
1177  Hamšahrī, 6 Ordībehešt 1374 (26 April 1995). 
1178  Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999). 
1179  Qods, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997). 
1180  Āzād, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999). 
1181  Kaihān, 25 Ḫordād 1374 (15 June 1995); Kaihān, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995). 
1182  Aḫbār, 6 Tīr 1376 (27 June 1997). 
1183  Here as šaiṭān-ī sepīd: Īrān, 18 Āḏar 1374 (9 December 1995); Resālat, 6 Ābān 1376 (28 October 1997). 
1184  Hamšahrī, 6 Ordībehešt 1374 (26 April 1995); Āfarīneš, 21 Ābān 1376 (12 November 1997). 
1185  Īrān, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995); Āfarīneš, 21 Ābān 1376 (12 November 1997). 
1186  Āfarīneš, 16 Āḏar 1376 (7 December 1997) I. 
1187  Abrār, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999). 
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addiction” (tīregī-ye e‘tiyād)1188, “global abyss of addiction” (varṭeh-ye ǧahānī-ye e‘tiyād) 1189, 
“inauspicious shadow of addiction” (sāyeh-e šūm-e e‘tiyād)1190, “ashes of addiction” (ḫākestar-e 
e‘tiyād) 1191 , “well of addiction” (čāh-e e‘tiyād) 1192  and “deep water of addiction” (ġarq-āb-e 
e‘tiyād)1193. Further variants are “dark and sinister soil of death” (ḫāk-e tīreh va tār-e marg)1194 or 
“inauspicious shadow of the octopus of death” (sāyeh-ye šūm-e oḫtāpūs-e marg)1195. 
 
The dark-light contrast is, however, also used for more elaborate play on words. Thus, the 
newspapers describe addiction rehabilitation as “emergence of the ‘bright morning’ from the ‘dark 
evening’ of addiction” (damīdan-e “ṣobḥ-e rawšan” az “šām-e tīreh-ye” e‘tiyād),1196 and as hope that 
the addicts “breaks out from the darkness of addiction in order to smile again at the brightness of the 
health of mind and body” (az tīregī-ye e‘tiyād bīrūn mīyāyad tā beh rawšanī-ye salāmat-e fekr va 
ǧesm lab-ḫand bezanad).1197 
 
The holy defence in a war without borders 
 The Iranian press naturally perceives the drugs that are trafficked from Afghanistan 
and Pakistan into Iran as being a  “big threat” (tahdīdī bozorg)1198, which “menaces the 
world“ (ǧahān-rā tahdīd mīkonad)1199. They consequently stress the need for a serious “drug 
combat” (mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḫadder). This war is alternatively also described “silent 
war” (ǧangī ḫāmūš)1200, “war of all fineness” (ǧang-e tamām-e ‘ayār)1201 and especially as 
“war without borders” (ǧang bedūn-e marz)1202 or war that “doesn’t know a border for people, 
culture or economy” (marz-e mardom, farhang va eqteṣād ne-mī-šenāsad)1203. Rather absurd, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1188  Kaihān, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995). 
1189  Salām, 2 Tīr 1378 (23 June 1999). 
1190  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 16 Mehr 1376 (8 October 1997). 
1191  Ḫorāsān, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999). 
1192  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 24 & 25 Šahrīvar 1378 (15 & 16 September 1999); only as čāh: Salām, 1 Ḫordād 
1378 (22 May 1999). 
1193  Īrān, 2 Esfand 1378 (21 February 2000). 
1194  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995). 
1195  Salām, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) II; Abrār, 19 Mordād 1374 (10 August 1995). 
1196  Kaihān, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995). 
1197  Kaihān, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995). 
1198  Abrār, 8 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999). 
1199  Fatḥ, 19 & 20 Bahman 1378 (8 & 9 February 2000). 
1200  Resālat, 14 Ābān 1376 (5 November 1997). 
1201  Īrān, 11 Āḏar 1378 (12 December 1999). 
1202  Abrār, 12 Šahrīvar 1376 (3 September 1997); Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 6 & 
7& 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999); Ḫorāsān, 7 & 9 Mordād 1378 (29 & 31 
July 1999); Kaihān, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999); Mošārekat, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000). 
1203  Hamšahrī, 2 Mehr 1376 (24 September 1997); also simply as “doesn’t know borders” (marz ne-mī-
šenāsad): Abrār, 19 Mordād 1374 (10 August 1995); “doesn’t know frontiers or borders” (ḥadd va marz 
ne-mī-šenāsad): Eṭṭelā‘āt, 24 Mehr 1376 (14 October 1997); “doesn’t know politics, borders or cultures” 
(siyāsat va marz va farhang ne-mī-šenāsad): Abrār, 8 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999). 
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in contrast, is Kaihān’s expression “war without borders between Iran and the global 
arrogance“ (ǧang bedūn-e marz-e īrān bā estekbār-e ǧahānī).1204 
 The newspapers accordingly  describe the bleak situation with “the danger is serious” 
(ḫaṭar ǧeddī ast)1205 and “the alarm bell has rung” (zang-e ḫaṭar beh ṣadā dar āmadeh)1206, 
because “tomorrow, it will be to late for the fight against drugs” (fardā barā-ye mobārezeh bā 
mavādd-e moḫadder dīr ast)1207. They are, however, also expressing the hope, that Iran’s 
“holy defense” (defā‘-e moqaddas)1208 or “holy and fundamental action” (ḥarakat-e moqaddas 
va asāsī)1209 against the drug traffickers eventually will be successful, before the following 
title materializes: “opium – the winner of the war” (taryāk – barandeh-ye ǧang). 
 
 The press consequently describes the Iranian security forces of being “the vanguard of 
the global combat against drugs” (pīš-gām-e mobārezeh-ye ǧahānī bā mavādd-e 
moḫadder)1210 and of fighting this war alone “at the frontline” (ḫaṭṭ-e moqaddam-e ǧebheh)1211 
– all this for the “salvation of the humankind” (nagāt-e bašariyyat)1212 and in order to “block 
the flood at the source and prevent the destruction of the cities” (sail-āb-rā az sar-e čašmeh 
bebandand va vīrānī-ye šahr-hā ǧelou-gīrī konand)1213. 
 
 In principle, all newspapers use the image of war to describe Iran’s combat against 
drugs. Judging from the quotes, it seems, however, that the reformist newspapers understand 
this war in a broader sense as a defense against drugs, while the conservative newspapers 
rather perceive it as a physical fight against drug smuggling. All newspapers, however, 
support the combat of the Iranian security forces against the supply of drugs from the east. 
 
Addiction: the trap of the dangerous demon, the satanic plague or the devil’s virus 
The local problem of drug addiction is arguably the main concern for the Iranian press. 
The most figurative expressions are, thus, logically used to describe addiction. The 
corresponding expressions can be divided into three groups: a first group consisting of terms 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1204  Kaihān, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999). 
1205  Fatḥ, 19 & 20 Bahman 1378 (8 & 9 February 2000). 
1206  Salām, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I; only as zang-e ḫaṭar: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995). 
1207  Āfarīneš, 24 Mehr 1378 (16 October 1999). 
1208  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 6 & 7& 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999). 
1209  Qods, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997). 
1210  Kaihān, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999). 
1211  Qods, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 6 & 7& 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 
July 1999);  
1212  Ḫorāsān, 23 Āḏar 1378 (14 December 1999). 
1213  Abrār-e Eqteṣādī, 14 Dey 1378 (5 January 2000). 
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that describe addiction with limited fantasy as problem or calamity; a second group 
encompassing more pictographic metaphors, which, however, in certain cases might already 
have lost their sensational character; and third group consisting of even more dramatic and 
sophisticated expressions, which arguably still catch the reader’s attention.  
 
The newspapers of course also simply use the terms “drug addiction” (e‘tiyād beh 
mavādd-e moḫadder) or “addiction” (e‘tiyād), and even replace it with the scientifically more 
adept concept of “habit” (‘ādat).1214  
 
Yet, commonly, they rather use more evocative terms and expressions. Addiction thus 
is described as “difficulty / problem” (mo‘żal), “evident problem” (mo‘żal-e ‘ayān),1215 
“inauspicious problem” (mo‘żal-e šūm),1216 “ruinous problem” (mo‘żal-e ḫānemān-sūz),1217 or 
“most evil problem” (moškel-e por-mafsadeh);1218 as “rough social phenomenon” (padīdeh-ye 
nā-hanǧār-e eǧtemā‘ī),1219 “hidden and anti-social phenomenon” (padīdeh-ye maḫfī va żedd-e 
eǧtemā‘ī), 1220  “inauspicious phenomenon” (padīdeh-ye šūm), 1221  “inauspicious, satanic 
phenomenon” (padīdeh-ye šūm-e šaiṭānī), 1222  or “inauspicious, poisoned phenomenon” 
(padīdeh-ye šūm-e masmūm);1223; as “plague” (āfat) or “ruinous plague” (āfat-e ḫānemān-
sūz),1224 “family-overthrowing and fatal plague” (āfat-e ḫānemān-bar-andāz va mohlek),1225 
and “satanic plague” (āfat-e šaiṭānī);1226 as “inauspicious calamity” (balīyyeh-ye šūm).1227 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1214  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 20 Farvardīn 1376 (9 April 1997); Salām, 20 Ḫordād 1378 (10 June 1999). 
1215  Kaihān, 15 Ābān 1374 (6 November 1995). 
1216  Lit. „one of the inauspicious social problems“ (yekī az mo‘żalāt-e šūm-e eǧtemā‘i): Abrār, 15 Esfand 1374 
(5 March 1996); Āzād, 6 Mehr 1378 (28 September 1999). 
1217  Hamšahrī, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 March 1995); also as “ruinous addiction” (e‘tiyād-e ḫānemān-sūz): 
Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997) and Abrār, 12 Šahrīvar 1376 (3 September 1997); 
Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 
1999); Ǧavān, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999). 
1218  Kaihān, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995). 
1219  Abrār, 9 Ordībehešt 1378 (29 April 1999). 
1220  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 29 Ḫordād 1374 (19 June 1995). 
1221  E.g. in: Resālat, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995); Salām, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) II; Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 
July 1995); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997); Salām, 1 Ḫordād 1378 (22 May 1999); 
Hamšahrī, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999); Ḫorāsān, 7 & 9 Mordād 1378 (29 & 31 July 1999); Āzād, 6 Mehr 
1378 (28 September 1999; Kār va Kārgar, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999). 
1222  Salām, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) II. 
1223  Etṭelā’āt, 13 Tīr 1374 (4 July 1995). 
1224  Īrān, 8 Ḫordād 1374 (29 May 1995); Salām, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I; as āfat-e ḫānemān: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 
Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995). 
1225  Resālat, 21 Ordībehešt 1378 (11 May 1999); already KŪHĪ-KERMĀNĪ referred to addiction as “fatal and 
home-overthrowing poison” (semm-e mohlek va ḫāneh-bar-andāz): Kūhī-Kermānī (1945/46), 137.  
1226  Āfarīneš, 16 Āḏar 1376 (7 December 1997) II. 
1227  Kaihān, 15 Ābān 1374 (6 November 1995); Abrār, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 March 1996). 
 240 
“ruinous calamity” (balā-ye ḫānemān-sūz), 1228  “black calamity” (balā-ye siyāh), 1229  or 
“calamity of the century” (balā-ye qarn)1230; as “addiction epidemic” (epīdemī-ye e‘tiyād),1231 
“ruinous tragedy” (fāǧe‘eh-ye ḫānemān-sūz),1232 “terrible tragedy” (trāžedī-ye vaḥšat-nāk),1233 
“family-dissipating chaos” (hayūlā-ye ḫānemān bar bād deh), 1234  “disagreeableness and 
filthiness of addiction” (maḏmūmiyyat va palīdī-ye e‘tiyād),1235  or simply as a “destructive 
system” (sīstem-e moḫarreb)1236 or “destruction” (tabāhī)1237. Especially the terms plague, 
calamity and tragedy are used interchangeably with problem and thus arguably already might 
have lost their stronger connotation in the eyes of the readers. 
 
The press displays a richer imagination when describing addiction as “trap of 
addiction” (dām-e e‘tiyād),1238 “its bitter trap” (dām-e talḫ-e ḫod),1239 “fearsome trap” (dām-e 
moḫavvef),1240 “trap of this dangerous demon” (dām-e īn dīv-e ḫaṭar-nāk),1241 “world – lit. 
places where nets are spread – of addiction” (dām-gāh-e e‘tiyād),1242 or simply as “cobweb” 
(dām-e ankabūtī). 1243  Further pictographic expressions for addiction are: “captivity of 
addiction” (esārat-e e‘tiyād),1244 “claws of addiction” (čangāl-e e‘tiyād),1245 “high fortification 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1228  E.g. in: (in Salām only as “family calamity” (balā-ye ḫānemān)): Salām, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I; 
Qods, 9 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 23 Dey 1376 (13 January 1998); Āryā, 16 
Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999); Hamšahrī, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 6 & 7& 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 
1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999); Vohūman, 7 Šahrīvar 1378 (29 August 1999); Ḫorāsān, 8 
Mehr 1378 (30 September 1999); Ǧavān, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999); Kār va Kārgar, 24 Ābān 
1378 (15 November 1999); Kaihān, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999). 
1229  Āfarīneš, 16 Āḏar 1376 (7 December 1997) I. 
1230  Fatḥ, 19 & 20 Bahman 1378 (8 & 9 February 2000). 
1231  Īrān, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999). 
1232  Abrār, 12 Šahrīvar 1376 (3 September 1997); only as fāǧe‘eh: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 24 Mehr 1376 (14 October 1997). 
1233  Salām, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) II. 
1234  Āryā, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999). 
1235  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 30 Bahman & 1 & 2 & 19 Esfand 1378 (19 & 20 & 21 February & 9 March 2000). 
1236  Āftāb-e Emrūz, 2 Šahrīvar 1378 (24 August 1999). 
1237  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997). 
1238  Eg. in: Īrān, 8 Ḫordād 1374 (29 May 1995); Kaihān, 25 Ḫordād 1374 (5 June 1995); Īrān, 29 Tīr 1374 
(20 July 1995); Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 30 Bahman & 1 & 2 & 19 
Esfand 1378 (19 & 20 & 21 February & 9 March 2000); Gozāreš-e Rūz, 1 & 11 & ?? Esfand 1378 (20 
February & 1 March 2000). 
1239  Īrān, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995). 
1240  Āfarīneš, 16 Āḏar 1376 (7 December 1997) I. 
1241  Resālat, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997). 
1242  Hamšahrī, 27 Mehr 1376 (19 October 1997). 
1243  Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997). 
1244  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 29 Ḫordād 1374 (19 June 1995); as „captives of addiction“ (asīrān-e e‘tiyād): Eṭṭelā‘āt, 1 Tīr 
1374 (5 July 1995); as “in the captivity of this illness” (dar esārat-e īn bīmārī): Hamšahrī, 27 Tīr 1378 
(18 July 1999). 
1245  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 19 Bahman 1376 (8 February 1998); Enteḫāb, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999); Īran, 29 
Ābān 1378 (20 November 1999); as „merciless claws“ (čangāl-e bī-raḥm): Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 30 
Bahman & 1 & 2 & 19 Esfand 1378 (19 & 20 & 21 February & 9 March 2000). 
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of addiction” (ḥeṣār-e boland-e e‘tiyād),1246 “darkness of addiction” (tīregī-ye e‘tiyād),1247 
“engorged breath of the inauspicious shadow of addiction” (dam-e afzūn-e sāyeh-ye šūm-e 
e‘tiyād),1248 “black shadow of destruction” (sāyeh-ye siyāh-e tabāhī),1249 “well of addiction” 
(čāh-e e‘tiyād),1250 “deep water of addiction” (ġarq-āb-e e‘tiyād),1251 “ashes of addiction” 
(ḫākestar-e e‘tiyād),1252, or “inauspicious chain” (zanǧīr-e šūm)1253. Especially the picture of 
trap or web is being used so often that it has become almost an automatic extension of the 
word addiction.  
 
The expressions of the third group are even more graphic and arguably still keep a 
sensational meaning for the Iranian audience. Vivid examples for such descriptions of 
addiction are: “octopus of addiction” (oḫtāpūs-e e‘tiyād),1254 “merciless octopus” (oḫtāpūs-e 
bī-raḥm),1255 and “inauspicious shadow of the octopus of death” (sāyeh-ye šūm-e oḫtāpūs-e 
marg)1256; “terrible nightmare of addiction” (kābūs-e vaḥšat-nāk-e e‘tiyād),1257 “global abyss 
of addiction” (varṭeh-ye ǧahānī-ye e‘tiyād),1258 and “cancerous gland of addiction” (ġoddeh-
ye saraṭānī-ye e‘tiyād); 1259  “deep and dirty ulcer” (zaḫm-e ‘amīq va čertūn), 1260  or 
“inauspicious owl of addiction” (ǧoġd-e šūm-e e‘tiyād);1261 More somber expressions are 
“ghoul of addiction” (ġawl-e e‘tiyād),1262 “devil’s virus” (vīrūs-e eblīs),1263 “die-hard evil 
spirit” (ahrīman-e ǧān-saḫt),1264 or “claws of the evil-minded demon of addiction“ (čangāl-e 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1246  Īrān, 8 Ḫordād 1374 (29 May 1995); in the plural ḥeṣār-hā-ye boland: Kaihān, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 
1995). 
1247  Kaihān, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995). 
1248  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 16 Mehr 1376 (8 October 1997); also as “the nightmare of drugs still casts a shadow” (kābūs-e 
māvādd-e moḫadder ham-čonān sāyeh mī-afkanad): Našāṭ, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999). 
1249  Abrār, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999). 
1250  Also as “deep well” (omq-e čāh): Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 24 & 25 Šahrīvar 1378 (15 & 16 September 1999); 
only as čāh: Salām, 1 Ḫordād 1378 (22 May 1999). 
1251  Īrān, 2 Esfand 1378 (21 February 2000). 
1252  Ḫorāsān, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999). 
1253  Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997). 
1254  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 23 Dey 1376 (13 January 1998). 
1255  Salām, 1 Ḫordād 1378 (22 May 1999). 
1256  Salām, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) II; Abrār, 19 Mordād 1374 (10 August 1995). 
1257  Written daḥšatnāk instead of vaḥšatnāk: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 28 Ḫordād 1374 (18 June 1995); also as “nightmare of 
cigarettes” (kābūs-e sīgār): Hamšahrī, 18 Ābān 1376 (9 November 1997); as “nightmare of drugs” (kābūs-
e mavādd-e moḫadder): Našāṭ, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999). 
1258  Salām, 2 Tīr 1378 (23 June 1999). 
1259  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997); as ġaddeh-ye saraṭānī: Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 19 Bahman 
1376 (8 February 1998). 
1260  Ḫorāsān, 23 Āḏar 1378 (14 December 1999). 
1261  Abrār, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999). 
1262  Qods, 9 Dey 1376 (30 December 1997); Āfarīneš, 24 Mehr 1378 (16 October 1999); Payām-e Āzādī, 2 
Āḏar 1378 (23 November 1999).  
1263  Āryā, 11 Ordībehešt 1378 (1 May 1999). 
1264  Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḫordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999). 
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dīv-e bad-sīrat-e e‘tiyād).1265 Further used are “the world of the enchanter of addiction” 
(donyā-ye afsūn-gar-e e‘tiyād ),1266 “desert of the enchanter of opium” (ṣaḥrā-ye afsūn-gar-e 
afyūn),1267 “death-bringing marshes” (mordāb-e marg-āvar)1268, “dark and sinister soil of death” 
(ḫāk-e tīreh va tār-e marg), 1269 “dreadful storm” (ṭūfān-e sahm-gīn), 1270 “final weapon” 
(aṣlaḥeh-ye nehāʼī)1271, “gradual death” (marg-e tadrīǧī) or “the most dangerous and fatal 
virus” (ḫaṭar-nāk-tarīn va mohlek-tarīn vīrūsī)1272. The newspapers have also produced some 
more complex descriptions for the phenomenon of addiction, such as: “addiction comes 
calmly and without a noise and spreads quietly” (e‘tiyād ārām va bī-sar-o-ṣadā mī-āyad va 
bī-ṣadā gostareš paidā mī-konad),1273 “a fire that doesn’t know dry or wet” (ātešī keh tar-o-
ḫošk-rā ne-mī-šenāsad),1274 or a “fire, in which all burn” (āteš-ī keh hameh dar ān mī-
sūzand)1275. Youth addiction is called a “time-bomb” (bomb-e sā‘atī),1276 and an “elephant in 
the darkness” (fīl-rā dar tārīkī),1277 and tobacco smoking described as “a smoke that goes into 
everyone’s eye{s}” (dūdī keh be čašmeh-ye hameh mī-ravad).1278 But even some of these 
pictographic expressions – in particular “octopus of death” – are used so frequently that they 
might have lost their sensational meaning to the reader. 
 
While all newspapers use a whole range of such graphic expressions for addiction, it 
seems that the conservative, and especially the “religious” newspapers – both Ǧomhūrī-ye 
Eslāmī, Resālat and Qods on the conservative side and Salām and Ḫorāsān on the reformist 
side – are using them more frequently. 
 
Destroyed families & the Iranian youth under the siege of the cursed material  
The newspapers, however, also have specific terms to describe the victims (qorbānī-
yān) of drugs, especially the youth. Iran is generally depicted as being “under the siege of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1265  Resālat, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995). 
1266  Āfarīneš, 24 Mehr 1378 (16 October 1999). 
1267  Hamšahrī, 27 Mehr 1376 (19 October 1997). 
1268  Īrān, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995). 
1269  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995). 
1270  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 19 Bahman 1376 (8 February 1998). 
1271  Hamšahrī, 24 Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997). 
1272  Āryā, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999). 
1273  Īrān, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995). 
1274  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999); also as “this fire burns dry and wet” (īn āteš tar-
o-ḫošk-rā mī-sūzānad): Enteḫāb, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999). 
1275  Qods, 25 Ābān 1378 (16 November 1999). 
1276  Īrān, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999). 
1277  Īrān, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999). 
1278  Hamšahrī, 10 Ḫordād 1376 (31 May 1997). 
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drugs” (dar moḥāṣereh-ye mavādd-e moḫadder),1279 or in the “fort of the Mafia’s ruses” (dar 
ḥeṣār-e nīrang-e māfiyā).1280 Drugs are described as “cursed materials” (mavādd-e la‘natī) 
that “brought down the roof of the house of all of us” (sar az ḫāneh-ye hameh-ye mārā dar 
āvord),1281 or “a smoke that ruins the family“ (dūd-ī ke dūdmān-rā beh bād mī-dehad),1282 and 
as leading to the “gradual ruin of the man, the destruction of the family foundation, and the 
annihilation of the body and soul of the children and adolescents” (taḫrīb-e tadrīǧī-ye mard 
va enhedām-e asās-e ḫāne-vādeh, va nā-būdī-ye ǧasam va ǧān-e kawdak-ān va naw-ǧavān-
ān),1283 or the “breakup of the family” (forū-pāšī-ye ḫāne-vādeh).1284 Heroin is described as 
being “the enemy of the soul, wealth, spirit and zeal” (došman-e ǧān va māl va rūḥ va 
ġairat);1285 while “opium smokes the zeal of the young generation“ (afyūn ġairat-e nasl-e 
ǧavān-rā dūd mī-konad)1286.  
 
The newspapers express a specific concern for the Iranian youth, by stating that  “the 
swirl of addiction lies in the ambush of the youth” (gerdāb-e e‘tiyād dar kamīn-e ǧavānān 
ast),1287 and that drugs “contaminate the young generation” (nasl-e ǧavān-rā ālūdeh mī-
sāzad)1288; and by emphasizing that the colonialists “have delivered a large number of the 
young of this country to the maw of the addiction to heroin and its derivates” (te‘dād-e ziyādī 
az ǧavān-ān-e īn marz-o-būm-rā dar kām-e e‘tiyād beh herōʼīn va taba‘āt-e ān qarār 
dādand).1289. 
 
 The drug addict itself is generally rather depicted as a victim than a criminal. The 
newspapers accordingly call addicts, a “captive of the white devil” (asīr-e šaiṭān-e sefīd),1290 
or a “captive of the grey prisons of this terrestrial evil spirit” (asīr-e zandān-hā-ye ḫākestarī-
ye īn ahrīman-e zamīnī),1291 who has “fallen into the trap” (dām-oftāde{gān}).1292 They are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1279  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 19 Bahman 1376 (8 February 1998). 
1280  Kār va Kārgar, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999). 
1281  Resālat, 6 Ābān 1376 (28 October 1997). 
1282  Ǧavān, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999). 
1283  Āfarīneš, 20 Ābān 1376 (11 November 1997). 
1284  Ḫorāsān, 8 Mehr 1378 (30 September 1999); also as “scattering of the familiy system” (forū-pāšī-ye 
neẓām-e ḫāne-vādeh): Ǧavān, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999). 
1285  Āfarīneš, 22 Ābān 1376 (13 November 1997); also as “the enemy of the people’s soul and also of its spirit 
and zeal” (došman-e ǧān-e mardom va ham došman-e rūh va ġayrat): Āzād, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 
1999). 
1286  Kār va Kārgar, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999). 
1287  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997). 
1288  Īrān, 8 Tīr 1378 (29 June 1999). 
1289  Salām, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I. 
1290  Īrān, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995). 
1291  Āfarīneš, 24 Mehr 1378 (16 October 1999). 
1292  Hamšahrī, 27 Mehr 1376 (19 October 1997). 
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further described as “dry sapling” (nahāl-e ḫošk)1293 in the “dark and sinister soil of death” 
(ḫāk-e tīreh va tār-e marg),1294 or as “flowers in a storm” (gol-hā dar ṭūfān);1295 as “clouded 
brains” (maġz-hā-ye abr-ālūdeh)1296 who “fall into a well” (dar čāhī mī-oftand),1297 or “fall 
into a trap” (beh dām mī-oftand);1298 and as being seduced by “the temptations of drugs” (vas-
vaseh-ye mavādd-e moḫadder),1299 “the temptations of Satan” (vas-vaseh-ye šaiṭān),1300 or 
simply by “temptations” (vasvaseh).1301 Especially drug addiction of women is described as 
“fall of the woman in the ashes of addiction“ (ġorūb-e zan dar ḫākestar-e e‘tiyād)1302. 
 
The fatal habit of the drug consumption is furthermore compared to a “gradual death” 
(marg-e tadrīǧī),1303 a “gradual and abating death” (marg-e tadrīǧī va ḫammūdī),1304 or a 
“gradual suicide” (ḫod-košī-ye tadrīǧī).1305 Drug users are described as “those who turn health 
and zeal into smoke” (ānān keh salāmat va ġairat-rā bā ham dūd mīkonand),1306 and whose 
“lungs of enjoyment are full of the oxygen of death” (riyeh-hā-ye leḏḏat por az oksīžen-e 
marg ast)1307. Interestingly, especially the traditional and conservative newspapers use such 
terms for drug addicts. 
 
A piece of sorrow with an unacceptable ending? 
In order to save the victims of drug addiction, the newspapers particularly place their 
hope on addiction therapy. Therapy accordingly is described as “deliverance from the high 
fortification of addiction” (rahāʼī az ḥeṣār-e boland-e e‘tiyād), 1308  “deliverance of the 
individual from the captivity of addiction” (rahāyī-ye fard az esārat-e e‘tiyād), 1309 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1293  Īrān, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995). 
1294  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995). 
1295  Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḫordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999). 
1296  Hamšahrī, 14 Ordībehešt 1374 (4 May 1995). 
1297  Salām, 1 Ḫordād 1378 (22 May 1999). 
1298  Salām, 13 Ḫordād 1378 (3 June 1999); “he falls into the trap of opium” (be-dām-e taryāk mī-oftad) is 
already an expression used by: Āḏaraḫš (1955/56), 415.  
1299  Kaihān, 17 Tīr 1376 (8 July 1997). 
1300  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 14 Tīr 1374 (5 July 1995); as vas-vaseh-hā-ye šayṭānī: 
Āryā, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999).  
1301  Hamšahrī, 25 Šahrīvar 1376 (15 September 1997); Salām, 13 Ḫordād 1378 (3 June 1999).  
1302  Ḫorāsān, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999). 
1303  Hamšahrī, 10 Tīr, 1374 (1 July 1995); Kaihān, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 6 & 7& 8 & 9 
& 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999).  
1304  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997). 
1305  Kaihān, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995). 
1306  Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997). 
1307  Īrān, 8 Tīr 1378 (29 June 1999). 
1308  Īrān, 8 Ḫordād 1374 (29 May 1995) and Resālat, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997) 
1309  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 29 Ḫordād 1374 (19 June 1995). 
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“deliverance of the trap of addiction” (rahāyī az dām-e e‘tiyād),1310 or “salvation of the addict” 
(naǧāt-e mo‘tād)1311. The language is even more illustrative in the first year of the sample 
period, when the newspapers describe the rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn with 
sentences like “growth of the rose of ‘hope’ and ‘life’ in the brackwater of addiction” (rūyeš-e 
gol-e “omīd” va “zendegī” dar šūreh-zār-e e‘tiyād),1312 “rehabilitation – emergence of the 
‘bright morning’ from the ‘dark evening’ of addiction” (bāz-parvarī, damīdan-e “ṣobḥ-e 
rawšan” az “šām-e tīreh-ye” e‘tiyād),1313 or “here, life smiles again for the cured addicts” 
(īnǧā zendegī do bāreh beh rū-ye mo‘tādān-e šafā-yāfteh lab-ḫand mī-zanad).1314 Later, the 
descriptions become more neutral, and to a certain degree more disillusioned. The newspapers 
maintain, “one can get out of the well of addiction” (az čāh-e e‘tiyād mī-tavān ḫāreǧ šod),1315 
or “one has to escape from the well of addiction” (bāyad az čāh-e e‘tiyād bīrūn biyābad), but 
also ask more tentatively “what is the way of salvation from the deep water of 
addiction?“ (rāh-e neǧāt az ġarq-āb-e e‘tiyād kodām ast?).1316 They now describe addiction as 
“a piece of sorrow with an unacceptable ending” (ġam-nāmeh-ye pāyān-e nā-paḏīr)1317, when 
talking about the many young addicts, who “are not [yet] delivered from the trap of those 
[drugs]” (az dām-e ān rahā na-yāfteh).1318  
 
 More hope is consequently placed in the families of the drug addicts as a supportive 
forum. They are described as a “firm fortification” (ḥeṣār-e moḥkam),1319 or “an impenetrable 
dam against the entrance of drugs” (sad-e nofūḏ-nā-paḏīr-e vorūd-e mavādd-e moḫadder),1320 
“so that our children don’t fall into the net/trap of addiction” (barāye īn-keh farzandān-e mā 
beh dām-e e‘tiyād na-y-oftand)1321. And the Iranian society is generally described as being in 
need of a “social vaccination” (vāksīnāsiyōn-e eǧtemā‘ī), 1322  and a “cultural combat” 
(mobarezeh-ye farhangī)1323 against the problem of drug addiction.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1310  Īrān, 8. Ḫordād 1374 (29 May 1995); slightly different as “that they deliver themselves from the trap of 
addiction” (ḫod-rā az dām-e e‘tiyād rahānīdand): Kaihān, 25 Ḫordād 1374 (15 June 1995). 
1311  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 24 & 25 Šahrīvar 1378 (15 & 16 September 1999). 
1312  Kaihān, 25 Ḫordād 374 (15 June 1995). 
1313  Kaihān, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995). 
1314  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995). 
1315  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 24 & 25 Šahrīvar 1378 (15 & 16 September 1999). 
1316  Īrān, 2 Esfand 1378 (21 February 2000). 
1317  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999); Hamšahrī, 5 Mehr 1378 (27 September 1999). 
1318  Āfarīneš, 16 Āḏar 1376 (7 December 1997) I. 
1319  Hamšahrī, 17 Šahrīvar (7 September 1997). 
1320  Payām-e Āzādī, 7 Bahman 1378 (27 January 2000). 
1321  Gozāreš-e Rūz, 1 & 11 & ?? Esfand 1378 (20 February & 1 & ??, March 2000). 
1322  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 20 Bahman 1376 (9 February 1998). 
1323  Ḫordād, 13 Ordībehešt 1376 (3 May 1999); Kār va Kārgar, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999). 
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V. 3. b. Drug Addiction, a Crime or an Illness?  
 
 Arguably the most crucial question of the Iranian press discourse on drugs is the 
question whether “the addict is a criminal or a sick person” (mo‘tād – bīmār yā moǧrem?).1324 
Following the amended drug law of 1997, according to which “all addicts are permitted to go 
to legal centers [...] and use such centers for their treatment and rehabilitation”, the 
newspapers almost unanimously describe drug addicts as sick persons in need of medical 
support – at least on the level of explicit argumentation. The notable exceptions are two 
articles by the newspapers Kaihān and Resālat,1325 which otherwise agree with the prevalent 
tenor. And indeed, this question has not really been solved in Iran. In fact, even the 
amendment of 1997 still maintained that “drug addiction is a crime” (e‘tiyād ǧorm ast). And 
as Hamšahrī correctly points out, there are still “officials who consider this phenomenon as 
an illness and other officials who count it as a crime” (masʼūlān-ī keh īn padīdeh-rā yek 
bīmār mī-dānand, yā dīgar masʼūlān keh ān-rā ğorm mī-šomārand) in Iran. 1326  This 
continuing contradiction is mainly due to the fact, that the decision, whether to send a drug-
addicted person to prison or rehabilitation, is incumbent upon the courts. Since drug addicts 
often commit acquisitive crimes such as theft, robbery or prostitution – which is considered a 
crime in Iran – such a distinction is admittedly not always easy feasible. 
 
 It is not astonishing, then, that the newspapers, too, display the same ambiguity 
between a criminological and a medical notion of drug addiction. This discrepancy is not 
primarily observable between the different newspapers, for instance between the conservative 
and the reformist press. It rather permeates the press discourse as a whole. While the 
newspapers explicitly argue that drug addiction is an illness; they continue to use expressions 
for drug addicts that still reveal a deep-rooted moral perception of drug addiction. Thus, only 
exceptional newspapers call drug addicts “committer of sins and crimes” (mortakeb-e gonāh-
ān va ǧarāyem); but many still make a connection between addiction and misdemeanor, for 
instance by calling addiction a “deviation” (enḥerāf) from assumed social and moral norms. 
  
 Instances of newspapers calling addiction an “illness” (bīmārī) or drug addicts “sick 
persons” (bīmār-ān) are numerous and cannot be listed here. The same applies for the more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1324  This is e.g. the title of: Hamšahrī, 24 Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997). 
1325  Kaihān, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995); Resālat, 6 Ābān 1376 (28 October 1997). 
1326  This statement even might suggest that more officials still called it a crime: Hamšahrī, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 
September 1997), 
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neutral term “help-seeking person” (madad-ǧū). More emotional expressions used by the 
newspapers for addiction are “mortal illness” (bīmārī-ye košandeh)1327 or “terrible illness” 
(bīmārī-ye vaḥšat-nāk).1328  
 
 Stronger value judgments become apparent, when addiction is counted among “social 
harms” (āsīb-hā-ye eǧtemā‘ī);1329 when “the ghoul of addiction” is described “as one of the 
most important social deviations” (ġawl-e e‘tiyād {emrūz} beh ‘onvāne-e yekī az mohemm-
tarīn enḥerāf-āt-e eǧtemā‘ī);1330 or when a newspaper talks about “drug consumption or every 
other deviation” (maṣraf-e mavādd {-e moḫadder} yā har enḥerāf-e dīgar) .1331 Drug addiction, 
consequently, is made responsible for “social deviations” (enḥerāfāt-e eǧtemā‘ī);1332 “social 
aberrations” (kaǧravī-hā-ye eǧtemā‘ī);1333 “moral deviations” (enḥerāfāt-e aḫlāqī);1334 “social 
ruptures like divorce, sexual and moral deviations and family quarrels” (az-ham-gasīḫtegī-hā-
ye eǧtemā‘ī mānand-e ṭalāq, enḥerāf-āt-e ǧensī, aḫlāqī, va nezā‘-hā-ye ḫāne-vādegī);1335 or 
the “appearance of abnormalities, scuffles in families and groups […] and the endangering of 
the social security and stability” (borūz-e nā-hanǧārī-hā, kešmakeš-hā-ye ḫāne-vādegī va 
gorūhī […] va beh ḫaṭar oftādan-e amniyyat va ṯobāt-e eǧtemā‘ī).1336 Īrān even explicitly 
states that “they [the drug addicts] are in their soul / essence not criminal, but bad factors and 
social abnormalities cause their deviation” (fī nafse-he moǧrem nīstand, balkeh ‘avāmel-e sūʼ 
va nā-hanǧarī-hā-ye eǧtemā‘ī mawǧeb-e enḥerāf-e ānhā mī-šavad).1337 And Āzād maintains 
that “the various social harms resulting from addiction […] bring as a gift moral deviations 
and numerous social disorders for the children of those [wives of drug addicts]” (āsīb-hā-ye 
moḫtalef-e eǧtemā‘ī nāšī az e‘tiyād […] enḥerāf-āt-e aḫlāqī va nā-besāmānī-hā-ye 
mota‘addedī-rā barāye farzandān-e ānān beh armaġān mī-āvord)1338.  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1327  Hamšahrī, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999). 
1328  Payām-e Āzādī, 7 Bahman 1378 (27 January 2000). 
1329  Īrān, 8 Ḫordād 1374 (29 May 1995). 
1330  Āfarīneš, 24 Mehr 1378 (16 October 1999). 
1331  Ḫorāsān, 6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 1999). 
1332  Hamšahrī, 19 Ordībehešt 1374 (9 May 1995); Salām, 20 Ḫordād 1378 (10 June 1999). 
1333  Abrār, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 March 1996). 
1334  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 28 Tīr 1376 (19 July 1997); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999). 
1335  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 17 Mehr 1376 (9 October 1997); Ǧavān, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999). 
1336  Resālat, 5 Ābān 1376 (27 October 1997); also as “causes the growth and appearance of social deviations 
and aberrations” (mouǧeb-e rošd va borūz-e enḥerāf-hā va nā-hanǧārī-hā-ye eǧtemā‘ī mī-šavad): Ǧavān, 
6 Dey 1378 (28 December  1999). 
1337  Īrān, 8 Ḫordād 1374 (29 May 1995). 
1338  Āzād, 6 Mehr 1378 (28 September 1999). 
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More explicitly linked to criminal behavior are statements calling addiction “a ladder 
to the commitment of crimes” (nardebān-e ertekāb-e ǧorm);1339 or maintaining that “many 
crimes like murder, rape or theft […] result from drug addiction” (besyārī az ǧarāyem 
mānand-e qatl, taǧāvoz, dozdī […] nāšī az e‘tiyād beh mavādd-e moḫadder ast);1340 that “a 
society that approaches [its] decline with addiction […] entails many crimes like murder, rape, 
theft, felony, the disintegration of the family [sic] and many more” (ǧāme‘ehʼī keh bā e‘tiyād 
beh samt-e enḥeṭāṭ mīravad […] keh voqū‘-e besyārī az ǧarāyem naẓīr-e qatl, taǧāvoz, serqat, 
bezeh-kārī, motalāšī šodan-e ḫāne-vādeh va besyārī dīgar-rā nīz bā ḫod ham-rāh mī-
āvarad);1341 or that “in the bosom [lit. belly] of every social crime other felonies are hidden” 
(dar baṭan-e har bezeh-e eǧtemā‘ī bezeh-kārī-hā-ye dīgarī nīz nahofteh ast) by explicitly 
connecting addiction to theft and prostitution.1342 The newspapers even directly call addiction 
a crime, by saying that “one of the reasons for the addiction and most crimes and felonies of 
the youth and the adolescents” (yekī az ‘elal-e mohemm-e e‘tiyād va akṯar-e ǧorm-hā va 
bezeh-hā-ye ǧavān-ān va naw-ǧavān-ān);1343 or noticing “a regrettable, increasing trend of 
crimes and contraventions including addiction among pupils” (ravand-e motaʼassef-āneh-ye 
ṣo‘ūdī-ye ǧarāyem va taḫallof-āt az ǧomleh e‘tiyād dar bain-e dāneš-āmūz-ān).1344  
 
 In even stronger, religiously inspired terms, the newspapers maintain that “addiction, 
like a reel, paves the way for other moral evils” (e‘tiyād mānand-e yek čarḫeh, zamīneh-sāz-e 
mafāsed-e aḫlāqī-ye dīgar mī-šavad)1345, and that drug addiction is in short the “mother of 
{all} evils” (omm-ol-mafāsed)1346, the “mother of {all} vices” (omm-ol-ḫebāsat)1347 or the 
“mother of {all} corruption” (omm-ol-fesād)1348. The “combat against drugs” consequently is 
described as “a combat against social evils” (mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḫadder, mobārezeh 
bā mafāsed-e eǧtemā‘ī)1349. And while drug addicts are never explicitly called “corrupt” 
(mofsed), they are still called “anti-social individuals” (afrādī żedd-e eǧtemā‘ī),1350 and their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1339  Salām, 20 Ḫordād 1378 (10 June 1999). 
1340  Abrār, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999). 
1341  Āryā, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999). 
1342  Hamšahrī, 17 Šahrīvar 1376 (7 September 1997). 
1343  Kār va Kārgar, 21 & 22 & 24 Farvardīn 1378 (10 & 11 & 13 April 1999). 
1344  Kār va Kārgar, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999). 
1345  Ḫorāsān, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999). 
1346  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 6 & 7& 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999). 
1347  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 6 & 7& 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 4 1999). 
1348  Payām-e Āzādī, 2 Āḏar 1378 (23 November 1999). 
1349  Kaihān, 22 Tīr 1374 (13 July 1995). 
1350  Kaihān, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995). 
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lifestyle is depicted as a “parasitic life” (zendegī-ye angalī)1351. As a result, the newspapers 
warn them that “harms to the soul are religiously forbidden” (ażrār beh nafs ḥarām ast).1352 
 
 Even though ambiguous language on drug addiction and drug addicts is observable in 
press as a whole, it is especially the more traditional and often the conservative and religious 
newspapers that are applying morally judging expressions. The conservative newspapers in 
general rather tend to condemn drug addicts and call it a “moral deviation”, while their 
reformist colleagues rather call it a “social deviation”. In the conservative camp, next to the 
traditional Kaihān, Resālat and Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, in particular Ǧavān stands out. The new 
reformist newspapers almost never use such language, while the newspapers of the religious 
left Salām and Ḫorāsān, as well as Īrān, Hamšahrī and Kār-va-Kārgar, still display a moral 
tone at times.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1351  Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 6 & 7& 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June 
& 4 July 1999); also as “their life changes to a parasitic form” (zendegī-ye ān-hā beh form-e angalī mī-
yābad): Abrār, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 March 1996).  
1352  Kaihān, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995). 
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VI. Synthesis & Interpretation: the Iranian Press Discourse on Drugs & Power 
Struggles 
 
Based on the fact that drug policy issues are hotly discussed political and social topics 
throughout the world; and against the background of increasingly factional disputes between 
conservatives and reformists in Iran since mid 1980s, the present study initially assumed that 
the Iranian press displays such contradictory opinions on drug policy issues. It could be 
expected that this applies all the more so, since in the absence of political parties in Iran, 
Iranian newspapers have an even more pronounced role as important forums for the political 
and ideological positions of the competing factions. Additionally, the present study initially 
assumed the overall Iranian press discourse on drugs to express relatively repressive and 
reactionary positions in the beginning, and to forward more liberal and progressive opinions 
over the course of the of the sample period – thus reflecting both the change of the official 
Iranian drug policy, and the development of an increasingly liberal press, especially during 
the Ḫātamī administration. 
 
The analysis of the Iranian press discourse on drugs, however, shows a more complex 
picture. From the beginning of the sample period, Iranian newspapers openly discuss the 
problem of drug addiction by highlighting the need for a modern and effective drug policy. 
Consequently, they already advance progressive policy positions such as in particular the 
need for scientific addiction therapy. Astonishingly, factional disputes are largely absent, 
throughout the whole sample period. Admittedly, there are a few exceptions to this general 
rule. But the press nevertheless displays a relatively uniform, and an increasingly critical 
coverage of the national drug policy – eventually including controversial topics like 
prostitution, the spread of HIV, and adequate harm reduction measures. 
 
Homogenizing and heterogenizing powers in the Iranian press discourse on drugs  
 
The subsequent synthesis and interpretation of the Iranian press discourse on drugs 
takes a closer look at the likely reasons for this overall uniformity and progressiveness. The 
general observation of such a consistency, is in fact not as surprising as it might seem at first 
sight. It rather follows the general postulation of discourse analysis, according to which 
discourses develop specific discourse orders, setting the rules and regulations of what can be 
said in a society on a specific topic, and how it can be said. Factional differences thus can be 
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expected to be restrained to a certain degree by homogenizing discourse orders, which 
contribute to a relative uniformity of the drug discourse. Such underlying forces will be 
addressed as homogenizing power of the Iranian press discourse on drugs in the following 
section. Discourse analysis in the tradition of Foucault, however, not only analyses the overall 
homogeneous and continuous power of discourses, but also concentrates on heterogeneous 
and discontinuous aspects. Such heterogeneous aspects do not forcibly or exclusively reflect 
inter-factional disputes, but are innate to the discourse as a whole, often irrespective of the 
factional alignment of a single group. Individual participants of a discourse can, however, 
strategically use individual heterogeneous, differing discourse positions or strategies in order 
to advance their own agenda. By doing so, they can influence and eventually transform the 
discourse. These underlying forces will be addressed as heterogenizing power of the Iranian 
press discourse on drugs in the following. Such transformations, however, often rather happen 
as a result of the interaction of all participants, and, thus, again might represent an aspect of 
the homogenizing power of discourses. Both, homogenizing and heterogenizing forces of the 
discourse wield power on the discourse and its individual participants, the specific 
newspapers in this case. 
 
To make matters even more complicated, critical discourse analysis further 
differentiates between different discourse levels, which together form a discourse. In 
everyday speech, such discourse levels are, however, often simply called discourses. 
Discourse levels correspond to functionally different settings, where the same topic is being 
discussed, such as for instance the levels of international politics, domestic politics, media, 
academia or religion. Various discourse levels are naturally closely interwoven and have a 
mutual influence on each other. Since the press is part of the discourse level of media, other 
discourse levels also have an impact on the press discourse. 
 
 Within the Iranian press discourse on drugs, the homogenizing power of discourse 
becomes evident in the overall orders of discourse, which cause the newspapers to write 
about the same topics, use the same arguments and often compose their texts in a similar style 
with the use of similar expressions. The heterogenizing power, in contrast, is manifest in 
various inconsistencies, contradictions and disagreements, but also in new topics and 
arguments within the discourse. Such heterogeneities are not only present between individual 
newspapers, but often within the press discourse as a whole, and as such also within 
individual newspapers. The individual newspaper can strategically use them to formulate their 
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own discourse positions and discourse strategies. Homogenizing discourse orders therefore 
already contain heterogeneous elements, which are never entirely dissolved; but by 
influencing discourse orders, such heterogeneous elements can themselves be the origin for 
new homogenizing discourse orders.  
 
 Since the Iranian press discourse on drugs only constitutes the discourse level of 
media, other discourse levels within the overall drugs discourse are also seen to be 
influencing it. The same is true for entirely different discourses. Here, such influences are 
called extrinsic factors. These can, in turn, exert both homogenizing and heterogenizing 
power on the Iranian press discourse on drugs. In the present case, these extrinsic forces are 
specifically the official Iranian drug policy as manifest in the official Iranian drug discourse; 
and the official press policy, which is, in turn, manifest in the official press discourse. Iranian 
drug policy and press policy, thus, exert both homogenizing and heterogenizing power on the 
Iranian press discourse on drugs. The same is true for other extrinsic discourse levels such as 
the international drug discourse, the religious drug discourse or the medical drug discourse. 
Since these are closely intertwined with the official drug discourse, they will be subsumed 
under the official drugs discourse. As a result, the Iranian press discourse on drugs is 
influenced by both extrinsic homogenizing and heterogenizing power factors, and by intrinsic 
homogenizing and heterogenizing power factors.  
 
 To summarize, the Iranian press discourse on drugs is primarily influenced by the 
discourse level of the official drug discourse or simply by the official drug policy. The official 
drug discourse, in turn, is itself influenced by other discourse levels, namely the international 
drug discourse and the medical drug discourse; but also for instance by the religious and 
historical drug discourse. The international drug discourse, as embodied in institutions like the 
UNDCP, the INCB or the WHO, has a major influence on both the official drug discourse and 
the press discourse on drugs, especially during the first year of the sample period. It provides 
them with basic information on the situation of drug cultivation, drug trafficking, and drug 
consumption around the world as well as with general information about the phenomenology 
of drugs, scientific addiction therapy and drug prevention approaches. The medical drug 
discourse, as embodied in the WHO but also domestically in the Health Ministry, the SWO, 
medical universities and individual researchers, too, has a strong and increasing influence on 
both during the sample period. It provides them with information in the field of addiction 
therapy, drug prevention, and harm reduction measures.  
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 While the international and medical discourse levels do influence the Iranian press 
directly, this occurs indirectly first by having an influence on the official drug discourse, 
which in turn influences the press discourse. The official Iranian drug discourse, thus, 
arguably exerts most power on the Iranian press discourse on drugs. This is particularly true 
for the first two years of the sample period. While its influence continues, other, extrinsic 
power factors gain in importance in the last year of the sample period. As a result, Iranian 
press discourse becomes increasingly independent from, and critical towards the official 
Iranian drug policy.  
 
These various homogenizing and heterogenizing extrinsic and intrinsic power factors 
will be addressed separately just below. It will begin with a discussion of the homogenizing 
power: specifically by the extrinsic official drug policy (or discourse) including the 
international and medical discourse; by the extrinsic official press policy, and by the intrinsic 
dynamics of the press. This will be followed by a discussion of the heterogenizing power of 
the same discourses. 
 
VI. 1. Homogenizing powers  
 
VI. 1. a. The homogenizing power of the official Iranian drug policy 
The official Iranian drug policy or the official drug policy discourse respectively 
arguably has the most direct and most important extrinsic homogenizing power on the press 
discourse. Even though the press becomes increasingly critical towards the government 
during the sample period, it still fulfills the basic function of serving the Iranian government 
and as an extension the Islamic Republic and the Iranian society in general, as explicitly 
requested by press law of 1986 (chapter III). Since the newspapers typically function as 
surrogates to, or at least as mouthpieces of the political factions in Iran, they are naturally 
intertwined with the political decision-making. It is, therefore, not surprising that the press 
discourse on drugs closely mirrors the official political discourse. This influence of the 
official Iranian drug policy discourse already has proved true in the analysis of the discourse 
events. There, it was shown that clusters of drug-related newspaper articles usually appear 
around events organized by the Iranian government (chapter V. 1). 
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As the chapter on the history of drugs (chapter III) has shown, the transformation of 
the Iranian drug policy from a mere security-based, repressive approach to a strategy that 
more evenly balances between drug supply and drug demand reduction measures started 
during the Rafsanǧānī administration. Although certainly driven by the administration, the 
general reorientation of the domestic drug policy eventually represents a decision of the entire 
political establishment, including particularly the Supreme Leader. Possible differences 
between the political factions, albeit still existing to a certain degree, are thus already 
minimized on the level of the official drug policy discourse. 
 
The official drug policy discourse is itself, however, also influenced and shaped by 
various discourses or discourse levels. As the analysis of the press discourse shows, it is 
strongly influenced by international drug policy discourses, especially at the beginning of the 
sample period; but also increasingly by academic, medical and psychological discourses on 
addiction therapy and drug prevention. Further influencing discourses that can be observed in 
the press discourse on drugs are for instance the religious discourse and the historical 
discourse. While the former seems to be rather negligible, the latter is arguably still strongly 
present, especially on the level of the language.  
 
These extrinsic discourse levels all shape the official drug policy discourse in Iran, and 
as a result also the press discourse. As they become increasingly integrated in the official 
discourse over the sample period, it is eventually not always possible to distinguish these 
separate external discourse levels from the level of the official drug policy. Additionally, it is 
often not clear to what extent they directly shape the discourse level of the media, without the 
intermediary of the official drug policy. Ultimately, all these different discourse levels are 
closely intertwined. 
 
The following analysis of the influence of the official drug policy thus basically 
subsumes all these different discourse levels under the official drug policy; but differentiates 
them wherever possible. The topical order will be as follows: the international drug discourse; 
the domestic drug discourse, consisting of various main sub-topics; the religious drug 
discourse and the medical drug discourse. The enumeration of these homogeneous topics 
serves concomitantly as a synthesis of the analysis of the Iranian press discourse on drugs, as 
presented in the previous chapter (chapter V. 2) 
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The international drug discourse 
 The Iranian press discourse on drugs displays a strong influence by the discourse level 
of international drug policies, or more precisely international organizations involved in drug 
policy and international media sources. This is especially true for the first year of the sample 
period, when the newspapers often refer to international sources in describing the situation of 
drugs in the world and in Iran. Later, the press relies more on domestically provided 
information, but references to international sources continue throughout the sample period. 
This is particularly explainable by the fact that Rafsanǧānī again had established contacts with 
the international community, especially with the INCB, the UNDCP and the WHO. As a 
result, the UNDCP opened a field office in Tehrān in 1999, and further intensified its 
cooperation with the Iranian government. The influence of the UNDCP is particularly visible 
in the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking, which serves as the 
single most important discourse event for the press discourse on drugs (chapter V. 1). As has 
been shown, in each year of the sample period, most newspaper articles appear around 26 
June. As a result, this day has in fact become a truly national discourse event that is indeed 
more “celebrated” in Iran than in most other countries. 
 
Certainly with the blessing of the Iranian government, these international bodies, 
however, also directly provide the press with information on the international drug situation 
and on international drug legislation; on the phenomenology of drugs and drug addiction; on 
addiction treatment and on drug prevention.  
 
The press consequently often cites material provided by the UNDCP: for instance the 
annual World Drug Report; a study on drug cultivation in Afghanistan;1353 statistics on Iran’s 
combat against drug trafficking, 1354  or on the situation of drug addiction in Iran. 1355 
Additionally, the newspapers also report on UNDCP delegations, visiting for example the 
rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn in 1995,1356 or the Eastern border in 1999.1357 The 
opening of the UNDCP field office in Tehrān, in contrast, is surprisingly only explicitly 
mentioned by a single newspaper.1358 But the press subsequently often quotes UNDCP 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1353  Aḫbār-e Eqteṣādī, 31 Šahrīvar 1378 (22 September 1999). 
1354  Resālat, 3 Tīr 1376 (24 June 1997); Kaihān, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 30 
Bahman & 1 & 2 & 19 Esfand (19 & 20 & 21 February & 9 March 2000). 
1355  Āfarīneš, 22 Ābān 1376 (13 November 1997); Āzād, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999); Payām-e Āzādī, 
7 Bahman 1378 (27 January 2000). 
1356  Kaihān, 25 Ḫordād 1374 (15 June 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 28 Ḫordād 1374 (18 June 1995). 
1357  Enteḫāb, Tīr 5, 1378 (June 26, 1999); Qods, Tīr 7, 1378 (June 28, 1999). 
1358  Tarǧomān-e Rūz, 8 Esfand 1378 (27 February 2000). 
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officials like its first representative of the field office in Tehrān, Antonio Mazzitelli; or then 
UNDCP director general Pino Arlacchi;1359 and it repeatedly reports on meetings between 
Iranian officials, especially of the DCHQ, with UNDCP representatives. While often 
complaining about insufficient help contributed by the international community to Iran’s drug 
combat, the press nevertheless repeatedly mentions specific instances of assistance by the 
UNDCP or individual Western countries, like financial contributions, tracking devices, 
sniffing dogs, bullet-proof vests or night vision devises.1360 
 
Further international bodies that are regularly mentioned are for instance the INCB 
and the WHO. Aḥmad Moḥīṭ, an Iranian member of the WHO, even authors an article on 
addiction causes in the newspaper Hamšahrī;1361 and then president of the INCB, Iranian-born 
Hamid Ghodse, is repeatedly interviewed.1362 Another international event triggering drug-
related newspapers articles is for instance Interpol’s “inter-regional session on drugs” (eǧlās-e 
bayn-e manṭaqeh-ye mavādd-e moḫadder), which the Iranian government had hosted in 
Eṣfahān.1363 
 
Other international sources for drug-related information are in particular foreign 
newspapers and magazines. The Iranian press often even translates entire articles. As Resālat 
informs in an article, such translations are apparently often put at the press’ disposal by the 
DCHQ. 1364  Specifically quoted are for instance the The New York Times, The Times, 
Newsweek Magazine, The Christian Science Monitor, The Reader’s Digest, the BBC, Le 
Monde Diplomatique, the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, die Zeit, Bild am Sonntag, or 
Radio Köln. These articles mostly deal with the situation of drugs and drug policy in foreign 
countries, including in particular the liberal drug policies of the Netherlands, Germany, 
Austria and Switzerland.1365 Further international sources the newspapers mention are for 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1359  H ̮orāsān, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999); Kār va Kārgar 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999); Vohūman, 7 Šahrīvar 
1378 (29 August 1999).. 
1360  Enteḫāb, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 13 & 14 & 15 & 16 & 17 & 19 
Mehr 1376 (5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 11 October 1997); Ḫorāsān, 6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 1999); 
Ḫorāsān, 7 Āḏar 1378 (28 November 1999); Kayhān, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999). 
1361  Hamšahrī, 19 Ordībehešt 1374 (9 May 1995). 
1362  Hamšahrī, 31 Ḫordād 1374 (21 June 1995); Hamid Ghodse is again interviewed in the third year by: 
Aḫbār-e Eqteṣādī, 11 Mehr 1378 (3 October 1999). 
1363  Hamšahrī, 2 Mehr 1376 (24 September 1997); or: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 13 Mehr 1376 (5 October 1997). 
1364  Resālat, 21 Farvardīn 1376 (10 April 1997). 
1365  The BBC: Hamšahrī, 27 Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995); Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Resālat, 21 
Farvardīn 1376 (10 April 1997); Bild am Sonntag and the Reader’s Digest: Hamšahrī, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 
(10 September 1997); the Times: Ḫorāsān, 7 Āḏar 1378 (28 November 1999); Radio Köln: Ǧomhūrī-ye 
Eslāmī, 4 Dey 1376 (25 December 1997); die Zeit: Hamšahrī, 24 & 25 Šahrīvar 1376 (14 & 15 September 
1997); New York Times: Aḫbār-e Eqteṣādī, 31 Šahrīvar 1378 (22 September 1999); the Christian Science 
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instance Fīrūz Ǧalīlī-Ḫiyābānī, an Iranian-born addiction psychiatrist of the UNIVERSITY OF 
MICHIGAN;1366 the CANCER RESEARCH CENTRE in Oxford UK;1367 and many other research 
studies and statistics.1368 
 
The domestic drug discourse 
The history of drugs in Iran 
The history of drugs in Iran is a regular feature in the Iranian press discourse on drugs. 
This is particularly true for the first year of the sample period. The newspapers base their 
information on a small treatise – most probably the Political History of Opium in Iran (tārīḫ-e 
siyāsī-ye mavādd-e moḫadder dar īrān) 1369  – provided by the DCHQ, as Eṭṭelā‘āt 
discloses.1370 The history usually starts with the earliest appearance of drugs among the 
Sumerians, Egyptians and the Greek. During Islamic times, particularly the great medical 
scholars of Persian descent, Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī, are mentioned, who prescribed opium as a 
medicine. Typically, the newspaper set the beginning of veritable opium curse in Iran to the 
Qāǧār times, by particularly blaming the British “old fox” (rūbāh-e pīr) for having actively 
encouraged opium consumption in Iran. They often also talk about „colonialists“ (este‘mār-
garān) in general. The British opium policy in Iran is also regularly compared to the indeed 
infamous British opium policy in China.1371  
 
In the 20th century, the newspapers put the blame for the ongoing addiction problem in 
Iran particularly on the Pahlavī shahs, who are portrayed as stooges of the colonialist powers. 
Eṭṭelā‘āt further mentions that even the family of Moḥammad-Reżā Šāh was actively 
involved in the drug business.1372 More commonly, however, and already for the times of the 
shah, the newspapers blame the international mafia gangs for the domestic addiction problem. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Monitor: Gozāreš-e Rūz, 24 Āḏar 1378 (15 December 1999); Newsweek: Bayān, 27 & 28 Āḏar 1378 (18 
& 19 December 1999); Abrār, 8 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999); Fatḥ, 18 Esfand 1378 (8 March 2000): 
New York Times: Aḫbār-e Eqteṣādī XXX, 31 Šahrīvar 1378 (22 September 1999); le Monde 
Diplomatique: Salām, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997). 
1366  Hamšahrī, 2 Mehr 1376 (24 September 1997). 
1367  Kaihān, 8 Ḫordād 1376 (29 May 1997). 
1368  A report and statistics on drug addiction in Germany: Resālat, 21 Farvardīn 1376 (10 April 1997); research 
on marihuana in the USA: Aḫbār, 8 Tīr 1376 (29 June 1997); research on the efficiency of drug prevention 
by media in Europe: research on causes and effects of drug addiction: Hamšahrī, 3 Tīr 1376 (24 June 
1997); Hamšahrī, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 September 1997); research of the Brazilian police on money 
laundering by drug trafficking cartels: Qods, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997); research on the role of the 
family in preventing drug addiction, or in rehabilitating drug addicted family members: Āzād, 23 Ābān 
1378 (14 November 1999); European research in increasing drug consumption in Afghanistan: Abrār, 8 
Dey 1378 (29 December 1999). 
1369  DCHQ (N.A.) 
1370  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995). 
1371  E.g. in: Hamšahrī, 6 Ordībehešt 1374 (26 April 1995); Salām, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995). 
1372  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995). 
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Additionally, they often portray them of being backed by the West, now clearly pointing to 
the USA: the CIA is even directly accused of being involved in drug trafficking.1373  
 
In contrast to the pre-revolutionary times, the press initially paints a rosy picture of the 
situation of drugs in the Islamic Republic, by presenting the drug supply efforts of the Islamic 
Republic as the first serious and successful drug combat in the Iranian history.1374 This is at 
true for the first two years of the sample period. Āfarīneš provides the most comprehensive 
overview on Iran’s drug policy of these early years.1375 
 
Drug trafficking 
 The Iranian press almost unanimously shares the view of the Iranian government that 
Iran is a victim of the international drug business. The domestic addiction problem is, thus, 
primarily blamed on the availability of drugs originating from the producer countries 
Afghanistan and Pakistan in the Golden Crescent (helāl-e ṭalāʼī).1376 Based on statistics of the 
DCHQ, and on interviews with state officials, the press reports in detail about Iran’s costly 
combat against drug traffickers, both in terms of financial costs and the cost of the lives of 
thousands of killed security officers, who are typically called martyrs (sg. šahīd).1377 The press 
initially also assumes the official line of arguing, that even though Iran is conducting its 
combat against drug trafficking mainly for the sake of Europe, it does not obtain financial 
support by the international community.1378 Particularly in 1378 (1999-2000), however, 
officials of the DCHQ are increasingly cited with specific examples of financial and logistic 
support provided to Iran by European countries like Great Britain and France, as shown 
above.1379 The same officials also start to admit that the traffickers are not only foreign 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1373  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 27 Šahrīvar 1376 (18 September 1997). 
1374  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999). 
1375  Āfarīneš I, 16 Āḏar 1376 (7 December 1997). 
1376  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 12 Tīr 1374 (3 July 1995); Abrār, 14 Ābān 1374 (5 November 1995); Kaihān, 15 Ābān 1374 (6 
November 1995); Īrān, 28 Dey 1374 (19 January 1996); Hamšahrī, 17 Šahrīvar (7 September 1997); 
Qods, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 19 Bahman 1376 (8 February 1998); 
Kaihān, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999). 
1377  E.g. in: Resālat, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 12 Tīr 1374 (3 July 1995); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 19 
Bahman 1376 (8 February 1997); Qods, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999); Enteḫāb, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 
& 15 & 17 July 1999); Payām-e Āzādī, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999); Ḫordād, 1 & 2 Āḏar 1378 
(22 & 23 November 1999); Ḫorāsān, 7 Āḏar 1378 (28 November 1999); Ḫorāsān, 23 Āḏar 1378 (14 
December 1999); Kaihān, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999). 
1378  E.g. in: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 & 11 & 12 & 13 & 14 Tīr 1374 (1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 July 1995); Qods, 10 Dey 1376 
(31 December 1997); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 19 Bahman 1376 (8 February 1998). 
1379  Enteḫāb, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 13 & 14 & 15 & 16 & 17 & 19 
Mehr 1376 (5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 11 October 1997); Ḫorāsān, 6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 1999); 
Ḫorāsān, 7 Āḏar 1378 (28 November 1999); Kayhān, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999). 
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nationals but also Iranians.1380 The Iranian press never questions the official drug policy to 
execute drug traffickers; but in 1376 (1998/99), it cites officials from the DCHQ and the 
STATE PRISONS ORGANIZATION (SPO), that this, too, puts a high financial burden upon the 
country’s courts and prisons.1381  
 
Addiction – crime or illness? 
 From the beginning of the sample period, the press is almost unanimous in describing 
drug addiction as an illness in need of rehabilitation and therapy. The rhetorical question “the 
drug addict - an ill or a sick person” (mo‘tād – bīmār yā moǧrem) is arguably the most 
crucial message of the entire press discourse on drugs (chapter V. 3). Particularly when 
discussing the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of 1997 in 1376 (1997-98), the newspapers 
echo the officially stated opinion, that from now on, addiction treatment will be legally 
available to all drug addicts willing to undergo treatment.1382 The newspaper Hamšahrī 
concomitantly alludes to the high costs caused by the prevalent practice of incarcerating drug 
addicts and petty dealers,1383 an argument that is later repeated by Resālat and Ǧomhūrī-ye 
Eslāmī.1384 But in 1378 (1999-2000), even DCHQ officials openly admit that drug addicts are 
still being sentenced to “flogging” (żarbeh-ye šallāq), “financial fines” (ǧazā-ye naqdī) and 
even “imprisonment” (zendān).1385 
 
Drug addiction 
 Concerning the domestic situation of drug addiction, the Iranian press usually refers to 
official estimations provided by the DCHQ and further governmental agencies. As will be 
shown below, however, already the government did not agree on the exact number of addicts 
in Iran. Nevertheless, initially the press unanimously reproduces the official estimation of 
500,000 drug addicts, while concomitantly referring to an increasing addiction rate, 
particularly among the youth.1386 From 1376 (1995-96) the newspapers start to cite new 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1380  E.g. in: Qods, 7 & 8 & 9 & 10 Dey 1376 (28 & 29 & 30 & 31 December 1997); Enteḫāb, 23 & 24 & 26 
Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999). 
1381  Qods, 9 Dey 1376 (30 December 1997); Enteḫāb, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999). 
1382  Hamšahrī, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 September 1997); Hamšahrī, 17 Šahrīvar (7 September 1997); Qods, 7 
Dey 1376 (28 December 1997); Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997); Qods, 9 Dey 1376 (30 December 
1997); Qods, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997); more implicitly: Resālat, 6 Ābān 1376 (28 October 1997). 
1383  Hamšahrī, 27 Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995); repeated in: Īrān, 8. Ḫordād 1374 (29 May 1995); while 
Kaihān in contrast points to the high costs of therapy for the families of drug addicts: Kaihān, 4 Ābān 1374 
(26 October 1995). 
1384  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 23 Dey 1376 (13 January 1998). 
1385  Salām, 13 Ḫordād 1378 (3 June 1999); Enteḫāb, 18 Tīr 1378 (9 July 1999). 
1386  E.g. in: Hamšahrī, 19 Ordībehešt 1374 (9 May 1995); Hamšahrī, 27 Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995); 
Īrān, 8. Ḫordād 1374 (29 May 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 27 & 28 Ḫordād 1374 (17 & 18 June 1995); Resālat, 5 Tīr 
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statistics provided by the DCHQ and the police, such as for instance on seized drugs or cured 
addicts.1387 Concomitantly, however, they continue to highlight the need for more exact 
statistics.1388 In 1378 (1999-2000), the press quotes many more official statistics. Interestingly, 
only the newspaper Abrār-e Eqteṣādī and Kār va Kārgar explicitly refer to the recently 
published Rapid Situation Assessment (RSA) of the SWO, and thus mentions the new official 
estimation of two million drug users in Iran – 1.2 million drug addicts and another 800,000 
recreational drug users.1389 Other newspapers, in contrast, still repeat the previous estimation 
of 500,000 addicts.1390 In the same year, Kār va Kārgar based on research oft he DCHQ also 
mentions opium, heroin and cannabis as the drugs of choice in Iran;1391 and Enteḫāb quotes 
the director of the DCHQ that there are certainly not 200,000 drug-addicted students in 
Iran.1392 Finally, Qods mentions research carried out by the DCHQ, according to which sixty-
five per cent of all HIV/AIDS cases in Iran are due to needle sharing among intravenous drug 
users.1393 
 
Addiction causes 
 A particular field of addiction phenomenology consists of addiction causes. The 
Iranian press often writes about such causes, not limited to medical causes. It often mentions 
poverty, unemployment and family problems, especially other drug-addicted family members, 
thus arguably reflecting the official drug discourse in Iran. As this topic is often discussed by 
psychologists and in relation to drug prevention, it will be discussed in further detail below, 
together with either drug prevention or the academic and medical discourse. 
 
Addiction therapy 
With a few notable exceptions, the press unanimously endorses the new official drug 
demand reduction measures of the Iranian government. An often-cited reason for this support 
is the official viewpoint that drug demand reduction is in effect cheaper and more effective 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1374 (26 June 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 13 & 14 & 15 & 16 & 17 & 19 Mehr 1376 (5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 11 
October 1997); Hamšahrī, 27 & 28 Mehr 1376 (19 & 20 October 1997); Āfarīneš, 24 Mehr 1378 (16 
October 1999). 
1387  E.g. in: Resālat, 26 Ḫordād 1376 (16 June 1997); Kār va Kārgar, 21 & 22 & 24 Farvardīn (10 & 11 & 13 
April 1999); Enteḫāb, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999); Abrār, 9 Ordībehešt 1378 (29 April 1999); or: 
Salām, 1 Ḫordād 1378 (22 May 1999); and later in the year: Qods, 25 Ābān 1378 (16 November 1999); 
Ḫordād, 1 & 2 Āḏar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999); or: ‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān, 17 Āḏar 1378 (8 December 
1999). 
1388  Hamšahrī, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995). 
1389  Abrār-e Eqteṣādī, 23 Ordībehešt 1378 (13 May 1999); Kār va Kārgar, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999). 
1390  E.g.: Āfarīneš, 24 Mehr 1378 (16 October 1999). 
1391  Kār va Kārgar, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999). 
1392  Enteḫāb, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999). 
1393  Qods, 25 Ābān 1378 (16 November 1999). 
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than drug supply reduction.1394 In practice, of course, the official drug policy in Iran consists 
of a combination of both, which the DCHQ calls Iran’s “third thinking” (andīšeh-ye sevvom), 
thus rather strangely highlighting this as a unique Iranian feature.1395  
 
Frequently, the introduction of governmental addiction therapy centers and the 
coverage of governmental-organized workshops and conferences serve the newspapers as an 
incentive to explain various addiction therapy measures. The earliest such example during the 
sample period is the organization of a workshop on drug prevention and addiction treatment, 
organized by the SWO. On this occasion, the government presented a draft of its “national 
program of addiction prevention and therapy” (barnāmeh-ye mellī-ye pīš-gīrī va bāz-parvarī-
ye e‘tiyād) to the present medical researchers and the press. Apparently on the same occasion, 
the SWO also presented the rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn. This center was 
apparently one of the earliest governmental centers of the new medical type, even though the 
description often still rather resembles the traditional rehabilitation camps of the Islamic 
Republic.1396 In this context, also the private NARCOTICS ANONYMOUS (mo‘tādān-e gom-nām) 
are mentioned for the first time as an organization that closely cooperates with the 
rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn.1397 Apparently as part of the national plan, the 
government further announced the creation of the NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST DRUG 
ABUSE (komīteh-ye kešvarī-e sūʼ-maṣraf-e mavādd-e moḫadder) as part of the HEALTH 
MINISTRY.1398  
 
Further events and conferences, like the exhibition “war without borders” (ǧang 
bedūn-e marz) in Tehrān, or the conference on “addiction and some other crimes” (e‘tiyād va 
ba‘żī ǧarāyem-e dīgar) in Qom, were organized by the DCHQ shortly after Ḫātamī’s 
inauguration.1399 Also frequently quoted are new research findings by the DCHQ and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1394  E.g.: Īrān, 8. Ḫordād 1374 (29 May 1995); Ḫordād, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999). 
1395  On the conference in Qom: Hamšahrī, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 September 1997); on the exhibition: Abrār, 12 
Šahrīvar 1376 (3 September 1997); Resālat, 14 Ābān 1376 (5 November 1997). 
1396  Hamšahrī, 27. Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995); Kaihān, 25 Ḫordād 1374 (15 June 1995) Kaihān, 27 
Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 28 Ḫordād 1374 (18 June 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 29 Ḫordād 1374 (19 
June 1995); or: Fatḥ, 25 & 26 Esfand 1378 (16 & 17 March 2000). 
1397  Īrān, 18 Āḏar 1374 (9 December 1995). 
1398  Hamšahrī, 27. Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995); in Kaihān as NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST ADDICTION 
(kōmiteh-ye kešvarī-ye mobārezeh bā e‘tiyād): Kaihān, 25 & 27 Ḫordād 1374 (15 & 17 June 1995); Īrān, 
8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995). 
1399  Abrār, 12 Šahrīvar 1376 (3 September 1997). 
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SWO; as are DCHQ officials like the director-general Moḥammad Fallāḥ and the director 
general for research Ġolām-Reżā Ṣarāmī; or SWO officials like ‘Alī Anṣārī.1400 
 
Drug prevention 
 Drug prevention is the perhaps weakest aspect in the official Iranian drug policy. 
Exactly due to this reason, the newspapers repeat the official mantra that “prevention is the 
best therapy” (behtar-īn darmān pīš-gīrī ast). 1401  During the first sample year, the 
government organized as mentioned a workshop on drug prevention and addiction treatment 
in Gačsar near Šīrāz, which brought together different health specialists. On this occasion, 
Hamšahrī interestingly issues an warning claiming that the provision of information on drugs 
would only further incite people to take drugs – a claim repeated in later articles.1402 The 
NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST DRUG ABUSE, which apparently was assigned a central role 
in the development of specific prevention programs, subsequently highlighted the crucial role 
the schools and mass media play herein.1403  
 
Yet, Kaihān later cites a DCHQ official, who admits that even half a year after the 
announcement of the “national program of addiction prevention and therapy” not much has 
happened in this regard.1404 In 1997, there was still no such prevention plan according to 
Eṭṭelā‘āt;1405 and even in 1999, the deputy of the DCHQ continued to deplore the lack of 
governmental prevention programs. 1406  He specifically criticized the inactivity of the 
MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE and the IRIB in this regard.1407 Against this 
background, the newspapers throughout the years repeat the question: “what has to be done” 
(čeh bāyad kard?).1408 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1400  Resālat II, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995); with Moḥammad Fallāḥ, secretary general of the DCHQ: Ǧomhūrī-
ye Eslāmī, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999); with Fallāḥ and ‘Alī Anṣārī, head of the SWO: Enteḫāb, 5 Tīr 1378 
(26 June 1999); with Āfarīn Raḥīmī-Movaqqar, a senior expert of the SWO: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 6 & 7& 8 & 9 & 13 
Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999); Enteḫāb, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999); Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 6 
Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999). 
1401  E.g. in: Āfarīneš, 24 Ābān 1376 (15 November 1997); Hamšahrī, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 September 1997); 
Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḫordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999). 
1402  Hamšahrī, 27. Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995); Resālat, 21 Ordībehešt 1378 (11 May 1999). 
1403  Īrān, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995). 
1404  Kaihān, 15 Ābān 1374 (6 November 1995). 
1405  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 28 Tīr 1376 (19 July 1997). 
1406  Ḫordād, 13 Ordībehešt 1376 (3 May 1999); Enteḫāb, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999). 
1407  Such as for instance the IRIB or the Ministry of Islamic Culture and Guidance: Enteḫāb, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 
1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999). 
1408  Hamšahrī, 27. Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995): Eṭṭelā‘āt, 6 & 7& 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 
30 June & 4 July 1999); Enteḫāb, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999); Āfarīneš, 20 Ābān 
1376 (11 November 1997); Āzād, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999). 
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In the same year, however, the government apparently organized a congress on the 
“immunization of children and adolescents against the appearance of harms” (maṣūn-sāzī-ye 
koudak-ān va nou-ǧavān-ān dar barābar-e āsīb-zāyī).1409 This took probably place under the 
supervision of the EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR THE PREVENTION OF DRUG Abuse (daftar-e eǧrāyī-
ye pīš-gīrī az sūʼ-maṣrafe-e mavādd-e moḫadder), the relevant department within the 
EDUCATION MINISTRY. Resālāt accuses this department of only planning to develop 
corresponding prevention programs for students. In 2000, finally, Mošārekat reports about a 
“second conference on addiction prevention among high school students”.1410 
 
The religious drug discourse 
 To a large degree absent from the Iranian press discourse on drugs is the religious 
discourse level. Given the permeating role of religion in the official politics in Iran, this is 
indeed an astonishing finding. Since the passing of the ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of 1988, drug 
traffickers and drug addicts were not any more judged by individual clerical judges, as was 
the case during the first years after the revolution. The competent courts were now the 
revolutionary courts, which, however, admittedly continued to judge traffickers on the basis 
of the religious accusations “combatant against God” (moḥāreb bā ḫodā) or “corrupt on earth” 
(mofsed fe ‘l-arż) (cf. chapter II). 
 
 Since the legal basis for the conviction of drug traffickers and drug addicts, thus was 
clarified, the press generally does not delve on this topic. Individual newspapers do, however, 
still report on earlier fatāvā of different ayatollahs against drug consumption.1411 But since the 
religious ban on drug consumption has become unanimous, the clerics apparently did not 
issue further such edicts, as the newspaper Ḫorāsān insinuates.1412 However, as Eṭṭelā‘āt and 
Kaihān both mention, some of the country’s most outstanding clerics, among them the 
āyatollāhs Gīlānī and Moqtadāʼī, gave their consent to the re-orientation of the official drug 
policy towards addiction therapy.1413 And the clerics in Qom apparently were consulted during 
the draft oft he AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of 1997.1414 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1409  Īrān, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999). 
1410  Mošārekat, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000): 
1411  Kaihān, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995). 
1412  Ḫorāsān, 6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 1999). 
1413  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995); Kaihān, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995). 
1414  Hamšahrī, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 September 1997); Hamšahrī, 17 Šahrīvar (7 September 1997). 
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 Otherwise, the religious seminaries in Qom – as well as the religion in general – were 
rather assigned a role in drug prevention. In January 1998, the DCHQ convened a conference 
on “addiction and some other crimes” (e‘tiyād ba‘żī ǧarāyem-e dīgar) in Qom, in order to 
discuss matters of drug prevention with the “missionaries” (moballeġīn), “preachers” 
(ḫotabāʼ) and “clerics” (rūḥāniyūn) of the religious seminaries.1415 And particularly the 
conservative newspapers ascribe religion a preventive role against drug addiction;1416 while 
only Aḥmad Moḥīṭ from the WHO has denied the place of religion as playing a useful role in 
drug prevention assuming that  drug addicts would not receptive to such instructions.1417 
 
The medical drug discourse 
 In Iran too, academic research on addiction is especially done in the fields of medicine 
and psychology. The relevant institutions such as the medical universities, which are under 
the supervision of the HEALTH MINISTRY, but also apparently the DCHQ and the SWO are 
naturally governmental institutions. The researchers the newspapers quote, nevertheless, often 
voice opinions that are more critical than the official drug policy positions. 
 
 During the first year of the sample period, most information on scientific addiction 
therapy is still provided by international institutions. This is exemplarily shown by the fact 
that one of the earliest article during the sample period is authored by Moḥīṭ from the WHO, 
who informs about various aspects of drug addiction, addiction therapy and drug 
prevention.1418 The WHO is arguably also responsible for sensitizing the press to problematic 
language concerning drug addiction; and in proposing more neutral, scientific expressions. 
Explicitly mentioned as being proposed by the WHO is the term “medical dependence” 
(vābastegī-ye dārūʼī) instead of “addiction” (e‘tiyād).1419 The same might, however, also 
apply to further terms, to which the press refers throughout the sample period, such as in 
particular the basic concepts of “drug demand reduction” (kāheš-e taqāżā-ye mavādd-e 
moḫadder), “rehabilitation” (bāz-parvarī), “therapy” (darmān), “prevention” (pīš-gīrī), and 
“harm reduction” (kāheš-e āsīb-hā). The terms “assistance-seeking” (madad-ǧū-yān) instead 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1415  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 23 Dey 1376 (13 January 1997). 
1416  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 28 Tīr 1376 (19 July 1997); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 13 & 14 
& 15 & 16 & 17 & 19 Mehr 1376 (5 & 6 & 7 & 8 & 9 & 11 October 1997); Resālat, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 
October 1997). 
1417  Hamšahrī, 6 Ordībehešt 1374 (26 April 1995); Hamšahrī, 14 Ordībehešt 1374 (4 May 1995): Hamšahrī, 
19 Ordībehešt 1374 (9 May 1995). 
1418  Hamšahrī, 19 Ordībehešt 1374 (9 May 1995); also based on WHO information are relevant information 
provided by: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995). 
1419  Resālat, 5 Ābān 1376 (27 October 1997). 
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of “drug addict” (mo‘tād-e mavādd-e moḫadder), 1420  and “therapy centers” (marākez-e 
darmānī) instead of “rehabilitation centers” (marākez-e bāz-parvarī), are, in contrast, 
suggested by Iranian researchers.1421 
 
Already under Rafsanǧānī, the Iranian government has actively encouraged the 
consideration of new scientific and medical addiction therapy measures. Given the scantiness 
of addiction research in Iran during the first two years of the sample period, the press initially 
often refers to international medical experts, some of them like Moḥīṭ born in Iran. Further 
examples are the professor for addiction psychology, Ǧalīlī-Ḫiyābānī, from the UNIVERSITY 
OF MICHIGAN,1422 or Robert Martin, a sociologist from the USA.1423 
 
A gradual change is reflected in articles from 1376 (1997-98), when addiction 
withdrawal by means of medication started to be introduced to Iran. As a logical consequence, 
more domestic medical professionals and psychologists started to specialize on addiction 
therapy and drug prevention, while often having done parts of their studies abroad and 
remaining in close contact with the international research community. They consequently 
started to conduct their own research, both within academic and official institutions such as 
the DCHQ and the SWO, as a result of which the press starts to refer much more frequently to 
local expert sources. Their recommendations for the development of more adequate addiction 
therapy and drug prevention measures generally follow the line of the official drug policy, 
since they were often advising the government in this regard in the first place. Specific 
examples of domestic addiction research include the LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCES (NAJA),1424 
the DCHQ,1425 the SWO,1426 the EDUCATION MINISTRY,1427 and various universities.1428 While 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1420  The term madad-ǧū-yān is for the first time mentioned on the occasion of the SWO workshop on drug 
prevention and addiction treatment in Gačsar: Kaihān, 25 Ḫordād 1374 (15 June 1995); for further 
instances: Hamšahrī, 27. Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 28 Ḫordād 1374 (18 June 1995); 
Īrān, 18 Āḏar 1374 (9 December 1995); Hamšahrī, 25 Šahrīvar 1376 (15 September 1997); Ǧomhūrī-ye 
Eslāmī, 24 & 25 Šahrīvar 1378 (15 & 16 September 1999). 
1421  According to sociology professor Manṣūr Voṯūqī: Īrān, 29 Tīr 1374 (20 July 1995). 
1422  Hamšahrī, 2 Mehr 1376 (24 September 1997). 
1423 Abrār, 9 Ordībehešt 1378 (29 April 1999). 
1424  Kaihān, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995). 
1425  E.g in: Qods, 25 Ābān 1378 (16 November 1999); Āftāb-e Emrūz, 26 Ābān 1378 (17 November 1999); 
Ḫordād also mentions that in 1376 (1997-98) the DCHQ has created a SUPREME COUNCIL OF RESEARCH 
AND PLANNING (šūrā-ye ‘ālī-ye taḥqīqāt va barnāmeh-rīzī): Ḫordād, 13 Ordībehešt 1376 (3 May 1999). 
1426  Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḫordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999). 
1427  Īrān, 8 Tīr 1378 (29 June 1999). 
1428  Sociology professors Ṣādeq Farbod and Manṣūr Voṯūqī: Īrān, 29 Tīr 1374 (20 July 1995); Kār va Kārgar, 
28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999); the clinical psychologist Mehdī Esmā‘īl of the Azād University in Fasā: 
Resālat, 5 Ābān 1376 (27 October 1997); the SWO University: Ḫorāsān, 5 Tīr 1376 (26 June 1999); the 
Medical University of Šīrāz: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997); Hedāyat Saḥrāyī from the 
Medical University Baqiyyat-Āllāh in Tehran: Kaihān, 8 Āḏar 1378 (29 November 1999). 
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at the beginning of the sample period, the press rather generally points to the importance of 
addiction research; they later report in detail about specific addiction therapy measures,1429 
addiction causes, 1430  drug prevention 1431  and harm reduction measures. 1432  Concerning 
addiction therapy, the press usually describes methods combining different physical, 
psychological and occupational therapies as being most successful. In the prescription of drug 
prevention, the press follows the WHO-inspired national model consisting of three levels: 
primary prevention concentrating on awareness-raising among the general population; and 
secondary and tertiary prevention targeting drug consumers and addicts in order to prevent 
harmful consumption and lifestyle patterns. Concomitantly, however, they continue to 
emphasize that still more research is needed. But the press not only quotes theoretical 
addiction research. It also conducts interviews with practitioners, such as physicians (sg. 
pezešk), psychologists (sg. ravān-šenās), psychiatrists (sg. ravān-pezešk), and sociologists (sg. 
ǧāme‘eh-šenās), who all accentuate the importance of a health-based approach to drug 
demand reduction.1433 
 
These same experts, at times, also criticize the existing governmental addiction 
therapy and – mostly lacking – drug prevention programs. Instead, they propose occasionally 
astonishingly progressive new treatment methods, and particularly harm reduction programs. 
Since during the sample period, such harm reduction measures were not yet officially 
introduced to Iran, they will be addressed below. The government, nevertheless, already 
seems to have started to implement first harm reduction measures in different pilot programs. 
The reason for this was particularly the realization of a spread of HIV/AIDS among drug 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1429  Ḫorāsān, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July  1999); Kaihān, 8 Āḏar 1378 (29 November 1999). 
1430  Īrān, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995); deceiving advertisements for private addiction therapy: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 13 Tīr 
1374 (4 July 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 14 Tīr 1374 (5 July 1995); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997); 
Hamšahrī, 27 Tīr 1378 (18 July 1999); Kaihān, 18 Šahrīvar 1376 (8 September 1997); too much leisure 
time: Hamšahrī, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 September 1997); Hamšahrī, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 
1997); social causes for addiction and relapse: Āfarīneš I, 16 Āḏar 1376 (7 December 1997); Qods, 7 Dey 
1376 (28 December 1997); Kār va Kārgar, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999). 
1431  ‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān, 17 Āḏar 1378 (8 December 1999). 
1432  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997); Ḫorāsān, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July  1999); Vohūman, 7 
Šahrīvar 1378 (29 August 1999); Ḫordād, 1 & 2 Āḏar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999); Āftāb-e Emrūz, 
27 Bahman 1378 (16 February 2000); Ḫordād, 1 & 2 Āḏar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999) 
1433  The psychiatrist Faraḥ-Saif Behzād: Īrān, 8. Ḫordād 1374 (29 May 1995); the two brothers and clinical 
psychologists Nāṣer and Manṣūr Eskandarī: Kaihān, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995); Dr. Ṣāleḥ Šīvā, an 
US-trained acupuncture specialists: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 13 Tīr 1374 (4 July 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 14 Tīr 1374 (5 July 
1995); sociology professors Ṣādeq Farbod and Manṣūr Voṯūqī: Īrān, 29 Tīr 1374 (20 July 1995); Hūtan 
Gol-Sorḫī, a biologist and drug specialist living in Canada, and the author of the article in: Hamšahrī, 24 
Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997); addiction specialists and psychiatrist Āḏaraḫš Mokrī and others: Āftāb-e 
Emrūz, 2 Šahrīvar 1378 (24 August 1999); specialist for neuropathy Mīnū Moḥarrez: Ḫordād, 1 & 2 Āḏar 
1378 (22 & 23 November 1999); psychiatrist Šahāb Ṣāleḥpūr of the INDEPENDENT REHABILITATION 
CENTRE of Mašhad: Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997); Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997); 
Ḫorāsān, 5 Tīr 1376 (26 June 1999); Ḫorāsān, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July  1999). 
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injecting users. While in the Islamic Republic, AIDS originally was rather portrayed as being 
the result of a sexually permissive lifestyle; the topic appears for the first time in the press 
discourse on drugs on the occasion of the congress on “addiction and some other crimes” in 
Qom, where officials of the DCQH apparently already discussed it with the clerics.1434 Later it 
is mentioned as a problem in Iran’s border provinces, without a clear reference to drug use, 
and thus is rather portrayed as a foreign phenomenon.1435 Even though the interviewed 
officials, initially, rather try to avoid the topic,1436 the press repeatedly mentions HIV and 
AIDS among injecting heroin users in 1378 (1999-2000), as will be shown below. 
 
VI. 1. b. The homogenizing power of the official Iranian press policy 
 The power exerted by the official Iranian press policy has been defined above as a 
non-drug-related extrinsic force. This chapter will address homogenizing influences of Iran’s 
media policy on the Iranian press, as exemplified in the press discourse on drugs. It is, 
admittedly, not always possible to differentiate between homogenizing effects produced by 
the official press policy, and homogenizing effects produced by a more automatic, intrinsic 
dynamic of the press. 
 
 Iranian press policy nevertheless clearly has an effect on the Iranian press and, thus, 
arguably also on the press discourse on drugs. This is due to the following aspects: by virtue 
of the existing strict press laws, which provide the press with a general legal framework; by 
the respective policies of the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE, which is tasked 
with putting these laws into practice, and which for instance organized seminaries on media 
topics during the sample period; by the PRESS SUPERVISORY BOARD, which is responsible for 
issuing media licenses and for providing further specific regulations; and last but not least by 
the judiciary, which is tasked with taking legal proceedings against violations of the press law. 
This constellation, however, already contains in itself a major conflict of interests, due to 
different ideological affiliation of the specific institutions. This naturally has an overall 
heterogenizing effect on the press and in extension on the press discourse on drugs, which 
will be addressed further below. Yet, individual policies of the separate institutions arguably 
still exercise a certain homogenizing effect. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1434  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 23 Dey 1376 (13 January 1997). 
1435  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 23 Dey 1376 (13 January 1997). 
1436  Such as particularly Ḥešmatī, the deputy of the DCHQ: Enteḫāb, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 
July 1999). 
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 First, as has been shown, article 2 of the restrictive press law of 1986, contains a 
provision that generally puts the Iranian press at the service of the Islamic Republic, by 
requesting that the media “fight against the manifestations of the colonialist culture [] and the 
promotion and propagation of the noble Islamic culture” (chapter III). This vaguely worded 
stipulation certainly remains open to various interpretative differences, and in reality more 
often than not has served the conservatively controlled courts to shut down reformist 
newspapers. But the Iranian press nevertheless accomplishes a primary role of serving the 
Iranian nation, or more precisely society. It fulfills this role primarily by its duty to inform the 
public, without foregoing their right to criticism.  
 
 Arguably a less homogenizing effect on the Iranian press and the press discourse on 
drugs has the judiciary – at least during the sample period. By gradually banning critical 
reformist newspapers, it certainly aspired to a homogenized media landscape. But the 
phenomenon of the so-called “serial newspapers”, where publishers of banned newspapers 
simply launched new ones, already shows that it failed. Professedly, the judiciary eventually 
succeeded in shutting down most reformist newspapers between May and August 2000. 
However, some reformist newspapers survived and the press continued to be a forum for the 
expression of critical voices, albeit admittedly to a lesser degree. Yet, this development took 
place after the sample period of the current analysis, and is, thus, of secondary importance to 
the present context. 
 
 Both the press law and the judiciary, however have a further homogenizing effect, 
which might be more indirect at times. By sanctioning libel and defamation of vaguely 
defined concepts like Islam or the revolution, the judiciary of course has the legal means to 
prosecute and thus censor disliked newspapers. Such ambiguous provisions, however, also 
encourage self-censorship, a topic that the reformist administration explicitly addressed in the 
first press seminary (chapter III). In the press discourse on drugs, this self-censorship might 
primarily become visible in topics that are not being addressed by the newspapers and thus, 
apparently, are taboo subjects. It is, however, not always possible to trace back the origin of 
these taboos; they might just as well date back further and thus be social taboos. Still, some 
taboos are clearly characteristic for the Islamic Republic and often based on respective laws. 
A natural taboo is the overt criticism of the Supreme Leader, an anathema in Iran, which is 
only rarely violated. Further taboo subjects are for instance corruption among officials; 
(ethnic) minority policies of the state; or prostitution among drug-addicted women. Within the 
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Iranian press discourse on drugs, these taboos are largely respected; yet some newspapers 
nevertheless dared to break them, as will be shown below. 
 
The MINISTRY FOR ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE, arguably, had a bigger 
homogenizing influence.  From the beginning of the sample period, this ministry was led by 
liberal-minded and reformist individuals: first during the administration of the modern right 
Rafsanǧānī by Moḥammad Ḫātamī, a representative of the former Islamic left; and eventually 
under the reformist administration of Ḫātamī by ‘Aṭāʼollāh Mohāǧerānī, an outspoken 
representative of the former Islamic left. Both have been responsible for the emergence of a 
reinvigorated press, especially but not exclusively of reformist newspapers (chapter III). 
This might arguably rather have had a heterogenizing effect on the press. But both of them 
also strived at introducing a more accountable and professional journalism to Iran. This is for 
instance demonstrated by the organization of the first press seminary in 1991, still under the 
auspices of then culture minister Ḫātamī, where topics like state censorship, self-censorship or 
the lack of professional staff was discussed. When he assumed the function of culture minister 
in 1997, Mohāǧerānī declared: ”I disagree with almost all of the present practices in the 
culture ministry”,1437 and consequently encouraged the press to adopt more critical reporting. 
This is again shown by the organization of the “second seminary for the discussion of the 
problems of the press” in summer 1998. Such progressive media policies not only led to more 
press freedom, from which all newspapers would profit; but arguably also to a more critical 
understanding of journalism and a more factual reporting in general.  
 
The new cultural freedoms conceded by the government also signaled that both the 
Rafsanǧānī and Ḫātamī administrations were more open towards criticism and accountability. 
This reflects a new reformist understanding of politics, where the governing elite – at least in 
the executive – sees its duty rather in serving the public than ruling over it. Concerning 
Iranian press discourse on drugs, this can, arguably be observed by the fact that the various 
governmental institutions active in the field of drug policy, such as in particular the DCHQ 
and the SWO, increasingly provided the press with drug-related information. 
 
It is argued here, that the analysis of the Iranian press discourse on drugs indeed shows 
this trend towards an increasingly factual, well-investigated, balanced and critical coverage of 
the drug problem in Iran. This even includes the most radical conservative newspapers, such 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1437  Samii (2001), 2. 
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as Kaihān, Resālat or Ǧavān, even though certain exceptions exist. In the first year of the 
sample period, in 1374 (19965/96), the press still maintains a rather didactic and moralizing 
style when reporting on drug-related topics, although it already reports predominantly in a 
factual and accurate style. In 1376 (1997-98), and parallel to the political development, the 
press becomes more critical in its reporting and cites a broader and more varied range of 
sources. In 1378 (1999-2000), finally, the press becomes increasingly independent from the 
political parameters, by referring to more non-governmental sources, and by increasing its 
criticism of the official drug policy. 
 
This assessment is primarily based on an analysis of the sources and interviews that 
are cited by the newspapers; as well as on an analysis of further details such as the disclosure 
of authorship. In 1374 (1995-96), for instance, only 21% of the articles reveal the name of the 
author or explicitly mention the sources; this percentage increases to 43% in 1376 (1997-98) 
and 46% (1999-2000) respectively. Male journalists wrote most of the articles that disclose 
the authorship, but women also become increasingly active, including in conservative 
newspapers like Kaihān or Āfarīneš.1438  
 
Regarding sources, these are disclosed from the beginning of the sample period, 
especially the foreign sources: the BBC, Bild am Sonntag, Le Monde Diplomatique, Radio 
Köln, the Times, Newsweek, the New York Times, the Reader’s Digest and the Christian 
Science Monitor. 1439 But only from 1376 (1997-98) do the newspapers usually also indicate 
the name of the translator of such articles; while Resālat for instance explicitly mentions that 
the public relation office of the DCHQ often provides the press with these articles.1440 
International sources like the UNDCP or the INCB are quoted throughout the sample 
period; 1441  but the press increasingly cites other foreign specialists. 1442  And while the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1438  A female journalist regularly contributing to Kaihān is e.g. Mīnū Badī‘ī: Kaihān, 25 Ḫordād 1374 (15 June 
1995); Kaihān, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995); Kaihān, 7 Ḫordād 1376 (28 May 1997); contributing to 
Āfarīneš is Fāṭemeh Sādāt-Ma‘ṣūmī: Āfarīneš II, 16 Āḏar 1376 (7 December 1997). 
1439  The BBC: Hamšahrī, 27 Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995); Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Resālat, 21 
Farvardīn 1376 (10 April 1997); Bild am Sonntag and the Reader’s Digest: Hamšahrī, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 
(10 September 1997); the Times: Ḫorāsān, 7 Āḏar 1378 (28 November 1999); Radio Köln: Ǧomhūrī-ye 
Eslāmī, 4 Dey 1376 (25 December 1997); die Zeit: Hamšahrī, 24 & 25 Šahrīvar 1376 (14 & 15 September 
1997); New York Times: Aḫbār-e Eqteṣādī, 31 Šahrīvar 1378 (22 September 1999); the Christian Science 
Monitor: Gozāreš-e Rūz, 24 Āḏar 1378 (15 December 1999); Newsweek: Bayān, 27 & 28 Āḏar 1378 (18 
& 19 December 1999); Abrār, 8 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999); Fatḥ, 18 Esfand 1378 (8 March 2000): 
New York Times: Aḫbār-e Eqteṣādī XXX, 31 Šahrīvar 1378 (22 September 1999); le Monde 
Diplomatique: Salām, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997). 
1440  Explicitly mentioned by: Resālat, 21 Farvardīn 1376 (10 April 1997). 
1441  UNDCP and INCB in general: Hamšahrī, 31 Ḫordād 1374 (21 June 1995); Pino Arlacchi: Qods, 7 Tīr 
1378 (28 June 1999); Kār-o-Kārgar, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999); Abrār, 14 Tīr 1378 (5 July 1999) 
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newspapers initially most often refer to state institutions like the DCHQ, the SWO, the police 
and the judiciary, or the HEALTH MINISTRY; the National AIDS Committee and the Education 
Ministry; 1443  they increasingly diversify their domestic sources from 1376 (1997-98), 
including Iranian universities; academic addiction researchers and practical addiction 
specialists, such as particularly from private addiction organizations like the ĀFTĀB SOCIETY 
or the CONGRESS 60; and members of parliament.1444 
 
VI. 1. c. The homogenizing power of the Iranian press discourse on drugs 
 The intrinsic homogenizing power within the Iranian press discourse on drugs is 
naturally less easily demonstrable. This intrinsic power often overlaps with the extrinsic 
powers exerted both by the official drug policy and the press policy. It is nevertheless argued 
here, that such an intrinsic power exists, corresponding to the postulations of discourse 
analysis. This is particularly visible in the large absence of factional disputes in the Iranian 
press discourse on drugs; but also in orders of discourse that are different from the official 
discourses.  
This already becomes visible in the discourse events, which provide the discourse with 
a basic structure, as shown by the quantitative distribution of newspaper articles over the 
course of the sample period. As has been shown, these articles often appear in clusters around 
important events. While most discourse events, admittedly, are induced by international or 
domestic events such as the International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking or 
the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of 1997, this is not the case for others. Particularly in the 
1378 (1999-2000), the newspapers published a series of drug-related newspaper articles in the 
months of September, October, and March. While no specific external event can be identified 
for this phenomenon, this could be explained by an inherent mutual influence of the press.  
 
  Such mutual influences are, however, especially observable when newspapers 
introduce new topics and arguments. As this commonly first happens by individual 
newspapers, these dynamics only become effective later. In the case of the Iranian press 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1442  For instance the psychiatrist Fīrūz Ǧalīlī-Ḫiyābānī from the university of Michigan: Hamšahrī, 2 Mehr 
1376 (24 September 1997); Robert Martin, a sociologist from the USA: Abrār, 9 Ordībehešt 1378 (29 
April 1999); or the French dog instructor: Īrān, 11 Āḏar 1378 (12 December 1999). 
1443  Abrār, 14 Tīr 1378 (5 July 1999). 
1444  In particular MP Sohailā Ǧeloudārzādeh, director of the SOCIETY AGAINST ADDICTION: Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 25 
& 26 & 27 Ḫordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999); Payām-e Āzādī, 2 Āḏar 1378 (23 November 1999); or 
MP Marżiyyeh Ṣadīqī: Ḫorāsān, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July  1999); Ḫorāsān, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 
September 1999); or a member of parliament from Zāhedān: Ḫorāsān, 23 Āḏar 1378 (14 December 1999). 
 272 
discourse on drugs, such new arguments and topics often express a dissenting opinion before 
the become commonplace arguments; therefore, they will be discussed below.  
 
 Such mutual influences, however, also become visible in two specific formal features 
of the Iranian press discourse on drugs: the publication of a series of consecutive articles over 
the course of several days; and personal stories of individual drug addicts. In 1374 (1995-96), 
only the newspaper Kaihān and Eṭṭelā‘āt use the format of article series, specifically on the 
occasion of the presentation of the rehabilitation center Qarčak Varāmīn and on the 
International Day Against Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking.1445 In 1376 (1997-98), Eṭṭelā‘āt 
again publishes most of these serial articles;1446 but so do now the newspapers Hamšahrī, 
Āfarīneš, and Qods.1447 In 1378, finally, this feature has definitively become an established 
feature of the press, including again in Eṭṭelā‘āt but also in many reformist newspapers.1448 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1445  Consisting of two articles: Kaihān, 25 Ḫordād 1374 (15 June 1995) and Kaihān, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 
1995); consisting of three articles: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995), Eṭṭelā‘āt, 28 Ḫordād 1374 
(18 June 1995) and Eṭṭelā‘āt, 29 Ḫordād 1374 (19 June 1995); consisting of five articles: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 Tīr 
1374 (1 July 1995), Eṭṭelā‘āt, 11 Tīr 1374 (2 July 1995), Eṭṭelā‘āt, 12 Tīr 1374 (3 July 1995), Eṭṭelā‘āt, 
13 Tīr 1374 (4 July 1995), and Eṭṭelā‘āt, 14 Tīr 1374 (5 July 1995). 
1446  On the occasion of the No Tobacco Week, a series consisting of two articles: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 18 Ḫordād 1376 (8 
June 1997); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 19 Ḫordād 1376 (9 June 1997); and another series consisting of two articles: 
Eṭṭelā’āt, 1 Tīr 1376 (22 June 1997); Eṭṭelā’āt, 2 Tīr 1376 (23 June 1376); and on occasion of the 
AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW a series again consisting of six articles: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 13 Mehr 1376 (5 
October 1997), Eṭṭelā‘āt, 14 Mehr 1376 (6 October 1997), Eṭṭelā‘āt, 15 Mehr 1376 (7 October 1997), 
Eṭṭelā‘āt, 16 Mehr 1376), Eṭṭelā‘āt, 17 Mehr 1376 (9 October 1997), and Eṭṭelā‘āt, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 
October 1997). 
1447  Also on the occasion of the No Tobacco Week are for instance the series consisting of two articles in: 
Kaihān, 7 Ḫordād 1376 (28 May 1997) and Kaihān, 8 Ḫordād 1376 (29 May 1997); on the occasion of the 
AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW a series consisting of two articles in: Hamšahrī, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 
September 1997) and Hamšahrī, 17 Šahrīvar (7 September 1997); a series consisting of two articles: 
Hamšahrī, 24 Šahrīvar 1376 (14 September 1997) and Hamšahrī, 25 Šahrīvar 1376 (15 September 1997); 
and yet another series consisting of two articles: Hamšahrī, 27 Mehr 1376 (19 October 1997) and 
Hamšahrī, 28 Mehr 1376 (20 October 1997); a series consisting of four articles: Āfarīneš, 20 Ābān 1376 
(11 November 1997), Āfarīneš, Ābān 1376 (12 November 1997), Āfarīneš, 22 Ābān 1376 (13 November 
1997), and Āfarīneš, 24 Ābān 1376 (15 November 1997); a series consisting of two articles on the history 
of drugs: Abrār, 10 Āḏar 1376 (1 December 1997) and Abrār, 11 Āḏar 1376 (2 December 1997); and 
finally again on the occasion of the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW a series consisting of four articles: 
62) Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997), Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997, Qods, 9 Dey 1376 (30 
December 1997), Qods, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997). 
1448  Not all instances for the publication of such series are evident; on the occasion of an interview a series 
consisting of three articles: Kār va Kārgar, 21 & 22 & 24 Farvardīn (10 & 11 & 13 April 1999); on the 
occasion of the international drugs day a series consisting of three articles: Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 25 & 26 & 27 
Ḫordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999); on the same occasion a series consisting of two articles: Ḫorāsān, 
6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 1999); on the occasion of an interview a series consisting of three articles: 
Enteḫāb, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999); on the occasion of a research study a series 
consisting of two articles: Ḫorāsān, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July  1999); without evident occasion a series 
consisting of two articles: Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 24 & 25 Šahrīvar 1378 (15 & 16 September 1999); without 
evident occasion a series consisting of two articles: Ḫordād, 1 & 2 Āḏar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999); 
a series consisting of two articles: Fatḥ, 19 & 20 Bahman (8 & 9 February 2000); on the occasion of a new 
research study a series consisting of three articles: Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 30 Bahman & 1 & 2 & 19 Esfand 
(19 & 20 & 21 February & 9 March 2000); on the same occasion a series consisting of two (or more?) 
articles: Gozāreš-e Rūz, 1 & 11 & ?? Esfand (20 February & 1 & ?? March 2000); and finally again 
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Again in 1374 (1995-96), especially the moderate newspapers produce personal life stories of 
predominantly young drug addicts interviewed in the rehabilitation center of Qarčak Varāmīn. 
They use these stories to explain the dangers of drug addiction, but also to display a certain 
understanding for the problems of the addicts and their difficulties in quitting drug 
addiction.1449 In 1376 (1997-98), only the conservative newspapers Āfarīneš and Qods report 
such personal stories; now, however, in an almost caricature-like style, depicting an overtly 
gloomy and negative image of drug addicts, arguably primarily to serve as a deterrent.1450 In 
1378 (1999-2000), such stories only appear again towards the end of the year, now in the 
reformist press and again depicting a more realistic and sympathetic image of the drug 
addicts.1451  
 
Other similarities in the Iranian press discourse might date back further, and thus 
rather reflect collective symbols of the Iranian society, as the critical discourse analysis calls 
them. Such similarities are particularly present in the language (chapter V. 3). The language 
can thus be seen as another homogenizing factor, even though language rather serves as a 
carrier of discourses. Yet, congruent with the postulations of the discourse analysis, 
homogeneous orders of discourse only develop over time and thus usually have their origin in 
the historical past of a society. This is not only observable on the level of language but also on 
the level of the historical drugs discourse in Iran. Many arguments put forward in the history 
of drugs in Iran, are not specific to the drugs discourse of the Islamic Republic, but actually 
date further back. This is particularly true for the anti-imperialist view, which blames the 
introduction, or at least the further spread of opium consumption on the “colonialist” British 
Empire (chapter II). The same might of course be true for the specific language of the 
Iranian press discourse on drugs.  
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
without evident occasion a series consisting of two articles: Fatḥ, 25 & 26 Esfand 1378 (16 & 17 March 
2000). 
1449  Īrān, 8. Ḫordād 1374 (29 May 1995); other stories are desribed by: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 28 Ḫordād 1374 (18 June 
1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 13 Tīr 1374 (4 July 1995); Īrān, 18 Āḏar 1374 (9 December 1995); Īrān also interviews 
young drug addicts living in the streets of Tehras: Īrān, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995); even in the prison 
Qezel Ḥeṣār: Īrān, 29 Tīr 1374 (20 July 1995). 
1450  Āfarīneš, 20 Ābān 1376 (11 November 1997); Āfarīneš, Ābān 1376 (12 November 1997); Āfarīneš, 22 
Ābān 1376 (13 November 1997); Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997); Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (29 
December 1997); Qods, 9 Dey 1376 (30 December 1997). 
1451  Gozāreš-e Rūz, 24 Āḏar 1378 (15 December 1999); Bayān, 27 Āḏar 1378 (18 December 1999); Payām-e 
Āzādī, 7 Bahman 1378 (27 January 2000); Fatḥ, 19 & 20 Bahman (8 & 9 February 2000); Īrān, 2 Esfand 
1378 (21 February 2000). 
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VI. 2. Heterogenizing powers  
 Just like various homogenizing factors influence the Iranian press discourse on drugs, 
so do various heterogenizing factors. These heterogeneities appear in the form of 
inconsistencies, contradictions and disagreements concerning the topics and arguments, the 
used styles and quoted sources in the discourse. They can equally be further divided into 
drug-related and non-drug related extrinsic factors, as exemplified by the discourse levels of 
the official drug policy and the official press policy; as well as intrinsic factors that are 
present within the press discourse on drugs.  
 
A prime example for heterogenizing forces from the field of drug policy are 
competing interests between different authorities involved in drug policies, particularly 
between those responsible for drug supply reduction and those responsible for drug demand 
reduction policies. This relates to the security- and legal-based approach of the security forces 
and the courts and the health-based approach of institutions active in the fields of addiction 
treatment and drug prevention.  
 
In the field of the press policies, too, such heterogenizing forces originate in diverging 
interests of different institutions, whose ideological affiliation is of more importance in this 
regard. Such a factional division line particularly divides the conservatively controlled 
judiciary and the reformist MINISTRY FOR ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE. 
 
Finally, intrinsic heterogenizing forces are also present within the press. This is not 
astonishing, since the press was the arguably most crucial site for the airing of factional 
disputes between the conservatives and reformists. More surprising is the fact, that such 
factional disputes are not more pronounced in the press discourse on drugs.  
 
VI. 2. a. The heterogenizing power of the official Iranian drug policy 
 The heterogenizing forces of Iran’s official drug policy have, arguably, less an 
influence on the press discourse on drugs than its homogenizing forces. Inconsistencies and 
contradictions in the official drug policy nevertheless are felt as well in the press discourse. 
This is not primarily due to inter-factional disputes between the conservatives and the 
reformists, even though this also plays a certain role. Such contradictions are rather the result 
of the competing interests and approaches of the various institutions active in the drug policy 
field. Such inconsistencies are particularly felt between the security-based approach of the 
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security forces and the courts, which are directly controlled by the Supreme Leader and his 
conservative allies; and the health-based approach of the institutions active in the fields of 
addiction treatment and drug prevention, which are predominantly subordinate to the 
reformist administration during the sample period. 
 
 Such contradictions are characteristic for the drug policies of practically all countries 
around the world. They originate in a fundamental contradiction of the law: on the one hand, 
drug consumption is prohibited by law; and on the other, drug addicts are usually allowed to 
undergo medical treatment instead of being sent into prison. In Iran, this dilemma is 
exemplified in the most crucial question of the press discourse on drugs, namely whether the 
“addict is an ill or a criminal person” (mo‘tād – bīmār yā moǧrem). In reality, the problem is, 
admittedly, more complex, since acquisitive crimes often accompany drug addiction. Drug 
addicts are thus often sentenced to prison not because of their addiction but because of the 
concomitant crimes they commit.  Particularly in Western countries, the judicial system has 
developed a specific penal framework for such cases, as exemplified in the drug courts. 
Instead of being imprisoned, drug addicts are often sentenced to community service, 
electronically monitored, and regularly have to report to medical centers and to the police or 
the drug courts. The declared goal of this pragmatic approach is a successful rehabilitation 
and subsequent reintegration of drug addicts into society, by not removing them from the 
society in the first place. Similar solutions have been discussed in Iran, but have not been 
implemented yet. 
 
 As a result of this ongoing prohibition and criminalization of drug consumption, the 
problem of drug addiction is not only treated as a health issue, but also as a criminal matter. In 
most countries, therefore, a whole range of institutions are involved in drug policy, 
particularly the law enforcement and judicial system on the one side; and the sectors of health 
care, social work and drug prevention on the other. In these countries, including Iran, these 
bodies cooperate and complement each other; but certain conflicts of interest may remain. 
Often, their institutional approach in dealing with people differs. Security agencies and courts 
tend to have a more paternalistic, controlling approach, while the health and social institutions 
rather approach people as service and assistance providers. In the absence of pragmatic 
solutions like drug courts, such inconsistencies will arguably persist. 
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This difference in mentalities and approaches certainly applies to the relevant Iranian 
bodies involved in drug policy. Responsible for outlining and coordinating the overall 
national drug policy is the DCHQ. Since the successive secretary-generals of the DCHQ 
always come from Iran’s security forces, a certain tendency towards a more repressive drug 
policy might be innate to the DCHQ. This is all the more true, since the general outlines of all 
security-related policies in Iran, including the drug policy, are defined by the SUPREME 
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL. The DCHQ is, however, formally only a cooperative body 
comprising all institutions active in the field of drug policy (chapter II).  
 
These institutions include on the security-related side: the MINISTRY OF INTERIOR and 
the LAW ENFORCEMENT FORCE or simply police; the MINISTRY OF INTELLIGENCE AND 
NATIONAL SECURITY; the BASĪǦ; the OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR GENERAL; and the 
REVOLUTIONARY COURT OF TEHRĀN.1452 Additionally, the EXPEDIENCY COUNCIL and the 
JUDICIARY also have an influence on the national drug policy. The EXPEDIENCY COUNCIL 
functions as a legislative body that passed the existing drug laws and the JUDICIARY, 
particularly the competent revolutionary courts, as the prosecution authority, and as 
supervisor of the SPO, which administers the thousands of imprisoned drug traffickers and 
drug addicts. All these institutions are aligned with the conservatives and form part and parcel 
of the repressive apparatus of the Islamic Republic, which was particularly used against the 
reformists during the sample period. 
 
On the health- and prevention-related side, the institutions include: the MINISTRY OF 
HEALTH, which at the time also supervised the SWO; the MINISTRY OF EDUCATION; the 
MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE, but also the IRIB. Since these institutions are 
controlled by the administration, they were aligned with the reformists during the sample 
period. The only exception is IRIB, whose director is directly appointed by the Supreme 
Leader. Thus, an ideological line of division additionally runs through the institutions 
responsible for developing adequate drug prevention programs, all the more since the 
religious seminaries in Qom apparently were also involved, as the newspapers disclose. 
 
Apart from traditional institutional differences, and concurrently with their ideological 
alignment, these two groups of institution further differ in respect to their governance 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1452  On the member institutions of the DCHQ before and after the amendment to the Anti Narcotics Law: 
DCHQ (1997), 16f.; also on the initially eight institutions being represented in the DCHQ: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 12 Tīr 
1374 (3 July 1995); Kaihān, 15 Ābān 1374 (6 November 1995). 
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approach during the sample period. The conservatively controlled institutions continued the 
traditional top-down principle of governance of the Islamic Republic; while the institutions of 
the reformist administration, in line with Ḫātamī’s slogan of (democratic) participation, 
followed, or at least propagated, a participatory bottom-up principle. Thus, during the sample 
period, various overlapping fracture lines characterized the national drug policy. But the 
probably biggest problem was arguably not even their ideological and procedural differences; 
but as some newspapers emphasize, simply a lack of cooperation, for which Enteḫāb also 
explicitly blames the DCHQ.1453 Against this background, it is rather astonishing, that the 
Iranian state nonetheless succeeded in reforming the overall drug policy nonetheless. This 
certainly was mainly due to the sheer extent of drug addiction in the country, which required 
cooperation and swift action. 
 
VI. 2. b. The heterogenizing power of the official Iranian press policy 
While the heterogenizing effect of the Iranian drug policy on the press discourse on 
drugs is rather due to institutional differences, the heterogenizing effect of Iran’s press policy 
is foremost a result of factional disputes, which, at the same time, however, also overlap with 
different institutions. As mentioned, the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE can 
be ascribed with a certain homogenizing effect on the press, namely by promoting 
professional and accountable journalism. Concomitantly, however, the ministry also had a 
heterogenizing effect, insofar as it played a crucial role in the factional dispute between the 
conservatives and reformists, which primarily took place in the field of media. Although the 
ministry was not responsible for licensing newspapers, it was still encouraging the emergence 
of a liberal, reformist-oriented press – with the culture minister Mohāǧerānī even publishing 
his own newspapers. The body responsible for issuing new media licenses is rather the PRESS 
SUPERVISORY BOARD, whose board members include a judge appointed by the head of the 
judiciary; a member of parliament; the culture minister or a representative appointed by him; 
a university professor appointed by the MINISTRY OF EDUCATION; and a representative chosen 
by press editors. The PRESS SUPERVISORY BOARD, thus, also exhibits a factional divide, even 
if during the sample period it was rather controlled by the government.1454 It assumed 
responsibility for issuing dozens of licenses for the reformist newspapers, even though some 
new conservative or radical newspapers appeared as well; and as a result might be seen as 
having contributed to the polarization of the press. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1453  Enteḫāb, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999). 
1454  Shahidi (2007), 69. 
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The courts, which the conservatives used to gradually ban practically all outspoken 
reformist and critical newspapers, had a stronger heterogenizing power effect on the press. 
Involved in this process were many further conservatively controlled entities, which usually 
served as plaintiffs against specific reformist newspapers (chapter III). It could be argued 
that this was a certain corrective to the imbalance in the press landscape that was dominated – 
at least numerically – by the reformist press. But the conservatives were in control of all 
television and radio stations and of practically all other relevant political bodies, and thus 
eventually had the upper hand in the press policy. The passing of the new press law of 1999, 
which only came into effect on 14th April 2000, shortly after the end of the sample period, 
eventually formed the basis for the closure of the reformist press in 2000 and 2001. It could 
be argued that this closure of practically all reformist newspapers eventually had a certain 
homogenizing factor, by basically only leaving moderate and conservative newspapers over. 
Since this only happened after the sample period, this action was at most felt afterwards. 
 
The aggressive procedure of the courts against the reformist newspapers, nevertheless, 
had a certain disruptive effect on the press. This heterogenizing effect on the drugs discourse 
is, admittedly, less felt on a content-related level and at least only marginally on the more 
existential level, since the publishers of the banned newspapers simply published new ones 
during the sample period. The reformist newspapers were, nevertheless naturally impeded in 
their reporting, since time gaps between successive publications as well as personal and 
organizational disruptions still had an inhibiting effect. While the popular reformist 
newspapers Ǧāme‘eh and its successor Ṭūs already were shut down in 1998 (chapter III); the 
SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS banned the equally important reformist papers Salām and Našāṭ 
in August and September 1999.1455 It might be a mere coincidence, but it is nevertheless 
noticeable that almost none of the new reformist newspapers publishes any drug-related 
articles between August and October, although other newspapers close to the reformist 
administration such as the Hamšahrī, Īrān, Ḫorāsān, or Payām-e Āzādī and Āzād still did.1456 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1455  The SPECIAL COURT FOR CLERICS actually already had ruled to ban the publication of Salām on 8th June 
1999, yet the definitive closure only occurred on 5th August: Karimian & Bahrampour (1999), 39; Samii 
(1999), 2; Buchta (2000), 191; Tarrock (2001), 590f.; Samii (2001), 3; after the court order in June, 
Salām indeed published another two drug-related articles: Salām, 20 Ḫordād 1378 (10 June 1999); Salām, 
2 Tīr 1378 (23 June 1999); concerning Našāṭ: Samii (1999), 3f.; Buchta (2000), 193f. 
1456  The only exceptions are: Āftāb-e Emrūz, 2 Šahrīvar 1378 (24 August 1999); and: Aḫbār-e Eqteṣādī, 31 
Šahrīvar 1378 (22 September 1999); Aḫbār-e Eqteṣādī, 11 Mehr 1378 (3 October 1999); on the 
appearance of drug related articles in the other, often more moderate reformist newspapers: Vohūman, 7 
Šahrīvar 1378 (29 August 1999); Īrān, 9 Šahrīvar 1378 (31 August 1999); Ḫorāsān, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 
September 1999); Payām-e Āzādī, 3 Mehr 1378 (25 September 1999); Hamšahrī, 5 Mehr 1378 (27 
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Only from November onwards, did the most famous reformist newspapers write again about 
drug-related issues, 1457  with Ḫordād managing to publish two articles before its final 
closure1458 
 
VI. 2. c. The heterogenizing power of the Iranian press discourse on drugs: power struggles 
within 
 Even though the Iranian press discourse on drugs displays a large overall homogeneity, 
it still contains heterogeneities that cannot be explained by heterogeneities within the official 
drug or press policies alone. The strongest heterogenizing influence on the Iranian press 
discourse on drugs is, arguably, exerted intrinsically within the press. Such heterogeneities 
appear as contradictions, inconsistencies, and disagreements in the discourse, concerning 
specific contents, but also in more formal aspects such as specifically the use of language and 
the quotation of sources. They are observable between individual newspapers, and thus might 
indeed stem from ideological differences between newspapers. Given the general function of 
newspapers as organs for political factions in Iran, such different opinions are not surprising. 
On the contrary, more astonishing is the fact that such differences are not more pronounced in 
the Iranian press discourse on drugs. Other heterogeneities are observable between the press 
in general and the official drug policy, without always consciously contradicting the latter. 
Individual newspapers nevertheless introduce new opinions and ideas, often by non-
governmental sources. In doing so, they might, admittedly still voice disagreement with 
existing drug policy patterns and advance their own ideas of adequate drug policy measures. 
More crucially, however, by expressing such diverging opinions, the newspapers also 
influence each other. In this manner, they collectively contribute to a constant renegotiation of 
the Iranian press discourse on drugs, and probably the official drug policy. As a result, 
heterogeneous discourse positions can establish new discourse orders, which in turn have a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
September 1999); Āzād, 6 Mehr 1378 (28 September 1999); Ḫorāsān, 8 Mehr 1378 (30 September 1999); 
Īrān, 19 Mehr 1378 (11 October 1999); Kār va Kārgar, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999); Kār va 
Kārgar, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999). 
1457  Ḫordād still published drug-related articles shortly before its closure: Ḫordād, 1 & 2 Āḏar 1378 (22 & 23 
November 1999); Ḫordād, 4 Āḏar 1378 (25 November 1999); further drug-related articles were published 
by the reformist newspapers: Āftāb-e Emrūz, 26 Ābān 1378 (17 November 1999); Āftāb-e Emrūz, 27 
Bahman 1378 (16 February 2000); Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 5 Esfand 1378 (25 February 2000); ‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān, 
17 Āḏar 1378 (8 December 1999); Bayān, 27 Āḏar 1378 (18 December 1999); Bayān, 28 Āḏar 1378 (19 
December 1999); Fatḥ, 19 & 20 Bahman (8 & 9 February 2000); Fatḥ, 12 Esfand 1378 (2 March 2000); 
Fatḥ, 18 Esfand 1378 (8 March 2000); Fatḥ, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000); Fatḥ, 25 & 26 Esfand 
1378 (16 & 17 March 2000); two further articles appeared in the reformist newspapers: Ham-Mīhan, 19 
& ?? Esfand (9 & ?? March 2000); Mošārekat, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000). 
1458  Ḫordād, 1 & 2 Āḏar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999); Ḫordād, 4 Āḏar 1378 (25 November 1999). 
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homogenizing effect. Such renegotiations, however, it must be noted, takes place in the 
discussion of other political and social topics.  
 
The international drug policy 
 As has been the case for the homogenizing influence, international drug policy 
discourses also have certain heterogenizing impact on the Iranian press discourse on drugs. 
This becomes for instance visible in the reporting on the liberal drug policy of foreign 
countries. While many newspapers, at least initially, refute the application of similar policies 
in Iran; Hamšahrī in 1376 (1997-98) nevertheless explicitly estimates harm reduction 
measures as those applied in Switzerland to be effective in reducing drug-related crimes, thus 
at least implicating a potential practicability in Iran.1459 Certainly the most critical comparison, 
however, comes from the reformist newspaper Fatḥ. By comparing the drug policies of 
Turkey and Iran, it not only explicitly criticizes insufficient prevention measures in Iran, but 
at least implicitly, also critically questions the existing laws banning alcohol in Iran, since the 
legality of alcohol is mentioned as a reason for the lower addiction rate in Turkey.1460 
 Some other dissenting, critical or new positions that are also influenced by 
international drug discourses, originate rather from the medical discourse level, and thus are 
discussed below. 
 
The domestic drugs discourse 
The history of drugs in Iran 
 While generally following the officially approved history of drugs in Iran as provided 
by the DCHQ treatise, some newspapers start to provide additional information. These are not 
always forcibly opposing the official narrative, but nevertheless provide a more nuanced 
understanding. Interestingly, the moderately conservative newspapers provide such additional 
information. Eṭṭelā‘āt for instance points to the fact that drugs have existed since earliest time 
in Iran, since they are already mentioned in the Avesta;1461 and later mentions the widespread 
opium consumption during Ṣafavīd times.1462 Drugs are, thus, at least implicitly presented as a 
traditional and integral part of the Iranian society, and not as the result of a “colonialist” 
conspiracy against Iran. Abrār for its part insists that opium “has no Iranian roots”,1463 but that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1459  Hamšahrī, 24 Šahrīvar 1376 (14 September 1997). 
1460  Fatḥ, 12 Esfand 1378 (2 March 2000). 
1461  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995). 
1462  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 6 & 7& 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999). 
1463  Abrār, 10 & 11 Āḏar 1376 (1 & 2 December 1997). 
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it was introduced to Iran during the Arab conquests.1464 This argument is later repeated by 
Hamšahrī and Āfarīneš, which explicitly refer to Āḏaraḫš’s history of drugs in Iran.1465 This, 
however, too rather deviates from the official narrative in Iran, as exemplified by the treatise 
on the history of drugs of Malek-Moḥammadī (chapter II). Abrār additionally even questions 
the Islamic Republic’s alleged initial success in combating drug trafficking by pointing to the 
general inexperience of the new authorities in this regard.1466 This opinion is later repeated by 
Ḫorāsān.1467  
 
Drug trafficking 
 Another dissenting voice is clearly directed at the government. The radical Kaihān 
explicitly opposes the judiciary’s apparent leniency towards local drug traffickers in the 
province of Sīstān va Balūčestān, as an article reveals, in which the DCHQ defends this 
practice.1468 Two years later, Resālat also requests an intensification of the security efforts 
against drug traffickers at the Eastern border, by specifically demanding to include the BASĪǦ. 
It even accuses the police of putting released drug dealers on the statistics of cured addicts 
without paying attention as to whether they continue to deal with drugs.1469 And again two 
years later, Kaihān accuses the DCHQ of spending money on the acquisition of “buildings for 
the dialogue of civilizations” (sāḫtemān-e goft-o-gū-ye tamaddon-hā) instead of leading a 
serious combat against drug trafficking, in a clear attack against the Ḫātamī administration.1470  
The governmental newspaper Īrān, in turn, identifies the economic underdevelopment in this 
province for the involvement of the local inhabitants in drug trafficking, thus at least 
implicitly also blaming the Iranian government.1471 Enteḫāb, in contrast, rather criticizes the 
DCHQ of not publishing statistics on executed drug traffickers;1472 while Āftāb-e Emrūz 
maintains that the official statistics of intercepted drugs merely proves that a much more 
extended drug trafficking is taking place.1473  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1464  Abrār, 10 Āḏar 1376 (1 December 1997); Abrār, 11 Āḏar 1376 (2 December 1997). 
1465  Also mentioning this detail are: Hamšahrī, 11 Āḏar 1376 (2 December 1997); and: Āfarīneš I, 16 Āḏar 
1376 (7 December 1997). 
1466  Abrār, 10 & 11 Āḏar 1376 (1 & 2 December 1997). 
1467  Āfarīneš I, 16 Āḏar 1376 (7 December 1997); Ḫorāsān, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July  1999); Ǧomhūrī-ye 
Eslāmī, in contrast, still defends the official version of a decrease in the addiction rate, in the first years 
after 1979: Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999). 
1468  Kaihān, 15 Ābān 1374 (6 November 1995). 
1469  Resālat, 26 Ābān 1376 (17 November 1997). 
1470  Kaihān, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999). 
1471  Īrān, 28 Dey 1374 (19 January 1996). 
1472  Enteḫāb, 18 Tīr 1378 (9 July 1999). 
1473  Āftāb-e Emrūz, 26 Ābān 1378 (17 November 1999). 
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Addiction – crime or illness? 
Arguably the most scathing attack on the official drug policy comes from the 
newspapers Resālat and Kaihān, before the passing of the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW in 
November 1997. Citing various fatāvā of famous clerics, Kaihān emphasizes that drug 
consumption is still religiously forbidden and that “as a consequence, the sentencing of […] a 
drug misuser and the admonishing of a criminal is necessary like in case of all other crimes 
for the protection and preservation of the community and for the prevention of evils” (laḏā 
moǧāzāt kardan-e […] sūʼ-maṣraf-konandeh beh ḫāṭer-e ḥefẓ va ṣiyānat-e eǧtemā‘ va ǧelou-
gīrī az mafāsedī […] va tanabboh-e moǧrem mānand-e har ǧorm-e dīgarī lāzem bāšad).1474 
Resālat also defends the previous repressive drug policy, which in practice has been re-
orientated towards a more health-based approach even before this law. It explicitly supports a 
continuing criminalization of drug addiction by calling the existing law of 1988 as “very good” 
(besyār ḫūb) and advocating a determined application of “the death penalty, of long prison 
sentences, and of the expulsion of addicts to labor islands” (moǧāzāt-hā-ye e’dām va zandān-
hā-ye ṭavīl-ol-moddat beh hamrāh-e e’zām-e mo’tādān beh ǧazāyer-e maḫṣūṣ-e kār).1475 Such 
radical positions are admittedly exceptional, even for these two newspapers. 
 
After the passing of the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW, the governmental 
newspaper Īrān is the first to point out that drug addicts are still being imprisoned, even if 
they are willing to undergo treatment,1476 a criticism that is repeated by other newspapers.1477 
Later, even Ḥešmatī, the deputy of the DCQH, admits in an interview with Enteḫāb: “we do 
not want to arrest thousands of people per day” (nemīḫvāhīm maṯalan rūzī hezār nafar dast-
gīr konīm).1478 Enteḫāb also points to a worse consequence of the widespread incarcerations, 
namely the spread of AIDS by way of needle sharing.1479 Īrān, in contrast, sees the basic 
problem not only in the law, but essentially also in inconsistent approaches of the different 
institutions involved in the official drug policy.1480 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1474  Kaihān, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995). 
1475  Resālat, 6 Ābān 1376 (28 October 1997); Resālat, 14 Ābān 1376 (5 November 1997). 
1476  Īrān, 8. Ḫordād 1374 (29 May 1995); Īrān, 29 Tīr 1374 (20 July 1995). 
1477  Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999); Ḫordād, 1 & 2 Āḏar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999). 
1478  Enteḫāb, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999). 
1479  Enteḫāb, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999). 
1480  Īrān, 19 Mehr 1378 (11 October 1999). 
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Drug addiction 
In the last year, the newspapers start to report about new drugs in Iran. Ḫordād for 
instance mentions crack (krāk), which it correctly describes as variety of heroin (in Iran);1481 
while Ḫorāsān, provides new details about student parties in Kermān, where girls smoke 
hashish (ḥašīš) and drink alcohol (alkol), thus being one of the few articles that explicitly talk 
about the consumption of these two certainly widespread drugs in Iran.1482 More importantly, 
the newspapers start to increasingly question the official addiction statistics. Initially, 
Hamšahrī complains about the lack of exact statistics on drug addiction in Iran,1483 while the 
official estimation of 500,000 drug addicts is repeated throughout the years (cf. above). In 
1378 (1999-2000), some newspapers start to refer to the new official estimation of two 
million drug users – 1.2 million addicts and another 800,000 recreational drug users – of the 
RSA study, which is only once explicitly mentioned by name in the newspaper Kār va 
Kārgar.1484 Yet, Abrār and Īrān reveal that the NATIONAL AIDS COMMITTEE actually assumes 
a number of three million drug addicts.1485 In reporting about the “second conference on 
addiction prevention among high school students” (dovvomīn hemāyeš-e pīš-gīrī az e‘tiyād-e 
dāneš-āmūzān), Mošārekat even mentions seven million drug addicts in the country, of which 
approximately half would be under the age of eighteen;1486 while Resālat rather alarmingly 
warns of twenty million drug users until the year 2014.1487 
 
From 1376 (1997-98), the newspapers also increasingly start to write about drug 
addiction among women. In the beginning, women are rather portrayed as victims of drug-
addicted husbands.1488 The first articles on drug addiction among Iranian women only appear 
in 1378 (1999-2000). Āftāb-e Emrūz’s dedicates an entire article to this topic, and reproduces 
the official estimation that ten percent of the country’s drug addicts are female.1489 Enteḫāb 
later publishes a report about drug addicted women prison,1490 which is followed by an article 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1481  Ḫordād, 13 Ordībehešt 1376 (3 May 1999). 
1482  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999); Ḫorāsān, 5 Tīr 1376 (26 June 1999). 
1483  Hamšahrī, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995). 
1484  The study is explicitly mentioned by Kār va Kārgar: Kār va Kārgar, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999); 
Mošārekat, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000). 
1485  Abrār, 14 Tīr 1378 (5 July 1999); Īran, 29 Ābān 1378 (20 November 1999). 
1486  Mošārekat, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000); Hamšahrī, 27 Mehr 1376 (19 October 1997). 
1487  Resālat, 18 Šahrīvar 1378 (9 September 1999). 
1488  Hamšahrī, 24 Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997); Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997); Qods, 7 Dey 1376 
(29 December 1997). 
1489  Āftāb-e Emrūz, 2 Šahrīvar 1378 (24 August 1999). 
1490  Also, 95% of all prison sentences for women are drug-related, while the same is only the case for 75% of 
men: Enteḫāb, 25 Mehr 1378 (17 October 1999). 
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of Fatḥ, which mentions a female addiction rate of five per cent of all drug addicts;1491 and of 
Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, the latter of which introduces women as drug traffickers.1492 The most 
critical statement, however, is found in Ḫorāsān, where Marżiyyeh Ṣadīqī, the director of the 
ĀFTĀB SOCIETY and a member of parliament, maintains that the lack of addiction therapy 
centers is particularly felt by the women.1493  
 
Salām has, admittedly, already earlier mentioned prostitution, but as a drug-related 
phenomenon in the international context. 1494  Hamšahrī also rather generally names 
prostitution as a “social crime” usually related to drug addiction, but in an article that is 
otherwise covering the situation of drug addiction in Iran.1495 In a later article of Qods, 
however, an interviewed women tells her personal experience with addiction, stating: “you 
give your body for every work” (va tan beh har kārī bedehī), thus clearly alluding to 
prostitution in Iran.1496 And in the same year, Eṭṭelā‘āt also talks about prostitution in relation 
to drug addiction.1497 
 
Addiction causes 
 Next to poverty and unemployment, which all newspapers cite as important addiction 
causes, individual newspapers also mention further probable addiction causes. Particularly the 
conservative newspapers – yet, including Hamšahrī – also mention the lack of religiosity as a 
cause for drug addiction.1498 The reformist and governmental newspapers, in contrast, rather 
identify factors such as lacking recreational facilities for the youth,1499 or in general lacking 
individual rights1500 as important addiction causes. Concerning women, most newspapers 
mention addicted family members – especially the husband – as an important addiction cause. 
Eṭṭelā‘āt even advocates an easing of divorce rules for women married to a drug-addicted 
husband.1501 Payām-e Āzādī further quotes Member of Parliament Sohailā Ǧeloudārzādeh 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1491  Fatḥ, 19 & 20 Bahman (8 & 9 February 2000). 
1492  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 30 Bahman & 1 & 2 & 19 Esfand (19 & 20 & 21 February & 9 March 2000). 
1493  Ḫorāsān, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999). 
1494  Salām II, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995). 
1495  Hamšahrī, 17 Šahrīvar (7 September 1997); again in an international context: Hamšahrī, 28 Mehr 1376 
(20 October 1997). 
1496  Qods, 7 & 8 & 9 & 10 Dey 1376 (28 & 29 & 30 & 31December 1997). 
1497  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 6 & 7& 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999) 
1498  Hamšahrī, 19 Ordībehešt 1374 (9 May 1995); but also in: Kaihān, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995). 
Eṭṭelā‘āt, 11 Tīr 1374 (2 July 1995); in particular in: Kaihān, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995). 
1499  Hamšahrī, 19 Ordībehešt 1374 (9 May 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 29 Ḫordād 1374 (19 June 1995); Īrān, 29 Tīr 
1374 (20 July 1995); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997); Resālat, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 
1997); Qods, 9 Dey 1376 (30 December 1997). 
1500  Īrān, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999); Īrān, 19 Mehr 1378 (11 October 1999);  
1501  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 20 Bahman 1376 (9 February 1997). 
 285 
with a statement that in reality thirty-four per cent of all marriages are divorced due to the 
drug addiction of the husband; and that in such a case “divorce … is [indeed] the best form of 
combat” (ṭalāq […] behtarīn šekl-e mobārezeh [...]).1502 A further interesting, though rather 
rhetorical question is asked by Resālat, which wonders why there is less addiction among 
Afghan refugees than among the inhabitants of Zahedan / Baluchestan.1503 
 
Addiction therapy & drug prevention 
 From the beginning (1997-98), the newspapers point to the insufficiencies and 
inconsistencies of the official drug demand reduction measures. An obvious confusion already 
exists concerning the number of official rehabilitation centers.1504 Eṭṭelā‘āt further criticizes 
the official treatment period of two months in the rehabilitation center Qarčak Varāmīn of 
being too short.1505 And Īrān quotes the sociology professor Ṣādeq Farbod, who criticizes that 
the HEALTH MINISTRY is still only planning to implement new medicinal and prevention 
measures.1506 This argument is later often repeated again.1507  
 
Some newspapers even express a more fundamental criticism. While Ḫorāsān dates 
the beginning of serious addiction therapy and prevention programs to 1374 (1995-96),1508 
Kār va Kārgar assumes serious addiction therapy only started under Ḫātamī.1509 In 1378 
(1999-2000), the reformist newspapers criticize the lack of therapy facilities for the many 
domestic drug addicts,1510 as well as the lack of treatment medication.1511 Īrān even claims that 
the therapy measures applied in Iran differ diametrically from international models;1512 while 
Ḫorāsān quotes ‘Emrān-Moḥammad Razzāġāi, the author of recently published RSA, with 
the opinion that in the official drug demand reduction programs, many mistakes have been 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1502  Payām-e Āzādī, 2 Āḏar 1378 (23 November 1999). 
1503  Resālat, 26 Ābān 1376 (17 November 1197). 
1504  11 centers: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 27 & 28 & 29 Ḫordād 1374 (17 & 18 & 19 June 1995); Īrān, 18 Āḏar 1374 (9 
December 1995); 17 centers: Hamšahrī, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995); 20 centers: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 & 11 & 12 & 
13 & 14 Tīr 1374 (1 & 2 & 3 & 4 & 5 July 1995). 
1505  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 28 Ḫordād 1374 (18 June 1995). 
1506  Īrān, 29 Tīr 1374 (20 July 1995). 
1507  Cf. for instance: Hamšahrī, 3 Tīr 1376 (24 June 1997)  
1508  Ḫorāsān, 6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 1999). 
1509  Kār va Kārgar, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999). 
1510  Āfarīneš, 24 Ābān 1376 (15 November 1997); Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḫordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 
June 1999); Enteḫāb, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999); Ḫorāsān, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 
September 1999); Fatḥ, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000). 
1511  Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḫordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999); Fatḥ, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 
2000). 
1512  Īrān, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999; Hamšahrī, 3 Tīr 1376 (24 June 1997); Hamšahrī, 2 Mehr 1376 (24 
September 1997) Āfarīneš, 22 Ābān 1376 (13 November 1997); Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997). 
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made so far.1513 To yet another problem points the newspaper Āfarīneš, which deplores a 
lacking cooperation between governmental and private therapy centers. 1514  Ḫorāsān, in 
contrast, emphasizes the higher success rate of private centers in treating drug addicts;1515 and 
in a later article points to the fact that such private centers are still not allowed to legally treat 
their patients with certain medication.1516 Qods, additionally, points to the ongoing social 
stigmatization as a reason for the high relapse rates.1517 Yet, the most progressive article in 
this regard is published by Ḫordād. In an interview with the clinical psychologist Amīr 
Hūšang Mehryār, it mentions substitution treatment by methadone and even maintenance 
treatment by opioids, as well as the distribution of syringes for drug addicts in Iran. Mehryār 
also complains that medication-supported therapy was neglected to a certain degree in 1376 
(1997-98) in favor of drug prevention.1518 A little later, Āftāb-e Emrūz conveys the rumor that 
the HEALTH MINISTRY in fact already has provided the SPO with syringes to be distributed 
among addicted inmates;1519 while Āzād even earlier has requested the development of 
addiction therapy in prisons.1520 While the discussion of such harm reduction measures might 
not have influenced Iranian drug policy directly, some of these measures, nevertheless, would 
be made legally available in Iran soon afterwards (chapter III). 
 
Drug prevention 
 Concerning specific drug prevention measures, Hamšahrī initially publishes an article 
by Moḥīṭ from the WHO, who states that religion plays no decisive role in drug prevention. 
While not forcibly sharing his opinion, it is nevertheless astonishing that it publishes his 
statement.1521 The more conservative newspapers continue to cite religious institutions and 
particularly religious families as important for drug prevention throughout the years.1522 This 
emphasis of the preventive character of religion later even has an influence on some reformist 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1513  Ḫorāsān, 6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 1999). 
1514  Āfarīneš, 24 Ābān 1376 (15 November 1997). 
1515  Ḫorāsān, 8 Mehr 1378 (30 September 1999). 
1516  Ḫorāsān, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July  1999). 
1517  Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997). 
1518  Ḫordād, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999); also in: Ḫordād, 1 & 2 Āḏar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999). 
1519  Āftāb-e Emrūz, 27 Bahman 1378 (16 February 2000). 
1520  Āzād, 6 Mehr 1378 (28 September 1999). 
1521  Hamšahrī, 19 Ordībehešt 1374 (9 May 1995); similar in: Resālat I, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 
11 Tīr 1374 (2 July 1995). 
1522  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 29 Ḫordād 1374 (19 June 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 11 Tīr 1374 (2 July 1995); emphasizing the 
repressive character of religion: Kaihān, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995); Abrār, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 
March 1996); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 28 Tīr 1376 (19 July 1997); 
Abrār, 12 Šahrīvar 1376 (3 September 1997); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 17 Mehr 1376 (9 October 1997; Āfarīneš, 22 
Ābān 1376 (13 November 1997); Āfarīneš, 24 Ābān 1376 (15 November 1997); or: Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (29 
December 1997); Qods, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 6 & 7& 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 
28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999); Enteḫāb, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999); Resālat, 
18 Šahrīvar 1378 (9 September 1999); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999). 
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newspapers. 1523  The reformist newspapers, however, rather tend to emphasize other 
prevention measures. Īrān for instance advises the Iranian government to take more 
inspiration from foreign countries.1524 
 
The press further especially criticizes that the prevention measures applied so far have 
failed.1525 Ḫorāsān particularly blames this on the fact that drug prevention is not addresses by 
the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of 1997.1526 Others directly accuse the DCHQ and the 
EDUCATION MINISTRY of being inactive in this regard.1527 This even leads to a veritable 
exchange of mutual recriminations. The deputy of the DCQH in turn accuses the MINISTRY OF 
ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE, as well as the IRIB and the media in general, of not doing 
enough; while Enteḫāb defends the media by insisting that the press extensively covers drug-
related topics, but that they are indeed not always provided with correct information by state 
institutions such as the DCHQ.1528 
 
Harm reduction measures 
 The reason for the introduction of specific harm reduction measures in Iran has 
in particular been the spread of HIV/AIDS among injecting drug users. During the sample 
period, however, only few newspapers refer to this illness. The first newspaper to mention 
AIDS – as all newspapers indiscriminately refer to – is Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, by mentioning it 
as a particular problem in Iran’s border provinces, thus insinuating a foreign impact.1529 It is, 
however, astonishingly, also the first to explicitly mention it as a specific problem among 
intravenous drug users in Iran.1530 In 1378 (1999-2000) the reformist newspapers continue to 
write about HIV/AIDS as a consequence of needle sharing practices. Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz and 
Enteḫāb now both mention it as a problem in Iranian prisons;1531 while Ḫordād provides more 
detailed information on the transmission of HIV by citing governmental research on HIV in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1523  Kār va Kārgar, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999); Āzād, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999); Payām-e 
Āzādī, 7 Bahman 1378 (27 January 2000). 
1524  Īrān, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999). 
1525  Ḫorāsān, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July  1999); Gozāreš-e Rūz, 1 & 11 & ?? Esfand (20 February & 1 & ?? 
March 2000). 
1526  Ḫorāsān, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July 1999). 
1527  Ḫordād for instance accuses the DCHQ of paying only attention to treatment: Ḫordād, 13 Ordībehešt 1376 
(3 May 1999); Kār va Kārgar cites a study of the DCHQ which has shown that school books still only 
contain few information on drug addiction: Kār va Kārgar, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999); Fatḥ 
deplores that ‘after years’ (pas az sāl-hā) such information in schoolbooks are still lacking: Fatḥ, 12 
Esfand 1378 (2 March 2000). 
1528  Enteḫāb, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999). 
1529  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 19 Bahman 1376 (8 February 1997). 
1530  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997). 
1531  Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḫordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999); Enteḫāb, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 
(14 & 15 & 17 July 1999). 
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the prisons of Kermānšāh and Kahnavač.1532 That drugs are also being consumed within the 
Iranian prisons, is stated by the newspaper Abrār: „the craving for drugs is stronger in 
prisons than outside”.1533 The newspaper Ḫordād later claims that this is only possible 
because drugs are obviously smuggled into prisons by corrupt prison officials.1534 Enteḫāb, 
finally, even insinuates that the DCHQ is not publishing correct statistics on the real extent of 
this disease among drug users.1535  
 
Heterogeneities in the citation of interviews in the Iranian drug discourse 
 Further differences between conservative and reformist newspapers can be observed in 
the domestic sources they are quoting, both concerning the number of interviews as well as 
the institutional affiliation of the interviewed specialists. These differences do, however, not 
coherently run along factional lines. 
 
 The differences are most pronounced in 1374 (1995-96). In this year, the conservative 
newspapers are referring more often to security-related officials, such as for instance then 
interior minister ‘Alī-Moḥammad Bašāratī, the top police commander Reżā Sayf-Elāhī, or 
Yūsef Reżā Abo ‘l-Fatḥī, the police commander of greater Tehran.1536 The newspapers of the 
moderate right, including Eṭṭelā‘āt, in contrast, rather quote specialists from health-related 
institutions such as ‘Alī-Reżā Ǧazāyerī, director of the SWO, and Emrān-Moḥammad 
Rezzāġī, deputy for cultural affairs of the SWO; the sociology professors Ṣādeq Farbod and 
Manṣūr Voṯūqī; the independent acupuncture specialist Ṣāleḥ Šīvā,1537 and many more health 
professionals.1538 In 1376 (1997-98), the differences between the newspapers are rather 
negligible, since all newspapers now conduct interviews with health care specialists. In 1378 
(1999-2000), in contrast, the reformist newspaper 1539  – yet including the religious-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1532  Ḫordād, 1 & 2 Āḏar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999). 
1533  Āfarīneš, 20 & 21 & 22 & 24 Ābān 1376 (11 & 12 & 13 & 15 November 1997):  
1534 Ḫordād, 1 & 2 Āḏar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999). 
1535  Enteḫāb, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999). 
1536  For Bašāratī: Resālat II, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995); Abrār, 15 Tīr 1374 (6 July 1995); for Saif-Elāhī: 
Kaihān, 22 Tīr 1374 (13 July 1995); for Abo ‘l-Fathī: Resālat I, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995); also XXX 
Ḥossanī, head of the REVOLUTIONARY COURTS: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 13 Tīr 1374 (4 July 1995); ‘Alī Šafī‘ī, the head 
of the ANTI NARCOTICS UNIT of the police: Īrān, 8. Ḫordād 1374 (29 May 1995). 
1537  For Ǧazāyerī: Īrān, 8. Ḫordād 1374 (29 May 1995); for Razzāġī: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 29 Ḫordād 1374 (19 June 
1995); for Farbod and Voṯūqī: Īrān, 29 Tīr 1374 (20 July 1995); for Šīvā: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 14 Tīr 1374 (5 July 
1995); again for Šīva: Abrār, 15 Tīr 1374 (6 July 1995). 
1538  Particularly in: Eṭṭelā‘āt, 28 Ḫordād 1374 (18 June 1995); Eṭṭelā‘āt, 29 Ḫordād 1374 (19 June 1995); 
Eṭṭelā‘āt, 13 Tīr 1374 (4 July 1995); many interviews: Īrān, 8. Ḫordād 1374 (29 May 1995); Resālat, 5 
Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995). 
1539  Most experts were interviewed by: Enteḫāb, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999); Abrār, 9 Ordībehešt 
1378 (29 April 1999); Āryā, 11 Ordībehešt 1378 (1 May 1999); Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḫordād 
1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999); Ḫorāsān, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July  1999); Āftāb-e Emrūz, 2 
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conservative newspapers Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī and Qods – are starting to cite an increasingly 
diverse range of sources.1540 The reformist newspapers also more often cite female addiction 
specialists such as Āfarīn Raḥīmī-Movaqqar from SWO, Member of Parliament Sohaylā 
Ǧeloudārzādeh, or Marżiyyeh Ṣadīqī, director of the ĀFTĀB SOCIETY.1541  
 
VI. 3. Summary: Professional journalism 
 
VI. 3. 1. Summary: the newspaper dominating the Iranian press discourse on drugs 
 In 1374 (1995-96), the newspaper that report most critically about the situation of 
drugs and drug policy in Iran, are Hamšahrī and Īrān. Both are already reporting in a factual 
and critical style on increasing drug addiction in Iran, for instance by pointing to a lack of 
exact addiction statistics, or to the dire economic situation Sīstān va Balūčestān that turns the 
local inhabitants to drug trafficking. They also particularly promote the new drug demand 
reduction measures of the Iranian government.1542 This is not astonishing, since both were 
close to the modern right administration of Rafsanǧānī, which was responsible for introducing 
these first liberal drug policies. Equally accurate is the nominally conservative newspaper 
Eṭṭelā‘āt, which throughout its history has always been a serious and moderate newspaper. 
Quite different is the radical newspaper Kaihān, which directly attacks the judiciary and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Šahrīvar 1378 (24 August 1999); Ḫorāsān, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999); and: Kār va Kārgar, 
28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999). 
1540  E.g. Ġolām-Reżā Anṣārī, the new director of the SWO: Enteḫāb, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999); 
Ḫorāsān, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July  1999); Bahrām Yegāneh, director of the NATIONAL AIDS 
COMMITTEE: Abrār, 14 Tīr 1378 (5 July 1999); ‘Emrān-Moḥammad Razzāġī, the author of the RSA, and 
later director of INCAS: Ḫorāsān, 6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 1999); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 30 Bahman 
& 1 & 2 & 19 Esfand (19 & 20 & 21 February & 9 March 2000); the researchers Moḫtār Mūsavī and 
Farhād Ṭāremīyān of the SWO: Kār va Kārgar, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999); sociology professor 
Farǧād: Kār va Kārgar, 21 & 22 & 24 Farvardīn (10 & 11 & 13 April 1999); Enteḫāb, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 
June 1999); Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 4 Āḏar 1378 (25 November 1999); medical specialist Saif-Elāhī: Kār va 
Kārgar, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999); Ḫorāsān, 5 Esfand 1378 (24 February 2000); addiction 
specialist Ṣāleḥpūr: Ḫorāsān, 5 Tīr 1376 (26 June 1999); Ḫorāsān, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July  1999); 
clinical psychologist Mehryār: Ḫordād, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999); psychiatrist Āḏaraḫš Mokrī, later the 
director of INCAS: Āftāb-e Emrūz, 2 Šahrīvar 1378 (24 August 1999); Ḫorāsān, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 
September 1999); prevention specialist Sūfīvandī: Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḫordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 
18 June 1999); Āftāb-e Emrūz, 2 Šahrīvar 1378 (24 August 1999); or Ḥossain Dežākām, the founder of 
Congress 60: Ḫorāsān, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999). 
1541  On Ǧeloudārzādeh, director of the SOCIETY AGAINST ADDICTION: Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḫordād 
1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999); Payām-e Āzādī, 2 Āḏar 1378 (23 November 1999); on Ṣadīqī: Ḫorāsān, 
7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July  1999); Ḫorāsān, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999); addiction 
withdrawal specialist Naṣrīn Qodrat-Namā: Salām, 2 Tīr 1378 (23 June 1999);  Mīnū Moḥarrez, a 
specialist for neuropathology: Ḫordād, 1 & 2 Āḏar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999); Ms. Zamanī, the head 
of the Council of the Youth, and Ms. Tehrānī, an education specialist in the Society Against Drugs Āftāb-e 
Emrūz, 2 Šahrīvar 1378 (24 August 1999); or Zohreh Zāre‘, a consultant for the province of Tehran: Āzād, 
6 Mehr 1378 (28 September 1999). 
1542  Hamšahrī, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995); Īrān, 28 Dey 1374 (19 January 1996). 
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DCHQ of being too lenient towards drug traffickers at the Eastern border.1543 Salām in 
contrast, propagates an ideological, anti-imperialist reading of Iran’s drug history, and, thus, 
reveals an ongoing ideological affiliation with the Islamic left.1544 
 
 In 1376 (1997-98), the moderate newspapers Hamšahrī and Eṭṭelā‘āt initially continue 
to lead in factual and critical reporting. For undisclosed reasons, the governmental newspaper 
Īrān, publishes no drug-related articles throughout the year. After Ḫātamī’s inauguration, the 
two newspapers defend their positions. Hamšahrī positively assesses the harm reduction 
measures of Switzerland, and refers to women as victims of drug addicted husband;1545 while 
Eṭṭelā‘āt even advocates the easing of the restrictive rights to divorce for such women.1546 
Salām, soon the most outspoken reformist newspaper, is still largely absent from the 
discourse. Ostensibly on the occasion of the Amended Anti Narcotics Law, but arguably also 
due to the inauguration of the Ḫātamī administration, which now supervised the DCHQ, 
Kaihān and Resālat publish their scathing attack against the new law, defending the old, 
repressive drug policy. On the other hand, however, the moderately conservative newspaper 
Āfarīneš, and even more astonishingly the strictly conservative newspaper Qods also start to 
write openly and outspokenly about the local drug problem. Āfarīneš criticizes the lack of 
treatment facilities in Iran and, in particular, a lacking cooperation between governmental and 
private clinics in this regard;1547 while Qods now, too, presents women as victims of male 
drug-addicted family members and points to the problem of social stigmatization of drug 
addicts as a reason for addiction relapse.1548 The traditionally conservative Ǧomhūrī-ye 
Eslāmī, for the first time, even mentions AIDS as a drug-related problem in Iran.1549 
 
 In 1378 (1999-2000), the new reformist newspapers clearly take the lead in critical 
reporting. They address the hitherto most sensitive aspects of drug addiction and drug policy, 
and often even criticize the reformist administration. Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz and Ḫordād bring up the 
topic of HIV/AIDS among drug-addicted inmates in Iran’s overcrowded prisons;1550 while 
Ḫordād asks the SPO to distribute sterile syringes among drug addicted prisoners. Āftāb-e 
Emrūz even reports that this harm reduction measure is apparently already being applied in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1543  Kaihān, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995). 
1544  Salām, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995). 
1545  Hamšahrī, 24 Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997). 
1546  Eṭṭelā‘āt, 20 Bahman 1376 (9 February 1998). 
1547  Āfarīneš, 24 Ābān 1376 (15 November 1997). 
1548  Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997); Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997). 
1549  Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 23 Dey 1376 (13 January 1998). 
1550  Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḫordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999); Ḫordād, 1 & 2 Āḏar 1378 (22 & 
23 November 1999). 
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certain prisons.1551 Ḫordād generally advocates the introduction of more comprehensive harm 
reduction measures such as substitution and maintenance treatment in Iran,1552 and Fatḥ 
publishes its challenging article, in which it compares the drug policies of Turkey and Iran.1553 
The moderate Īrān blames the contradictions and inconsistencies between different state 
institutions for the inefficiency of Iran’s drug policy,1554 and Kār va Kārgar accuses the 
EDUCATION MINISTRY of still not having prepared prevention material for schools.1555  
 
But, the reformist newspapers are not the only newspapers writing critically about the 
drug problem in Iran. Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī for instance publishes by far the most drug related 
articles this year. Abrār reports that according the National AIDS Committee, there are three 
million drug addicts in Iran,1556 only to be topped by the estimation of seven million by 
Mošārekat.1557 One of the most critical articles comes from the nominally conservative 
Enteḫāb, which broaches upon many controversial issues, such as the spread of HIV in 
prisons, wrong statistics on AIDS/HIV cases and executed drug traffickers.1558 The radical 
Ǧavān, also reports about HIV/AIDS among injecting drug users.1559 All these newspapers 
furthermore now include a wide range of sources and interviews including many private 
addiction specialists and in particular many female addictions specialists. Finally, a criticism 
of the DCHQ’s official drug policy again comes from the radical Kaihān, again rather 
directed against the reformist administration.1560 In general, however, Kaihān like Resālat 
almost cease reporting on drugs in this last sample year. 
 
VI. 3. 1. Discussion: the Iranian press as a fourth estate? 
The literature on the press during the reformist era of Ḫātamī has in length discussed 
the relationship between the state, civil society and the press. This discussion particularly 
centers on the question as to what extent the reformist press has been independent from the 
reformist government, and thus truly a part of the civil society.1561 Without aiming at 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1551  Āftāb-e Emrūz, 27 Bahman 1378 (16 February 2000). 
1552  Ḫordād, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999). 
1553  Fatḥ, 12 Esfand 1378 (2 March 2000). 
1554  Īrān, 19 Mehr 1378 (11 October 1999). 
1555  Kār va Kārgar, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999). 
1556  Abrār, 14 Tīr 1378 (5 July 1999). 
1557  Mošārekat, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000). 
1558  Particularly in: Enteḫāb, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999). 
1559  Ǧavān, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999). 
1560  Kaihān, 8 Āḏar 1378 (29 November 1999). 
1561  Tazmini assumes an increasing independence of the reformist press from the reformist government: 
Tazmini (2009); Tazmini (2009); Khiabany sees the reformist press still primarily in the service of the 
reformist government: Khiabany (2010), 128. 
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expanding on this complex general relationship, it is nevertheless argued here, that at least in 
the press discourse on drugs, a tendency towards a more independent reporting and a stronger 
self-consciousness of the press as an independent entity, possibly even a fourth estate (rokn-e 
čahārom), might be observable. In the present analysis, this seems, however, rather to apply 
to the press as a whole, not only to the reformist press. Admittedly, individual newspapers 
continue to serve as organs for the respective political and ideological factions. But at least 
concerning less contentious issues, yet including the issue of drug policy, an increasingly 
factual, accurate and critical reporting becomes visible.  
 
As was discussed in this chapter, various factors might be responsible for this. First, 
the MINISTRY OF ISLAMIC CULTURE AND GUIDANCE actively encouraged more professional 
criticism, as exemplified in the topics of the press seminaries.1562 It can also be observed in the 
Iranian press discourse on drugs that newspapers became more factual, more investigative, 
more balanced, and more transparent in their reporting.  
 
Second, the intrinsic dynamics, or homogenizing factors within the press and the press 
discourse also clearly had an influence on the individual newspapers. This becomes clear not 
only in the range of quoted sources, but also in positions that started as heterogeneous, 
individual positions, but eventually were adopted by the press as a whole, or at least by other 
newspapers. This can, for instance, be seen in the introduction of new sensitive topics like 
HIV/AIDS or corresponding harm reduction measures. But it is also observable in criticism 
directed towards the government. Concerning the latter aspect, one might argue, that the 
reformist press was generally more inclined to include the reformist government in its 
criticism, while the conservative press was naturally inclined to criticize the reformist 
government. But most criticism expressed by the newspapers in the present analysis is not 
specifically directed against the reformist government, but rather against the DCHQ and the 
lacking cooperation between different state institutions. It seems, that in this process, the press 
as a whole has become more critical, and generally more inclined to hold the state 
accountable for its policies. 
 
Whether this really demonstrates a continual development towards a new self-
consciousness of the press remains open to discussion. The fact, nevertheless remains, that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1562  Khiabany correctly points to the crucial interests of the reformists in a more liberal press policy, because 
they only could communicate their ideas and policies through the press, while the conservatives – of course 
among other institutions – controlled in particular all television and radio channels: Khiabany (2000), 134. 
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even after the mass closure of the reformist newspapers, Iranian press discourse on drugs 
remained factual, accurate, accountable, balanced and critical, often including the most 
radical newspapers. As has been shown, certain newspapers were, admittedly, more decisive 
in this process: initially particularly the newspapers of the modern right, subsequently the 
reformist newspapers; but many conservative newspapers, too, followed suit. Since the 
newspapers concomitantly continued to serve as political organs, this conclusion might sound 
contradictory and confusing. But such confusing contradictions are often typical for the 
Islamic Republic. 
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VII. Conclusion and Outlook 
 
 The present study set out to investigate Iranian press discourse on drugs as it changed 
during the transitional period from the moderate Rafsanǧānī administration to the reformist 
administration of Ḫātamī (1995-2000). This period is distinguished by an increasing power 
struggle between the different factions that shaped the Islamic Republic. The conflict between 
the conservatives and the reformists has been primarily about power, but also, and more 
crucially, about the interpretation and implementation of governance. The power struggle 
between the different political factions in Iran, was essentially about the press, and therefore 
particularly visible in the press. In the absence of legal political parties, the press has a 
fundamental political role in Iran. As a rule, Iranian newspapers serve the political factions as 
organs and the press consequently emerged as a political battleground. This power struggle 
was observable in the press discourse on drugs, particularly, since the Islamic Republic had 
recently reoriented its drug policy towards a more liberal and progressive approach. In 
analyzing this discourse, the study reveals that such ideological differences concerning 
Iranian drug policy does exist, but to a much lesser degree than expected. It describes a more 
complex picture, in which both homogeneous and heterogeneous aspects characterize the 
discourse, but not merely along factional lines.  
 
Iran’s drug policy in a historical perspective 
The chapter on the history of drugs demonstrated how subsequent Iranian 
governments have developed and changed their approaches to drug consumption, by 
constantly adapting their policies. Yet, none of the governments have been successful in 
stemming the rising consumption and addiction rates, with some willingly or unwillingly 
contributing to its growth. Drug consumption had been unregulated in Iran for many centuries. 
Neither the Ṣafavīds, nor the Qāǧārs attempted to address the growing problem of drug 
addiction. The Qāǧārs, and later Reżā Šāh, further contributed to this trend by encouraging 
the local opium industry as a source of income. Although concomitantly passing first anti 
drug laws, these remained largely ineffective. The flow of petrodollars soon decreased the 
importance of the local opium production but addiction rates remained high. Under 
Moḥammad Reżā Šāh, a first serious repressive drug law was implemented from 1955, 
arguably under pressure from the USA. But Iranians continued to consume opium, and 
increasingly heroin, which was trafficked from Afghanistan and Pakistan to Iran. This 
unintended consequence caused the Iranian government to (re-)introduce a, more liberal law 
in 1969, allowing for a limited maintenance program. 
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The new authorities of the Islamic Republic, however, opposed such liberal measures 
and eventually shut down all therapy facilities. Drug traffickers and drug dealers were put into 
prisons and prison like rehabilitation camps, and initially were even executed. While such 
sentences were based on religious law during the initial years, the first explicit ANTI 
NARCOTICS LAW was passed in 1988, which continued this repressive practice. However, like 
the law of 1955, it did not succeed in curbing drug addiction, which seems to have become 
more widespread during the war years. From the mid 1990s, the Rafsanǧānī administration, 
therefore, shifted is drug policy towards a more liberal approach, including medical addiction 
treatment. The legal basis for this re-orientation was, however, only created by the amended 
law of 1997. Ḫātamī expanded these drug demand reduction measures, including progressive 
harm reduction measures such as the distribution of syringes and methadone, even within 
prisons. However, drug consumption and addiction remained criminalized by the law. 
 
Iran’s press policy in the Islamic Republic 
The chapter on the history of the press in the Islamic Republic revealed similar 
repeating patterns. During the fall of Moḥammad-Reżā Šāh, Iran experienced a fourth and last 
truly free period of press freedom. Not long after, the authorities of the Islamic Republic 
started to control the press in a strict manner as before. The few existing newspapers became 
increasingly aligned to the competing political factions during the 1980s. But they only again 
gained more freedom under Ḫātamī, first as Rafsanǧānī’s culture minister and later as 
president. His election ushered in a fifth „press spring“, which led to the appearance of dozens 
of newspapers, especially reformist publications. This period was, however, never really free, 
as the conservative courts started to proceed against the critical and reformist press. By 2000, 
they practically banned all outspoken reformist newspapers, and the spring came to an end. 
 
The Iranian press discourse on drugs: topics & arguments, homogeneities & 
heterogeneities  
Unlike in the beginning of the Islamic Republic, when the press had presented drug 
addicts as homosexuals, pimps, or prostitutes, newspapers began to report more factually and 
sympathetically on drug addiction and drug addicts during the sample period (1995-2000). 
This was, arguably, also the result of the changing drug policy and press policy respectively. 
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The analysis has shown that the official drug policy (discourse) provides Iranian press 
discourse on drugs with most information. Institutions like the DCHQ, the SWO or the 
HEALTH MINISTRY, organized events introducing its drug policy, which in turn triggered drug-
related newspaper articles; but they also provided the press with much information on the 
situation of drug addiction, addiction therapy, drug prevention and even first harm reduction 
measures. Particularly in the beginning, but continuing throughout the years, both the 
government and the press, takes inspiration from the international drug policy, especially 
from UN bodies like the UNDCP and the WHO and also from foreign newspaper articles and 
from foreign addiction experts. Further inspirations come from the religious and the medical 
drugs discourse. This, nevertheless often takes place through the intermediary of the 
government.  
 
The government, together with these other sources, thus provides a basic, relatively 
homogeneous structure of topics and arguments of the Iranian press discourse on drugs; and it 
determines the general direction towards the discussion of ever more liberal addiction 
treatment and prevention methods. The analysis has shown that the most important topics and 
arguments, as presented in the press discourse are: an anti-imperialist history of drugs in Iran; 
Iran’s fierce and successful combat against drug trafficking from Afghanistan; a 
phenomenology of drugs and drug addiction, together with increasingly precise research 
findings on the extent, causes, and patterns of addiction, such as for among women, or a drug-
related HIV/AIDS; growing medical addiction treatment in governmental and private centers; 
legislative measures such as especially the AMENDED ANTI NARCOTICS LAW of 1997, which 
was designed to clarify whether “an addict is an ill or a criminal” person; and ever more 
sophisticated plans for drug prevention; and last but not least drug prevention, which even the 
government assess critically. 
 
Concomitantly, Iranian press discourse on drugs, however, also displays more 
heterogeneous patterns. As has been shown, such inconsistencies might also originate from 
contradictory governmental policies. More often, they originate either from new ideas 
presented by non-governmental sources, or from individual newspapers. Such new positions 
do not often appear critical of the official or predominant drug discourse(s). The criticism 
takes places simply by virtue of expressing new ideas. Such heterogeneities often develop 
their own dynamic: new opinions or criticism can influence other newspapers in expressing 
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similar positions, and eventually become a homogeneous factor influencing the entire press 
(discourse). 
 
As demonstrated, Kayhān and Resālat lead the most direct attack against the liberal re-
orientation. Other newspapers, too, criticized governmental policies or simply introduce new 
drug policy propositions. Examples for this are Hamšahrī’s positive estimation of progressive 
harm reduction measures in Switzerland; Eṭṭelā‘āt’s advocacy for an easing of divorce rules 
for women of addicted husbands; Enteḫāb’s criticism of inexact statistics on HIV in prisons 
and on executed drug trafficker; Abrār’s and Mošārekat’s challenge of the official number of 
two million drug addicts; Āfarīneš’ lamentation of an insufficient cooperation between 
governmental and private therapy centres; or Ḫordād’s proposal to distribute sterile syringe’s 
among imprisoned addicts.  
 
The Iranian press discourse on drugs: extrinsic & intrinsic influences  
 
 The analysis has further revealed that Iranian drug policy, the press policy and the 
press discourse on drugs on itself have a homogenizing effect on the press as a whole, namely 
concerning factual and accurate journalism. As argued, such topics were for instance 
discussed in the press seminaries organized by the MINISTRY FOR ISLAMIC CULTURE AND 
GUIDANCE. But a similar effect can be ascribed to the mutual influence between the 
newspapers. In the first year of the sample period, the moderate newspapers like Hamšahrī, 
Īrān, and Eṭṭelā‘āt are responsible for critical, factual and well-investigated reports. In the 
second year, this style seems to have influenced the conservative newspapers like Āfarīneš 
and Qods. In the last year of consideration, the reformist newspapers set new standards for 
critical reporting with the conservative Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī and particularly Enteḫāb writing 
according to critical and professional journalistic standards. As a result, the press as a whole 
might have increasingly developed more professional standards, maybe even a certain self-
consciousness as a fourth estate – even thought the individual newspapers continued to serve 
as organs for the competing political factions. This is observable in the Iranian press discourse 
on drugs, in fact even after the mass closure of the reformist newspapers in 2000. The 
newspapers from both sides continue to critically question official statistics and drug policy 
measures, and to introduce increasingly progressive concepts of harm reduction. 
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Implications for future research and outlook 
 
 This analysis of Iranian press discourse is one of the few existing content analysis that 
has been undertaken of Iranian media. Further analyses are recommended here, since they can 
contribute to a more material-based and accurate interpretation of the functioning of Iranian 
media. Much recent research has concentrated on the new social media in Iran, including 
online news portals, web logs, or twitter feeds. While such research is certainly important and 
informative, it nevertheless runs the risk of overrating their importance in the Iranian society. 
The press in general still remains important in influencing and forming public opinion in Iran 
– at least at the time of the writing of this study (not its publication). 
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VIII. Appendix I: Drug-Related Newspaper Articles in the Iranian Daily Press (1995-
2000) 
 
A) Drug-Related Newspaper Articles in 1374 (1995/96) 
 
1) Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 14 Farvardīn 1374 (3 April 1995): “The president [said] in the 
ceremony of the Friday prayer in Iran: the emphasis of the Supreme Leader on monetary and 
economical discipline and on the prevention of lavishness and dissipation is a constructive 
recommendation for the Islamic state” (Raʼīs-e ǧomhūr dar marāsem-e namāz-e ǧom‘ah-ye 
tehrān: taʼkīd-e rahbarī dar mawred-e enżebāṭ-e mālī va eqteṣādī va ǧelaw-gīrī az esrāf va 
tabḏīr-e yek tawṣiyyah-ye banāʼī barāye neẓām-e eslāmī ast). 
 
2) Hamšahrī, 6 Ordībehešt 1374 (26 April 1995): “The Golden Triangle and the black 
powder” (Moṯallaṯ-e ṭalāʼī, gerd-e siyāh). 
 
3) Hamšahrī, 14 Ordībehešt 1374 (4 May 1995): “Clouded brains” (Maġz-ha-ye abr-ālūdeh) 
– not available.  
 
4) Hamšahrī, 19 Ordībehešt 1374 (9 May 1995): “Where should we start – in preventing 
addiction?” (Az koǧā āġāz konīm – barāye pīš-gīrī az e’tiyād?). 
 
5) Abrār, 20 Ordībehešt 1374 (10 May 1995): “Economical crime” (Ǧenāyat-e eqteṣādī). 
 
6) Hamšahrī , 23 Ordībehešt 1374 (13 May 1995): “A flood of the entrance of drugs to 
Europe” (Sayl-e vorūd-e mavādd-e moḫadder beh orūpā). 
 
7) Hamšahrī I, 27 Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995): “Europe’s criticism of Holand’s laws 
handling with drugs” (Enteqād-e orūpā az qavānīn-e bar-ḫord bā mavādd-e moḫadder dar 
holand). 
 
8) Hamšahrī II, 27. Ordībehešt 1374 (17 May 1995): “What needs to be done? Summary of 
the preliminary national programme of addiction prevention and therapy” (Čeh bāyad kard? 
Ḫolāṣah-ye pīš-nevīs-e barnāmeh-ye mellī-ye pīš-gīrī va bāz-parvarī-ye e‘tiyād). 
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9) Īrān, 8. Ḫordād 1374 (29 May 1995): “Deliverance from the high fortification of addiction” 
(Rahāʼī az ḥeṣār-e boland-e e’tiyād). 
 
10) Kayhān, 25 Ḫordād 1374 (15 June 1995): “Growth of the rose of “hope” and “life” in the 
brackwater of addiction. On the occasion of the formation of the NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO 
FIGHT ADDICTION 1” (Rūyeš-e gol-e "omīd" va "zendegī" dar šūre-zār-e e‘tiyād. Be 
monāsebat-e taškīl-e komīteh-ye kešvarī-ye mobārezeh bā e‘tiyād 1). 
 
11) Kayhān, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995): “Rehabilitation, emergence of the "bright 
morning" from the dark evening of addiction. On the occasion of the formation of the 
NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO FIGHT ADDICTION 2” (Bāzparvarī, damīdan-e "ṣobḥ-e rawšan" az 
"šām-e tīreh-ye" e‘tiyād. Be monāsebat-e taškīl-e komīteh-ye kešvarī-ye mobārezeh bā 
e‘tiyād 2). 
 
12) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 27 Ḫordād 1374 (17 June 1995): Rehabilitation centre of Qarčak. Here, life 
smiles again for cured addicts. On the occasion of the visit of UNODC experts to the 
country’s  rehabilitation centres 1” (Markaz-e bāz-parvarī-ye "qarčak", īnǧā zendegī do 
bāreh beh rū-ye mo‘tādān-e šafā’yāfteh labḫand mizanad. Be angīzeh-ye bāz-dīd-e kār-
šenāsān-e kontrol-e mavadd-e moḫadder-e sāzemān-e melal-e mottaḥed az marākez-e bāz-
parvarī-ye mo‘tādān-e kešvar 1). 
 
13) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 28 Ḫordād 1374 (18 June 1995): “Cooperation between the family and the 
society – a necessity for a success of the program of the rehabilitation of addicts. On the 
occasion of the visit of UNODC experts to the country’s  rehabilitation centres 2” (Ham-kārī-
ye ḫāne-vādeh va eǧtemā‘ – żorūrat-e movaffaqiyyat-ye barnāmeh-ye bāz-parvarī-ye 
mo‘tādān. Be angīzeh-ye bāz-dīd-e kār-šenāsān-e kontrol-e mavadd-e moḫadder-e sāzemān-e 
melal-e mottaḥed az marākez-e bāz-parvarī-ye mo‘tādān-e kešvar 2). 
 
14) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 29 Ḫordād 1374 (19 June 1995): “Rehabilitation centres – protection of the 
society and deliverance of the individual from the captivity of addiction. On the occasion of 
the visit of UNODC experts to the country’s  rehabilitation centres 3” (Marākez-e bāz-parvarī 
– ṣiyānat-e ǧāme‘ah va rahāʼī-ye fard az esārat-e e‘tiyād. Be angīzeh-ye bāz-dīd-e kār-
šenāsān-e kontrol-e mavadd-e moḫadder-e sāzemān-e melal-e mottaḥed az marākez-e bāz-
parvarī-ye mo‘tādān-e kešvar 3). 
 301 
 
15) Hamšahrī, 31 Ḫordād 1374 (21 June 1995): “How is the money from drug trafficking 
laundered?” (Pūlhā-ye teǧārat-e mavādd-e moḫadder čegūneh taṭhīr mīšavad?). 
 
16) Resālat, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995) I: “Drugs - a weapon against the well-being of 
humankind” (Mavādd-e moḫadder - ḥarbeʼī ‘alay-he salāmat-e bašariyyat). 
 
17) Resālat, 4 Tīr 1374 (25 June 1995) II: “The interior minister has announced on occasion 
of the international [global] day of drugs combat: a smuggler is a criminal, and an addict an ill 
person” (Vazīr-e kešvar dar āstāneh-ye rūz-e ǧahānī-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-ye moḫadder 
e‘lām kard: qāčaqčī moǧrem ast, va mo‘tād bīmār). 
 
18) Resālat, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I: “The people [say] - the combat of the Islamic state 
against drugs has guaranteed the well-being of humankind” (Mardom - mobārezeh-ye neẓām-
e eslāmī ‘alay-he mavādd-e moḫadder salāmat-e bašariyyat-rā tażmīn karde ast). 
 
19) Resālat, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) II: “The judicial organization is the pillar of 
safeguarding justice” (Dastgāh-e qażāʼī rokn-e taʼmīn-e ‘edālat ast) – not available. 
 
20) Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995): “The world's drug day” (Rūz-e mavādd-
e moḫadder dar ǧahān). 
 
21) Salām, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) I: “A short history of drugs in the world and in Iran - 
on the occasion of the world day of the combat against drug addiction and drug trafficking” 
(Tārīḫčeh-ye mavādd-e moḫadder dar ǧahān va īrān - be bahāneh-ye rūz-e ǧahānī-ye 
mobārezah bā e‘tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḫadder). 
 
22) Salām, 5 Tīr 1374 (26 June 1995) II: “The gloomy shadow of the octopus of death over 
the world” (Sāyeh-ye šūm-e oḫtāpūs-e marg bar ǧahān). 
 
23) Īrān, 8 Tīr 1374 (29 June 1995): “White powder, black death – reasons for addiction 
among adolescents” (Gerd-e Sefīd, Marg-e Siyāh – ‘elal-e gerāyeš-e ǧavānān beh e‘tiyād). 
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24) Hamšahrī, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995): “The world in the trap of addiction” (Ǧahān dar 
dām-e e‘tiyād). 
 
25) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 10 Tīr 1374 (1 July 1995): “The Western colonialists, criminal propagators of 
drugs in the world. Every day has to be a Global Day against Addiction and Drug Smuggling 
1” (Este‘mār-garān-e ġarbī, ravāǧ-dehandegān-e tabahkār-e mavādd-e moḫadder dar ǧahān. 
Hameh rūz bāyad "rūz-e ǧahānī-ye mobārezah bā e‘tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḫadder" 
bāšad 1). 
 
26) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 11 Tīr 1374 (2 July 1995): “The fight against addiction and drug smuggling is 
resolutely continued. Every day has to be a Global Day against Addiction and Drug 
Smuggling 2” (Mobārezah bā e‘tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḫadder qāṭe‘āneh edāmeh 
miyābad. Hameh rūz bāyad "rūz-e ǧahānī-ye mobārezah bā e‘tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e 
moḫadder" bāšad 2). 
 
27) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 12 Tīr 1374 (3 July 1995): “Drug trafficking, an inauspicious activity that is 
more profitable than the oil trade. Every day has to be a Global Day against Addiction and 
Drug Smuggling 3” (Qāčaq-e mavādd-e moḫadder, fa‘‘āliyyatī-ye šūm ke az teǧārat-e naft 
sūd-āvartar ast. Hameh rūz bāyad "rūz-e ǧahānī-ye mobārezah bā e‘tiyād va qāčāq-e 
mavādd-e moḫadder" bāšad 3). 
 
28) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 13 Tīr 1374 (4 July 1995): “Addiction withdrawal in 6 days, illusion or reality? 
Every day has to be a Global Day against Addiction and Drug Smuggling 4” (Tark-e e‘tiyād 
dar 6 rūz, sarāb yā vāqe‘iyyat? Hameh rūz bāyad "rūz-e ǧahānī-ye mobārezah bā e‘tiyād va 
qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḫadder" bāšad 4). 
 
29) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 14 Tīr 1374 (5 July 1995): “The medical treatment with acupuncture has to take 
place within the framework of good order and legal provisions. Every day has to be a Global 
Day against Addiction and Drug Smuggling 5” (Modāvā-ye mo‘tādān bā ṭebb-e sūzanī bāyad 
dar čārčūb-e naẓm va moqarrerāt-e qānūnī dar āyad. Hameh rūz bāyad "rūz-e ǧahānī-ye 
mobārezah bā e‘tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḫadder" bāšad 5). 
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30) Abrār, 15 Tīr 1374 (6 July 1995) “The Interior Minister in conversation with Abrār: The 
fifth Parliament [says] – we are  guaranteeing the health of the election.” (Vazīr-e kešvar dar 
goft-o-gū bā Abrār: maǧles-e pančom – salāmat-e enteḫābāt-rā tażmīn mīkonīm). 
 
31) Hamšahrī, 21 Tīr 1374 (12 July 1995): “Cigarette[s] – the death caravan from the 16th 
century until today” (Sīgār – kārvān-e marg az sadeh-ye 16 tā emrūz). 
 
32) Kayhān, 22 Tīr 1374 (13 July 1995): “Statement[s] of the police commander on the 
security of the borders, and the combat against the networks of merchandise smuggling, theft 
and social evils” (Eẓhārāt-e farmāndeh-ye nīrū-ye enteẓāmī dar bāre-ye amniyat-e marzhā va 
mobārezah bā šabake-hā-ye qāčāq-e kālā, serqat va mafāsed-e eǧtemā‘ī). 
 
33) Abrār, 24 Tīr 1374 (15 July 1995): “The drug cartels prefer the East” (Kārtel-hā-ye 
mavādd-e moḫadder šarq-rā tarǧīḥ mīdehand). 
 
34) Resālat, 24 Tīr 1374 (15 July 1995): “I say it from the heart [tongue] of the people that 
our nation is not on reconciliating terms with America” (Az zabān-e mardom migūyam, 
mellat-e mā bā āmrikā sar-e āštī nīst). 
 
35) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 26 Tīr 1374 (17 July 1995): “Biological, psychological and sociological 
foundations of addiction” (Bonyād-hā-ye zīst-šenāḫtī, ravān-šenāḫtī va ǧāme‘ah-šenāḫtī-ye 
e‘tiyād) – not available. 
 
36) Īrān, 29 Tīr 1374 (20 July 1995): “The role of the family in the salvation and 
rehabilitation of the addicts – roundtable of [the newspaper] Īrān on families and youth 
addiction” (Naqš-e ḫāne-vādeh dar naǧāt va bāz-parvarī-ye mo‘tādān – mīz-gerd-e "īrān" 
dar bāreh-ye ḫāne-vādeh-hā va e‘tiyād-e ǧavānān). 
 
37) Abrār, 19 Mordād 1374 (10 August 1995): “High concern for the combat against an 
inauspicious global trade” (Hemmat-e ‘ālī barāye mobārezah bā teǧārat-e šūm-e ǧahānī). 
 
38) Īrān, 3 Šahrīvar 1374 (25 August 1995): The heavy shadow of the drug smugglers in the 
Colombian society” (Sāyeh-ye sangīn-e qāčāqčīyān-e mavādd-e moḫadder dar ǧāme‘ah-ye 
kolombiyā). 
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39) Īrān, 26 Mehr 1374 (18 October 1995): “Hungary – the crossing for heroin smugglers” 
(Maǧārestān – goḏar-gāh-e qāčāqčīyān-e herōʼīn). 
 
40) Kayhān, 27 Mehr 1374 (19 October 1995): “Confessions of an American official on the 
crimes of the White House and the reality behind” (E‘terāfāt-e yek maʼmūr-e āmrīkāʼī dar 
bāreh-ye ǧenāyat-e kāḫ-e sefīd va vāqe‘iyyat-e pošt). 
 
41) Kayhān, 4 Ābān 1374 (26 October 1995): “Drugs from the viewpoint of Islam” 
(Mavādd-e moḫadder az dīdgāh-e eslām). 
 
42) Kayhān, 11 Ābān 1374 (2 November 1995): “Cocaine trafficking in Europe” (Qāčāq-e 
kōkāʼīn dar orūpā). 
 
43) Abrār, 14 Ābān 1374 (5 November 1995): “The policies of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
in the field of the inter-regional cooperation in the combat against drugs” (Siyāsat-hā-ye 
ǧomhūrī-ye eslāmī-ye īrān dar bo‘d-e ham-kārī-hā-ye manṭaqeʼī-ye mobārezeh bā mavādd-e 
moḫadder). 
 
44) Kayhān, 15 Ābān 1374 (6 November 1995): “Aims and positions of Iran concerning the 
fight against drugs” (Ahdāf va dīdgāh-hā-ye īrān dar mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder). 
 
45) Īrān, 18 Āḏar 1374 (9 December 1995): “Hard days of waiting – a report on the 
rehabilitation centre for addicts (in Qarčak)” (Rūz-hā-ye saḫt-e enteẓār – gozārešī az markaz-
e bāz-parvarī-ye mo‘tādān {qarčak}). 
 
46) Kayhān, 4 Dey 1374 (26 December 1995): “In a special interview with Kayhān it is 
announced - the public prosecutor officially intervenes in public crimes in his function as the 
public plaintiff” (Dar goft-o-gū-ye eḫteṣāṣī bā kayhān e‘lām šod - dādsetān-e koll-e kešvar 
dar ǧarāyem-e ‘omūmī beh ‘onvān-e modda‘i-ol-‘omūm raʼsan modāḫelah mikonad). 
 
47) Abrār, 18 Dey 1374 (9 January 1996): “Golden Triangle” (Moṯallaṯ-e ṭalāʼī). 
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48) Īrān, 28 Dey 1374 (19 January 1996): “Improvement of the East from the traders of death 
– a report on the governmental measures in the fight against drug trafficking at the Eastern 
borders” (Beh-sāzī-ye šarq az sawdā-garān-e marg – gozārešī az eqdāmāt-e dawlat dar 
mobārezah bā qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḫadder dar marz-hā-ye šarqī). 
 
49) Aḫbār, 19 Bahman 1374 (8 February 1996): “The conviction of a president” 
(Moḥākemah-ye yek raʼīs-e ǧomhūr). 
 
50) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 2 Esfand 1374 (21 Ferbruary 1996): “Drug traffickers – a threat to democracy 
in Latin America” (Sawdā-garān-e mavādd-e moḫadder, tahdīdī ‘alay-he demōkrāsī dar 
āmrīkā lātīn) – not available. 
 
51) Abrār, 15 Esfand 1374 (5 March 1996): “The addiction phenomenon” (Padīde-ye 
e‘tiyād).  
 
B) Drug-Related Newspaper Articles in 1376 (1997/98) 
 
1) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 20 Farvardīn 1376 (9 April 1997): „One of the serious issues of adolescents“ 
(Mas’ala-ye ǧeddī az masāʼel-e ǧavānān) 
 
2) Resālat, 21 Farvardīn 1376 (10 April 1997): „Did the trade and consumption of drugs in 
Germany become free“ (Ḫarīd, forūš va maṣraf-e mavādd-e moḫadder dar ālmān āzād šod?). 
 
3) Abrār, 13 Ordībehešt 1376 (3 May 1997): “The vigilance and wakefulness of the Iranian 
nation and not being negligent of the enemy [is a …] necessity” (Hūšyārī va bīdārī-ye mellat-
e īrāEM8jāfel nabūdan az došman yek ẓarūrat [ast]). 
 
4) Kayhān, 7 Ḫordād 1376 (28 May 1997): „6 million smokers in Iran – put it out!“ (6 
mīliyūn sīgārī dar īrān - ḫāmūš kon) 
 
5) Kayhān, 8 Ḫordād 1376 (29 May 1997): “Smokers are buying poison and thus spread the 
pollution” (Sīgārī-hā sem mīḫarand tā ālūdegī tawzī‘ mīkonand) 
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6) Abrār, 7 Ḫordād 1376 (28 May 1997): „Children are more inspired by the deeds than the 
words of their parents“ (Kawdakān az raftār-e vāledayn bīštar elhām mīgīrand tā goftārešān) 
 
7) Hamšahrī, 10 Ḫordād 1376 (31 May 1997): „Cigarette[s], a smoke that affects everyone’s 
eyes“ (Sīgār, dūdī ke beh čašm-e hameh mīravad). 
 
8) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 18 Ḫordād 1376 (8 June 1997): „Cigarettes, a big menace to the hygiene of 
school“ (Sīgār, tahdīdī-ye bozorg barāye behdāšt-e madāres) 
 
9) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 19 Ḫordād 1376 (9 June 1997): „ Cigarettes, a big menace to the hygiene of 
schools“ (Sīgār, tahdīdī-ye bozorg barāye behdāšt-e madāres) 
 
10) Resālat, 26 Ḫordād 1376 (16 June 1997): „A resumé of some operations of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran in the combat against drugs” (Ḫolāṣah-ye baḫšī az ‘amal-kard-e ǧomhūrī-ye 
eslāmī-ye īrān dar amr-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder). 
 
11) Eṭṭelā’āt, 1 Tīr 1376 (22 June 1997): „Smoking in public places has to be forbidden. A 
glance at smoking and its unpleasant consequences (Kešīdan-e sīgār dar maǧāme‘-e ‘omūmī 
bāyad mamnū‘ šavad. negāhī beh este‘māl-e doḫāniyāt va peyāmad-hā-ye nā-govār-e ān) 
 
12) Eṭṭelā’āt, 2 Tīr 1376 (23 June 1376): “Recommendations of the Society to Fight Smoking 
to quit smoking. A glance at smoking and its unpleasant consequences “ (Pīš-nehād-hā-ye 
ǧam’iyyat-e mobārezah bā este’māl-e doḫāniyyāt barāy-e tark-e sīgār. negāhī beh este‘māl-e 
doḫāniyāt va peyāmad-hā-ye nā-govār-e ān) 
 
13) Hamšahrī, 3 Tīr 1376 (24 June 1997): „The silent chemical war. A study of the effective 
causes that bring an addict to an afresh drug consumption“ (Ǧang-e šīmīyāʼī-ye ḫāmūš. Bar-
rasī-ye ‘avāmel-e moʼaṯṯer dar dar rūy āvordan-e far-e mo‘tād be maṣraf-e moǧaddad-e 
māddah-ye moḫadder) 
 
14) Resālat, 3 Tīr 1376 (24 June 1997): „The combat against drugs needs a comprehensive 
and harmonious program – Oon occasion of 5 Tīr, the International Day against Drug 
Addiction and Drug Trafficking“ (Mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder niyāz beh barnāmeh-ye 
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ǧāme‘ va hāmahang dārad – beh monāsebat-e 5 tīr māh, rūz-e ǧahānī-ye mobārezah bā 
e’tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḫadder) 
 
15) Resālat, 4 Tīr 1376 (25 June 1997): We investigate the plaints without regard to the 
postion of the persons“ (Bedūn tavaǧǧoh beh mawqa‘‘iyyat-e ašḫāṣ beh šekāyat resīdegī 
mīkonīm) 
 
16) Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 4 Tīr 1376 (25 June 1997): „The Taliban – promoters of drugs 
inside and outside of Afghanistan“ (Ṭālebān – moravveǧ-e mavādd-e moḫadder dar dāḫel va 
ḫāreğ az afġānestān) 
 
17) Aḫbār, 6 Tīr 1376 (27 June 1997): „The Taliban – planters […] of the white 
death“ (Ṭālebān – kāšeġān-e […] marg-e sefīd) – not available. 
 
18) Aḫbār, 8 Tīr 1376 (29 June 1997): „The destructive effect of marijuana – this is the first 
step!“ (Aṯar-e moḫarreb-e „mārī ǧūwānā“ – īn qadam-e avval ast) 
 
19) Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 9 Tīr 1376 (30 June 1997): „The president [announces]: the Islamic 
society wants the Judiciary to be decisive in confronting violators“ (Raʼīs-e ǧomhūr: 
ǧāme’ah-ye eslāmī ḫvāhān-e qāṭe’iyyat-e dast-gāh-e qożāʼī dar bar-ḫord bā motaḫallefān 
ast). 
 
20) Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 14 Tīr 1376 (5 July 1997): „Caution! The swirl of addiction lies in 
the ambush of the youth!“ (Hošdār! Gerdāb-e e‘tiyād dar kamīn-e ǧavānān ast). 
 
21) Kayhān, 17 Tīr 1376 (8 July 1997): „How can addiction be defeated?“ (Če-gūneh 
mītavān bar e’tiyād ġalbeh kard?). 
 
22) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 28 Tīr 1376 (19 July 1997): „Epidemic of addiction“ (Epīdemī-ye e‘tiyād) 
 
23) Abrār, 12 Šahrīvar 1376 (3 September 1997): „Addiction – what are our prevention 
policies? An account of the exhibition „A war without border“, organized by the Drug 
Control Headquarter“ (E‘tiyād – tadābīr-e pīšgīrāneh-ye mā čīst? Gozāreš az nemāyeš-gāh-e 
ǧang bedūne-e marz be hemmat-e setād-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder). 
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24) Hamšahrī, 16 Šahrīvar 1376 (6 September 1997): „Addiction – Prevention or Combat? 
On the margins of the ratification of the law{s} for the combat agains drugs in the 
EXPEDIENCY DISCERNMENT COUNCIL OF THE SYSTEM” (E‘tiyād – pīšgīrī yā mobārezah? Dar 
ḥāšiyya-ye taṣvīb-e qavānīn-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder dar maǧma‘-e tašḫīṣ-e 
maṣlaḥat-e neżām). 
 
25) Hamšahrī, 17 Šahrīvar (7 September 1997): „The family – a solid fortification in the 
confrontation with addiction“ (Ḫāne-vādeh - ḥeṣār-e moḥkam dar moqābelah bā e’tiyād. „On 
the margins of the ratification of the law{s} for the combat agains drugs in the EXPEDIENCY 
DISCERNMENT COUNCIL OF THE SYSTEM” (Dar ḥāšiyya-ye taṣvīb-e qavānīn-e mobārezah bā 
mavādd-e moḫadder dar maǧma‘-e tašḫīṣ-e maṣlaḥat-e neżām 
 
26) Kayhān, 18 Šahrīvar 1376 (8 September 1997): „How should we educate our infants, so 
that they are not caught by addiction in their young days“ (Kūdakān-emān-rā čegūneh 
tarbiyyat konīm tā dar ǧavānī gereftār-e e’tiyād našavand?);  
 
27) Hamšahrī, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997): „How do we keep our children away 
from drugs? (Čegūneh farzandān-e ḫodrā az mavādd-e moḫadder dūr negah-dārīm?) 
 
28) Hamšahrī, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997): „The number of people in Germany 
that take drugs fort he first time, is increasing remarkably“ (Te‘dād-e afrādī ke barāy-e 
naḫostīn bār dar ālmān mavādd-e moḫadder estefāde mīkonand, beh šeddat afzāyeš 
mīyābad) 
 
29) Salām, 19 Šahrīvar 1376 (10 September 1997): „Drugs, a pretext to suppress the 
people“ (Mavādd-e moḫadder – bahānaʼī barāye sar-kūb-e mardom). 
 
30) Hamšahrī, 24 Šahrīvar 1376 (14 September 1997): „In fighting drugs, prohibition is not 
sufficient“ (Dar mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder, mamnū‘iyyat kāfī nīst). 
 
31) Hamšahrī, 25 Šahrīvar 1376 (15 September 1997): „In fighting drugs, prohibition is not 
sufficient. What is the solution?“ (Dar mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder, mamnū‘iyyat kāfī 
nīst. Rāh-e ḥall čīst?). 
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32) Hamšahrī, 25 Šahrīvar 1376 (15 September 1997): „Cigarettes – choice or 
compulsion?“ (Sīgār, enteḫāb yā eǧbār?). 
 
33) Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 27 Šahrīvar 1376 (18 September 1997): „Clinton’s support for fifty 
years of conspiracy and crime of America’s spy organization ‘CIA’” (Ḥemāyat-e klīntūn az 
50 sāl-e tūṭeʼe va ǧanāyat-e sāzemān-e ǧāsūsī-ye āmrīkā, “sia”). 
 
34) Hamšahrī, 2 Mehr 1376 (24 September 1997): „Medicine alone is no remedy for 
addiction. Causes for a lacking success of the drug combat – in an interview with Professor 
Fīrūz Ǧalīlī“ (Faqaṭ dārū, čāreh-ye e’tiyād nīst. ‘Elal-e ‘adam-e movaffaqiyyat-e mobārezah 
bā mavādd-e moḫadder dar goft-o-gū bā prōfesōr Fīrūz Ǧalīlī) 
 
35) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 13 Mehr 1376 (5 October 1997): „Drugs – a supra-national problem and a 
serious menace to all earth dwellers“ (Mavādd-e moḫadder - moškelī-ye farā-mellī va 
tahdīdī-ye ǧeddī barāye ǧahāniyān) 
 
36) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 14 Mehr 1376 (6 October 1997): „Iran is not a safe route for the international 
drugs smuggling networks anymore“ (Īrān dīgar masīr-e amnī barāye šabakeh-hā-ye bayn-
ol-melalī-ye qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḫadder nīst) 
 
37) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 15 Mehr 1376 (7 October 1997): „The fight against drugs production and 
distribution needs a global approach“ (Mobārezah bā tawlīd va tawzī‘-e mavādd-e moḫadder, 
niyāz-mand-e ravī-kardī-ye ǧahānī ast) 
 
38) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 16 Mehr 1376 (8 October 1997): „The international drugs trade – a spread of 
the exceeding breath of the inauspicious deathly shadow of addiction“ (Teǧārat-e ǧahānī-ye 
mavādd-e moḫadder – gostareš-e dam-e afzūn-e sāyeh-ye šūm-e marg-bār-e e‘tiyād) 
 
39) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 17 Mehr 1376 (9 October 1997): „Important background [knowledge] for the 
visibility of an inclination towards drug consumption “ (Zamīneh-hā-ye momehh padāī-ye 
gerāyeš beh maṣraf-e mavādd-e moḫadder) 
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40) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997): „The young – the first victims of the 
greediness and criminality of the drug traffickers“ (Ǧavānān, naḫostīn qorbāniyān-e āzmandī 
va tebeh-kārī-ye qāčāqčīyān-e mav¯dd-e moḫadder) 
 
41) Resālat, 19 Mehr 1376 (11 October 1997): „The use of drugs [is] an alarm bell! On 
occasion of start of the manoeuvre ‚prognosis’“ (Este’māl-e mavādd-e moḫadder, zang-e 
ḫaṭar! Beh monāsebat-e šorū‘-e mānovr-e „enḏār“) 
 
42) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 24 Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997): „Addiction, prevention, therapy and follow-
up ...“ (E‘tiyād, pīš-gīrī, darmān va pey-gīrī ...) 
 
43) Hamšahrī, 24 Mehr 1376 (16 October 1997): „The addict – an ill or a criminal 
person?“ (Mo’tād – bīmār yā moǧrem?). 
 
44) Hamšahrī, 27 Mehr 1376 (19 October 1997): „From the Golden Triangle of opium to the 
thousands mazes of the Mafia. A glance at the global drug production centres and 
market(s)“ (Az moṯallaṯ-e ṭalāʼī-ye taryāk tā hezār-tū-ye māfiyā. Negāhī beh kānūn-hā-ye 
tawlīd va bāzār-e ǧahānī-ye mavādd-e moḫadder) 
 
45) Hamšahrī, 28 Mehr 1376 (20 October 1997): „The necessity for a common contract to 
put an end to the global drugs networks. A glance at the ways of production, trafficking and 
markets of drugs“ (Żorūrat-e peymān-e dast-ǧam’ī barāye barčīdarn-e šabakeh-hā-ye 
ǧahānī-ye mavādd-e moḫadder. Negāhī beh kam-o-keyf-e tawlīd, qāčāq, va bāzār-e mavādd-
e moḫadder). 
 
46) Resālat, 5 Ābān 1376 (27 October 1997): „Addiction – the role of the parents and the 
supervisory levers of the society“ (E‘tiyād – naqš-e vāledayn va ahram-yā-ye neẓāratī-ye 
ǧāme‘ah). 
 
47) Resālat, 6 Ābān 1376 (28 October 1997): „What does public education mean?“ (Āmūzeš-
e ‘omūmī ya‘nī čeh?). 
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48) Resālat, 14 Ābān 1376 (5 November 1997): „The answer of the Drug Control 
Headquarter and explanations of Resālat“ (Ǧavābiyya-ye setād-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e 
moḫadder va tawżīḥāt-e resālat) 
 
49) Hamšahrī, 18 Ābān 1376 (9 November 1997): „The roads of tobacco – the nighmare of 
cigarettes instead of food (Ǧādde-hā-ye tūtūn – kābūs-e sīgār beh ǧā-ye ġaḏā). 
 
50) Āfarīneš, 20 Ābān 1376 (11 November 1997): “Addiction – an issue of yesterday, today 
and tomorrow“ (E’tiyād ... masʼalah-ye dīrūz ... emrūz ... fardā ...!). 
 
51) Āfarīneš, Ābān 1376 (12 November 1997): “Addiction – an issue of yesterday, today and 
tomorrow“ (E’tiyād ... masʼalah-ye dīrūz ... emrūz ... fardā ...!). 
 
52) Āfarīneš, 22 Ābān 1376 (13 November 1997): “Addiction – an issue of yesterday, today 
and tomorrow“ (E’tiyād ... masʼalah-ye dīrūz ... emrūz ... fardā ...!). 
 
53) Āfarīneš, 24 Ābān 1376 (15 November 1997): “Addiction – an issue of yesterday, today 
and tomorrow“ (E’tiyād ... masʼalah-ye dīrūz ... emrūz ... fardā ...!). 
 
54) Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 21 Ābān 1376 (12 November 1376): „Do we know ...?“ (Āyā 
mīdānīm ...?). 
 
55) Resālat, 26 Ābān 1376 (17 November 1997): „The combat [!] against drugs addicts from 
words to actions“ (Mobārezah bā mo‘tādān-e mavādd-e moḫadder az ḥarf tā ‘amal). 
 
56) Abrār, 10 Āḏar 1376 (1 December 1997): „A Short History of drugs in the world and in 
Iran“ (Tārīḫčeh-ye mavādd-e moḫadder dar ǧahān va īrān). 
 
57) Abrār, 11 Āḏar 1376 (2 December 1997): „A Short History of drugs in the world and in 
Iran“ (Tārīḫčeh-ye mavādd-e moḫadder dar ǧahān va īrān). 
 
58) Hamšahrī, 11 Āḏar 1376 (2 December 1997): „How do we help the addicts? The role of 
the family in addiction prevention“ (Čegūneh beh mo‘tādīn komak konīm? Naqš-e ḫāne-
vādeh dar pīš-gīrī az e‘tiyād). 
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59) Āfarīneš, 16 Āḏar 1376 (7 December 1997) I: „The young and the global black calamity 
of today“ (Ǧavānān va balā-ye siyāh-e donyā-ye emrūz). 
 
60) Āfarīneš, 16 Āḏar 1376 (7 December 1997) II: “The satanic plague“ (Āfat-e šayṭānī). 
 
61) Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 4 Dey 1376 (25 December 1997): „’The Taliban’ – the biggest drug 
exporters“ („Ṭālebān“ – bozorgtarīn ṣāder-konandeh-ye mavādd-e moḫadder) 
 
62) Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (28 December 1997): „200 million addicts (are) vitctims to the death 
trade in the world. On the occasion of the new ratified law by the EXPEDIENCY DISCERNMENT 
COUNCIL OF THE System “ (200 mīlīyūn mo’tād, qorbānī-ye teǧāra-e marg dar ǧahān. Beh 
angīzeh-ye moṣavvabeh-ye ǧadīd-e maǧma‘-e tašḫīṣ-e maṣlaḥat-e neẓām)  
 
63) Qods, 7 Dey 1376 (29 December 1997): „Those, who turn health and zeal into smoke. On 
the occasion of the new ratified law by the EXPEDIENCY DISCERNMENT COUNCIL OF THE 
System“ (Ānān keh salāmat va ġayrat-rā bā ham dūd mīkonand. Beh angīzeh-ye 
moṣavvabeh-ye ǧadīd-e maǧma‘-e tašḫīṣ-e maṣlaḥat-e neẓām) 
 
64) Qods, 9 Dey 1376 (30 December 1997): „The production of 5 thousand tons of opium in 
Afghanistan; the Taliban are the largest factor for the spread of addiction in the world. On the 
occasion of the new ratified law by the EXPEDIENCY DISCERNMENT COUNCIL OF THE System 
“ (Tawlīd-e 5 hezār ton-e taryāk dar afġānestān; ṭālebān bozorgtarīn ‘āmel-e gostareš-e 
e‘tiyād dar ǧahān ast. Discernment Council of the System“ (Ānān keh salāmat va ġayrat-rā 
bā ham dūd mīkonand. Beh angīzeh-ye moṣavvabeh-ye ǧadīd-e maǧma‘-e tašḫīṣ-e maṣlaḥat-
e neẓām) 
 
65) Qods, 10 Dey 1376 (31 December 1997): „Iran ist he mose successful country of the 
world in the area of the drugs combat. On the occasion of the new ratified law by the 
EXPEDIENCY DISCERNMENT COUNCIL OF THE System “ (Īrān dar ‘arṣah-ye mobārezah bā 
mavādd-e moḫadder, movaffaqtarīn kešvar-e ǧahān ast“ (Ānān keh salāmat va ġayrat-rā bā 
ham dūd mīkonand. Beh angīzeh-ye moṣavvabeh-ye ǧadīd-e maǧma‘-e tašḫīṣ-e maṣlaḥat-e 
neẓām) 
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66) Hamšahrī, 9 Dey 1376 (30 December 1997): „The mules don’t even have pity with 
themselves. The role of the middleman in the distribution and trafficking of drugs“ (Qāṭerhā 
beh ǧān-e ḫodešān ham raḥm nemīkonand. Naqš-e vāseṭah dar tawzī‘ va qāčāq-e mavādd-e 
moḫadder). 
 
67) Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 23 Dey 1376 (13 January 1998): „“Octopus of addiction. The fight 
against addiction has to be [undertaken] from all sides“ (Oḫtāpūs-e marg. Mobārezah bā 
e’tiyād bāyad hameh-ye ǧānebah bāsad). 
 
68) Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 19 Bahman 1376 (8 February 1998): „Iran in the siege of the drugs. 
The Islamic Republic of Iran remains alone on the front of the combat against drugs“ (Īrān 
dar moḥāṣerah-ye mavādd-e moḫadder. Ǧomhūrī-ye eslāmī-ye īrān dar ǧebha-ye mobārezah 
bā mavādd-e moḫadder tanhā māndeh ast!). 
 
69) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 20 Bahman 1376 (9 February 1998): „The influence of a father’s addiction on 
[the outputs of] the family“ (Āṯār-e e‘tiyād-e pedar bar kār-kard-hā-ye ḫānevādeh). 
 
C) Drug-Related Newspaper Articles in 1374 (1995/96) 
 
1) Hamšahrī, 17 Farvardīn 1378 (6 April 1999): „What are the effects of addiction to 
hallucinogenic and stimulant drugs?“ (Āṯār-e e’tiyād beh mavādd-e tavahhom-zā va moḥarrek 
čīst?) 
 
2-4) Kār-o-Kārgar, 21 & 22 & 24 Farvardīn (10 & 11 & 13 April 1999): „A view at the 
phenomenon of addiction and ist causes and effets“ (Negāhī beh padīdeh-ye e’tiyād va ‘elal 
va ‘avāreż-e ān) 
 
5) Qods, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999): „Why addiction“ (E‘tiyād čerā?) 
 
6) Enteḫāb, 28 Farvardīn 1378 (17 April 1999): „Drugs – youth – addiction. This fire burns 
wet and dry. 6 Millions are overtaken, 60 Millions are in danger“ (Mavādd-e moḫadder – 
ǧavānān – e‘tiyād. Īn āteš, tar va ḫošk-rā mīsūzānad. 6 mīlīyūm dar-gīrand, 60 mīlīyūn dar 
ḫaṭar) 
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7) Abrār, 9 Ordībehešt 1378 (29 April 1999): „What are the motives of drug use? An 
investigative study of addiction as a rough social phenomenon“ (Angīze-hā-ye este‘māl-e 
mavādd-e moḫadder čīst? Bar-rasī-ye taḥqīqī-ye e’tiyād beh ‘onvān-e yek padīdeh-ye nā-
hanǧār-e eǧtemā’ī). 
 
8) Āryā, 11 Ordībehešt 1378 (1 May 1999): „Opium, the winner in the war“ (Taryāk, 
barandeh-ye ǧang). 
 
Ḫordād, 13 Ordībehešt 1376 (3 May 1999): „The hands that wave a net of death. The 
adolescents are the main victim of drugs“ (Dastānī keh dām-e marg mītanand. Ǧavānān 
qorbānīyān-e aṣlī-ye mavādd-e moḫadder). 
 
10) Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999): „Drug addiction, a fire that 
doesn’t know wet or dry“ (E‘tiyād beh mavādd-e moḫadder, āteşī keh tar va ḫosk-rā 
nemīšenāsad) 
 
11) Ǧavān, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999): „Some reasons and backgrounds for the 
spread of drug addiction“ (Barḫī dalāyel va zamīneh-hā-ye gostareš-e e‘tiyād beh mavādd-e 
moḫadder) 
 
12) Āryā, 16 Ordībehešt 1378 (6 May 1999): „Addiction, the virus of the devil“ (E‘tiyād, 
vīrūs-e eblis). 
 
13) Resālat, 21 Ordībehešt 1378 (11 May 1999): „Drugs and the reasons why adolescents 
turn towards them“ (Mavādd-e moḫadder va ‘elal-e gerayeš-e ǧavānān beh ān). 
 
14) Abrār-e Eqteṣādī, 23 Ordībehešt 1378 (13 May 1999): „How much cost take the drugs 
with them“ (Mavādd-e moḫadder če meqdār arz bā ḫod mibarad?). 
 
15) Salām, 23 Ordībehešt 1378 (13 May 1999): „Heantos, a medicine that causes to abandond 
addiction? Dan made himself addiction in order to discover a method for curing 
addicts“ (Hāntoz, dārūyī keh e’tiyād-rā tark mīdehad? Dān, be-manẓūr-e kašf-e yek raveš-e 
moʼaṯṯar dar mo‘āleǧah-ye mo‘tādīn, ḫod-rā beh e‘tiyād rūy mi-āvarad). 
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16) Salām, 1 Ḫordād 1378 (22 May 1999): „A second warning for drug control“ (Hošdārī-ye 
dō bāreh barāye kontrol-e mavādd-e moḫadder). 
 
17) Salām, 13 Ḫordād 1378 (3 June 1999): „Strong and weak points of the national combat 
against drugs and addiction. A special interview of Salām with the deputy secretary of the 
Drug Contro Headquarter“ (Noqāṭ-e qovvat va ża‘f dar mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder va 
e’tiyād-e kešvar. Dar goft-o-gū-ye eḫteṣāṣī-ye salām bā ǧā-nešīn-e dabīr-e setād-e 
mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder ‘onvān šod). 
 
18) Salām, 20 Ḫordād 1378 (10 June 1999): „We’re still worried. Addiction, a ladder to 
commiting crimes“ (Hanūz negarānīm. E‘iyād, nardebān-e ertekāb-e ğorm). 
 
19-21) Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 25 & 26 & 27 Ḫordād 1378 (16 & 17 & 18 June 1999): „In search of 
a die-hard devil / Ahriman. A week with addiction prevention specialists“ (Dar ǧost-o-ǧū-ye 
ahrīmanī-ye ǧān-saḫt. Yek hafteh bā kāršenāsān-e pīšgīrī az e’tiyād). 
 
22) Salām, 2 Tīr 1378 (23 June 1999): „The youth and the global abyss of 
addiction“ (Ǧavānān va varṭeh-ye ǧahānī-ye e‘tiyād).  
 
23) Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999): “Drug Addiction – a piece of sorrow 
with an unacceptable ending” (E‘tiyād beh mavādd-e moḫadder – ġam-nāmeh-ye pāyān-e 
nāpaḏīr). 
 
24) Īrān, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999): „The people cannot be defrauded. A report on the 
scientific and practical ‚social health’ congress with the title ‚Immunization of the children 
and adolescents against the appearance of harms “ (Sar-e mardom nemīšavad kolāh goḏāšt! 
Gozārešī az hemāyeš-e ‘elmī-kārbordī „selāmat-e eǧtemā’ī“ be-‘onvān-e „maṣūn-sāzī-ye 
kūdakān va nawǧavānān dar barābar-e āsīb-zāyī). 
 
25) Ḫorāsān, 3 Tīr 1378 (24 June 1999): „The Golden Crescent, drug trafficking towards 
Europe and the costs only the regional countries pay. A report on the region of the Golden 
Crescent and drug transit“ (Helāl-e ṭalāyī, qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḫadder beh orūpā va 
hazīneh-hāyī keh tanhā kešvar-hā-ye manṭaqe mīpardāzand. Gozārešī az manṭaqeh-ye helāl-
e ṭalāyī va trānzīt-e mavādd-e moḫadder). 
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26) Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999): „The global profession of drug 
business“ (Ḥarfeh-ye ǧahānī-ye dād-o-setad-e mavādd-e moḫadder). 
 
27) Ḫorāsān, 5 Tīr 1376 (26 June 1999): „Addiction from a scientific and psychological 
viewpoint. The application of scientific methods in addiction withdrawal is 
necessary“ (E‘tiyād az dīd-gāh-he ‘elmī va ravān-šenāsī. Be-kār-gīrī-ye raveš-hā-ye ‘elmī 
barāye tark-e e‘tiyād żorūrī ast). 
 
28) Enteḫāb, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999): „The addict is not a criminal. Why aren’t you taking 
his pain serious?“ (Mo’tād moǧrem nīst. Čerā dardeš-rā ǧeddī nemīgīrīd). 
 
29) Našāṭ, 5 Tīr 1378 (26 June 1999): „On the occasion of the Global Day of Drugs Combat. 
The nightmare of drugs still casts a shadow“ (Beh angīzeh-ye rūz-e ǧahānī-ye mobārezah bā 
mavādd-e moḫadder. Kābūs-e mavādd-e moḫadder ham-čonān sāyeh mīyafkanad). 
 
30) Hamšahrī, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999): „Is there a solution for the problem of 
addiction?“ (Āyā rāh-e ḥall barāye masʼalah-ye e’tiyād voǧūd dārad?) 
 
31-35) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 6 & 7& 8 & 9 & 13 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 & 29 & 30 June & 4 July 1999): 
„The drugs combat, an encompassing battle that doesn’t know a border“ (Mobārezah bā 
mavādd-e moḫadder, nabardī-ye farā-gīr keh marz nemīšenāsad). 
 
36) Abrār, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999): „214 Million addicts world wide. The inauspicious 
owl of addiction, the black shadow of destruction. On the occasion of 26 June, the global day 
of drugs combat “ (214 mīlīyūn mo‘tād dar saṭḥ-e ǧahān. Ǧoġd-e šūm-e e‘tiyād, sāyeh-ye 
siyāh-e tabāhī. Beh bahāneh-ye 5 tīr māh, rūz-e ǧahānī-ye mobārezah bā mavādd-e 
moḫadder). 
 
37) Ḫordād, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999): „The average age of addiction has reached 27 
years“ (Miyāngīn-e senn-e e’tiyād beh 27 sāl resīd). 
 
38) Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 6 Tīr 1378 (27 June 1999): „Reżā Ṣarāmī, the general director of research 
and studies of the Drug Control Headquarter: The war against drugs is a war without 
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borders“ (Reżā Ṣarāmī, modīr-e koll-e moṭāle’āt va pažūheš-e setād-e mobārezah bā mavādd-
e moḫadder: ǧang bā mavādd-e moḫadder, ǧang bedūn-e marz ast) 
 
39-40) Ḫorāsān, 6 & 7 Tīr 1378 (27 & 28 June 1999): „A conversation with the deputy for 
prevention of the Welfare Organization?“ (Goft-o-gū bā mo‘āven-e pīš-gīrī-ye sāzemān-e 
beh-zīstī). 
 
41) Kār-o-Kārgar, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999): „An interview with Arlacchi“ (Soḫanī bā 
Ārlākī). 
 
42) Qods, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999): „Iran on the frontline“ (Īran, ḫaṭṭ-e moqaddam-e 
ǧebhah). 
 
43) Enteḫāb, 7 Tīr 1378 (28 June 1999): „A poll of ‚Enteḫab’ on the occasion of the global 
day to combat drugs“ (Nażar-sanǧī-ye „enteḫāb“ be mosāsebat-e rūz-e ǧahānī-ye mobārezah 
bā mavādd-e moḫadder). 
 
44) Īrān, 8 Tīr 1378 (29 June 1999): „The lungs of enjoyment are full of the oxigen of death. 
A poll on the issue of drug addiction“ (Riyeh-hā-ye leḏḏat por az oksīžen-e marg ast). 
 
45) Abrār, 14 Tīr 1378 (5 July 1999): „American stingers and drug caravans. A report of the 
political group of Abrār on the frightening dimensions of the drugs crisis“ (Estīngtheder-hā-
ye āmrīkāyī va kārvān-hā-ye mavādd-e moḫadder. Gozāreš-e gorūh-e siyāsī-ye Abrār dar 
bareh-ye ab’ād-e ḫawf-nāk-e boḥrān-e mavādd-e moḫadder). 
 
46) Enteḫāb, 18 Tīr 1378 (9 July 1999): „Globalization of the drugs trade“ (Ǧahān šodan-e 
teǧārat-e mavādd-e moḫadder). 
 
47-49) Enteḫāb, 23 & 24 & 26 Tīr 1378 (14 & 15 & 17 July 1999): „Are the smuggling 
caravans taking shape on this side [too]? Unfortunately, that’s true. In conversation with 
Moḥammad Ǧavād Ḥešmatī, deputy of the Drug Control Headquarter“ (Kārvān-hā-ye qāčāq 
īn ṭaraf taškīl mīšavad? Motaʼassefāne dorost ast. Goft-o-gū bā Moḥammad Ǧavād Ḥešmatī, 
mo’āvenat-e setād-e mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder). 
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50) Hamšahrī, 27 Tīr 1378 (18 July 1999): „The illusion of ‚addiction 
withdrawl’“ (Tavahhom-e „tark-e e‘tiyād). 
 
51) Ḫorāsān, 7 & 9 Mordād (29 & 31 July 1999): „In the conversation with officials and 
experts it was performed: a study of the National Law of Strengthening the Penalties of the 
Drug Convicts“ (Dar goft-o-gū bā masʼūlān va ṣāḥeb-e naẓar enǧām šod: bar-rasī-ue qānūn-
e tašdīd-e moǧāzāt-e maḥkūmīn-e mavādd-e moḫadder). 
 
52) Āftāb-e Emrūz, 2 Šahrīvar 1378 (24 August 1999): „Women – pioneers in the fight 
against addiction. Civil structures and the readiness to fight drugs“ (Zanān – pīš-gāmān-e 
mobārezah bā e’tiyād. Nehād-hā-ye madanī va āmādegī barāye mobārezah bā mavādd-e 
moḫadder). 
 
53) Vohūman, 7 Šahrīvar 1378 (29 August 1999): „Iran is first in the combabt, but the 
addiction ...“ (Īrān dar mobārezah avval ast, ammā e’tiyād ...). 
 
54) Īrān, 9 Šahrīvar 1378 (31 August 1999): „The international laws against the chaos of 
drugs“ (Qavānīn-e bayn-ol-melalī ‘alay-he hayūlā-ye mavādd-e moḫadder). 
 
55) Resālat, 18 Šahrīvar 1378 (9 September 1999): „Education, training and the struggle for a 
combat against drugs“ (Āmūzeš va parvareš vā talāš barāye mobārezah bā mavādd-e 
moḫadder). 
  
56-57) Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 24 & 25 Šahrīvar 1378 (15 & 16 September 1999): „One can get 
out of the well of addiction“ (Az čāh-e e’tiyād mītavān ḫāreǧ šod). 
 
58) Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999): „The youth are the main 
victim of drugs“ (Ǧavānān ‘omdah-tarīn qorbāniyān-e mavādd-e moḫadder). 
 
59) Ḫorāsān, 27 Šahrīvar 1378 (19 September 1999): „Downfall of the woman in the ashes 
of addiction“ (Ġorūb-e zan dar ḫākestar-e e’tiyād). 
 
60) Aḫbār-e Eqteṣādī, 31 Šahrīvar 1378 (22 September 1999): „Afghanistan – the worlds 
opium field“ (Afġānestān, kašt-zār-e taryāk-e ǧahān). 
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61) Payām-e Āzādī, 3 Mehr 1378 (25 September 1999): „Iranian, addiction and 
family“ (Īrānī, e’tiyād va ḫāne-vadeh). 
 
62) Hamšahrī, 5 Mehr 1378 (27 September 1999): „Addiction, a piece of sorrow with an 
unacceptable ending“ (E‘tiyād, ġam-nāmeh-ye pāyān-e nāpaḏīr). 
 
63) Āzād, 6 Mehr 1378 (28 September 1999): „The wives of addicted men are suffering from 
the social harms of addiction“ (Hamsarān-e mardān-e mo‘tād az āsīb-hā-ye eǧtemā‘ī-ye 
e‘tyiād ranǧ mībarand). 
 
64) Ḫorāsān, 8 Mehr 1378 (30 September 1999): „2 million addicts and the downfall of the 
families“ (2 mīlīyūn mo’tād va forū-pāšī-ye ḫāne-vādeh). 
 
65) Aḫbār-e Eqteṣādī, 11 Mehr 1378 (3 October 1999): „The year 2000 will be the year of 
combatting the spread of drugs in the world“ (Sāl-e 2000, sāl-e mobārezah bā gostareš-e 
mavādd-e moḫadder dar donyā). 
 
66) Īrān, 19 Mehr 1378 (11 October 1999): „The application of experimental and erroneous 
methods in regard to addiction is wrong!“ (Estefādeh az raveš-e āzemūn va ḫaṭā dar mawred-
e e‘tiyād ġalaṭ ast!). 
 
67) Āfarīneš, 24 Mehr 1378 (16 October 1999): „Tomorrow it will be too late to combat the 
youth addiction“ (Fardā barāye mobārezah bā e’tiyād-e ǧavānān dīr ast). 
 
68) Enteḫāb, 25 Mehr 1378 (17 October 1999): „Does anyone know the price? Comfort for 
Europe and America – exorbitant costs for Iran“ (Āyā kasī qadr mīdānad? Āsāyeš-e orūpā va 
āmrīkā – hazīneh-hā-ye gazāf barāye īrān). 
 
69) Kār-o-Kārgar, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999): „Education, training and the cultural 
combat aganst drugs“ (Āmūzeš va parvareš va mobārezah-ye farhangī bā mavādd-e 
moḫadder). 
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70) Ǧavān, 28 Mehr 1378 (20 October 1999): „Addiction – a smoke that ruins the 
family“ (E‘tiyād – dūdī ke dūdmān-rā beh bād mīdehad). 
 
71) Kār-o-Kārgar, 1 Ābān 1378 (23 October 1999): „Opium smokes the enthuisiasm of the 
young generation!“ (Afyūn ġayrat-e nasl-e ǧavān-rā dūd mīkonad). 
 
72) Āfārīneš, 2 Ābān 1378 (24 October 1999): „The Taliban and opium in 
Afghanistan“ (Ṭālebān va taryāk dar afġānestān). 
 
73) Āzād, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999): „Drugs from the viewpoint of statistics and 
the reality“ (Mavādd-e moḫadder az negāh-e āmār va vāqe‘iyyat). 
 
74) Payām-e Āzādī, 23 Ābān 1378 (14 November 1999): „Opium war“ (Ǧang-e taryāk). 
 
75) Kār-o-Kārgar, 24 Ābān 1378 (15 November 1999): „Drugs – the main problem of 
developing countries“ (Mavādd-e moḫadder – ‘omdah-tarīn mo’żal-e kešvar-hā-ye dar ḥāl-e 
goẕār). 
 
76) Qods, 25 Ābān 1378 (16 November 1999): „Addiction – a fire, in which all 
burn“ (E‘tiyād – ātešī ke hameh dar ān mīsūzand). 
 
77) Āftāb-e Emrūz, 26 Ābān 1378 (17 November 1999): „Drugs and addiction in the 
language of statistics“ (Mavādd-e moḫadder va e’tiyād beh zabān-e āmār). 
 
78) Īrān, 27 Ābān 1378 (18 November 1999): „’How’ do we keep our children away from 
drugs?“ („Čegūneh“ farzandemān-rā az mavādd-e moḫadder dūr negāh dārīm?). 
 
79) Īran, 29 Ābān 1378 (20 November 1999): „Continuation of the confrontation with the 
drug traffickers at the Eastern borders of Iran“ (Edāmah-ye dar-gīrī dar marz-hā-ye šarqī-ye 
īran bā qāčāqčīyān-e mavādd-e moḫadder). 
 
80-81) Ḫordād, 1 & 2 Āḏar 1378 (22 & 23 November 1999): „Iran, the smoothest path for 
the passing of drug caravans“ (Īrān, hamvar-tarīn rāh-e ‘obūr-e kārvān-hā-ye mavādd-e 
moḫadder). 
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82) Īrān, 2 Āḏar 1378 (23 November 1999): „How does the perverted cargo reach the 
dwelling?! Suggestions of knowing social misbehaviours with an emphasis on the topic of 
addiction “ (Bār-e kaǧ četawr be manzel mīresad?! Naẓariyyeh šenāsī eǧtemā’ī-ye kaǧravī 
bā taʼkīd bar maqūlah-ye e’tiyād). 
 
83) Payām-e Āzādī, 2 Āḏar 1378 (23 November 1999): „The world has to know ...“ (Donyā 
bāyad bedānad ...). 
 
84) Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 4 Āḏar 1378 (25 November 1999): „The role of occupational and 
psychological therapy in the salvation of the addicts from the swirl of addiction“ (Naqš-e kār-
darmānī va ravān-darmānī dar naǧāt-e mo‘tādān az gerd-āb-e e‘tiyād). 
 
85) Ḫordād, 4 Āḏar 1378 (25 November 1999): „We need a change of the theory in the 
combat against drugs“ (Mā beh taġyīr-e negareš dar mobārezah bā mavādd-e moḫadder 
niyāz dārīm) – not available. 
 
86) Ḫorāsān, 7 Āḏar 1378 (28 November 1999): „Which price do the Western countries pay 
for the combat against the drugs transit through Iran?“ (Kešvar-hā-ye ġarbī čeh bahāyī 
barāye mobārezah bā trānzīt-e mavādd-e moḫadder az īrān mīpardāzand?). 
 
87) Kayhān, 8 Āḏar 1378 (29 November 1999): „Implementation of the research plan of 
addiction withdrawal in the country“ (Eǧrā-ye ṭarḥ-e taḥqīqātī-ye tark-e e‘tiyād dar kešvar). 
 
88) Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 17 Āḏar 1378 (8 December 1999): „Pattern of the combat against 
drug smuggling and addiction“ (Rāh-kār-hā-ye mobārezah bā qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḫadder 
va e‘tiyād). 
 
89) ‘Aṣr-e Āzādegān, 17 Āḏar 1378 (8 December 1999): „We are not paying 11 billion 
dollars drug indemnities“ (11 mīliyārd dolār tāvān-e mavādd-e moḫadder-rā na-pardāzīm). 
 
90) Īrān, 11 Āḏar 1378 (12 December 1999): „Police dogs are stationed at airports and on 
roads“ (Sag-hā-ye polīs dar forūd-gāh-hā-ye va ǧāddeh-hā mostaqerr mīšavand). 
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91) Ḫorāsān, 23 Āḏar 1378 (14 December 1999): „400 million square metres of cultivation 
of drug production [sic] in Afghanistan. Aid for Iran in this combat against the smuggler is an 
aid for the humankind“ (400 mīlīyūn metr-e morabba‘ kašt-e tawlīd-e mavādd-e moḫadder 
dar Afġānestān. Komak beh īrān barāye mobārezah bā qāčāqčiyān komak beh bašariyyat ast). 
 
92) Gozāreš-e Rūz, 24 Āḏar 1378 (15 December 1999): „Iran – the combat against the drugs 
flood“ (Īrān – mobārezah bā sayl-e mavādd-e moḫadder). 
 
93) Bayān, 27 Āḏar 1378 (18 December 1999): „Addiction – an onesided 
transaction“ (E‘tiyād – mo’āmelah-ye yek-savīyyah). 
 
94) Bayān, 28 Āḏar 1378 (19 December 1999): „The Golden Territory. Afghanistan was 
devastated in the war, but in opium production it is extremely flourishing“ (Sar-zamīn-e 
ṭalāyī. Afġānestān dar ǧang vīrān šod ammā dar tawlīd-e taryāk ābād ābād ast). 
 
95) Hamšahrī, 6 Dey 1378 (28 December 1999): „Necessity of knowing the factors and 
motives for an inclination towards addiction“ (Żorūrat-e šenāḫt-e ‘avāmel va angīzeh-hā-ye 
gerāyeš beh e‘tiyād). 
 
96) Ǧavān, 6 Dey 1378 (28 December 1999): „Addiction is an illness, so let’s cure 
it“ (E‘tiyād bīmārī ast, ān-rā darmān konīm). 
 
97) Kayhān, 7 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999): „Drugs – the war without borders between 
Iran and the global arrogance“ (Mavādd-e moḫadder – ǧang bedūn-e marz-e īrān bā 
estekbār-e ǧahānī). 
 
98) Abrār, 8 Dey 1378 (29 December 1999): „Afghanistan and the opium 
dollars“ (Afġānestān – dolār-hā-ye afyūn). 
 
99) Abrār-e Eqteṣādī, 14 Dey 1378 (5 January 2000): „The ‚business’ of drugs cannot be 
scattered by these {kind} of activities“ („Bīznes-e“ mavādd-e moḫadder, bā īn kār-hāa 
motalāšī nemīšavad). 
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100) Payām-e Āzādī, 7 Bahman 1378 (27 January 2000): „Drugs, a reality of yesterday, 
today and the future“ (Mavādd-e moḫadder, vāqe’iyyat-hā-ye dīrūz, emrūz va fardā). 
 
101) Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 11 Bahman 1378 (31 January 2000): „Dirty trade. The income from 
drugs is higher than the income from oil“ (Teǧārat-e kaṯīf. Dar-āmad-e mavādd-e moḫadder 
az dar-āmad-e naft bālātar ast). 
 
102-103) Fatḥ, 19 & 20 Bahman (8 & 9 February 2000): „The danger is serious! Addiction 
menaces the world“ (Ḫaṭar ǧeddī ast! E’tiyād ǧahān-rā tahdīd mīkonad). 
 
104) Kār-o-Kārgar, 25 Bahman 1378 (14 February 2000): „A look at the international drug 
conventions“ (Negāhī beh konvānsīyūn-hā-ye bayn-ol-melalī-ye kontrol-e mavādd-e 
moḫadder). 
 
105) Āftāb-e Emrūz, 27 Bahman 1378 (16 February 2000): „Prisoners, drugs and 
AIDS“ (Zandānīyān, mavādd-e moḫadder va aydz). 
 
106-109) Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 30 Bahman & 1 & 2 & 19 Esfand (19 & 20 & 21 February & 
9 March 2000): „A new theory on the increase of drug addiction and drug smuggling in the 
society“ (Negarešī-e naw bar afzāyeš-e e’tiyād va qāčāq-e mavādd-e moḫadder dar ǧāme’ah). 
 
110-111) Gozāreš-e Rūz, 1 & 11 & ?? Esfand (20 February & 1 & ?? March 2000): 
„Addiction and a theoretical research“ (E‘tiyād va taḥqīq-e teʼōrīk) 
 
112) Īrān, 2 Esfand 1378 (21 February 2000): „Which is the way of salvation from the deep 
water of addiction?“ (Rāh-e neǧāt az ġarq-āb-e e‘tiyād kodām ast?). 
 
113) Ḫorāsān, 5 Esfand 1378 (24 February 2000): „Scientific approaches to fight 
addiction“ (Rāh-kār-hā-ye ‘elmī barāye mobārezah bā e’tiyād). 
 
114) Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz, 5 Esfand 1378 (25 February 2000): „The representative of the United 
Nations Drug Control Program office in Iran: 1,5 to 3 percent of Iranian use 
drugs“ (Nemāyandeh-ye daftar-e barnāmeh-ye kontrol-e mavādd-e moḫadder-e sāzemān-e 
melal dar īran: 1/5 tā 3 dar ṣad-e īrānī-hā az mavādd-e moḫadder estefādeh mīkonand). 
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115) Tarǧomān-e Rūz, 8 Esfand 1378 (27 February 2000): „After the publication of the 
annul report on drugs: the United Nations expressed their appreciation of Iran“ (Dar pey-y 
gozāreš-e sālāneh dar bāreh-ye mavādd-e moḫadder: sāzemān-e melal az īrān qadr-dānī 
kard). 
 
116) Kār-o-Kārgar, 9 Esfand 1378 (28 February 2000): „A look at the international drug 
control conventions” (Negāhī beh konvānsiyūn-hā-ye bayn-ol-melalī-ye kontrol-e mavādd-e 
moḫadder). 
 
117) Fatḥ, 12 Esfand 1378 (2 March 2000): „Turkey – a main drug passage with few 
addicts“ (Torkiyyeh, goḏar-gāh-e ‘omdah-ye mavādd-e moḫadder bā mo’tādān-e andak). 
 
118) Fatḥ, 18 Esfand 1378 (8 March 2000): „The protection of the exuberant drug production 
in Afghanistan by the Taliban secures three quarters of the global opium product and 90 
percent of the heroin in Europe“ (Ḥemāyat az tawlīd-e anbūb-e mavādd-e moḫadder az sūye 
ṭālebān seh čahārom-e koll-e maḥṣūl-e taryāk-e ǧahān va 90 dar ṣad-e herōʼīn-e orūpā-rā 
taʼmīn mīkonad). 
 
119-120) Ham-Mīhan, 19 & ?? Esfand (9 & ?? March 2000): „Addiction withdrawal in a 
week is not addiction withdrawal“ (Tark-e e‘tiyād-e yek hafteʼī nīst tark-e e‘tiyād). 
 
121) Ǧomhūrī-ye Eslāmī, 21 Esfand 1378 (11 March 2000): „Opium – the main source of 
income for the Taliban“ (Taryāk - manba‘-e aṣlī-e dar-āmad-e ṭālebān). 
 
122) Fatḥ, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000): „An interview with the deputy for prevention of 
the Welfare Organisation: Advertisements for addiction therapy can be prosecuted 
legally“ (Goft-o-gū bā mo‘āvenat-e pīš-gīrī-ye sāzemān-e beh-zīstī: āgahī-hā-ye darmān-e 
e‘tiyād qābel-e ta‘qīb-e qānūnī ast). 
 
123) Mošārekat, 22 Esfand 1378 (12 March 2000): „In the second Congress for the 
Prevention of Addiction of Students it was discussed: Half of the country’s addicts are under 
18 years“ (Dar dovvomīn hemāyeš-e pīš-gīrī az e‘tiyād-e dāneš-āmūzān maṭraḥ šod: Nīmī az 
mo’tādān-e kešver zīr-e 18 sāl hastand). 
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124-125) Fatḥ, 25 & 26 Esfand 1378 (16 & 17 March 2000): „We are all clean“ (Mā hameh 
pāk hastīm). 
 
D) Additionally Considered Drug-Related Newspaper Article in 1377 (1998/99) 
 
1) Eṭṭelā‘āt, 21 & 22 Šahrīvar 1377 (12 & 13 September 1998). ‚Report of the United 
Nations on the situation of the drugs combat in Iran (gozāreš-e sāz-mān-e melal dar vaż‘-e 
mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḫadder dar īrān) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 326 
IX. Bibliography 
 
Abrahamian, Ervand (1973): Kasravi: the Integrative Nationalist of Iran. In: Middle Eastern 
Studies 9:3, 271-295. 
Abrahmian, Ervand (October 1978): Iran: The Political Crisis Intensifies. In: MERIP Reports 
71. 
Abrahamian, Ervand (March-April 1979): Iran in Revolution: the Opposition Forces. In: 
MERIP Reports 75/76. 
Abrahamian, Ervand (1982): Iran Between Two Revolutions. Princeton: Princeton Studies on 
the Near East). 
Abrahamian, Ervand & Alavi, Bozorg (1986): Arānī, Taqī. In: Encyclopaedia Iranica. 
Āḏaraḫš, Ḥosein ‘Alī (1334 HŠ – 1955/1956 AD): Āfat-e Zendegī (Calamity of Life). Tehrān: 
n.p. 
Adibi, Peyman & Rezailashkajani, Mohammadreza & Roshandel, Delnaz & Behrouz, Negar 
& Ansari, Shahin & Somi, Mohammad Hossein & Shahraz, Saeed & Zalli, Mohammad 
Reza (2004): An Economic Analysis of Premarriage Prevention of Hepatitis B 
Transmission in Iran. In: BMC Infectious Deseases 4:31 (2004). 
AEGD → cf. Association d’Études Géopolitiques des Drogues 
Afkhami, Gholam Reza (2009): The Life and Times of the Shah. Berkeley LA & London: 
University of California Press. 
AFP → Agence France Press 
Agahi, Cyrus & Spencer, Christopher (1981): Drug Abuse in Pre- and Post-Revolutionary 
Iran. In: Journal of Psychoactive Drugs 13, 39-46. 
Agahi, Cyurs & Spencer, Christopher (1982a): Patterns of drug use among secondary school 
children in post-revolutionary Iran. In: Drug and Alcohol Dependence 9 (1982), 235-242. 
Agahi, Cyrus & Spencer, Christopher (1982b): Social background, personal relationships and 
self-description as predictor of drug users status. A study of adolescent in post 
revolutionary Iran. In: Drug and Alcohol Dependence 10, 77-84. 
Agahi, Cyrus & Spencer, Christopher (1982c): Beliefs and opinions about drugs and their 
users as predictors of drug user status of adolescents in post revolutionary Iran. In: Drug 
and Alcohol Dependence 10, 99-110. 
Agahi, Cyrus & Spencer, Christopher (1990-1991): Drugs and Iran after the Islamic 
Revolution. Prophesying the next quarter century. In: The International Journal of the 
Addictions 25:2A, 171-179. 
 327 
Agence France Press (23 May 2007): Iran has quarter-million intravenous drug users [sic].  
(http://www.aegis.com/news/afp/2007/af070519.html, accessed 24 September 2010). 
Ahmadi, Jamshid (2002): Buprenorphine Maintenance Treatment of Heroin Dependence. The 
first Experience from Iran. In: Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment 22 (2002), 157-
1599. 
Ahmadi, Jamshid & Ghanizadeh. Ahmad (2000): Motivations For Use of Opiates Among 
Addicts Seeking Treatment in Shiraz. In: Psychological Reports 87: 3 II, 1158-1164. 
Ahmadi, Jamshid & Hasani, Mahsa (2003): Prevalence of Substance Use Among Iranian 
High School Students. (Short Communication). In: Addictive Behaviors 28 (2003), 375-
379. 
- Ahmadi, Jamshid & Babaee-Beigi, Mohammadali & Alishahi, Mohammadjavad & Maany, 
Iraj & Hidari, Taghi (2004): Twelve-Month Maintenance Treatment of Opium-
Dependent Patiens. In: Journal of Substance Abuse Treatment 26 (2004), 61-64. 
- Ahmadi, Jamshid & Pridmore, Saxby & Alimi, Abbas & Cheraghi, Ahmad & Arad, Ahmad 
& Pasaeyan, Hamid & Mogagheghzadeh, Mohammad Sadegh & Kianpour, Mohsen 
(2007): Epidemiology of Opium Use in the General Population. In: The American 
Journal of Drug and Alcohol Abuse 33 (2007), 483-491. 
- Akasheh, Bahram & Eshghi, Iraj (1980): The Tabas (Iran) Earthquake of 16 September 
1978. In: Pure and Applied Geophysics 119, 207-211. 
- Akhavi, Shahrough (1987a): Elite Factionalism in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In: Middle 
East Journal 41:2, 181-201. 
- Akhavi, Shahrough (February 1987b): Institutionalizing the New Order in Iran. In: Current 
History 86:517, 56-83f. 
- Alaei, Kamiar & Alaei, Arash (2010): HIV/AIDS Reform in Iran. From a Long Denial to 
Breaking Silence. 
- Alavian, S.M. & Fallahian, F. (October 2009): Epidemiology of Hepatitis C in Iran and the 
World. In: Shiraz Electronic Medical Journal 10:4, 162-172. 
- Ambühl, Annemarie (2010): Galene. In: Cancik, Hubert & Schneider, Helmuth (eds.): 
Brill’s New Pauly. 
- Amin, Camron Michael (2001): Selling and Saving „Mother Iran“. Gender and the Iranian 
Press in the 1940s. In: International Journal of Middle East Studes 33:3 (2001), 335-361. 
- As‘adī, Ḥasan (1384 – 2005/06): Pīš-gīrī az e‘tiyād. Mavādd-e moḫadder, āsīb-hā va rāh-
bord-hā. (Drug Prevention. Drugs, Harms, and Strategies). Tehrān: Anǧoman-e 
Awliyāʼva Morabbīyān. 
 328 
- As‘adī, Ḥasan (1384 – 2005/06): Gozīdeh-ye āṯār-e maktūb-e felsefī, ḥoqūqī, eǧtemā‘ī, va 
…. (selected Philosophical, legal, social, and … papers). Qom: Čāpḫāneh-ye ‘Emrān. 
- ‘Aṣr-e Naw (19 Bahman 1387 – 8 February 2009): Raḥmān hātefī, rūz-nāmeh-negār-e rūz-
nāmeh-negār-ān-e īrān. (Raḥmān Hātefī, the journalist of all journalists in Iran). 
(http://asre-nou.net/php/view.php?objnr=2148, accessed 25 September 2010) 
- Association d’Études Géopolitiques des Drogues (December 2001): Axes of Afghan Drug 
Trade. Northern Itineraries. (1/3). In: AEGD Geopolitical Drug Newsletter 3, 6f. 
- Association d’Études Géopolitiques des Drogues (January 2002): Axes of Afghan Drug 
Trade. Southern Routes Through Pakistan (2/3). In: AEGD Geopolitical Drug Newsletter 
4, 6f. 
- Association d’Études Géopolitiques des Drogues (February 2002): Axes of Afghan Drug 
Trade. The Western Routes. (3/3). In: AEGD Geopolitical Drug Newsletter 5, 6f. 
- Azarkar, Zohreh & Sharifzadeh, Gholamreza (2010): Evaluation of the Prevalence of 
Hepatitis B, Hepatitis C, and HIV in Inmates with Drug-Related Convictions in Birjand, 
Iran in 2008. In: Hepatitis Monthly 10:1, 26-30. 
- Azimi, Fakhreddin (2004): Unseating Mosaddeq. The Configuration and Role of Domestic 
Forces. In: Gasiorowski, Mark J. & Byrne, Malcolm (eds.): Mohammad Mosaddeq and 
the 1953 Cou in Iran. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 27-101. 
- Badrīyān, Faḫr ol-Dīn (1385 – 2006/07): Maǧmū‘eh-ye kāmel-e qavānīn va moqarrer-āt-e 
mavādd-e moḫadder moštamel bar qavānīn qalb va ba‘d az enqelāb. (Complete 
Collection of Drug Laws and Regulations Containing the Laws before and After the 
Revolution. Tehrān: Entešārāt-e Dānešvar. 
- Bahar, Sarvenaz & Silberberg, Sophie Fellow & Brown, Cynthia G. (1993): Guardians of 
Thought. Limits on Freedom of Expression in Iran. A Middle East Watch Report. Human 
Rights Watch. 
- Bāḫtar, Aḥmad & Raʼīsī, Mas‘ūd (1383 – 2004/05): Ǧadāval-e ḥoqūqī dar qavānīn va 
moqarrer-āt-e mawżū‘e. (Legal Tables on Arranged Laws and Regulations). Tehrān: 
Nāšer-e Ḫaṭṭ-e Sevvom. 
- Balaghi, Shiva (1997): The Viceroy as Spectacle. Newspapers and power in Nineteenth 
Century Iran. In: Culture & History 16, 127-135. 
- Bāqerī, Bahrām (Farvardīn 1383 – 2004/05): Bar-rasī-ye lozūm-e zandān-ī kardan-e 
mo‘tād-ān. (A Study on the Necessity of Imprisoning Addicts). In: Eṣlāḥ va Tarbiyyat. 25, 
36-40. 
 329 
- Beeman, W.O. (1984): The Cultural Role of the Media in Iran. The Revolution of 1978-79 
and After. In: Arno, Andrew & Dissanayake, Wimal (eds.): The News Media in National 
and International Conflict. Boulder: Westview & Epping & Bowker, 147-165. 
- Bélanger, Charles (1838): Voyage aux Indes-Orientales. Volume II. Paris: Arthus Bertrand. 
- Bidokhti, Nahaleh Moshtagh & Yazdandoost, Rokhsareh Yeke & Behrooz, Birashk & 
Shottenfeld, Richard S. (March 2006): Family Environment of Detoxified Opiate Addicts 
in Iran and its Relationship with Symptoms of Anxiety and Depression. In: 
Contemporary Family Therapy 28:1, 153-164. 
- Böhm, Andreas (2004): Theoretisches Codieren. Textanalyse in der Grounded Theory. In: 
Flick, Uwe & von Kardorff, Ernst & Steinke, Ines (eds.): Qualitative Forschung. Ein 
Handbuch. Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt Taschenbuch Verlag. (1st Edition 2000), 475-
485. 
- Boilot, D.J. (2010): al-Bīrūnī (Bērūnī), Abu ʼl-Rayḥān Muḥammad b. Aḥmad. In: Bearman, 
P. & Bianquis, Th. & Bosworth, C.E. & van Donzel, E. & Heinrichs, W.P. (eds.): 
Encyclopaedia of Islam. Leyden: Brill. Second Edition. 
- Bolharī, Ğa‘far (2002): Arz-yābī-ye sūʼ-maṣraf-e mavādd-e moḫadder dar zandān-hā-ye 
īrān. (Assessment of Substance Abuse Situation in Iran’s Prisons). Unpublished. 
- Booth, Martin (1996): Opium. A History. New York: St. Martin's Griffin. 
- Boyce, Mary (2003): Haoma II: The Rituals. In: Encyclopedia of Iran. 
- Brownstein, Michael J. (1993): A Brief History of Opiates, Opioid Peptids, and Opioid 
Receptors. In: Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA 90:12, 
5391-5393. 
- Buchta, Wilfried (2000): Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic. 
Washington D.C.: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung. 
- CACI → Central Asia Caucasus Institute 
- Calabrese, John (2007): Iran’s War on Drugs: Holding the Line? In: The Middle East 
Institute, Policy Brief 3 (December 2007). Washington DC: Middle East Institute, 1-18. 
- Calmard, Jean (2009): Shi‘i Rituals and Power II. The Consolidatino of Safavid Shi‘ism: 
Folklore and Popular Religion. In: Melville, Charles (ed.): Safavid Persia. London & 
New York: I.B. Tauris. 2nd edition (1st edition 1996), 139-190. 
- Catania, Holly (Fall 2004): Progressive Harm Reduction in Iran’s Prisons. In: Harm 
Reduction News 5:3, 17-18. 
 330 
- Central Asia Caucasus Institute. Silk Road Studies Program (2004): Country Factsheets, 
Eurasian Narcotics. Iran. 
(http://www.silkroadstudies.org/new/inside/research/narcotics_crime/FactSheet/2004/Iran
.pdf, accessed 22 September 2010). 
- Chahkar, Mohamed (1936): Le Problème de l’Opium en Iran. Paris: Maisonneuve. 
- Chardin, Jean (1811): Voyages de Chevalier Chardin, en Perse, et autres lieux de l’orient. 
Volume IV. Paris: le Normant. 
- Chardin, Jean (1811): Voyages de Chevalier Chardin, en Perse, et autres lieux de l’orient. 
Volume VIII. Paris: le Normant. 
- Corstange, Daniel M. (2000): IRAN: The Party System from 1963 to 2000. International 
Comparative Political Parties Project (ICPP), ICPP 2000. Evanston/Chicago: 
Northwestern University. 
- Country Studies (2010): Islamic Republican Party. 
(http://www.country-studies.com/iran/islamic-republican-party.html, accessed 25 
September 2010) 
- Culture Ministry → Vezārat-e Farhang va Eršād-e Eslāmī 
- Curzon, George Nathaniel (1966): Persia and the Persian Question. London: Cass. Reprint 
of 1st edition of 1892). 
- Dalvand, S. & Agahi, C. & Spencer CP. (1984): Drug addicts seeking treatment after the 
Iranian revolutionary Iran. A clinic-based study. In: Drug and Alcohol Dependence 14, 
87-92. 
- Dāneš, Tāǧ-Zamān (2006/07): Mo‘tād kīst? mavādd-e moḫadder čīst? (Who is an Addict? 
What are Drugs?) Tehrān: Entešārāt-e Kayhān. 2nd Edition (1st Edition 1379 – 2000/01). 
- Darley-Doran, R.: Ṣafawids. In: Bearman, P. & Bianquis, Th. & Bosworth, C.E. & van 
Donzel, E. & Heinrichs, W.P. (eds.): Encyclopaedia of Islam. Leyden: Brill. Second 
Edition. 
- DCHQ → Drug Control Headquarter 
- Destrée, Annette (1969): L'opium en Iran. In: Correspondance d'Orient, Etudes 15-16, 81-
103. 
- Deutsche Welle (online) (8 August 2009): Rawnaq-e ‘šīšeh’ dar īrān. (Thriving of ‘glass’ in 
Iran). 
(http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4544079,00.html, accessed 4 November 2019) 
- Deutsche Welle (online) (9 November 2009): Taryāk, krāk va šīšeh, qātel-ān-e ḫāmūš-e 
mardom-e īrān. (Opium, crack and glass. Silent killers of the Iranian people). 
 331 
(http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,4874986,00.html, accessed 4 November 2019). 
- Dežākām, Ḥosayn (1998/99): ‘Obūr az manṭaqeh-ye 60 daraǧeh zīr-e ṣefr. (Passage through 
a zone of minus 60 degrees). Seventh Edition. Tehrān: Paraškūh. 
- Dikötter, Frank (2004): Narcotic Culture. A History of Drugs in China. Chicago: University 
of Chicago. 
- Dodson, G. Everard (1927): The Opium Habit in Persia. In: Moslem World 17 (1927), 261-
265. 
- Drug Control Headquarter (November 1997): The Anti-Narcotics Law of the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. Teheran: Drug Control Headquarter of the Islamic Republic of Iran. 
- Drug Control Headquarter (N.A.): The Political History of Opium in Iran. Tehran: Anti-
Drugs Campaign Headquarters. 
- Drug Control Headquarter (2010a): Qānūn-e eṣlāḥ-e mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḫadder va 
elḥāq-e mavāddī beh ān, 17 Ābān 1376. (Amendment to the Anti-Narcotics Law and 
addenda of 8 November 1997) 
(http://www.dchq.ir/html/index.php?module=htmlpages&func=display&pid=89, 
accessed 24 September 2010) 
- Drug Control Headquarter (2010b): Mo‘arrefī-ye setād-e mobārezeh bā mavādd-e 
moḫadder. (Presentation of the Drug Control Headquarter). 
(http://dchq.ir/html/index.php?module=htmlpages&func=display&pid=35, accessed 24 
September 2010) 
- Dubler, C.E. (2010): Afyūn. In: Bearman, P. & Bianquis, Th. & Bosworth, C.E. & van 
Donzel, E. & Heinrichs, W.P. (eds.): Encyclopaedia of Islam. Leyden: Brill. Second 
Edition. 
- Ebtekār (2010): Dawlat-e mūsavī, āḏarī-qommī, resālat va … (The government of Mūsavī, 
Āḏarī-Qommī, Resālat and …). 
(http://www.ebtekarnews.com/ebtekar/News.aspx?NID=19030, accessed 26 September 
2010) 
- Eder, Walter (2010): Tranquilitas. In: Cancik, Hubert & Schneider, Helmuth (eds.): Brill’s 
New Pauly. 
- Ehteshami, Anoushirvan (1995): After Khomeini. The Iranian Second Republic. London: 
Routledge. 
- Elgood, C. (2010): Alī b. al-‘Abbās al-Madjūsī. In: Bearman, P. & Bianquis, Th. & 
Bosworth, C.E. & van Donzel, E. & Heinrichs, W.P. (eds.): Encyclopaedia of Islam. 
Leyden: Brill. Second Edition. 
 332 
- Eshrati, Babak & Taghizadeh Asl, Rahim & Dell, Colleen Anne & Afshar, Parviz & Kamali, 
Mohammad & Weekes, John (2008): Preventing HIV Transmission Among Iranian 
Prisoners. Initial Support Providing Education on the Benefits of Harm Reduction 
Practices. In: Harm Reduction Journal 5:21. 
(http://www.harmreductionjournal.com/content/5/1/21, accessed 24 September 2010) 
- Esmā‘īlī, Īraǧ (Āḏar 1382 – 2003/04): Naqš-e vāledayn dar be-kār-gīr-ī-ye barnāmeh-hā va 
mahārat-hā-ye eǧtemā‘ī dar pīš-gīr-ī az e‘tiyād, baḫš-e avval. (The Role of the Parents 
in the Implementation of the Social Programmes and Expertises in Drug Prevention, Part 
1). In: Eṣlāḥ va Tarbiyyat 21, 20-23. 
- Esmā‘īlī, Īraǧ (Day 1382 – 2003/04): Naqš-e vāledayn dar be-kār-gīr-ī-ye barnāmeh-hā va 
mahārat-hā-ye eǧtemā‘ī dar pīš-gīr-ī az e‘tiyād, baḫš-e pāyān-ī. (The Role of the 
Parents in the Implementation of the Social Programmes and Expertises in Drug 
Prevention, Part 2). In: Eṣlāḥ va Tarbiyyat 22, 20-24. 
- Esmā‘īlī, Īraǧ & Ṣafātīyān, Sa‘īd & Motavallī-Ḫāmeneh, Mortażā & Moḥsenī, Loṭfollāh 
(Mordād 1383 – 2004/05): Bar-rasī-ye vaż‘īyat-e e‘tīyād beh mavādd-e moḫadder dar 
mīyān-e zandān-ī-yān-e dārā-ye taḥşīl-āt-e dāneš-gāh-ī-ye zandān-hā-ye ostān-e tehrān. 
(A Study of the Situation of Drug Addiction Among Prisoners With University Education 
in the Prisons of the Province of Tehran). In: Eṣlāḥ va Tarbiyyat 29, 52-54. 
- Ettehadieh Nezam-Mafi, Mansoureh & Sadeq, Said Mir Muhammad (2001): Newspapers 
and Journals Reprinted from 1991 to 2001. In: Iranian Studies 34:1 (2001), 195-201. 
- Fairclough, Norman (2003): Ananlysing Discourse. Textual Analysis For Social Research. 
London & New York: Routldege. 
- Fairclough, Norman (2009): Critical Discourse Analysis. The Critical Study of Language. 
Harlow: Pearson Education Limited. 2nd Edition (1st Edition 1995). 
- Falk, Harry (1989): Soma I & II. In: Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 
52:1 (1989), 77-90. 
- Fāżelī, ‘Eṣmat & Mawlavī, Fāṭemeh (Winter 2003): Bar-rasī-ye maṣraf-e mavādd-e 
moḫadder dar mīyān-e mo‘tād-ān-e mard dar īrān. (A Study of Sbustance Use Among 
Male Drug Addicts in Iran). In: E‘tīyād-e Pažūhešī (Research of Addiction) 1:1, 67-85. 
- Floor, Willem (2000): The Economy of Safavid Persia. Wiesbaden: Reichert Verlag. 
- Foucault, Michel (1976): Histoire de la Sexualité. La Volonté de Savoir. Paris: Gallimard. 
- Foucault, Michel (1981): Archäologie des Wissens. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 
Taschenbuch Verlag. 
 333 
- Fraser, James B. (1826): Travels and Adventures in the Persian Provinces on the Southern 
Banks of the Caspian Sea. London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Browne & Green. 
- Gasiorowski, Mark J. & Byrne, Malcolm (eds.) (2003): Mohammad Mosaddeq and the 1953 
Coup in Iran. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press. 
- Ǧavān-Far, ‘Abbās (Ḫordād 1382 – 2003/0): Ǧorm-angārī-ye e‘tīyād va taʼṯīr-e ān. 
(Criminalisation of Addiction and its Effect). In: Eṣlāḥ va Tarbiyyat 15, 28-31. 
- Gehrke, Ulrich & Mehner, Harald (1975): Iran. Natur - Bevölkerung - Geschichte - Kultur - 
Staat - Wirtschaft. Tübingen & Basel: Horst Erdmann Verlag. 
- Gelpke, Rudolf (1995): Vom Rausch in Orient und Okzident. Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta. 2nd 
edition. (1st edition 1966). 
- Ghaffari-Farhangi, Sétoreh (1995): IRNA, Agence d’information de la République 
Islamique. Centre d’Études et de Recherches sur les Médias (CERM). L’Évolution des 
Médias en Iran. Repères Chronolgiques. In: CEMOTI 20, 225-238. 
- Ghahari, Keivandokht (2001): Nationalismus und Modernismus in Iran in der Periode 
zwischen dem Zerfall der Qāǧāren-Dynastie und der Machtfestigung Reżā Schahs. Eine 
Untersuchung über die intellektuellen Kreise um die Zeitschriften Kāweh, Īrānšahr und 
Āyandeh. Berlin: Schwarz. 
- Ghani, Cyrus (1998): Iran and the Rise of Reza Shah: From Qajar Collapse to Pahlavir 
Power. London & New York: I.B. Tauris.  
- Gheiratmand, R. & Navipour, R. & Mohebbi, M. R. & Mallik, A. K. (2005): Uncertainty on 
the Number of HIV/AIDS Patients. Our Experience in Iran. In: Sexually Transmitted 
Infections 81:3, 279-280. 
- Gignoux, Ph. (1986): Ardā Wīrāz. In: Encyclopaedia of Iran. 
- Glaser, Barney G. & Strauss, Anselm L. (1974): The Discovery of Grounded Theory. 
Strategies For Qualitative Research. Chicago: Aldine Publishing Company. 
- Globalsecurity Online (2010): Expediency Discernment Council. 
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/iran/edc.htm, accessed 4 November 2019). 
- Gonābādī, ‘Alī (1948/49): Ketāb-e ḏu ‘l-feqār va ḥormat-e kešīdan-e taryāk. (Book of the 
piercing {sword} and the prohibition of opium smoking). Tehrān: N.P. 
- Goodman, L.E. (2010): al-Rāzī, Abū Bakr Muḥammad b. Zakariyyāʼ. In: Bearman, P. & 
Bianquis, Th. & Bosworth, C.E. & van Donzel, E. & Heinrichs, W.P. (eds.): 
Encyclopaedia of Islam. Leyden: Brill. Second Edition. 
- Groseclose, Elgin (1947): Introduction to Iran. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 334 
- GTZ = Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (2006): Drug Demand and 
Harm Reduction in the Islamic Republic of Iran. Project Sheet. Eschborn: Deutsche 
Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit. Development Oriented Drug Control 
Programme. 
- Haeri, Safa (1993): Iran: Blueprint for an Islamic Press. In: Index on Censorship 22:10, 39-
40.  
- Hagemeister, Jules de (1839): Essai sur les ressources territoriales et commerciales, de 
l’Asie Occidentale. Volume III. St.-Pétersbourg: Königliche Akademie der 
Wissenschaften. 
- Haghpanah, M. & Mokri, Azarakhsh & Khoshnood, K. & Shottenfeld, R. (2005): A Pilot 
Study Comparing HIV Knowledge, Risk Behaviors and Social Stability of Opium and 
Heroin Users in Tehran, Iran. Unpublished Paper. 
- Hansen, Bradley (2001): Learning to tax the political economy of the opium trade in Iran 
(1921-1941). In: Journal of Economic History 61:1, 95-133. 
- Ḥaqšenās, Ṭorāb (2010): Communism III: In Persia after 1953. In: Encyclopaedia Iranica. 
-  Hassan, Riaz (1984): Iran’s Islamic Revolutionaries: before and after the revolution. In: 
Third World Quarterly 6:3 (July 1984), 675-686. 
- Hendī, Sa‘īd (1377 – 1998/99): Afsāneh-ye afsūn. bar-rasī-ye mavādd-e moḫadder az dīd-
gāh-e ‘elm va dīn. (The Legend of a Spell. An Examination of Drugs from the Viewpoint 
of Science and Religion). Tehrān: IRIB. 
- Ḫorāsān (2010): Rūz-nāmeh-ye farhangī, eǧtemā‘ī, siyāsī, ḫabarī-ye ṣobḥ-e īrān. (A Cultural, 
Social, Political, and Informing Morning Daily of Iran). 
(http://www.khorasannews.com/AboutUs.aspx?type=1&year=1389&month=7&day=8, 
accessed 26 September 2010) 
- Hyman, Anthony (1990): Iran’s Press - Freedom with Limits. In: Index on Censorship 19:2, 
26. 
- Jäger, Siegfried (2004): Kritische Diskursanalyse. Eine Einführung. Münster: Edition DISS. 
4th Edition (1st Edition 1993). 
- Jassim, Esmā‘īl (2003): Bahār (2). In: Encyclopaedia Iranica. 
- Javadi, Hasan (1989): Contemporary Persian Press in Exile. In: MELA Notes 47 (1989), 18-
25. 
- Kaempfer, Engelbert (1940): Am Hofe des Persischen Grosskönigs (1684-85). Das 1. Buch 
der Amoenitates Exoticae. Eingeleitet und in deutscher Bearbeitung hg. von Walter Hinz. 
 335 
- Kalameh Online (12 Mordād 1389 – 3 August 2010): Mo‘tād-ān dīgar beh zandān nemī-
ravand. (The addicts are no longer going to prison). 
(http://www.kaleme.com/1389/05/12/klm-27619, accessed 26 September 2010) 
- Kamrava, Mehran (2001): The Civil Society Discourse in Iran. In: British Journal of Middle 
Eastern Studies 28:2, 165-185. 
- Karimi-Hakkak, Ahmad (1999): Farroḵī, Yazdī. In: Encyclopaedia Iranica. 
- Karimian, Ramin & Bahmanpour, Masoud (1999): Iranian Press Update. In: MiddleEast 
Report 29:3, 38-39. 
- Katouzian, Homa (2006): State and Society in Iran. The Eclipse of the Qajars and the 
Emergence of the Pahlavis. London & New York: I.B. Tauris. Paperback edition. (1st. 
edition 2000). 
- Keddie, Nikki R. (2006): Modern Iran. Roots and Results of Revolution. New Haven & 
London: Yale University Press. Updated Edition (1st Edition 2003). 
- Khiabany, Gholam (2010): Iranian Media: The Paradox of Modernity. Routledge Advances 
in Internaionalizing Media Studies, Volume 3. New York & Oxon: Routledge. 
- Khiabany, Gholam & Sreberny, Annabelle (2001): The Iranian Press and the Continuing 
Struggel over Civil Society (1998-2000). In: International Communication Gazette 63:2-3, 
203-233. 
- Kian, Azadeh (1995): L’Invasion Culturelle Occidentale: Mythe ou Réalité?. In: CEMOTI 
20 (1995), 73-90. 
- Kinzer, Stephen (2003): All the Shah’s Men. An American Coup and the Roots of Middle 
East Terror. Hoboken, N.J.: Wiley & Sons. 
- Kort, Gerard de & Vazirian, Mohsen & Nassirimanesh, Bijan & al. (2006): Young People 
and Drugs. Towards a Comprehensive Health Promotion Policy. Tehran Report. Tehran: 
Asian Harm Reduction Network & United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 
Field Office in Iran & Substance Abuse Prevention and Treatment Office, Undersecretary 
of Health, Ministry of Health and Medical Education.  
- Kūhī-Kermānī, Ḥossayn (1324 HŠ – 1945/1946 AD): Tārīḫ-e taryāk va taryākī dar īrān. (A 
History of Opium and Opium Smokers in Iran). Tehrān: Čāpḫāne-ye ‘Elmī. 
- Lambton, Ann Kathrin Swynford (1969): The Persian Land Reform, 1962-1966. Oxford: 
Clarendon Press. 
- Lambton, Ann Kathrin Swynford (2010): Ḳādjār. In: In: Bearman, P. & Bianquis, Th. & 
Bosworth, C.E. & van Donzel, E. & Heinrichs, W.P. (eds.): Encyclopaedia of Islam. 
Leyden: Brill. Second Edition. 
 336 
- Landwehr, Achim (2001): Geschichte des Sagbaren. Einführung in die Historische 
Diskursanalyse. Tübingen: Edition Diskurs. 
- Link, Jürgen (2006): Diskursanalyse unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Interdiskurs 
und Kollektivsymbolik. In: Keller, Rainer & Hirseland, Andreas & Schneider, Werner & 
Viehöfer, Willy (eds.): Handbuch sozialwissenschaftliche Diskursanalyse. Wiesbaden: 
VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 2nd Edition (1st Edition 2001), 407-430. 
- Madani, Ghahfarokhi, Saeid (2006): Health: Drug Use: Iran. In: Suad Joseph & al. (eds.): 
Encyclopedia of Women & Islamic Cultures. Volume 2. Leiden: Brill, 138-140. 
- Malcolm, John (1845): Sketches of Persia. London: John Murray. 
- Malek-Moḥammadī, Maǧīd (1384 HŠ – 2005/2006 AD): E‘tiyād va masā‘el-e ǧensī. 
(Addiction and the Question of Gender). Tehrān: Entešārāt Ferdows. 
- Matthee, Rudi (2005): The Pursuit of Pleasure. Drugs and Stimulants in Iranian History, 
1500-1900. Princeton & Oxford: Princeton University Press. 
- MacCallum, Elizabeth Pauline (1928): Twenty Years of Persian Opium (1908-1928). A 
Study. New York: Foreign Policy Association. 
- MacCormack, D.W. & Ameri, Soltan Mohamed (1924): Memorandum on Persian Opium. 
Prepared for Dr. A.C. Millspaugh, Administrator General of the Finances. Tehran: 
Parliament Press.  
- Mahrad, Ahmad (1983): Die deutsche Pénétration pacifique des iranischen Pressewesens, 
1909-1936. Europäische Hochschulschriften. Reihe 3: Geschichte und ihre 
Hilfswissenschaften, 197. Frankfurt a.M.: Lang. 
- Malek, Abbas & Mohsenian Rad, Mehdi (1994): Iran. In: Kamalipour, Yahya R. & Hamid, 
Mowlana (eds.): Mass Media in the Middle East. A Comprehensive Handbook. Westport: 
Greenwood, 74-95. 
- Mansoori, Seyed-Davood & Zadsar, Maryam & Arami, Siamak & Adimi, Parisa & Alaeyi, 
Kamyar & Velayati, Ali-Akbar (2003): Immunological and Clinical Features of HIV in a 
Group of Hospitaliyed Iranian Patients. In: Archives of Iranian Medicine 6:1, 5-8. 
- McCoy, Alfred W. (2003): The Politics of Heroin: CIA Complicity in the Global Drug 
Trade. Afghanistan, Southeast Asia, Central America, Colombia. 3rd, Revised Edition. 
Chicago: Lawrence Hill.  
- McLaughlin, Gerald T. (1976): The Poppy is not an ordinary flower. A survey of drug 
policy in Iran. In: Fordham Law Review 44 (1976), 701-772. 
- McLaughlin, Gerald T. & Quinn, Thomas M. (1974): Drug Control in Iran. A Legal and 
Historical Analysis. In: Iowa Law Review 59:3 (1974), 469-524. 
 337 
- McMahon, Keith (2002): The Fall of the God of Money. Opium Smoking in Nineteenth-
Century China. Lanham & Boulder & Oxford & New York: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers. 
- Mehryar, Amir Hooshang & Moharreri, Mohammad Reza (March 1978): A study of 
authorized opium addiction in Shiraz city and Fars Province, Iran. In: British Journal of 
Addiction 73:1 (1978), 93-102. 
- Menashri, David (1980): Shi’ite Leadership: In the Shadow of Conflicting Ideologies. In: 
Iranian Studies 13:1, Iranian Revolution in Perspective, 119-145. 
- Menashri, David (2001): Post-Revolutionary Politics in Iran: Religion, Society and Power. 
London: Frank Cass. 
- Merat, Zahir (Fall 1999): Pushing Back the Limits of the Possible. The Press in Iran. In: 
Middle East Report 212, 32-35.  
- Milani, Mohsen M. (1994): The Making of Iran’s Islamic Revolution. From Monarchy to 
Islamic Republic. Oxford: Westview Press. 2nd Edition (1st Edition 1988). 
- Millspaugh, Arthur Chester (1973): The American Task in Persia. New York: Arno Press. 
Reprint of the 1st edition of 1925. 
- Millward, W.G. (1984): The Popular Press of Iran: 1964-1974. In: Folia Orientalia 22 
(1984), 207-221. 
- Mīr-Faḫrāʼī, ‘Alī-Reżā (2004/05): E‘tiyād čīst? mo‘tād kīst? (What is Addiction? Who is an 
Addict?) Tehrān: Našr-e Vāḥed. 4th Edition (1st Edition 1378 – 1999/2000). [A translation 
of Coleman, Vernon (1946): Addiction and Addicts] 
- Mobasser, Nilou (1998a): Tehran Spring. In: Index on Censorship 27:4, 134-173. 
- Mobasser, Nilou (1998b): By Any Other Name. In: Index on Censorship 27:5, 16-18. 
- Mobasser, Nilou (2000): The News Fix. In: Index on Censorship 29: 5, 86-87.  
- Moharreri, Mohammad-Reza (1978): General View of Drug Abuse in Iran and a One-Year 
Report of Outpatient Treatment of Opiate Addiction in the City of Shiraz. In: Peterson, R. 
(ed.): The International Challenge of Drug Abuse. National Institute on Drug Abuse 
Research Monographe 19, 69-81. 
- Moḥsenī, Loṭfollāh (Mordād 1383 – 2004/05): E‘tīyād bā taʼkīd bar mabānī-ye ‘aṣab-
šenāḫt-ī-ye ān. (Addiction With an Emphasis on its Neurological Basics). In: Eṣlāḥ va 
Tarbiyyat 29, 21-23. 
- Mokri, Azarakhsh (2002): Brief overview of the status of drug abuse in Iran. In: Archives of 
Iranian Medicine 5, 184-190. 
- Motamed-Néjad, Kazèm (1995): Médias et pouvoir en Iran. In: CEMOTI 20 (1995), 13-43.  
 338 
- Mowlana, Hamid (1974): The Politics of Opium in Iran. A Social-Psychological Interface. 
In: Simmons, Luiz R.S. & Said, Abdul Aziz (eds): Drugs, Politics, and Diplomacy. The 
International Connection. Beverly Hills & London: Sage Publications. 
- Moẓaffarī, Aḥmad (1382 – 2003/04): Naẓar-āt-e qażāyī dar ǧarayem-e mavādd-e moḫadder. 
(Judicial Opinions on Drug Crimes). Tehrān: Entešārāt-e Qoqnūs. 
- Nabavi, Negin (2005): Spreading the Word. Iran’s First Constitutional Press and the 
Shaping of a 'New Era'. In: Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies 14:3 (2005), 307-
321. 
- Nagl, Ludwig (1998): Pragmatismus. Frankfurt / New York: Reihe Campus. 
- Nakhaee, F.H. (November 2002): Prisoners’ Knowledge of HIV/AIDS and Its Prevention in 
Kerman, Islamic Repbucli of Iran. In: Eastern Mediterranean Health Journal 8:6, 725-731. 
- Navai, Ramita (2005): Le Vie Della Droga (Con Una Schedi Di Mehdi Afroozmanesh – 
Terra minata). Translation by Bacciantini, Mario. In: limes. Rivista Italiana di 
Geopolitica. Volume V: l’Iran Tra Machera e Volto, 79-87. 
- Neligan, Anthony Richard (1927): The Opium Question with Special Reference to Persia. 
London: John Bale, Sons & Danielsson. 
- Nikazmerad, Nicholas M. (1980): A Chronological Suvey of the Iranian Revolution. In: 
Iranian Studies 13:1, Iranian Revolution in Perspective, 327-368. 
- Nissaramanesh [sic!, for Nassirimanesh], Bijan & Trace, Mike & Roberts, Marcus (2005): 
The Rise of Harm Reduction in the Islamic Republic of Iran. In: The Beckley Foundation 
Drug Policy Programme. Briefing Paper 8, 1-7. 
- NLAI → National Library & Archives of the Islamic Republic of Iran 
- Olivier, Guillaume-Antoine (1807): Voyage dans l’Empire Othoman, l’Égypte et la Perse. 
Volume V. Paris: Agasse. 
- Opwis, F. (1999): Shariarechtliche Stellungnahmen zum Drogenverbot. In: Die Welt des 
Islams 39, 159-182. 
- Pālāhang, Ḥasan (Ābān 1382 – 2003/04): Bar-rasī-ye rābeṭeh-ye ǧorm va e’tīyād dar 
zandān-e šahr-e kord. (A Study of the Relationship Between Crime and Addiction in the 
Prison of Šahr-e Kord). In: Eṣlāḥ va Tarbiyyat 20, 24-26. 
- Parvin, Manuchehr & Sommer, Maurie (1997): Production and Trade of Persian Opium. 
Economics and Law in Retrospect. In: Orient 28, 244-260.  
- Parvin, Nassereddin (1998): Eṭṭelā‘āt. In: Encyclopaedia Iranica. 
- Payk-e Īrān online (26 Farvardīn 1389 – 15 April 2010): Raʼīs-e polīs-e mavādd-e 
moḫadder: dō mīlīyūn nafar dar kešvar mavādd-e moḫadder maṣraf mī-konand. 
 339 
(According to the director of the Anti-Narcotics Police: Two million persons are 
consuming drugs in the country). 
- Petrushevsky, Ilya Pavlovich (1968): The Socio-Economic Condition of Iran under the Īl-
Khāns. In: Boyle, J.A. (ed.): The Cambridge History of Iran V. The Saljuq and Mongol 
Period. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 483-537. 
- Philippe, Lucien (1978): Voices That Can’t Be Ignored. In: Index on Censorship 7:1, 15-24. 
- Polak, Jakob-Eduard (1865): Persien. Das Land und seine Bewohner. Volume II. Leipzig: 
Brockhaus. 
- Polak, Jacob Eduard (1883): Das Persische Opium. In: Österreichische Mitteilungen für den 
Orient 9 (1883), 124-125. 
- Qavvī-Del, Parvīn (Mehr 1382 – 2003/04): Bar-rasī-ye eb‘ād-e moḫtalef-e e‘tīyād va 
čegūnegī-ye pīš-gīrī az ān dar naw-ǧavānān. (A Study of Different Dimensions of 
Addiction and Kinds of Prevention of it Among Adolescents). In: Eṣlāḥ va Tarbiyyat 19, 
14f. 
- Rafiey, Hassan & Harenjiha, Hooman & Shirinbayan, Peymaneh & Noori, Roya & 
Javadipour, Morteza & Roshanpajouh, Mohsen & Samiei, Mercedeh & Assari, Shervin 
(2009): Needle and Syringe Sharing Among Iranian Drug Injectors. In: Harm Reduction 
Journal 6:21. 
- Rahmdel, Mansour (2002): International Judicial Criminal Cooperation in Combating 
Narcotic Drugs Crimes in Iranian Law. In: European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and 
Criminal Justice 10:4 (2002), 294-302.  
- Raḥmdel, Manṣūr (1383 – 2003/04): Ḥoqūq-e kayfarī-ye mavādd-e moḫadder. (Penal Drug 
Laws). Tehrān: Mīṯāq-e ‘Edālat. 
- Raḥmatī, Moḥammad-Mehdī (Winter 2003): ‘Avāmel-e moʼaṯṯer dar šorū‘-e maṣraf-e 
mavādd-e moḫadder. Bā ešāreh beh vaż‘iyyat-e mo‘tād-ān-e zan. (The Factors Affecting 
Drug Abuse Among Addicted Women). In: E‘tīyād-e Pažūhešī (Research of Addiction) 
1:1, 131-150. 
- Raisdana, Fariborz & Gharavi Nakhjavani, Ahmad (July 2002): The Drug Market in Iran. 
In: Annals, AAPSS 583, 149-166. 
- Raʼīs-Dānā, Farīborz (Pāʼīz 1382 – Autumn 2003): Bāzār-e maṣraf-e mavādd-e moḫadder 
dar īrān va negāh-ī-ye vīžeh beh bāzār-e tehrān. (Iranian Illicit Drug Market, a Glance at 
Tehran’s Market). In: E‘tīyād-e Pažūhešī (Research on Addiction) 1:4, 13-43. 
- Rasāneh (2008): Qānūn-e maṭbū‘āt-e īrān (Iran’s press law). 
(http://www.rasaneh.org/NSite/FullStory/News/?Id=726, accessed 26 September 2010) 
 340 
- Rawan, Shir Mohammad (2000): Moderne Massenmedien und traditionelle Kommunikation 
in Iran und Pakistan. Hamburger Beiträge. Medien und Politische Kommunikation - 
Naher Osten und islamische Welt. Hamburg: Deutsches Orient-Institut. 
- Razzaghi, Emran Mohammad & Rahimi Movaghar, Afarin & Hosseini, M. & Chatterjee, A. 
(1999): Rapid Situation Assessment (RSA) of Drug Abuse in Iran (1998-1999). Tehran, 
Iran: Prevention Department, State Welfare Organization, Ministry of Health & United 
Nations International Drug Control Program. Unpublished. 
- Razzaghi, Emran Mohammad & Mokri, Azarakhsh & Vazirian, Mohsen (January 2005): 
Effectiveness of Methadone Maintenance Program in Reducing Illicit Drug Use and HIV 
Related High-Risk Behavior. A Multi-Center Study. Tehran: United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC). Unpublished. 
- Reid, Gary & Costigan, Genevieve (2002): Revisiting “the Hidden Epidemic”. A Situation 
Assessment of Drug Use in Asia in the Context of HIV/AIDS. Macfarlane Burnet 
Institute for Medical Research and Public Health. Centre for Harm Reduction. 
- Reżāpūr-Poršokūhī, Ma‘ṣūmeh (1381 – 2002/03): Aḥkām-e mavādd-e moḫadder dar feqh va 
ḥoqūq-e eslāmī. (Drug Edicts in Islamic Law and Jurisprudence). Tehrān: Andīšeh-ye 
Bartar. 
- Russell, Gül (2002): Greece X: Greek Medicine in Persia. In: Encyclopaedia of Iran. 
- Ṣādeqī, ‘Abdollāh & Bordbār, Ġolām-Reżā (Esfant 1383 – 2004/05): Ṭarḥ-e gostardeh va 
kār-bord-e metādōn beh ‘onvān-e negah-dārandeh-ye darmānī va qānūnī-ye darmān-ǧū-
yān va madad-ǧū-yān vābesteh be mavādd. (An Encompassing Project and Application 
of Methadone as a Means of a Therapeutical and Legal Protecting [Agent] for Therapy- 
and Assistance-Seeking [Patients] in Relation to Drugs). In: Eṣlāḥ va Tarbiyyat 35, 52-54. 
- Sadr, Shahryar (8 July 2010): How Hezbollah Founder Fell Foul of Iranian Regime. In: 
Mianeh. 
(http://mianeh.net/article/how-hezbollah-founder-fell-foul-iranian-regime, accessed 26 
September 2010) 
- Saʼedi, Gholam Hoseyn (1984): Iran under the Party of God. In: Index on Censorship 13:1, 
16-20. 
- Saeed, Leila (1981): Iran since the Shah. In: Index on Censorship 10:3, 11-15. 
- Ṣafarī, Fāṭemeh (Spring 2003): E‘tīyād va zanān. Tafāwot-hā-ye ǧensīyatī dar zamīneh-ye 
sūʼ-maṣraf-e mavādd va darmān-e ān. (Addiction and Women. Gender Diggerences 
Concerning Drug Abuse and its Treatment.) In: E‘tīyād-e Pažūhešī (Research of 
Addiction) 1:2, 119-138. 
 341 
- Šahīdī, Moḥammad-Ḥasan (1382 – 2003/04): Mavādd-e moḫadder, amniyyat-e eǧetmā‘ī, va 
rāh-e sevvom. (Drugs, Social Security and the Third Way). Tehrān: Entešārāt-e Eṭṭelā‘āt. 
2nd Edition (1st Edition 1375 – 1996/97). 
- Šahīdzādeh, Žāleh (Āḏar 1382 – 2003/04): E‘tīyād va zandān. (Addiction and Prison). In: 
Eṣlāḥ va Tarbiyyat 21, 39-41. 
- Šahrvand-e Emrūz (15 Tīr 1364 – 6 July 1985): Talāš barāye raf‘-e tawqīf-e rūz-nāmeh-ye 
ṣobḥ-e emrūz. (Effort at removing the suspension of the newspaper Ṣobḥ-e Emrūz). 
(http://www.shahrvandemrouz.com/content/2910/default.aspx, accessed 25 September 
2010). 
- Sajjādī, Ṣādeq (1995): Drugs. In: Encyclopaedia of Iran. 
- Šākerāmī, ‘Abd ol-Ḥosayn (2007/08): Darmān-e e‘tiyād beh mavādd-e moḫadder-e ṭabī‘ī 
va ṣan‘atī. (Therapy of Addiction to Natural and Synthetic Drugs). Tehrān: Entešārāt-e 
Gūtenberg. 
- Saleh, Jahanshah (1956): Iran Suppresses Opium Production. In: Bulletin on Narcotics 8 
(July-September 1956), 1-2.  
- Samii, A.W. (1999): The Contemporary Iranian News Media, 1998-1999. In: Meria Journal 
3:4, 1-10. 
- Samii, Abbas William (01.05.2000): Ever More Publications Closed Down. RFE/RL Iran 
Report 3:17. 
(http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/iran/2000/17-010500.html, accessed 4 
November 2019) 
- Samii, A.W. (2001): Sisyphus’ Newsstand. The Iranian Press Under Khatami. In: MERIA 
Journal 5:3, 1-11. 
- Samii, William Abbas & Recknagel, Charles (2002): Iran’s War on Drugs. In: Transnational 
Organized Crime 5:2, 153-175. 
- Samii, Abbas William (2003): Drug Abuse. Iran’s ‚Thorniest Problem’. In: The Brown 
Journal of World Affairs 9: 2, 283-299. 
- Sarasin, Philipp (2003): Geschichtswissenschaft und Diskursanalyse. Frankfurt a.M.: 
Suhrkamp Taschenbuch Verlag.  
- Sarkoohi, Faraj (1998): Showdown. In: Index on Censorship  27:4, 134-139. 
- Savage-Smith, Emilie & Ming, Zhu & Klein-Franke, F. (2010): Ṭibb. In: In: Bearman, P. & 
Bianquis, Th. & Bosworth, C.E. & van Donzel, E. & Heinrichs, W.P. (eds.): 
Encyclopaedia of Islam. Leyden: Brill. Second Edition. 
 342 
- Savage-Smith, Emilie (1998): ‘Emād al-Dīn Maḥmūd (b. Serāj-al-Dīn Mas‘ūd Šīrāzī). In: 
Encyclopaedia Iranica. 
- Scarborough, John (1995): The Opium Poppy in Hellenistic and Roman Medicine. In: Porter, 
Roy & Teich, Mikuláš (eds.): Drugs and Narcotics in History. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 4-23. 
- Sciolino, Elaine (1983): Iran’s Durable Revolution. In: Foreign Affairs 61:4 (Spring 1983), 
893-920. 
- Seefelder, Matthias (1996): Opium. Eine Kulturgeschichte: Antike, Arabien, China. 
Wirkungsweise, Chemie und Drogen heute. Hamburg: Nikol Verlagsgesellschaft. 3rd 
edition (1st edition 1987). 
- Seyf, Ahmed (1984): Commercialization of Agriculture: Production and Trade of Opium in 
Persia, 1850-1906. In: International Journal of Middle East Studies 16:2 (May 1984), 
233-250. 
- Shahidi, Hossein (2007): Journalism in Iran. From Mission To Profession. New York: 
Routledge. 
- Shahidi, Hossein (2008): Iranian Journalism and the Law in the Twentieth Century. In: 
Iranian Studies 41:5, 739-754. 
- Shahnavaz, S. (1985): Afyūn. In: Encyclopaedia of Iran. 
- Shahyād I (2010): Iranian National Police Force (šahr-bānī-ye koll-e kešvar-e šāhanšāhī-ye 
īrān). 
(http://www.shahyad.net/iiarmy/Police/police.html, accessed 22 September 2010) 
- Shahyād II (2010): Žandarmerī-ye koll-e kešvar-e šāhanšāhī-ye īrān (Iranian National 
Imperial Gendarmerie). 
(http://www.shahyad.net/iiarmy/Gendarmerie/Gandarmeri.pdf, accessed 22 September 
2010) 
- Siassi, Iradj & Fozouni, Bahman (1980a): Distribution of opium coupons to addicts in Iran. 
Policies and Problems. In: Chemical Dependencies 4 (1980): 1-2, 127-133. 
- Siassi, Iradj & Fozouni, Bahman (1980b): Dilemmas of Iran's opium maintenance program. 
An action research for evaluating goal conflicts and policy changes. In: The International 
Journal of the Addictions 15:8, 1127-1140. 
- Siavoshi, Sussan (1992): Factionalism and Iranian Politics.: the Post-Khomeini Experience. 
In: Iranian Studies 25:3, 27-49. 
 343 
- Siyāsat (19 Āḏar 1379 – 9 December 2000): Yek fāǧe‘eh! Īrān bīš az afghānestān ālūdeh-ye 
e‘tiyād ast. (A calamity! Iran is more contaminated by addiction than Afghanistan), p. 9, 
14 
- Sobhani, A.R. & Shojaii-Tehrani, H. & Nikpour, E. & Noroozi-Rad, N. (April 2000): Drug 
and Chemical Poisoning in Northern Iran. In: Archives of Iranian Medicine 3:2. 
- Sreberny-Mohammadi, Annabelle (1990): Small Media For A Big Revolution - Iran. In: 
International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 3:3 (1990), 341-371. 
- Stack, Edward (1882): Six Months in Persia. Volume I. London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 
Searle & Rivington. 
- Stack, Edward (1882): Six Months in Persia. Volume II. London: Sampson, Low, Marston, 
Searle & Rivington. 
- Strauss, Anselm L. (1994): Grundlagen qualitativer Sozialforschung. Dantenanalyse und 
Theoriebildung in der empirischen soziologischen Forschung. München: Wilhelm Fink 
Verlag. 
- Strohmaier, Gotthart (2010): Ḥunayn b. Isḥāḳ al-‘Ībādī. In: Bearman, P. & Bianquis, Th. & 
Bosworth, C.E. & van Donzel, E. & Heinrichs, W.P. (eds.): Encyclopaedia of Islam. 
Leyden: Brill. Second Edition. 
- Strübing, Jörg (2004): Grounded Theory. Zur sozialtheoretischen und epistemologischen 
Fundierung des Verfahrens der empirisch begründeten Theoriebildung. Wiesbaden: VS 
Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften. 
- Swissinfo (30 April 2008): Father of LSD Takes Final Trip. 
(http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/science_technology/Father_of_LSD_takes_final_trip.html?
cid=6623312, accessed 2 November 2019). 
- Sykes, Percy Molesworth (1902): Ten Thousand Miles in Persia or Eight Years in Irán. 
London: John Murray. 
- Tabrīzī, Īraǧ (1379 – 2000/01): Teǧārat-e šayṭānī. (Satanic Trade). Tehrān: Entešārāt-e 
Tehrān. 
- Taillieu, Dieter (2003): Haoma I: Botany. In: Encyclopaedia of Iran. 
- Tarrock, Adam (2001): The muzzling of liberal press. In: Third World Quarterly 22: iv, 585-
602. 
- Tavernier, Jean-Baptiste (1679): Les Six Voyages de Jean Baptiste Tavernier, Ecuyer Baron 
d’Aubonne, en Turquie, en Perse, et aux Indes. Volume I. Paris: N.P. 
 344 
- Tavoosi, Anahita & Zaferane, Azade & Enzevaei, Anahita & Tajik, Parvin &  
Ahmadinezhad, Zahra (2004): Knowledge and Attitude towards HIV/AIDS among 
Iranian Students. In: BMC Public Health 4:17. 
- Ṭayyār, ‘Abdollāh (1380 – 2001/02): Mavādd-e moḫadder dar feqh-e eslāmī. (Drugs in 
Islamic Law). Torbat Ǧām: Entešārāt-e Aḥmad Ǧām. 
- Tazmini, Ghoncheh (2009): Khatami’s Iran. The Islamic Reüublic and the Turbulent Path to 
Reform. International Library of Iranian Studies, Volume 12. London: I.B. Tauris. 
- Tehran Times (5 July 2008): Performance of Headquarter for Fighting Against Narcotics in 
2007 and Programs for 2008. Special Report, 7-10. 
- Teixeira, Pedro (1902): The Travels of Pedro Teixeira: With His ‘Kings of Harmuz’ and 
Extractions From His ‘Kings of Persia’. Translated by Sinclair, William F. and Notes by 
Ferguson, Donald. London: Hakluyt Society.  
- UN → United Nations 
- UNDCP → United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention 
- UNHCHR → United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights 
- United Nations (2010): United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime. 
(http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
12&chapter=18&lang=en, accessed 4 November 2019) 
- United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (2000): Global Illicit Drug 
Trends 2000. UNODCCP Studies on Drugs and Crime. Statistics.Vienna: United Nations 
International Drug Control Programme (UNDCP). 
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2009): World Drug Report 2009. Vienna: 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. 
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (2010): Integrated Border Control in the Islamic 
Republic of Iran. 
(http://www.unodc.org/iran/en/i50.html, accessed 24 September 2010) 
- United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime & Project Legal Assistance & Islamic Republic 
of Iran Drug Control HQS (1383 – 2004/05): Maǧmū‘eh-ye qavānīn va moqarrer-āt-e 
mobārezeh bā mavādd-e moḫadder. (Collection of Laws and Regulations against Illicit 
Drugs. Tehrān: Riyāsat-e ǧomhūrī. Mo‘āvenat-e pažūheš, tadvīn va tanqīḥ-e qavānīn va 
moqarrer-āt. Edāreh-ye koll-e tadvīn va tanqīḥ-e qavānīn va moqarrerāt. (The 
Presicency. The Directorate General for Codifiaction and Compilation of Laws and 
Regulations). 
 345 
- United Nations Office of the High Commissioner on Human Rights (2002): Civil and 
Political Rights, Including the Question of Freedom of Expression. 
(http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/6d299cfc98c537cac1256b75002f86f3?
Opendocument, accessed 26 September 2010) 
- UNODC → United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
- UNODCCP → United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention 
- Vadet, Jean-Claude (2010): Ibn Māsawayh, Abū ZakariyyāaʼYuḥannā. In: Bearman, P. & 
Bianquis, Th. & Bosworth, C.E. & van Donzel, E. & Heinrichs, W.P. (eds.): 
Encyclopaedia of Islam. Leyden: Brill. Second Edition. 
- Vakili-Zad, Cyrus (Spring 1990): Organization, Leadership and Revolution: Religiously-
Oriented Opposittion in the Iranian Revolution of 1978-1979. In: Conflict Quarterly 10:2, 
5-25. 
- Vazirian, Mohsen & Nassirimanesh, Bijan & Zamani, Saman & Ono-Kihara, Masako & 
Kihara, Masahiro & Ravari, Shahrzad Mostazavi & Gouya, Mohammad Mehdi (2005): 
Brief report: Needle and Syringe Sharing Practices of Injecting Drug Users Participating 
in an Outreach HIV Prevention Program in Tehran, Iran. A Cross-Sectional Study. In: 
Harm Reduction Journal 2:19. 
- Vezārat-e Farhang va Eršād-e Eslāmī (2010): Vezārat-e farhang va eršād-e eslāmī 
((Ministry for Islamic Culture and Guidance). 
(http://www.ad.gov.ir/pr/bio/, accessed 25 September 2010) 
- WHO → World Health Organization 
- Wills, Charles James (1886): Persia as it is. Being Sketches of Modern Persian Life and 
Character. London: Sampson Low, Marston, Searle & Rivington. 
- World Health Organization (2004): Best Practice in HIV / AIDS Prevention and Care for 
Injecting Drug Users. The Triangular Clinic in Kermanshah, Islamic Republic of Iran. 
Cairo: World Health Organization, Regional Office for the Eastern Meditteranean. 
- Yarshater, Ehsan (2006): Iran II. Iranian History 2, Islamic Period 5. The Qajar Dynasty 
(1799-1924). In: Encyclopedia Iranica. 
- Yassari, Nadjma (2001): The print media in Iran. An effective weapon for civil society? In: 
Orient. Deutsche Zeitschrift für Politik & Wirtschaft des Orients 42:3, 427-447. 
- Yavari d’Hellencourt, Nouchine (1995): La difficile réémergence d’une presse inépendante 
en Iran. Kyàn, une revue quête de modernité islamique. In: CEMOTI 20, 91-114. 
- Yazdī, Abo ʼl-Qāsem (1326 HQ – 1908/09 AD): Ketāb-e vāfūr va vāfūrīyān. (Book of the 
Opium Pipe and Opium Pipe Smokers). Tehrān: N.P. 
 346 
- Yūsefī-Maḥalleh, Emrāhīm & Maẓlūmī, ‘Alī-Reżā (1386 – 2007/08): Taǧdīd-e naẓar dar 
aḥkām-e mavādd-e moḫadder. Dīvān-e ‘ālī-ye kešvar – dad-setānī-ye koll-e kešvar. 
(Revision of Drug Edicts. Supreme Court – Office of the Public Prosecutor. Tehrān: 
Entešārāt-e Ṣāberīyūn. 
- Zabih, Sepehr (1982): The Mossadegh Era. Roots of the Iranian Revolution. Chicago, 
Illinois: Lake View Press. 
- Zakarīyāʼī, Moḥammad-‘Alī (1385 – 2006/07): Mavādd-e moḫadder va e‘tīyād dar arā-ye 
feqhī. (Drugs and Addiction in Legal Views). Tehrān: Dānešgāh-e ‘Olūm-e Enteẓāmī-ye 
NĀǦĀ. Mo‘āventat-e Pažūheš. Edāreh-ye Čāp. 
- Zamani, S. & Kihara, M. & Gouya, M.M. & al. (2005): Prevalence of and Factors 
Associated With HIV-1 Infection Among Drug Users Visiting Treatment Centres in 
Tehran, Iran. In: AIDS 19, 709-716. 
- Zamani, S. & Kihara, M. & Gouya, M.M. & Nassirimanesh, B. & Ono-Kihara, M. & Ravari, 
S.M. & Safaie, A. & Ichikawa, S. (April 2006): High Prevalence of HIV Infection 
Associated with Incarceration among community-based injecting drug users in Teheran, 
Iran. In: Journal of Acquired Immune Deficincy Syndrome 24, 342-346. 
- Zamani, Saman & Ichikawa, Seiichi & Nassirimanesh, Bijan & Vazirian, Mohsen & 
Ichikawa, Kazuko & Gouya, Mohammad Mehdi & Afshar, Parvin & Ono-Kihara, 
Masako & Mortazavi Ravari, Shahrzad & Kihara, Masahiro (2007): Prevalence and 
Correlates of Hepatitis C Virus Infection Among Injecting Drug Users In Tehran. In: 
International Journal of Drug Policy 18 (2007), 359-363. 
- Zerāʼāt, ‘Abbās (1386 – 2007/08): Ḥoqūq-e kayfarī-ye mavādd-e moḫadder. (Penal Drug 
Laws). Tehrān: Entešārāt-e Qoqnūs. 
- Ziaaddini, Hasan & Ziaaddini, Mohammad Reza (2005): The Household Survey of Drug 
abuse in Kerman, Iran. In: Journal of Applied Sciences 5:2 (2005), 380-382. 
- Zirinsky, Michael P. (1992): Imperial Power and Dictatorship: Britain and the Rise of Reza 
Shah, 1921-1926. In: International Journal of Middle East Studies 24:4, 639-663. 
 
